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1 Gender, intersectionality 
and institutions 
Annica Kronsell and 
Gunnhildur Lily Magnusdottir 
Introduction 
Climate change is one of the main security challenges of the 21st century and 
a growing concern among the public, politicians and civil societies around the 
globe. Climate objectives that have been agreed upon globally and nationally 
require substantial changes in most societal sectors and call for broad societal 
engagement. Proposed strategies tend to focus on technical and economic solu-
tions, while research stresses the importance of social inclusion to achieve a 
climate transition in line with current sustainability goals. Political and admin-
istrative institutions at different levels, i.e. international organisations, the EU 
Commission and its directorates, national, regional, as well as municipal govern-
ments and administrations, are authoritative key actors in climate policy-mak-
ing. However, there are often shortcomings in their climate policy-making, most 
prominently their prevalent focus on technical innovations and economic incen-
tives, and the lack of attention to social dimensions. There are important social 
differences that deserve recognition and this book will address this lack by pro-
viding gender and intersectional perspectives on climate policy and institutions. 
Research shows how greenhouse gas emissions, vulnerability to impacts and 
political participation vary considerably across the population, according to gen-
der, race, class, age, geography and other intersectional factors (IPCC, 2014; 
Kaijser and Kronsell, 2014; Djoudi et al., 2016; Alber et al., 2017; Buckingham 
and Le Masson, 2017, pp. 3–5). Recognition of social differences needs to inform 
climate policy and the incorporation of the UN’s Sustainable Development 
Goals provides an impetus. If social differences are left unattended to, climate 
policy will likely reinforce existing inequalities, but it will also risk overlooking 
differential effects and ending up becoming ineffective and give rise to protests 
among groups who feel unjustifably challenged by climate policies and decisions. 
Research on climate institutions in industrialised states – in the Global North
– indicates a lack of knowledge among policy-makers on social differences and
how to include climate-relevant social factors into climate objectives, such as in
governmental agencies in Scandinavian countries and in the EU Commission’s
Climate Action Directorate (Allwood, 2014; Magnusdottir and Kronsell, 2015,














2 Kronsell and Magnusdottir
knowledge on how social equity, equality and justice issues are and can be included
in climate policy-making. In turn, this requires more knowledge about how social
differences are relevant to the policy felds that are most signifcant for realising
climate objectives, going beyond the environmental sector to include transport,
energy, industry, building, land use and waste, sectors where activities that lead to
carbon emissions are carried out. Thus, climate institutions in industrialised states
are the primary focus of the book. Climate institutions can be narrowly defned as
governing bodies at different levels, such as global and regional intergovernmen-
tal organisations as well as state and local authorities. Inspired by institutionalist
scholarship, the concept institution does not merely refer to formal aspects but
includes the people, i.e. climate policy-makers and, most importantly, we include
the norms, rules and practices of the governing climate bodies in our defnition of
climate institutions (March and Olsen, 1989; Mackay et al., 2010). 
Gender analysis, developed from feminist theory, is the theoretical starting 
point of the book but an intersectional approach increases our understanding 
‘that there are different ways in which different women and men are affected by 
and relate to climate change, mediated by power structures which they experi-
ence differently’ (Buckingham and LeMasson, 2017, p. 5). Intersectionality has 
been recognised in the broader feminist environmental literature as a useful tool 
to analyse ‘capitalism, rationalist science, colonialism, racism, (hetero) sexism 
and speciesism’ (MacGregor, 2017, pp. 1–2). Feminist intersectional research 
on climate change has to a large extent focused on developing states, and on 
the violence of climate events, storms, hurricanes, fres and on gendered vulner-
abilities of such climate change events (Kinnvall and Rydstrom, 2019). While 
such research is relevant and highlights the serious effects of climate change, 
our work zooms in on industrialised states and on how their formal and informal 
climate institutions shape and develop their climate strategies. For one, this is 
because the industrialised countries need to reduce their carbon emissions dras-
tically and do so with increasing urgency (UNFCCC, 2015). Second, climate 
policies developed in rich industrialised countries tend to become normative for 
other countries that then follow suit (Sommerer and Lim, 2016; Griffn Cohen, 
2017; Tobin, 2017). Third, rich industrialised countries, e.g., in Europe and 
North America, are interesting since they have developed welfare systems and 
the resources needed to become green decarbonised states (Duit et al., 2016). 
Moreover, as shown in previous studies, equality and social issues, the diversity 
of the public and their various needs and behavioural patterns, such as transport 
behaviour of different groups, have not been suffciently recognised by industrial-
ised states (Allwood, 2014; Magnusdottir and Kronsell, 2015, 2016; Alber et al., 
2017; Buckingham and Kulcur, 2017). 
Accordingly, the overall aim of the book is to explore if and how climate 
institutions in industrialised states work with recognition and understanding of 
social differences in climate policy-making. We argue that the focus on climate 
institutions is important since they not only develop strategies and policies, but 
they also produce power relations, for example, by distributing resources such as 
through strategies for a green economy. Climate institutions also affect power 
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relations by promoting specifc norms and values such as ecological modernisa-
tion and by including specifc types of knowledge only, for example by privi-
leging technical knowledge. The different chapters of this book investigate 
policy-making in climate institutions and the role of informal institutions and 
norms, from the perspective of power related to gender and other intersecting 
social factors. We start by discussing the international institution of the United 
Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), because its 
norms established through international negotiations are signifcant as part of 
the norms that guide policies. All the institutions discussed in this book adhere 
and relate to the UNFCCC regime (see further in chapter two, this volume). The 
regime has become normative at national, as well as local levels, and in different 
sectors in many industrialised states. The existence of climate norms at multi-
ple levels and within different governmental or sector institutions, is evident in 
chapters both focusing on intergovernmental organisations, such as the UN and 
the EU as well as state and local authorities. As we are highly concerned with 
what the enactment of relevant norms like climate emission targets imply for 
gender equality, equity and justice, we investigate several different institutions 
where the actions required from climate agreements take place. In studying these 
and other relevant institutions the book explores and addresses the following two 
important questions: 
What are the main institutional challenges and barriers to the inclu-
sion of climate relevant social factors and in particular gender in climate 
policy-making? 
What and where are the main opportunities to advance gender equality, 
equity and social justice within climate institutions? 
Our main ambition is to study climate institutions, which makes feminist insti-
tutional theory a particularly relevant frame. Below we outline how institutional 
approaches combined with gender and intersectional perspectives can contrib-
ute to further an understanding of power relations within climate institutions in 
industrialised states and thereby highlight the challenges and opportunities for 
advancing gender equality, equity and social justice. 
Representation in climate policy-making 
How gender and other social categories are represented in climate institutions is 
important for discussions of inclusive climate strategies. If gender representation is 
imbalanced in climate authorities it can be a sign of an ill-functioning democracy 
or a democratic defcit, preventing the development of inclusive and gendered 
climate policies. Drawing on Anne Philip’s (1995) politics of presence, two main 
categories of representation have been developed, descriptive and substantive 
redundant (Lovenduski, 2005; Chaney, 2012). Descriptive representation relates 
to the number of women and men who can infuence policy-making, that is, 
the relationship and balance between males and females in political institutions 
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(Wängnerud, 2009, p. 53). When women are represented in greater numbers it 
is often the result of formal or informal quotas (Dahlerup and Leyenaar, 2013). 
Gender equity guidelines aim for a balance between male and female bodies, 
falling within the 40–60% range and qualify descriptive representation with the 
argument that the presence of only a few women in politics will not make a 
real difference (Lovenduski, 2005). Instead, it is argued that a certain number 
of women, a critical mass, must be present in order for their actions to produce 
substantial effects (Dahlerup, 1988, 2006). Concepts like critical mass and mech-
anisms involving gender quotas have helped to establish a growing female pres-
ence in politics and policy-making but can be problematic when reduced to mere 
numbers. Based on a democratic ethos as the baseline, representation should be 
inclusive and refect the citizenry. Here, we broaden the perspective to include 
other climate-relevant social categories that intersect with gender, when analys-
ing what kind of knowledge is included or excluded, and which voices are repre-
sented in the policy-making process. 
Feminists have argued that rather than looking at numbers, it is critical acts 
– action that makes a difference – that matters. This is tricky as it is linked to 
the question of whether women will make a difference or not, once they have 
been included in the polity and often there is an idea that they will, although 
this is seldom explicit (Dahlerup, 2006; Mushaben, 2012). Normally, it is based 
on some vague idea of a certain difference between men and women acquired 
through diverse life experiences and conditions, hence, leading to expectations 
that they bring into policy, diverse interests, knowledge and perspectives. When 
we move beyond the gender binary and include other social categories in the 
discussion about substantive representation, the idea of what additional quali-
ties the experiences of these groups will bring to institutions becomes even more 
complicated. Hence, we suggest that it suffces to argue for social inclusion on 
the basis of democratic rights and social justice. The degree of representation for 
women and other social groups will remain a pertinent issue also for the chapters 
in this book, not least due to the rather extreme conditions of male dominance 
exemplifed in the different sectors, i.e. transport, energy, building or the ‘green 
economy’, which are taking on climate mitigation challenges. 
Beyond this, we are mostly interested in critical climate acts. What are some 
of those critical acts that policy-makers and civil servants can perform in order 
to elicit change? Gender mainstreaming is a strategy endorsed in the EU (since 
1996) and by many institutions of its member states, which pushes the work with 
gender issues beyond adding women. It rests on the idea that most activities have 
a gender dimension found in the underlying norms of institutions (Woodward, 
2003; Kantola, 2010; Lowndes, 2020). The strategy is to ‘mainstream’ women’s 
experiences and needs by incorporating gender perspectives into all policy areas, 
at all stages, at all levels. Gender experts are often assigned the task of gender 
mainstreaming (Ferguson, 2015; Bustelo et al., 2016). Gender experts and advi-
sors have a particular role in the institutions and are assumed to have specifc 
knowledge of gender relations. They may perform critical acts. The concept fem-
ocrats, captures the more transformational aspect of such critical acts as it names 
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feminist civil servants, inspired by feminist movements, who work to further 
gender and feminist concerns within government and administrative institutions 
(Eisenstein, 1996; Yeatman, 2020). Similarly, green activists within administra-
tions perform in the same way on the basis of their dedication to environmen-
tal concerns (Hysing and Olsson, 2017). A related concept is that of ‘outsiders 
within’ originally from black feminist theory. Patricia Hill Collins (1986) points 
to the importance of individual actors in policy development and how they can 
bring in new and alternative perspective and knowledge on, for example, gender 
and race to climate policy-making from their positions as ‘others’. These questions 
about if and how an increased number of female policy-makers in climate institu-
tions and in climate-relevant sectors matters are addressed in various chapters. 
Path dependence in climate institutions 
Feminist institutionalism argues that it is important for feminist scholars to study 
institutions because they organise power inequalities through formal as well as 
informal rules and practices (Mackay et al., 2010; Krook and Mackay, 2011; 
Ljungholm, 2017; Miller, 2020). Through historical processes, power inequali-
ties become deeply embedded in organisations and are reinforced over time and 
the resulting institutional arrangements then steer or guide political actions 
(Pierson, 2004, p. 11). Institutions tend to have particular ‘pattern-bound’ effects 
over time, caused by locking into place certain rules and norms of behaviour 
which also give institutions resilience (Krook and Mackay, 2011; Waylen, 2014; 
Lowndes, 2020). This explains why historically derived notions of gender tend to 
persist. Path dependence makes institutions ‘sticky’ and opportunities for innova-
tion and change are thereby constrained by previous choices (Kenny, 2007, p. 93; 
Miller, 2020). In line with this historical institutional perspective, climate insti-
tutions can be viewed as path-dependent when it comes to both gender recogni-
tion and the acknowledgement of other intersecting social factors such as class, 
ethnicity, age, location and education. The stickiness or path dependence of cli-
mate institutions that have signifcance here is related to how climate change 
was originally put on the global agenda as a highly scientifc, elitist, technical and 
masculinised issue, privileging mainly the natural science community to defne 
the problem, thus downplaying and making irrelevant social interpretations 
(Skutsch, 2000; Hemmati and Röhr, 2009). In their study of the Commission 
Directorate-General for Climate Action, Magnusdottir and Kronsell (2016) 
concluded that the existing power order was reproduced within a new institu-
tional environment –in the then newly established DG Climate Action of the 
Commission – where path dependence meant that policy-makers in DG Climate 
Action largely accepted and adapted to the established masculinised institutional 
environment in which EU climate policies were formulated. 
Path dependence often has to do with normalisation, for example of mascu-
linity and of gender binaries. Normalisation reproduces power through simple 
everyday acts that are perceived as normal and it does not require overt strug-
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practices are based on a logic that may make the inclusion of gender and other 
intersecting social factors appear less appropriate and less desirable. It builds on 
March and Olsen’s (1989, pp. 21–38, p. 161) ideas about how institutions are 
reproduced through patterns of action in a ‘logic of appropriateness’. The logic is 
that individual policy-makers follow embedded rules and routines, according to 
what is appropriate for their social and professional role and individual identity. 
Feminist institutionalists coined the more specifc ‘gendered logic of appropriate-
ness’, which: ‘prescribes (as well as proscribes) acceptable masculine and femi-
nine forms of behaviour, rules and values for men and women within institutions’ 
(Chappell and Waylen, 2013, p. 601). Accordingly, it is not the individual inter-
est or personality of political actors in climate institutions that is important but 
how individuals give their actions meaning. What will be considered appropri-
ate in any given situation is not trivial. ‘Actions are ftted to situations by their 
appropriateness within a conception of identity’ (March and Olsen, 1989, p. 38). 
The outcomes of these institutional practices, thus the actual climate actions, 
policies and the included parameters, aspects, issues and knowledge, depend on 
the role expectations of individual policy-makers and how they make their role 
meaningful. If climate policy-making is taking place in the energy, environment 
or transport agencies, as is the case in most industrial states, then the rules and 
culture of those institutions as well as the professional identity of the policy-
makers, perhaps educated as engineers or economists, are likely to affect whether 
and how they view social power relations in policy-making. Within engineering, 
technical solutions may seem most appropriate while economists may focus on 
societal costs. Several chapters in this book critically assess climate policy-mak-
ing from the feminist institutional perspective. They reveal path dependencies, 
while at the same time remaining open to the possibility of change, in search of 
transformations that challenge the ‘stickiness’ of climate institutions. Thus, the 
book raises questions about how climate policy-makers are affected by this sticki-
ness and bound by a gendered logic of appropriateness and if or how institutional 
path dependence can be challenged. 
Intersectionality as a tool in institutional analysis 
Intersectionality was developed in feminist theory as a way to complicate the anal-
ysis of gender, arguing that gender is hardly ever a power relation that stands alone,
but is related to other power differences, such as class, ethnicity and age (Davis,
2008). Intersectionality is an important concept and an analytical tool that can
shed light on how power structures around social differences emerge and inter-
act (see e.g., Lykke, 2010; Cho et al., 2013; Buckingham and Le Masson, 2017).
Surely, it is applicable to climate issues. While gender is highly relevant (Alston,
2013; Resurrección, 2013), it is also nested into other power categories, for exam-
ple, depending on context and place (Nagel, 2012; Kaiser and Kronsell, 2014) and
related to economic status, e.g., in explaining carbon emissions (Ergas and York,
2012; MacGregor, 2017, p. 22) and ecological footprints. Although our starting
point is in exploring gender difference, many of the chapters in this book refect
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on which social categories are recognised and conceptualised in policy-making and
ask questions about whether intersectional aspects are visible and/or included. 
The contributions to this book are placed in three interconnected thematic 
parts, which focus on climate institutions, both formal authorities and informal, 
normative institutions, in industrialised states. 
Part 1: Intergovernmental and governmental climate institutions 
The frst part of the book outlines the broader scene of climate policy-making with 
its focus on formal intergovernmental and governmental climate institutions and 
how they work – e.g. with recognition of gender and other intersectional fac-
tors, gender representation, and gender equality in climate policy-making. The 
chapters in this part discuss the importance of formal institutions as well as the 
role of individual civil servants who might be dictated by a gendered logic of 
appropriateness. The chapters in Part 1 highlight the importance of representa-
tion in policy-making and the effects of path dependence as well as how formal 
institutions shape power relations and produce knowledge and norms in climate 
policy-making. 
In Chapter 2, ‘Gender in the global climate governance regime: a day late and 
a dollar short?’, Karen Morrow outlines the evolution of gender representation in 
the global climate governance regime (the UNFCCC), which is important for 
furthering international cooperation and for its prominent infuence on climate 
agendas across the world. The UNFCCC’s tardiness to act on gender is puzzling, 
not the least in comparison to activities within other Rio conventions. Although 
a laggard on gender, Morrow refects on the efforts made since its belatedly off-
cial recognition to the Gender Constituency in 2011. She discusses impediments 
to this process of improvements, which is conditioned by systemic features of the 
UNFCCC regime in international law and politics and an economics-driven, 
technocratic stance on climate issues. Such path dependencies infuence both 
the treatment of gender and broader social inclusion and thus, also the effcacy of 
initiatives taken so far. 
In Chapter 3 on the EU external climate policy, Gill Allwood notes that EU is 
committed to gender equality – a fundamental value in most policy areas, includ-
ing EU’s external relations – but EU climate policy is still largely gender-blind. 
It is the strong impact and vulnerability to climate change in countries outside 
Europe, that has provided a powerful framing of climate change as a develop-
ment issue and where it has related to gender concerns. In turn, this framing 
has served the interest of a security-focused foreign policy which downplays any 
efforts to mainstream gender or prioritise social inclusion. The chapter stresses 
the importance of issue framing resulting in an institutional stickiness that opens 
for certain actors to engage and excludes others. This trajectory means that the 
gender agenda and the climate agenda remain separate tracks although they are 
both embedded in the EU’s legal framework and institutions. 
In Chapter 4, ‘Making Germany’s climate change policy gender-responsive’, 
Gotelind Alber, Diana Hummel, Ulrike Röhr and Immanuel Stieß, highlight 
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how German climate institutions have worked with gender, intersectionality and 
civil society. German climate policy-makers have only recently begun addressing 
gender and have primarily been inspired by international agreements such as the 
UNFCCC Gender Action Plan. Recognising that research on these issues was 
lacking, the authors engaged in a research project which developed a Gender 
Impact Assessment tool as an instrument to analyse gender equality which was 
made available to policy-makers. The chapter accounts for these experiences and 
also sheds light on critical acts or the efforts made by the (female) minister for 
the environment to motivate and educate senior staff and climate change experts 
on gender and climate policy and how cooperation with female leaders in envi-
ronmental organisations was key for gender to gain traction in German climate 
policy-making. 
In Chapter 5, ‘Promoting a Gender Agenda in Climate and Sustainable 
Development, Gerd Johnsson-Latham and Annica Kronsell offer valuable 
insights into the institutional challenges government offcials face when initiat-
ing an inclusive gender-equal approach. The view is from 40 years of experience 
as a ‘femocrat’ working within the Swedish government, the Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs and in international institutions. The chapter emerged as a dialogue 
between a feminist academic and a feminist bureaucrat and the resulting narra-
tive is analysed against refections from feminist institutional theory. It offers an 
insider’s perspective of institutional practices by highlighting the institutional 
challenges that government offcials face when promoting gender equality in 
sustainability and climate issues and how they navigate that space in order to 
gender mainstream the agenda, e.g. through several different types of critical acts 
elaborated in the text. 
In Chapter 6, ‘Take a ride into the danger zone? Assessing path dependency 
and the possibilities for instituting change at two Swedish government agencies’, 
Ben Singleton and Gunnhildur Lily Magnusdottir argue that government agen-
cies are important sites for climate change action. Yet, the action space available 
to civil servants refects historically embedded norms in those institutions, i.e., 
path dependencies that relate to the prevalence of ecological modernisation and 
the preference for technical solutions. This frames subsequent policies with direct 
consequences for what type of climate action is possible. Using interview data, 
it explores how Swedish civil servants frame possibilities for institutional action 
and change on social justice in climate action. The civil servant is positioned in 
an ambiguous space, acting according to the logic of appropriateness in the con-
text of the general ethos of bureaucracy within the specifc logic of the agency’s 
remit. On the other hand, in line with another task of public offcers to act and 
serve the will of the democratically elected government transmitted from the 
political level. 
Part 2: Sectoral climate institutions 
The second thematic part of the book discusses how different climate-relevant 
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work with the inclusion of gender and other intersecting social factors. These 
chapters discuss the challenges and barriers related to path-dependent norms and 
how they can be challenged, and address questions on how an increased number 
of female policy-makers and/or professionals have a bearing on climate institu-
tions and in climate-relevant sectors. 
In Chapter 7, ‘Towards a climate-friendly turn? Gender, culture and performa-
tivity in Danish transport policy’, Hilda Rømer Christensen and Michala Hvidt
Breengaard stress that confgurations of environmentally friendly transport and
gender are vital in policy-making. The authors demonstrate how such align-
ments have unfolded in Denmark by examining a range of communicative events
related to gender and the enhancement of more climate-friendly transport prac-
tices. Using digital media archives and drawing on recent network analysis of the
Danish political elite, they disclose how the car-centred society has been con-
stantly re-constituted and maintained in both societies and the particular culture
of transport policy. Further, they expose an institutional path dependence around
car-centrism and masculine dominance that reconstitutes existing norms in trans-
port policy-making and culture. Through the analysis, both the potentials and
limitations of change are considered. It demonstrates how the longstanding alli-
ances of car culture and hegemonic masculine norms were performed at a critical
moment in the development of Danish transport policy. It locates the gendered
and cross political character of the alliances and hegemonies implicated in policy-
making and shows how various femininities and masculinities have been shaped
and nurtured within these institutional and hegemonic structures and cultures. 
In Chapter 8, ‘Wasting resources: challenges to implementing existing poli-
cies and tools for gender equality and sensitivity in climate change-related pol-
icy’, Susan Buckingham explores how waste management can make a signifcant 
contribution to curbing greenhouse gas emissions across Europe. However, given 
waste management’s record as being historically male-dominated, engineering-
focused and having deeply embedded masculinist structures and path dependen-
cies, it is not clear that it is yet up to the task. The author’s involvement in two 
research projects exploring the relationship between gender equality and waste 
minimisation provides a unique experience from which she refects on the capac-
ity for, and challenges to, gender mainstreaming in waste management, and its 
associated environmental benefts. The chapter sets this exploration within the 
broader context of gender mainstreaming in the EU and explains how commit-
ment to and awareness of gender equality and sensitivity vary widely depending 
on prior engagement with gender equality. 
In Chapter 9, ‘Gender analysis of policy-making in construction and transpor-
tation’, Bipasha Baruah and Sandra Biskupski-Mujanovic focus on two sectors 
(construction and transportation) deemed critical to Canada’s green economy, 
though sectors in which women are severely underrepresented. Using a gender 
equality perspective, they analyse existing government policies and programmes 
as well as corporate and civil society initiatives. Taking a starting point in Anne 
Phillip’s work (1995), they emphasise the importance of promoting employment 
equity measures in these sectors where women are marginalised. They discuss 
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institutionalised challenges that women face in these ‘masculine sectors’ and 
explore the role of different actors, including the limited role of the federal gov-
ernment, in framing and implementing effective policies to enable the transition 
to a green economy. 
Chapter 10, ‘Why radical transformation is necessary for gender equality and 
a zero carbon European construction sector’, reveals how gendered analysis can 
help identify structural problems, in this case for the construction sector. Linda 
Clarke and Melahat Sahin-Dikmen argue that these structural problems need 
to be solved for a climate transition and gender equality to be accomplished, 
and in tandem, because they are interdependent. The context of their study is 
the European Union’s (EU) strategy to reduce environmental carbon emissions 
in building construction – which of considerable importance as the construc-
tion industry is responsible for 30–40% of end-use emissions in EU. As a heavily 
white, male-dominated industry, the representation and participation of women 
across the construction sector are very low and the industry remains (gender) 
blind to this fact. Also, this sector works under the path dependence of ecological 
modernisation and is technology-driven. 
Part 3: Local, community institutions and climate practices 
The third theme explores normative climate institutions and community author-
ities in local policy-making. The chapters refect on which social categories are 
conceptualised and recognised in policy-making and ask questions about whether 
and how intersectional aspects are visible and/or included. They also raise ques-
tions about how climate policy-makers are affected by path dependence and gen-
dered logic of appropriateness and if or how institutional path dependence – e.g., 
existing norms on ecomodern masculinity – can be challenged. 
In Chapter 11, ‘Addressing climate policy-making and gender in transport 
plans and strategies’, Tanu Priya Uteng, Marianne Knapskog, André Uteng and 
Jomar Sæterøy Maridal argue for the need to recognise gendered daily mobilities 
in developing climate policies due to the way gender/intersectionality is linked to 
transport patterns. Questions such as ‘Which transport modes are women using?’ 
and ‘What are its systematic benefts for climate policy-making?’ demand further 
consideration in current and future scenarios, in light of demographic trends like 
the increase of elderly in the population. Climate policy-making in urban Norway 
has a zero growth objective (ZGO) and stipulates that future traffc growth should 
be absorbed by public transport, walking and cycling. Social differences in travel 
behaviour along the lines of e.g. gender and age, in the willingness to substitute 
car and an uneven population growth rate can all pose challenges in achieving 
climate goals if not addressed through stratifed interventions. Considering Oslo’s 
population growth, shifts in age distribution and combining it with empirical 
evidence on different demographic groups’ travel habits, this chapter investigates 
the overlaps between climate policy-making, gender and ZGO. 
In Chapter 12, ‘When gender equality and Earth care meet: ecological mas-
culinities in practice’, Robin Hedenqvist, Paul M. Pulé, Vidar Vetterfalk and 
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Martin Hultman stress that environmental considerations, such as global warm-
ing, have traditionally been marginal issues in masculinities research although 
men are the main perpetrators of the slow violences of social inequalities and 
ecological destruction. These violences are instigated and maintained by indus-
trial/breadwinner and ecomodern masculinities, which present considerable bar-
riers for men to engage in social and environmental care. The authors suggest 
ecological masculinities as an alternative for the necessary reconfguration of 
masculinities (particularly in the Global North). Interviews from a selected group 
of men in a progressive community in rural Sweden are used to identify several 
themes deemed important for a transition from passive awareness to deeper social 
and ecological actions. 
In Chapter 13, ‘Diverging priorities for adaptation: towards inclusive wild-
fre planning in northern Saskatchewan’, Heidi Walker, Maureen G. Reed and 
Amber J. Fletcher explore wildfre management in the province of Saskatchewan, 
Canada. The region, with one First Nation and two municipal jurisdictions, was 
among the areas most signifcantly affected by wildfres in 2015. The chapter 
examines how institutions for emergency and wildfre management shaped path-
ways for adaptation, as well as how gender and other intersecting social structures 
and power infuenced these pathways. Drawing from semi-structured interviews 
with local government representatives and community residents, the authors 
argue that there is a need for deeper transformative change towards an inclu-
sive wildfre adaptation as the current institutional approaches focus primarily 
on technical, physical and economic impacts and fail to address many of the 
more intangible impacts experienced by community residents, many of which 
were experienced differently across intersections of gender, race, socioeconomic 
status, and age. 
In Chapter 14, which is the fnal chapter of the book, we refect on the main 
fndings of the different chapters and the main research questions presented in 
the introduction. 
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2 Gender in the global climate 
governance regime 
A day late and a dollar short? 
Karen Morrow 
Introduction: Getting gender on the agenda 
The constitution, form, practices and culture of institutions generally (interna-
tional institutions among them) are increasingly understood as important not only
in mandating and structuring activities within their particular remits but also in
exercising a gate-keeping role. The latter is exhibited in the voices and inter-
ests that they include/exclude from participation in their processes. Institutions
and their operation ultimately embody and emphasise the broader contours of our
societies and thus exhibit strongly gendered structural characteristics, which have
long been the subject of feminist inquiry and analysis (Prugl and Meyer, 1999).
In this context, Meryl Kenny’s application of a feminist lens to path dependency
(which suggests that early institutional choices shape and limit subsequent regime
developments) and functionalist views of institutional change provides particu-
larly fruitful insights for considering the shaping of international climate govern-
ance (Kenny, 2007). While often presented as alternative explanatory models, it
can be said that the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change
(UNFCCC, 1992) regime exhibits features of both approaches. In terms of path
dependency, as a novel manifestation of a historically gendered international legal
system, the UNFCCC regime’s roots shape its institutions and institutional cul-
ture. Put briefy, it has long been argued by feminist scholars that, while ostensibly
presenting itself as gender-neutral, ‘international law has a gender … that gen-
der is a male one, and … this skews the discipline’ (Charlesworth, 2002, p. 94).
Furthermore, it has been observed that it remains the case that ‘[t]here is, by and
large, a disproportionate representation of men in the institutions of international
law’ (ibid.). The usually uninterrogated privileged, male-dominated and largely
masculinist nature of international legal institutions signally hampers their ability
to evolve and to develop creative approaches to new areas, the approach on offer
being to all intents and purposes ‘more of the same’. 
Continuing gender disparity within UN institutions raises serious questions as 
to the profound and seemingly intractable nature of this aspect of structural ine-
quality, particularly in the face of much-vaunted systemic recognition and serial 
attempts to engage with it (Morrow, 2006). The fact that the UN has, since its 
inception, raised the need to address gender equality, not least as a foundational 
and supposedly integral part of its core human rights agenda in both the 1945 UN 
DOI: 10.4324/9781003052821-2 
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Charter and the 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights, seemingly augurs 
well (UN OHCHR, 2014). On one level this positive impression is augmented 
by specifc and ongoing coverage for rights-based approaches to women’s par-
ticipation in and across the UN and states. Rights-based coverage, for example, 
features strongly in the 1979 Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of 
Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW), Article 8 of which is germane in 
the current context, providing that: 
States Parties shall take all appropriate measures to ensure to women, on 
equal terms with men and without any discrimination, the opportunity to 
represent their Governments at the international level and to participate in 
the work of international organizations. 
(UN CEDAW, 1979) 
Women’s participation rights were further amplifed by the ambitious 1995 Beijing 
Declaration and Platform for Action (UN OHCHR, 2014). The document fea-
tures dedicated coverage for women in power and decision-making, developing 
institutional mechanisms for the advancement of women, and addressing wom-
en’s human rights (UN BDPA, 1995, Chapter IV, sections G, H and I, respec-
tively). The rationale for including coverage of this nature was succinctly stated: 
Equality in political decision-making performs a leverage function without 
which it is highly unlikely that a real integration of the equality dimension 
in government policy-making is feasible. 
(UN BDPA, 1995, para. 181) 
The observation remains as cogent today as when it was made. The same holds 
for international policy-making contexts as they are populated by representatives 
selected by states. The strategic objectives for governments under the BDPA 
included what have become familiar themes: data collection and monitoring 
in the pursuit of gender balance, both domestically and in regard to UN bod-
ies (UN BDPA, 1995, para. 190). The UN itself was also charged with putting 
its own house in order by pursuing gender equality in its staffng, particularly 
at senior level, and with collecting and disseminating data on its progress (UN 
BDPA, 1995, para. 193). However, while the UN’s engagement with gender has 
matured, developing in range and sophistication over time (Morrow, 2006), it 
is also the case that there has been a constant need for periodic high-profle re-
engagement with gender issues. The latter throws a less positive light on matters, 
being prompted by a continuing paucity of progress on the ground. It remains the 
case that progress on realising rights is uneven and in consequence: 
Women around the world … regularly suffer violations of their human rights 
throughout their lives, and realising women’s human rights has not always 
been a priority. 
(UN OHCHR, 2014, p. 1) 
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The UNFCCC is frmly located in this long-established milieu and on this ground 
alone would have been ripe for feminist inquiry in the cause of the imperative 
need to address inclusivity and equality. 
At the same time, there is also a strong functionalist dimension to the insti-
tutional character of the UNFCCC system, rooted in the manner in which cli-
mate change was characterised in the fedgling regime, which has also profoundly 
shaped it and its approach to its role. The elements of the regime are many and 
their inter-relationship complex. For present purposes, the main regime actors 
and roles are state signatories who make up the supreme governing body of the 
convention in question; in the UNFCCC this is known as the Conference of 
Parties (CoP). Signatory states also provide the members of the regime’s spe-
cialist, limited membership constituted bodies, which are charged with carrying 
out a range of subject-specifc technical roles. The activities of the CoP and the 
constituted bodies are supported by a number of enabling bodies, notably, the 
regime’s Secretariat, which provides general technical advice and support and 
organisational services and the more focused Subsidiary Body for Implementation 
(SBI). Additionally, a number of recognised non-state actors now play a variety 
of roles in regime activities. In initially characterising climate change as a tech-
nical issue, suitable for traditional state-centric international law coverage and 
dominated by the search for scientifc and economic ‘fxes’ (themselves reliant on 
male-dominated disciplines) its pervasive, cross-cutting complex nature was not 
fully addressed (UN FCCC, 1992; Morrow, 2017a, p. 31). The social dimensions 
of climate change were initially largely absent from consideration in the regime, 
though, in fairness to the UNFCCC Secretariat, it recognised this lack at a fairly 
early stage and expanded its stakeholder engagement beyond states to embrace 
(some) major societal groups in its activities. However, the approach adopted 
tended to augment the initial masculinist dominance of technical and economic 
concerns within the regime (Morrow, 2017b, p. 39). The various voids that this 
approach propagated and perpetuated now seem obvious, yet took many years for 
the UNFCCC regime to grasp, in part because: 
Essentially, people tend to assume that our own way of thinking about or 
doing things is typical. … If the majority of people in power are men – and 
they are – the majority of people in power just don’t see it. Male bias just 
looks like ‘common sense’ to them. 
(Perez, 2019, p. 270) 
Tellingly, the newly expansive approach towards stakeholder groups did not, for 
many years and despite vigorous and sustained campaigning, extend to women. 
The regime’s failure to act decisively on gender inclusion was mystifying on a 
number of levels, not least as the UNFCCC had long been on the record as 
recognising the fact that women were underrepresented in its activities and on 
its constituted bodies and that this needed to be addressed (UN FCCC, 2001). 
This apperception did not, however, prompt an effective response, with calls for 
data collection and dissemination with reference to the gender composition of 
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the regime’s constituted bodies failing to generate much impact. Alongside this, 
it took the best part of two decades for the constituency status enjoyed by other 
major groups under the regime to fnally be accorded to the Women and Gender 
Constituency (WGC) in 2011 (Morrow, 2017a, pp. 33, 37–38). This develop-
ment coincided with a higher profle for gender in the context of discussions 
about climate change among UN institutions more generally, notably in bodies 
with remits in gender and in environmental matters (Morrow, 2017a, pp. 34–35). 
It was more particularly prompted by activity in the cognate ‘Rio Conventions’, 
comprising the UNFCCC itself, the Convention on Biodiversity (CBD) and 
the subsequently adopted United Nations Framework Convention to Combat 
Desertifcation (UNCCD) in which gender featured prominently, in their prepa-
rations for the Rio+20 Conference in 2012. The activities of the CBD and the 
UNCCD had seen gender not only raised but also engaged with (albeit to varying 
degrees) at a regime level in a way that, until this point, those of the UNFCCC 
had not and the latter was, in comparison a laggard (CBD, UNCCD, UNFCCC, 
2012, p. 5; Morrow, 2017a, p. 35). 
Gender landmarks in the UNFCCC regime 
Monitoring and reporting on gender representation 
Decision 23/CP.18, adopted at the UNFCCC CoP in Doha in 2012, arguably 
signals the start of an attempt to promote serious engagement with gender in 
global climate change governance (UN FCCC, 2012). The Decision’s title set 
out its stall very clearly: ‘Promoting gender balance and improving the participa-
tion of Women in UNFCCC negotiations and in the representation of Parties in 
bodies established pursuant to the Convention or the Kyoto Protocol’. Decision 
23/CP.18 was hugely important in both principle and evolving regime prac-
tice. It not only served to reiterate concerns previously (though sporadically) 
raised about the gender composition of the UNFCCC’s constituted bodies; it 
also looked explicitly to the gender make-up of signatory state delegations. More 
importantly still, it set the scene for gender to become a regular (rather than 
merely occasional) regime agenda item. The crucial element of Decision 23/ 
CP.18 lay in beginning to construct a factual foundation upon which to ground 
regime actions on gender, by regularising and enhancing monitoring, and report-
ing on gender representation in state delegations and constituted bodies. In con-
sequence, annual reports on the composition have featured in the UNFCCC’s 
regular diet of business since 2013 and this remains a central component of how 
the regime presents its coverage of gender issues. While a more granular analysis 
is not possible within the confnes of the current chapter, even a basic explora-
tion of material drawn from the regime’s annual gender composition reports from 
2013 to date is revealing (UN FCCC Gender and Climate Change Documents, 
n.d.). Figure 2.1 takes the average representation of women in the UNFCCC’s 
constituted bodies1 as an example and shows that taken overall, despite the 
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Figure 2.1 Average percentage female and male membership of UNFCCC constituted 
bodies drawn from gender composition reports 
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Figure 2.2 UNFCCC highest and lowest percentages of female representation on 
constituted bodies 2013–2019 
promotion of gender equality, progress has been scant. This remains the case 
when the expansion over this period of the number of constituted bodies from 
11 to 15 is accounted for. 
Figure 2.2, showing the top and bottom of the range of percentages of women 
sitting on constituted bodies, is also disappointing. While, as Figure 2.2 shows, 
particularly from 2017 onwards, upper averages are improving, the lower regis-
ter remains stubbornly on or below 10%. Figure 2.3 likewise shows a bifurcated 
picture: while in 2019 female representation was 30% and above on nine of the 
regime’s 15 constituted bodies, closer inspection of the source material reveals 
that there is still a long way to go. Of these nine bodies, women’s representa-
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Figure 2.3 Percentage of women members of UNFCCC constituted bodies 2019 
Only the Adaptation Committee (which has consistently been among the better 
performers on women’s representation, and more so since 2016) and the Paris 
Committee on Capacity Building exceed this, though both include well over 
50% female members. Furthermore, in 2019, fve constituted bodies still have a 
less than 30% female complement. At the bottom of the lower range of repre-
sentation, the powerful Executive Board of the Clean Development Mechanism, 
which, while now an outlier rather than, as previously, typical of many of its peer 
bodies, persists at a damning 10% (where it has stood since 2015, falling from 
20% in 2014). 
Acting to change institutional culture 
The provision of statistical data remains the most prominent strand in the 
UNFCCC regime’s own account of its engagement with gender. However, while 
such material is necessary to provide the basis for debate seeking to alter insti-
tutional culture and serves to capture what Lena Wängnerud (2009) has termed 
descriptive representation, it cannot suffce to promote effective engagement 
with gender issues. This requires a deeper, conscious and active engagement with 
equality, which, as revealed by work on domestic parliaments and gender, inevita-
bly collides directly with gendered systems, structures and practices (Wängnerud, 
2009, p. 52; Criado Perez, 2019, pp. 271–286). The fgures above strongly suggest 
that the same is true for the regime machinery of international agreements such 
as the UNFCCC, where data production and dissemination have not prompted 
appreciable progress. While the UNFCCC constituted bodies have a shorter his-
tory than domestic institutions, they are, as discussed above, grafted on to a sys-
tem hallmarked by entrenched gender inequality. In any event, even presence in 
numbers, while necessary to progress gender equality in a system, is not necessar-
ily suffcient (Wängnerud, 2009, p. 59). 
Thus, in addition to considering women’s presence in regime bodies, it is also 
crucial to examine what Wängnerud (2009) terms substantive representation, 
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that is, the effects of women’s presence on the regime. In the context of the 
UNFCCC, these will be examined by considering indicative developments in 
the regime’s gender culture through the changing nature of the coverage it offers 
to gender issues. 
The UNFCCC has not confned its activities to recording the numbers of 
women present in its constituent bodies and national delegations. The search 
for increased effcacy saw the gender agenda coalesce in the activities of the 
Conference of Parties itself, with the adoption of a suite of important decisions 
shaping the regime’s new approach. These documents are signifcant in that, 
while they continue to be led by quantitative elements, focusing on participation 
metrics, this is now coupled with commitments to substantive action with more 
qualitative dimensions. The latter demonstrates a shift, seeking to improve not 
just the numbers of women active in regime processes but also their ability to par-
ticipate meaningfully in them. Decision 18/CP20 on the Lima Work Programme 
on Gender (LWPG) was a landmark in this process (UN FCCC, 2014). The 
document, weighing in at only two pages, was brief but foundational, focusing on 
improving the coherence of the regime’s work to address gender through main-
streaming in the UNFCCC regime. Signifcantly, the contextual markers identi-
fed by the LWPG included CEDAW and the UN BDPA. The work programme 
was set up to pursue gender balance and develop gender-responsive climate policy 
(the meaning of which it promises to clarify) to improve women’s participation 
in the regime’s constituted bodies. The programme included strengthened report-
ing requirements, but also looked to substantive matters centred on training and 
capacity building and, perhaps most importantly of all, committed to a review 
in 2016, keeping progress under scrutiny (UN FCCC, 2014, paras. 3–6 and 16, 
respectively). 
Incremental progress continued with the adoption of Decision 3/CP.23 
(UNFCCC, 2017), which added a gender action plan (GAP) to the LWPG. The 
CoP had requested that the SBI develop the GAP in Decision 21/CP.22, with a 
view to supporting the implementation of gender-related decisions and mandates 
within the UNFCCC. A fairly broad range of potential courses of action was 
outlined therein, including ‘identifying priority areas, key activities and indica-
tors, timelines for implementation … responsible and key actors and indicative 
resource requirements for each activity’ and enhanced monitoring and review 
processes (UN FCCC, 2016, para. 27). If the LWPG provided the skeleton of 
the regime’s new, ostensibly more coherent approach to gender, the GAP put 
fesh on these bones. The GAP ran until 2019 and identifed fve priority areas, 
deliverables for each and the actors responsible for them. The fve priority areas 
comprised knowledge-sharing, gender balance, coherence, implementation and 
monitoring and reporting. While some of these areas share a strong quantitative 
bent with earlier initiatives, the package taken as a whole now demonstrates a 
mixed approach, though with qualitative elements continuing to play a part across 
the board. The hybrid approach espoused is apparent, for example, in priority area 
B, on gender balance – which on the face of it would seem to be largely quan-











elements, such as the promotion of travel funds for female participants in regime 
process, and information about gender balance to accompany recruitment to con-
stituted bodies, it also featured two activities centred on training, which also 
looked to qualitative considerations concerning capacity-building. The responsi-
ble actors identifed included state parties, the UNFCCC Secretariat, other UN 
bodies and relevant external organisations (UNFCCC, 2017, Annex). The GAP 
is presented as a four-page annex to Decision 3/CP.23, the frst of which outlined 
the fve priority areas and the remaining three of which comprised closely writ-
ten tables for each of them, detailing activities, the attribution of responsibilities, 
timelines, deliverables/outputs and the level at which implementation is required 
(local, national, regional and/or international). The task and action approach 
adopted in the GAP has a number of advantages in terms of expectation man-
agement and transparency for all actors within the UNFCCC system. While a 
rational and coherent approach does not of itself guarantee progress, it does at 
least serve to offer desirable consistency. 
Pursuant to the LWPG and the GAP’s stated priority to ensure that gender was 
integrated into the work of 11 of the UNFCCC’s constituted bodies,2 in 2019 the 
UNFCCC Secretariat produced a desk-based synthesis report on progress (or the 
lack of it) to date on reporting of gender coverage within the various mandates 
involved (UN FCCC, 2019a). The report identifed basic progress through time, 
in that while in 2017 only six constituted bodies mentioned gender as part of 
their regular reporting processes, in 2018 this had increased to 11. However, most 
were acknowledged as offering at best cursory coverage, indicating only marginal 
improvement. Of the seven that reported in some depth on their progress in inte-
grating gender into their processes and work, only three reported that they had 
instituted practical action such as setting up working groups and/or gender focal 
points or instituting their own gender action plans (UN FCCCC, 2019a, para. 
8–10). Slight improvement on previous practice must, however, be set against 
the fact that, the UNFCCC’s multiple efforts in the last few years notwithstand-
ing, coverage was at best uneven. It ranged from comprehensive approaches by 
some through to two constituted bodies that provided such limited information 
that it was not possible to determine their progress. Furthermore, where gender 
was reported upon, the approach adopted was idiosyncratic, making comparison 
and the sharing of best practice challenging. The provision of UNFCCC guid-
ance on the form and substance required for gender progress reports was suggested 
to improve the utility of the reporting process (UN FCCC, 2019a, para. 121). 
The LWPG and GAP themselves fell to be reviewed by the SBI (UN FCCC,
2019b). The SBI’s evaluation of progress on the fve priorities, based on submis-
sions from a range of state parties and observer organisations, also pointed to the
importance of the LWPG to the regime’s institutional culture as a framework for
gender action and the GAP as the practical focus for action. In the latter context,
the LMPG and GAP were identifed as providing a platform for stakeholders to
exchange information on and to advance the fve priorities. Review participants
also took the opportunity to suggest improvements, showing that the LWPG and
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process. This is confrmed by the adoption of Decision 3/CP.25 of the Enhanced
Lima Work Programme on Gender (ELWPG) and its gender action plan (UN
FCCC, 2019c), which are to run until 2024. The ELWPG rehearses the usual back-
ground mantra of the climate change regime: reiterating links with other UN remits
(notably the SDGs), exhorting states to act and requesting that the Secretariat con-
tinue to provide support to enable them to do so. However, as anyone familiar with
the UNFCCC’s attempts to improve its practice on gender equality fully expects, it
also clearly acknowledges that, previous efforts notwithstanding, there is a 
persistent lack of progress in and the urgent need for improving the represen-
tation of women in Party delegations and constituted bodies. 
(UN FCCC, 2019c, para. 2) 
The augmented GAP is similar in length, content and organisation to its pre-
decessor – and in many ways also indicates a ‘more of the same’ approach. Once 
again taking priority area B, gender balance, participation and women’s leader-
ship, as an example, travel funding and training remain as identifed activities. 
An additional strand of activity concerns working with the Local Communities 
and Indigenous Peoples Platform Facilitative Working Group (LCIPPFWG) ‘on 
women’s leadership and enhancing the participation of local communities and 
indigenous women in climate policy and action … to the extent that it is consist-
ent with the workplan of the … [LCIPPFWG] … and within existing resources’ 
(UN FCCC, 2019c, B3). Given that women’s participation is often contentious 
in these contexts (UN Secretariat of the Permanent Forum on Indigenous Issues 
[SPFII] et al., 2010), it is diffcult to gauge how effective this activity will be, 
beyond initiating a dialogue on the issues. However, in a crucial exception to 
the prevalent ‘more of the same’ approach, the most signifcant development in 
the new GAP involves priority area D, gender-responsive implementation and 
means of implementation. This sees a shift in emphasis in the action plan, with 
seven activity areas identifed, a signifcant increase on the three covered in the 
2017 version. Priorities continue developing work with various women’s organi-
sations to better inform approaches to gender issues but extend to: improving 
the provision of gender-disaggregated data, sharing good practice on mainstream-
ing gender in climate policy, and support for integrating gender into the central 
funding and technical concerns of the regime. The fact that the implementation 
strand is now providing for the main thrust of activity in the GAP is signifcant in 
drawing attention to gender implications in some of the core practical elements 
of the UNFCCC. 
In addition to the work programmes and action plans, the UNFCCC charged 
its Secretariat with securing practical improvements in the regime’s operation 
and outputs by developing a series of technical papers to inform the regime’s 
approach to gender. Such synchronous developments were geared to promote 
deeper integration of gender into the regime’s architecture. One important exam-
ple lay in identifying possible actions in the workstreams of the regime’s consti-




progress towards the parties’ goals on gender balance and gender-responsive cli-
mate policy (UN FCCC TP, 2018). The technical papers, in turn, form the basis 
for further work – in this example, the CoP in Decision 3/CP.23 (UNFCCC, 
2017) requested that its outcomes and recommendations form the basis of a 
dialogue between the chairs of the constituted bodies, to share experience and 
expertise and build capacity for effective engagement with gender. 
Increasing the profle and visibility of gender in the UNFCCC 
regime 
If progress on gender representation and integration leaves much to be desired, 
it is nevertheless the case that gender has become an established (if unevenly 
realised) agenda item across UNFCCC processes. Gender coverage is now also 
a much more visible and accessible presence on the organisation’s website. In 
addition to prominent positioning as one of the regime’s headline topics, col-
lated coverage of relevant regime decisions and documents pertaining to gender 
is now provided (UN FCCC Gender and Climate Change Documents, n.d.). The 
gender topic is also furnished with cross-cutting links to other core areas of the 
UNFCCC regime, namely adaptation, mitigation, capacity-building, technology, 
climate fnance and cross-cutting topics (UN FCCC Topics, n.d.). 
As illustrated in Figure 2.4, the coverage of gender in regime documents has 
broadly (if initially sporadically) increased over time, admittedly from paltry 
beginnings in 2001. More consistent development, prompted by shifts in the 
priority that the UNFCCC has accorded to gender in its institutional activities 
(discussed above), began in 2012 and relevant regime activity since has been 
considerably more frequent and, while not constant, operates at a level that dem-
onstrates at least a core level of engagement each year. 
Other forms of more public-facing engagement by the UNFCCC regime also 
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Figure 2.4 Numbers of UNFCCC documents pertaining per gender 
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development was the addition of a regular ‘Gender Day’ event to the meetings 
of the conference of parties from 2012 onwards (UN Women, 2012). A second 
innovation saw the regular inclusion of practically oriented gender-based work-
shops at regime meetings (UN FCCC, 2013). While these developments could 
have been fairly superfcial, they have not only generated headlines but have also 
raised the profle of gender issues in the main business processes of the UNFCCC, 
at the same time as providing opportunities to interrogate the regime’s short-
comings and attempt to build capacity to address them. Gender days have, for 
example, highlighted progress on gender equality and climate change (2014), 
the economic case for gender-responsive climate action (2017) and gender and 
national adaptation plans (2019). Gender workshops (reports on which are 
subsequently fed into the regime by its Secretariat) have addressed core topics 
such as gender and mitigation (2015), gender and adaptation (2016) and the 
gender-differentiated impacts of climate change and gender-responsive climate 
policy and action (2018). It is an indication of continuing institutional commit-
ment that workshops on integrating gender into national climate actions have 
not been side-lined by the COVID-19 pandemic but instead moved online in a 
development which should help to retain their momentum (UN FCCC, 2020). 
The Paris Agreement and gender 
Much is made by the UNFCCC on its website of the fact that gender attained 
preambular status in the Paris Agreement (PA), which acknowledges that, as 
climate change is a common concern of humankind, Parties should, when 
taking action to address climate change, respect, promote and consider their 
respective obligations on human rights, the right to health, the rights of 
indigenous peoples, local communities, migrants, children, persons with dis-
abilities and people in vulnerable situations and the right to development, 
as well as gender equality, empowerment of women and intergenerational equity. 
(UN FCCC, 2015b, emphasis added) 
However, while the PA could have been a springboard for a more balanced, 
socially directed approach to climate change coming to the fore, in many ways 
it missed the mark, not least with regard to gender, which garnered a scant three 
mentions in the Agreement’s main text. While the preamble to the PA adopts a 
more socially contextualised approach to climate change than hitherto, its role in 
the regime is comparatively limited, largely serving to provide an interpretative 
context for the substantive articles included in the main body of the Agreement. 
Gender had been a live issue during the negotiating process and prominent in 
the draft agreement – it was mentioned nine times in the bracketed negotiating 
text (UN FCCC, 2015a). Many were, however, hugely disappointed by what 
the PA actually delivered on gender, as the inter-state negotiating process took 
effect. One result was that elements perceived by some states as controversial, 
including, as Rochette observes, most of those on gender, were excised from the 
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text (Rochette, 2017, p. 254). In the Agreement as adopted, gender was siloed 
in coverage of adaptation (UN FCCC, 2015b, Article 7) and mitigation (UN 
FCCC, 2015b, Article 11). 
The use of language in the preamble to the PA, calling on states to ‘respect, 
promote and consider’ their human rights obligations, is remarkable and arguably 
signals a great deal in attitudinal terms. The usual parlance with regard to states’ 
human rights obligations requires them to ‘respect, protect and fulfl’ (emphasis 
added) them. In short, under the guise of ‘respect’, states are expected to refrain 
from interfering with human rights. To ‘protect’ requires that states address 
human rights issues for individuals and groups – ‘promotion’ is a much looser, 
hortatory term and not a like-for-like substitute. The obligation to ‘fulfl’ requires 
states to take positive action to deliver on the human rights that they have com-
mitted to (UN OHCHR, n.d.). An obligation merely to ‘consider’ (i.e. to take 
into account) is not commensurate with an obligation to fulfl (i.e. deliver) on 
human rights. The orientation of this preambular clause of the PA is signifcant 
in real terms, as it is now seen as representing part of the institutionally accepted 
context for actions under the UNFCCC (UN FCCC, 2019c). This careful and 
deliberate use of language is crucially important – in effect, it seeks to pay lip-
service to human rights, while at the same time diluting state obligations to act 
to secure those rights that are increasingly recognised by the UN’s human rights 
machinery to be infringed/infringeable by climate change (UN OHCHR, 2019). 
This is particularly signifcant with regard to gender, as women are recognised as 
a particularly vulnerable group in the context of climate change and as having 
protected human rights in this regard (UN OHCHR, 2019, paras. 45–47 and 64, 
respectively). Such gendered effects of climate change have long been recognised 
by many UN entities (Morrow, 2017a, p. 34), not least CEDAW (most recently 
in CEDAW, 2018). 
The Sustainable Development Goals, Agenda 2030 and gender 
The inclusion of reference to human rights in the PA itself is ambiguous, recog-
nising their relevance to climate change in principle while distancing the regime 
from their implementation in practice. Nevertheless, it is evident that, despite 
the evasive approach adopted, the very act of inclusion has affected the context 
of the climate change debate, serving to further fuel the active engagement of 
the UN human rights and gender machinery on climate change where it crosses 
into their respective remits. A similar situation arose in the cross-cutting of the 
gender/human rights/environment nexus (including climate change) expressed 
in the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development (Agenda 2030) (UN GA, 
2015) and the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) (UNDP, 2015). This is 
signifcant as there is clearly acknowledged crossover between the UNFCCC and 
the SDGs and Agenda 2030, not least in respect of Goal 13, climate action, and 
its supporting targets (UN GA, 2015, para. 14). While gender is covered in the 
SDGs themselves, both discretely (under Goal 5) and as a cross-cutting concern 
in a number of other goals and appears in many of the regime’s supporting targets 
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(Morrow, 2018), it is more prominent still in Agenda 2030. Nevertheless, in both 
contexts, rights-based coverage is again effectively side-stepped (Morrow, 2018). 
However, fawed as the coverage offered may be, the fact that gender is included 
in the SDGs provides an additional route to invoke gender equality, which is 
signifcant in the context of the increasingly regularised interplay between the 
climate change and SDG regimes. The latter is indicated, for example, by the 
inclusion of ‘Action on Climate and the SDGs’ under UNFCCC topics (UN 
FCCC Topics, n.d.). 
A plethora of institutional activity – But to what avail? 
The UNFCCC regime machinery has, belatedly, engaged prolifcally with the 
gender agenda and its approach has matured considerably, yet its impact has 
been at best limited. This begs the question, what is needed to do better? On 
paper, the building of a sound foundation of accurate and transparent data, its 
dissemination within the UNFCCC, and tying it in, however symbolically, with 
the human rights and SDG agendas more broadly, demonstrates some promise 
for more thoroughgoing engagement with gender and climate change than hith-
erto. Were this all that had been done, it would, however, have been open to 
interpretation as a cynical exercise in ecomodernism, favouring form over sub-
stance. However, latterly it has been joined by the promotion of institutional 
refection, debate and change, which ostensibly provides a more grounded basis 
for addressing substantive gender inequality issues. In practice, though, progress, 
even within the UNFCCC’s own constituent bodies, has been frankly unimpres-
sive. Self-evidently, more needs to be done – but what? Bringing gender into 
sharper focus than ever before has made the pervasive nature of gender inequal-
ity even more apparent. This is important in itself, as it lays bare the root of the 
failure of UNFCCC initiatives to gain much traction – state inaction on gender 
equality. The failure of states to live up to their international legal commitments 
is notionally a source of political embarrassment vis-à-vis other states and stake-
holders and often described as a potent lever to motivate states to action in both 
international human rights law (Cassel, 2001) and international environmental 
law (Benedick, 1998). Yet slow progress and even regression in gender equal-
ity suggest that both in general (as outlined above) and in the context of the 
UNFCCC shame does not always serve as an effective driver of state behaviour. 
The UNFCCC has done much to set its own house in order, but, as is read-
ily apparent from the discussion above, if it is confned to hortatory approaches 
to its state signatories, these will not suffce to bring about deeper change, as 
states are effectively free to ignore exhortations to act on existing gender equal-
ity commitments. In theory, the UNFCCC could do more; in recognition of the 
pervasive and deeply entrenched nature of gender inequality, a suite of tools has 
been identifed that can help to forge progress, for example, temporary quotas to 
promote participation (CEDAW, 2004; UN OHCHR, 2014). Failure to address 
gender equality could also be subject to innovative corrective action within the 












by limiting participation rights to a guaranteed minimum but rewarding gender-
equal delegations with support and increased opportunities to participate above 
that minimum. In practice, though, as an intergovernmental organisation, the 
UNFCCC is in a weak position to compel states to act, as it, in effect, relies 
on their goodwill to operate. The fundamental sovereign status of states in this 
area, as in all others, remains the ultimate brake on progress. Political buy-in 
and sustained commitment to the pursuit of gender equality by the UNFCCC’s 
signatory states is crucial, but remains controversial for some states, standing in 
the way of consensus. Additionally, but relatedly, state fnancial buy-in is also 
necessary to further progress – if gender equality is not viewed as a priority, it is 
not adequately resourced and progress will be hampered. It is telling that most 
UNFCCC documents on gender equality repeat the refrain that action is subject 
to the availability of fnancial resources. 
What is needed? Updating, expanding and fully realising 
UNFCCC engagement with gender issues 
The UNFCCC began as a male-dominated, masculinist-oriented regime and
despite concerted efforts to correct this, the continued paucity of women’s par-
ticipation and its limited impact underline that this remains largely the case in
substance, if not in form. Insofar as equality between women and men within the
global climate governance regime is concerned, we are dealing with a broadly
improving picture, after a belated start, but the business in hand is very much
unfnished and progress remains quite sporadic and slow overall. This is not the
only area of gender concern where concerted action is needed. Our understanding
of the complexity of sex and gender, extending far beyond the female/male binary,
has been rediscovered (Independent Lens, 2015) and grown apace in recent years.
The World Health Organisation (WHO) defnes gender as referring to: 
the roles, behaviours, activities, attributes and opportunities that any society 
considers appropriate for girls and boys, and women and men. Gender inter-
acts with, but is different from, the binary categories of biological sex. 
(WHO, n.d.) 
Thus, an informed and current approach to gender must extend its reach beyond 
the conventional female/male binary and be genderqueered to embrace those of 
all sexes, genders and orientations and indeed those of none. The understanding 
of gender as expressed in our international institutions more generally (human 
rights bodies excepted, discussed briefy below) has now fallen far behind our 
social and scientifc grasp of the issues that it raises and remains dominated by 
the female/male binary. 
As Kenny has observed, feminist analysis has evolved beyond a simplistic 
sexed approach focused on ‘women’s issues’ to embrace a broader perspective on 
gender as performance. Fully pursuing even this has, however, proven problem-
atic when looking at issues of representation, ‘where research continues to focus 
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on female bodies as the “main vehicles” for institutional change and transforma-
tion’ (Kenny, p. 94). It is also the case in global climate change governance that 
gender continues to be largely confated with ‘women’s issues’ and that broader 
gender concerns, notably those relating to LGBTQI+ persons, remain under-
interrogated to the point of near invisibility. UN work in cognate areas, such as 
food security (UNEP, 2018, p. 33) suggests, in passing, that LGBTQI+ people 
face many of the same disadvantages as women, and as these issues intersect with 
climate change, it is therefore reasonable to assume that a broader notion of 
equality than that typically current should be applied to the treatment of gender-
based vulnerability to climate change. This lacuna is fairly typical, as while the 
UN human rights machinery fnally turned its attention to LGBTQI+ rights in 
the last few years, as was the case with women’s issues for many years, other UN 
institutions remain relatively unengaged. It is also the case that the human rights 
activity in this area thus far remains fairly narrow, focusing primarily on frst-
generation (civil and political) rights (UN OHCHR, 2019). Second-generation 
(social and economic) and third-generation (solidarity) rights also need to be 
invoked, not least in the context of climate change, if we are to give full meaning 
to the universality of human rights and dignity in this regard; equal human rights 
are the entitlement of all, gender/no gender notwithstanding. Ebbs and fows in 
the respect accorded to human rights are, given the tide of human affairs, entirely 
to be expected. The core international protections owe their origins to reactions 
to the horrors of World War Two – and it speaks volumes that it was deemed 
necessary to articulate and garner state support for them in the context of vast 
infringements of the most basic entitlements of human beings. While arguments 
on the effcacy of international human rights law are commonplace (Cassel, 
2001), what it does provide is an articulation of core protections that serves as 
a yardstick to evaluate state (and international institutional) behaviour. As the 
boundaries that human rights protection delineate are tested, not least by climate 
change, the willingness – or not – of the international community to deploy 
rights rhetoric as prevention and/or cure is immensely revealing. Human rights 
commitments, then, have an important role to play in the conduct of human 
affairs, albeit as part of a broad, complex and multi-layered framework of legal, 
political and social processes (Cassel, 2001). Where gender and human rights 
are concerned, a global backlash fuelled by some religious and ultra-conservative 
groupings is currently observable in relation to both women’s (UN OHCHR, 
2014; Lilja and Johansson, 2018) and LGBTQI+ rights (UN OHCHR, 2019). 
This backlash demonstrates the precarity of even the limited progress that we 
have made in this regard and that there is a real danger of regression that will 
have broad ramifcations across our societies and act to the detriment of all. 
Conclusion – Process is all very well, but progress must be 
prioritised 
While there has been some progress in addressing gender in the global cli-




continues to dominate. Insofar as gender, narrowly defned across the female/ 
male binary, is concerned, advancement has been uneven and achingly slow. As 
Caroline Criado Perez puts it: 
we have to close the female representation gap. When women are involved 
in decision-making, in research, in knowledge production, women do not 
get forgotten. Female lives and perspectives are brought out of the shadows. 
(Perez, 2019, p. 318) 
It is now also readily apparent that a largely binary focus is too narrow to fully 
address gender issues (UNEP, 2018, p. 196). Furthermore, broader gender iden-
tity and sexuality–related diverse perspectives share many of the hallmarks of 
exclusion that have long been identifed with regard to the basic gender binary. 
Gender equality is not a novel claim, nor should it be regarded as a radical one, 
though given the paucity of progress that we have made in its realisation, one 
could be excused for thinking that it was both. It stands to our shame that the 
constant refrain that commentators must adopt in this feld is slow progress; 
more needs to be done. It remains the case that, in an international legal sys-
tem founded on state sovereignty (Dixon, 2013) and hallmarked by the limited 
enforcement capacity of a regime based on consent and consensus (Dixon, 2013), 
bodies such as the UNFCCC, however committed they are to advancing gen-
der equality, are politically constrained in getting states to live up to their com-
mitments. While more compelling approaches are notionally available, political 
realism in the context of the UNFCCC suggests that persuading states to act will 
continue to be the standard approach. Limited progress to date, however, suggests 
that this is incapable of delivering the paradigm shift required. It remains the case 
that representation – both in presence (which is necessary but not suffcient) 
and, in turn, in infuence – is the sine qua non of progress on gender equality. Self-
interest supports this; if climate change has taught us nothing else, it is that it will 
require the whole range of human ingenuity and agency to tackle it. It requires 
an inclusive approach that brings all human perspectives, female, LGBTQI+ and 
male, to the table – to proceed otherwise is a further act of self-sabotage, adding 
an avoidable additional challenge to the already obdurate problems that we face. 
Notes 
1 Initially there were 11 constituted bodies in total: the Executive Board of the clean 
development mechanism (CDM Executive Board); the Joint Implementation 
Supervisory Committee (JISC); the Compliance Committee facilitative branch; the 
Compliance Committee enforcement branch; the Least Developed Countries Expert 
Group (LEG); the Consultative Group of Experts on National Communications from 
Parties not included in Annex I to the Convention (CEG); the Adaptation Fund Board 
(AFB); the Technology Executive Committee (TEC); the Adaptation Committee 
(AC); the Standing Committee on Finance (SCF); and the Advisory Board of the 
Climate Technology Centre and Network (CTCN Advisory Board). The Executive 
Committee of the Warsaw International Mechanism for Loss and Damage associated 
with Climate Change Impacts (Executive Committee of the WIM) was added from 
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2014 and included in analysis of the report statistics from 2015. The Paris Committee 
on Capacity Building (PCCB) was added from 2017. The Facilitative Working Group 
of the Local Communities and Indigenous Peoples Platform (fgures analysed relate to 
government members only) and the Katowice Committee of Experts on the Impacts 
of the Implementation of Response Measures were added in 2019. 
2 Namely the AC, AFB, CDM Executive Board, CGE, CTCN Advisory Board, JISC, 
LEG, PCCB, SCF, TEC and Executive Committee of the WIM. Exceptions were task- 
or time-based. 
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3 EU external climate policy 
Gill Allwood 
Introduction 
Climate change has arrived centre-stage on the EU’s policy agenda. The new 
President of the Commission, Ursula von der Leyen, announced in 2019 that 
Europe would be the frst climate-neutral continent by 2050 and introduced the 
European Green Deal and the frst EU climate laws as part of the project to 
achieve this goal. Externally, the EU plays a major role in international climate 
negotiations, partly to meet its global leadership aspirations, and partly to ensure 
that European manufacturing is not undercut by producers with lower environ-
mental standards. Climate change also features prominently in EU foreign policy, 
where it is framed as part of a series of nexuses, connecting it with migration, 
security and confict. The need to address climate change rests against a back-
drop of crisis – economic, environmental, health and political – building a sense 
of urgency and strategic prioritisation. One of the consequences of this is the 
sidelining of gender equality, despite the EU’s repeated assertions of its commit-
ment to mainstreaming the goal of gender equality throughout all its internal and 
external activities. 
This chapter draws on feminist institutionalism and the literature on policy 
integration, including gender mainstreaming, to show how and why gender is 
excluded from EU external climate policy. It asks, frstly, where, in external 
climate policy, do we fnd references to gender and what, if anything, do they 
contribute to achieving gender-just climate policy. Secondly, it asks how femi-
nist institutionalism and policy integration studies can help us understand why 
gender equality is not mainstreamed in EU external policy and what institutional 
obstacles prevent its integration. I argue that gender has been excluded from 
EU external climate policy by a combination of institutional power struggles; a 
discourse of crisis and security, which pushes gender into the background; and a 
proliferation of nexuses and mainstreaming imperatives in which the treaty obli-
gation to mainstream gender is pushed to one side. 
EU climate policy 
EU climate policy has three main components: mitigation, adaptation and cli-
mate diplomacy. Mitigation refers to strategies for reducing climate change, 
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largely through the reduction of greenhouse gas emissions. Adaptation refers to 
strategies for adapting to the effects of climate change, such as increased food-
ing, droughts and unpredictable weather patterns. Climate diplomacy refers to 
the EU’s role in international climate negotiations and agreements, an area in 
which it has sought to assert leadership. However, fnancial, economic, and polit-
ical crises from 2008 slowed internal climate policy, and internal opposition to 
strong climate action has grown, particularly from central and eastern European 
member states, including Poland (Dupont and Oberthür, 2015, p. 229). While 
initially, the EU’s ambitions exceeded its own internal practice, since the mid-
2000s it has tried to ‘lead by example’. The EU, along with its member states, is 
a signatory to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change 
(UNFCCC) and plays a key role in trying to reach agreements on global tar-
gets (Biedenkopf and Dupont, 2013). The EU was an infuential player in the 
2015 Paris Agreement, the frst universal, legally binding climate agreement and 
continues to try to push global targets upwards (Oberthür and Groen, 2018). 
Key policy frameworks are the Climate and Energy Package for the period 
2020–2030 (COM [2014] 15 fnal), which sets out targets for greenhouse gas emis-
sions reductions, renewable energy and energy effciency; and the Environmental 
Action Programme, which provides an overarching framework for all environ-
mental and climate policy. The European Green Deal (2019) sets out a strategy 
for achieving net-zero greenhouse gas emissions by 2050 while sustaining eco-
nomic growth. The frst ‘climate law’ (COM [2020] 80 fnal) was proposed in 
early 2020, aiming to enshrine in legislation the objective of climate neutrality 
by 2050. 
Since 2013, internal EU climate policy has also included an adaptation strat-
egy, in recognition that climate change is having an impact within the EU, as 
well as, more obviously, elsewhere. While climate change mitigation was more 
readily framed as an issue to be dealt with at the EU level, adaptation to the 
effects of climate change appeared, until recently, to require local responses or 
to be of concern only in countries hit most severely by the impact of climate 
change, which are concentrated in the Global South. The foods and heatwaves 
of the early 2000s raised awareness of the impact of climate change within the EU 
and of its cross-border nature (Rayner and Jordan, 2010). As a consequence, the 
EU’s adaptation strategy was adopted in 2013 (COM(2018) 738 fnal). Member 
states are encouraged to produce national adaptation strategies, setting out, for 
example, how they will climate-proof their transport, energy and agriculture 
sectors, and protect their populations from fooding, droughts and heatwaves. 
As part of EU external relations, however, adaptation has a longer history. The 
visible impact of climate change in developing countries, and the use of devel-
opment aid for adaptation purposes, means that climate change has long been 
prominent in EU development policy. A Commission Communication in 2003 
(COM [2003] 85 fnal) declared climate change a development, as well as an 
environmental, problem. This has implications for the study of gender and EU 
climate policy, as will be demonstrated later. The well-established nature of 
gender and development within the European Commission and the European 
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Parliament (especially its FEMM Committee on Women’s Rights and Gender 
Equality and the Committee on Development) means that adaptation has been 
the core concern of gender and climate change analyses and policy proposals 
emanating from these institutions. 
The EU’s internal and external climate policies are dealt with by different 
decision-making institutions and processes. The European Commission is respon-
sible for drafting EU legislative proposals. The newly appointed President, Ursula 
von der Leyen, has declared climate change one of her top priorities, and the 
European Green Deal (2019) was introduced as one of the new Commission’s frst 
actions. Internal EU climate policy is proposed by the Commission Directorate-
General for Climate Action, DG CLIMA, which was created in 2010. However, 
climate change cannot be addressed by discrete policy measures. Energy, environ-
ment, agriculture, transport and trade all play a crucial role. Successfully meeting 
climate targets requires other policy sectors to integrate climate change into their 
work, as will be discussed later in this chapter. 
Externally, climate change appears in foreign, security, external migration and 
international development policy. Since the Paris Agreement (2015), external 
climate policy has included supporting partner countries with the formulation 
and implementation of their Nationally Determined Contributions (European 
Commission, 2019, p. 62). The EU’s Global Climate Change Alliance Plus 
initiative (GCCA+) has fostered policy dialogue with, and support for climate 
action in partner countries, mainly Least Developed Countries (LDCs) and 
Small Island Developing States (SIDS) (European Commission, 2019, p. 64). 
Before the Lisbon Treaty (2009), climate change, like other EU policy issues, 
was expected to align with the principle of Policy Coherence for Development. 
Policy Coherence for Development is a treaty obligation and is intended to 
prevent EU policies in areas other than international development undermin-
ing development objectives. This applies to all EU activities, including climate 
action. Impact assessments are supposed to be conducted to ensure that proposed 
actions will not have adverse effects on developing countries. However, the rela-
tive weakness of development policy institutions within the EU; the hierarchy of 
political priorities; and the poor implementation of the impact assessment obliga-
tion mean that Policy Coherence for Development has been more of a rhetorical 
commitment than an accomplishment. The Lisbon Treaty (2009) brought about 
a shift in emphasis, with development objectives being set alongside new strategic 
priorities, such as security and migration, and then gradually losing place to them. 
Development policy is increasingly required to serve the interests of a security-
focused foreign policy. According to the Global Strategy (High Representative of 
the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy 2016), which is the overarch-
ing statement of EU foreign policy, ‘Development policy needs to become more 
fexible and aligned with our strategic priorities’. EU foreign and security policy 
frames climate change as a security threat and a root cause of migration (High 
Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy 2016, p. 27). 
The Council Conclusions on Climate Diplomacy of 26 February 2018 state that: 
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become an even greater source of global risk, including forced displacement and 
migration’. Development policy is now expected to mainstream climate change 
adaptation to render partner countries more resilient when coping with climate 
change consequences in order to address the root causes of the migration crisis. 
The European Consensus on Development (2017) calls for climate change inte-
gration across all sectors of development cooperation. It commits to addressing 
the root causes of migration, including climate change. This is a reversal of the 
expectation prior to the Lisbon Treaty that climate action would be coherent 
with development policy objectives. 
The European Commission’s framing of the EU’s global role stresses the 
importance of access to 
partner countries’ markets, infrastructure and critical raw materials. This 
starts with enhancing the EU’s energy and climate diplomacy, and with fur-
ther mainstreaming climate change objectives and considerations in politi-
cal dialogues, including in the area of migration, security and development 
cooperation. 
(COM [2018]773 fnal) 
Climate mainstreaming is seen as a way to achieve the EU’s trade, security and 
migration priorities, and is, therefore, a core priority for external action. 
Where does gender ft into EU external climate policy? 
This section of the chapter gives an overview of EU gender equality policy, show-
ing where it intersects with climate policy. Focusing on external climate policy, 
it then asks where we can fnd references to gender and what, if anything, they 
contribute to achieving gender-just climate policy. 
The EU is committed to mainstreaming gender throughout all of its inter-
nal and external activities. Article 8 of the TFEU states: ‘in all its activi-
ties, the Union shall aim to eliminate inequalities, and to promote equality,
between men and women’. EU institutions still tend to frame gender equality
as ‘equality between men and women’, ignoring the heterogeneity of these
two categories, the power relations within, as well as between, them, and the
intersection of other structural inequalities with gender. There are institu-
tional pockets in which a more nuanced gender analysis emerges. These will
be discussed where they relate to external climate policy. The EU’s approach
to gender equality is contained in its Gender Equality Strategy, the most
recent version of which was launched in March 2020. The strategy makes
some move away from a focus on equality between women and men, aiming
to achieve 
a Europe where women and men, girls and boys, in all their diversity, are 
equal … The Commission will enhance gender mainstreaming by systemati-









policy areas, internal and external. The Strategy will be implemented using 
intersectionality as a cross-cutting principle. 
(p. 2) 
Although there is no detail about how this will be done, the recognition of inter-
sectionality is an important step away from equating gender equality solely with a 
men–women binary. An intersectional analytical lens has been used by feminist 
scholars to make important contributions to our understanding of the impact of 
climate change and responses to it (Nagel, 2012; Tschakert and Machado, 2012; 
Kaijser and Kronsell, 2014; MacGregor, 2014; Sultana, 2014). Intersectionality 
can help us understand individual and group-based differences in relation to cli-
mate change. Rather than designating women as vulnerable victims of climate 
change, an intersectional approach demonstrates that social structures based 
on characteristics such as gender, socio-economic status, ethnicity, national-
ity, health, sexual orientation, age and place infuence the responsibility, vul-
nerability and decision-making power of individuals and groups. For example, 
Kronsell’s (2013) study of Sweden shows that there are gendered differences in 
energy consumption and transportation. She argues, however, that it is important 
to recognise that gender is not the only relevant factor; sometimes class mat-
ters more than gender and there are considerable differences within the Global 
North and Global South. An intersectional analysis asks which social categories 
are included in, and excluded from, the cases in question, what assumptions are 
made about social categories, and what type of knowledge is privileged (Kaijser 
and Kronsell, 2014). Buckingham and Le Masson (2017, pp. 2–3) argue that, 
If gender, and gender equality, is to be a meaningful policy objective, it must be
recognised that it comprises relations between women and men, and between
and among different groups of women and men, not to mention between
different conceptualisations of masculinity and femininity, which can each
be practised by either, and both, women and men … Understanding gender
inequality also requires a simultaneous understanding of social and economic
divisions based on class, ethnicity, age, disability, religion, sexuality, parent-
hood, among others, and how these divisions intersect to compound particu-
lar disadvantages and inequalities between and within social groups. 
Internally, the EU’s concern with gender equality has focused primarily on equal 
pay for equal work, a principle enshrined in the treaties since the Treaty of Rome 
(1957). The EU has been committed to gender mainstreaming since 1996, mean-
ing that gender equality should be integrated into all areas and at all stages of 
policy-making. However, key areas of activity remain untouched, including 
energy, trade and transport. The European Parliament’s FEMM Committee has 
highlighted many of these gaps in a series of reports and resolutions, as has the 
European Institute for Gender Equality (EIGE). For example, EIGE (2016), 
fnds that the European Commission has only just begun to recognise the links 
between gender and transport, and according to the European Parliament (2018), 
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‘current EU trade policy and its “Trade for All” strategy … lack a gender equality 
perspective’. 
Gender equality and women’s empowerment are declared core objectives of 
EU external action (Gender Equality Strategy 2020–2025). Since 2015, the sec-
ond Gender Action Plan (GAPII), has required all actors in EU external action 
to implement and report on gender mainstreaming, specifc actions and political 
dialogue in relation to gender equality. GAPII also introduced a cross-cutting 
priority: Institutional Cultural Shift. This was based on the recognition that gen-
der equality will only be achieved once there is a signifcant change in institu-
tional culture. It will be discussed in the next section of this chapter. The original 
Gender Action Plan (2010) was created within the Directorate-General (DG) 
for Development and aimed to translate gender and development commitments 
into effective policy outcomes. This illustrates the importance of EU develop-
ment policy institutions in raising awareness of gender equality, gender main-
streaming and gender analysis. The strong infuence within DG Development 
of Gender and Development experts and advocates has resulted in development 
cooperation being the most gender-aware area of EU policy. In the wake of the 
Lisbon Treaty, the creation of the European External Action Service, and the 
restructuring of DG DEVCO, the second Gender Action Plan, GAPII (2015– 
2019), applied to all areas of EU external action, not just development policy, 
and to all actors, including EU headquarters in Brussels, EU delegations in part-
ner countries and member states. This shift from development to external action 
has diluted the infuence of gender and development activists and advocates on 
the framing of gender equality issues, and gender equality remains less well inte-
grated into areas of external action outside international development. 
Development policy documents continue to enshrine a long-standing commit-
ment to gender equality. For example, the European Consensus on Development 
(2017, para 15) states that: 
gender equality is at the core of the EU’s values and is enshrined in its legal 
and political framework. It is vital for achieving the SDGs and cuts across 
the whole 2030 Agenda. The EU and its Member States will promote wom-
en’s and girls’ rights, gender equality, the empowerment of women and girls 
and their protection as a priority across all areas of action. 
In line with the UN’s 2030 Agenda and with growing awareness of diversity 
and intersectionality, the European Consensus on Development (2017, para 16) 
moves beyond a focus on gender alone: 
the EU and its Member States will continue to play a key role in ensuring 
that no-one is left behind, wherever people live and regardless of ethnic-
ity, gender, age, disability, religion or beliefs, sexual orientation and gender 
identity, migration status or other factors. This approach includes addressing 
the multiple discriminations faced by vulnerable people and marginalised 
groups. 
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Statements of commitment to gender mainstreaming are pervasive in EU for-
eign and security policy, including external climate policy. The Global Strategy 
(High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy 2016, 
11 and 51), states that: ‘we must systematically mainstream human rights and 
gender issues across policy sectors and institutions’. The Council Conclusions 
on Climate Diplomacy of 26 February 2018, state that: ‘gender equality, wom-
en’s empowerment and women’s full and equal participation and leadership are 
vital to achieving sustainable development, including climate change adapta-
tion’. The Council Conclusions on Climate Diplomacy of 18 February 2019 state 
that: ‘the EU will continue to uphold, promote and protect human rights, gen-
der equality and women’s empowerment in the context of climate action’. The 
European Council Strategic Agenda 2019–2024, sets out as one of its four main 
priorities a climate-neutral, green, fair and social Europe, stating that ‘Europe 
needs inclusiveness and sustainability, embracing the changes brought about by 
the green transition, technological evolution and globalisation, while making 
sure no-one is left behind’. In this section, it adds: ‘we need to do more to ensure 
equality between women and men, as well as rights and opportunities for all. This 
is both a societal imperative and an economic asset’. 
These statements can be read as all-embracing or as add-ons to unchanged 
gender-blind policy. They are now systemic in EU external policy and can pro-
vide leverage for gender equality advocates, both inside and outside EU institu-
tions, but they can also suggest that the problem has been resolved, removing 
incentives to address it. 
In contrast, the European Green Deal (2019) is completely gender blind. It 
makes no reference to gender/women, although it does say that the transition 
to a climate-neutral economy must be ‘just and inclusive’ and must ‘put people 
frst’ (p. 2). The European Green Deal mostly concerns internal policy, but a sec-
tion on ‘the EU as a Global Leader’ stresses the importance of increasing climate 
resilience in partner countries to avoid ‘confict, food insecurity, population dis-
placement and forced migration’. The EU’s efforts to ‘lead by example’ in climate 
action are important, but the gender blindness of climate policy means that any 
norms it exports will also be gender blind. 
One of the reasons why gender is absent from the European Green Deal is that 
(gender) equality and climate action are presented as two of the new Commission’s 
top priorities, but they are kept separate from one another. Elements of gender-
awareness in relation to climate change exist in fragments of EU policy, but they 
lack coherence. The Gender Equality Strategy has a short section on climate 
change which points out some of the ways in which climate change is gendered 
and argues that, ‘Addressing the gender dimension can therefore have a key 
role in leveraging the full potential of these policies’. GAPII refers to climate 
issues only twice. The frst reference states that the Commission’s services and 
European External Action Service will contribute to ‘women’s increased partici-
pation in decision-making processes on climate and environmental issues’ and 
Objective 20 in Annex 1 is: ‘equal rights enjoyed by women to participate in 
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This is the objective least often reported upon. There are also reports on gender 
and climate change by EIGE and the European Parliament, some of which are 
limited to counting the numbers of women in climate decision-making, and some 
of which contain sophisticated gender analyses of climate issues and responses. 
The EIGE (2019) report, for example, reiterates the EU’s obligations to integrate 
gender equality into its climate change policies, in line with the UNFCCC Lima 
Work Programme on Gender and the 2017 Gender Action Plan, as well as with 
the EU’s own gender mainstreaming commitments. However, EIGE argues that 
these have not been translated into concrete actions, and EU climate policy has 
remained largely gender blind. 
To summarise, climate change is mentioned briefy in gender equality docu-
ments, such as GAPII and the Gender Equality Strategy, but the major climate 
framework document of 2019, the European Green Deal, is gender blind. The 
Social Development Goals (SDGs) offer the potential to bring gender equality 
and climate change together, but this has not yet been realised, including within 
EU policy-making. 
A feminist institutionalist analysis of gender and EU external 
climate policy 
The previous section has shown that gender equality is not mainstreamed in
EU external climate policy. Can feminist institutionalism help us to understand
why this is the case? Feminist institutionalism tells us that institutions matter,
that they are ridden with gendered power relations, and that they are resistant to
change. Feminist institutionalism (Mackay et al., 2009; Krook and Mackay, 2011;
Chappell and Waylen, 2013; Waylen, 2013) can help explain the gap between
formal commitments to gender mainstreaming and gender equality in all policy
areas and at all stages of policy-making and, on the other hand, persistently gen-
der-blind policy in particular areas, in this case, climate change. It enables us to
examine the institutional constraints, opportunities and resistances that affect
gender mainstreaming within climate change policy-making. Feminist institu-
tionalism emphasises the importance of informal practices, norms and values,
exposing the ways in which they can constrain or distort formal rules (Chappell
and Waylen, 2013; Waylen, 2013). A focus on the informal rules of the game
provides clues that can contribute to explaining the gap between the rhetoric and
reality of gender mainstreaming in specifc areas of EU policy. Focusing on the
relation between formal rules and informal practices can help us understand why
gender mainstreaming – which is formally compulsory in all policy areas and all
stages of policy-making – is ignored, overlooked, pushed down the agenda or out to
the margins, while the main business of climate change policy-making continues
unperturbed. Drawing on sociological institutionalism, feminist institutionalism
suggests that actors are constrained by cultural conventions, norms and cognitive
frames of reference which privilege a certain way of thinking about a policy prob-
lem and ensure that other perspectives remain submerged from view (Lowndes














focus on the construction and contestation of meaning in the interaction between
gender mainstreaming and climate change policies (Schmidt, 2012). Gender
mainstreaming is interpreted and re-interpreted in day-to-day institutional inter-
actions. Individual and collective actors engage in struggles to impose their under-
standings of gender mainstreaming, and this is affected by the broader context
of institutional power imbalances that push issues such as gender equality to the
centre or the margins of particular policy debates. It can reveal ways in which
gender mainstreaming is imbued with new meanings in day-to-day policy-making
practices. It can highlight the ways in which issues are constructed as certain types
of problem requiring certain types of solution. This can act as a constraint on those
pushing other meanings. The special issue of Political Studies Review on gender
and external action shows that in times of crisis, gender equality is pushed off the
agenda (Muehlenhoff et al., 2020). Studies on the gendered impact of COVID-19
have revealed the same effect (John et al., 2020). Crisis discourse wrongly pro-
claims that ‘we are all in this together’, whereas Cynthia Enloe (2020) insists that 
we are not all in this together. We’re on the same rough seas, but we’re 
in very different boats. And some of those boats are very leaky. And some 
of those boats were never given oars. And some of those boats have high-
powered motors on them. We are not all in the same boat. 
The EU’s institutions have very different institutional cultures. The European 
Parliament, for example, has traditionally been greener and more gender equal-
ity-friendly than the Council, but can be squeezed out of decision-making, par-
ticularly in areas where member states seek to retain control. The Council has 
retained exceptional control of climate policy-making, meaning that the mem-
ber states have more infuence and the European Parliament has less infuence 
than is set out in the treaties (Dupont, 2019). Climate and gender equality lag-
gards, often from central and eastern Europe, can water down policy in both 
of these areas. EU decision-making is famously sectoral, although some cross-
sectoral structures exist, for example, the European Parliament’s gender main-
streaming group and the promised Task Force for Equality in the Commission. 
Power relations between external climate institutions affect their relative ability 
to frame climate change. For example, the European Parliament Development 
Committee and the European Commission’s Directorate-General for develop-
ment are relatively weak. In contrast, security and migration institutions and 
frames are dominating the external climate policy agenda (Youngs, 2014). The 
Lisbon Treaty enhanced external action, but reduced the profle of development 
within it. There is also a gap between policy formulation in Brussels and imple-
mentation by the EUDs in the partner countries. As Debusscher and Manners 
(2020) point out, it is not just about what happens in the institutions in Brussels. 
External climate policy is also made and implemented in the delegations in the 
partner countries and in partnership with the partner countries. Studies have 
shown that gender mainstreaming is not consistently present in these institutions 
and processes (Allwood, 2018). 
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Institutional resistance to gender-sensitive change was recognised in GAPII 
which applies to all external action and contains an important cross-cutting pri-
ority: Institutional Cultural Shift. This means ‘shifting the Commission services 
and the European External Action Service’s institutional culture to more effec-
tively deliver on EU commitments’. Institutional Cultural Shift was based on 
the idea that change will only be brought about once a systemic shift has taken 
place. This aligns with Rao and Kelleher’s (2005) work on gender and organisa-
tions, which argues that effective gender mainstreaming needs transformational 
institutional change. It is a response to the recognition that organisations matter 
and that they are ‘sticky’. Path dependency might explain why climate change 
continues to be framed as a scientifc, elitist, technical and masculinised issue. As 
Cornwall and Rivas (2015, p. 400) argue, ‘Ultimately, a paradigm transformation 
is needed to reclaim the gender agenda and address the underlying structures of 
constraint that give these inequalities the systemic character and the persistence 
over time’. 
Institutional Cultural Shift and changing mindsets are essential for gender 
transformation, but will not be effective without political will. Gender composi-
tion at management level in the European External Action Service is worse than 
in the European Parliament, European Commission and Council. Chappell and 
Guerrina (2020, p. 8) fnd that, 
A common normative stance within the European External Action Service 
has not yet fully evolved, indicating that where a gender perspective does 
occur, it is unlikely to have dispersed across the European External Action 
Service. Hence, there may well be ‘pockets’ of gender actorness, but not 
full gender mainstreaming. From an institutional perspective, this relates not 
only to how many women are working within the European External Action 
Service but also whether offcials are looking at EU foreign policy through 
a gender lens. 
Efforts to integrate gender equality in the institutions continue. The European 
External Action Service Gender and Equal Opportunities Strategy 2018–2023, 
aims to achieve gender equality in the European External Action Service in 
the broadest sense, whereby women and men enjoy equal rights, equal obli-
gations and equal opportunities across the Service … through accelerated 
progress towards gender balance and accelerated Institutional Cultural Shift 
in the European External Action Service. 
(p. 6) 
This is justifed in terms of productivity and effectiveness: 
measures will be put in place for the sustainable transformation of institu-
tional refexes and individual mindsets. Transformational measures will aim 
to counteract stereotypes, unintended bias and prejudices while at the same 
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time fostering inclusivity, diversity and collaboration through training, men-
toring, coaching, networking and innovative learning and through provid-
ing equal development opportunities for women and men. 
(p. 8) 
However, the European Parliament draft report on Gender Equality in the EU’s 
Foreign and Security Policy 2019/2167 (INI), of 27 March 2020, calls for more 
precision and specifc targets on gender and diversity in this strategy. It also calls 
for member states to create a formal Council working group on gender equality, 
argues that the European External Action Service Principal Advisor on gender 
equality requires more staff and resources, and calls on the Vice President/High 
Representative to ensure that heads of European Union Delegations (EUDs) 
abroad ensure that gender equality is mainstreamed throughout all of the delega-
tion’s work and that there is a full-time gender focal point in each delegation. 
An additional obstacle to mainstreaming gender throughout all EU exter-
nal climate policy is that the latter is itself constructed as a cross-cutting issue. 
Gender mainstreaming is implemented more easily in discrete policy sectors and 
is more diffcult to apply to other cross-cutting issues. There is a long-standing 
and widespread understanding that some objectives cannot be reached by treat-
ing them as standalone goals, but that they need to be woven into all areas of 
decision-making and at all stages. This is referred to as mainstreaming (as in gen-
der mainstreaming), policy integration (as in environmental policy integration), 
or policy coherence (as in policy coherence for development). Collectively, 
they can be referred to as horizontal policy coordination. Gender mainstream-
ing, environmental policy integration and policy coherence for development are 
all treaty-based obligations. As policy-makers increasingly refer to cross-cutting 
issues and to policy nexuses, we need a way to understand and improve how they 
intersect. 
We can draw on the literature on horizontal policy coordination and policy 
nexuses to try to understand how policy issues interconnect and what happens 
when they do. This literature considers how cross-cutting issues are integrated 
into policy sectors. It shows where this works and where it fails, and suggests 
explanations for these outcomes (De Roeck et al., 2018). It suggests that suc-
cessful policy coherence requires a strong shared vision which acts as a strate-
gic goal and maintains focus on the objective, and not on the procedural tools 
and instruments. The substantial literature on gender mainstreaming shows 
that, despite repeated rhetorical commitments by EU actors, it is still absent 
from key policy areas and is often treated as procedural, rather than substan-
tive (Meier and Celis, 2011; Allwood, 2013; Guerrina and Wright, 2016). Kok 
and de Corninck’s (2007, pp. 587–599) study of climate change mainstreaming 
shows that organisational structures were not designed for cooperation, coordi-
nation and joint decision-making on different levels. There are power imbal-
ances between different Commission DGs; between different confgurations of 
the Council of Ministers; and between the Council, the European Parliament 
and the Commission. The European Parliament, and in particular its various 
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committees on the environment, development and gender equality, have been 
increasingly active in advocating the mainstreaming of these issues throughout 
all European Parliament decision-making, but the European Parliament can be 
excluded from forms of decision-making dominated by intergovernmentalism, 
and this applies to most of the Union’s climate change policy. Power imbalances 
and inter-institutional rivalries mean that issues such as environmental protec-
tion can struggle to impinge on policies shored up by powerful economic interests 
such as trade and agriculture. Institutional resistance, often based on powerful 
economic interests, is identifed as the main obstacle by Gupta and van der Grijp 
(2010), in their study of climate change mainstreaming. Climate change main-
streaming threatens the status quo and unsettles the vested interests of industry 
and the energy lobby. Resistance is therefore strong. Any policy competition or 
struggle for scarce resources will expose these imbalances, and rhetorical commit-
ment to mainstreaming may lack underlying substance, particularly in times of 
economic crisis. 
EU external policy increasingly uses the term ‘nexus’ to describe the inter-
section between two or more policy areas (Lavenex and Kunz, 2009; Carbone, 
2013; Furness and Gänzle, 2017; De Roeck et al., 2018). Climate change is situ-
ated in a series of nexuses, including climate-security and climate-migration. The 
Council Conclusions on Climate Diplomacy of 26 February 2018 ‘resolve … to 
further mainstream the nexus between climate change and security in political 
dialogue, confict prevention, development and humanitarian action and dis-
aster risk strategies’. While this is an important recognition that policy issues 
are intersecting and cannot be addressed in isolation from each other, it raises 
substantial questions about how gender can be mainstreamed throughout other 
cross-cutting issues. Allwood (2020a) found that gender equality is absent from 
the migration-security-climate nexuses which are driving development policy 
priorities. This makes mainstreaming even more challenging. Not only are cli-
mate change, migration and other cross-cutting issues to be mainstreamed in 
development cooperation and policy dialogue, but the nexus between them must 
also be mainstreamed. This raises questions about the practicalities of addressing 
complex webs of intersecting issues, especially when some of them are accorded 
priority status. It also creates a context in which the mainstreaming of gender 
becomes even more diffcult. 
Conclusion 
This feminist institutionalist analysis of EU external climate policy shows that the 
framing of climate change as a policy problem affects which institutions address it 
and which solutions are proposed. When climate change was framed as a devel-
opment issue, decisions were made by development institutions in the context of 
policy coherence for development. The relatively strong infuence of gender and 
development in DG DEV meant that there was some chance of external climate 
policy being tinged with gender awareness. Following the Lisbon Treaty, the 
creation of the European External Action Service, and the restructuring of DG 
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DEVCO, foreign and security policy gained prominence, and development policy 
became subservient to its priorities. Given that gender was relatively prominent 
in development policy, this contributed to gender slipping down the agenda. 
Crisis discourse accentuated this trend (Muehlenhoff et al., 2020). 
External relations gained prominence on the EU’s political agenda with the 
adoption of the Lisbon Treaty. The creation of the role of High Representative 
and the European External Action Service marked a new era in foreign and secu-
rity policy. These new institutional arrangements had consequences for both cli-
mate policy and gender equality. The new external agenda prioritised migration 
and security, and climate change was constructed as an external issue in relation 
to these priorities. The EU makes much of its foundational myth of gender equal-
ity (MacRae, 2010), and of the fact that gender equality is a fundamental value 
of the Union. Commitments to gender equality and to gender mainstreaming 
as a means of achieving it, abound in EU policy documents, both internal and 
external. Internal gender equality policy is closely linked to equality between 
women and men in the workplace. Present in the treaties since the foundation 
of the Common Market in 1957, equal pay for equal work (and later, work of 
equal value) has been at the heart of the EU’s gender equality narrative, even as 
the principle has extended to other areas of EU policy and has slowly begun to 
include other forms of inequality, discrimination and exclusion. Gender equality 
in external relations was, for many years, most visible in relation to development 
cooperation, which was infuenced by gender and development theory and prac-
tice. Gender awareness was higher than in other parts of EU external action and 
the Gender Action Plan of 2010, demonstrated a desire to implement commit-
ments to gender equality on the ground. This constituted an institutional context 
in which climate change as an issue affecting developing countries and the EU’s 
relations with them could potentially begin to be addressed in a gender-just fash-
ion. However, the reframing of climate change as a migration and security issue 
has acted as an obstacle to this. 
The construction of climate change as a problem which can be solved with 
market, technological and security solutions has, until recently, excluded a peo-
ple-centred approach, which could favour a gender-sensitive policy. There are 
signs that this is beginning to change very slowly. EU climate policy is edging away 
from an exclusive focus on technological solutions towards a recognition that cli-
mate change affects people, and that people are part of the solution. However, 
integrating diversity and intersectionality into the analysis of climate change and 
proposed responses to it is still a marginal concern (Allwood, 2020b). Efforts to 
address gender inequality and efforts to address climate change continue to exist 
in parallel, rather than being fully integrated into each other. Gender equality is 
not integrated into all aspects of decision-making and at all stages. Instead, it is 
tagged on or addressed in separate documents and debates, in what Acosta et al. 
(2019, p. 15) refer to as a ‘stale reproduction of set pieces of text [pointing to] sig-
nifcant levels of inertia in thinking and practice around gender mainstreaming 
issues’. This is a result of institutional stickiness, which makes it diffcult to bring 
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In addition to contributing to our understanding of why gender has not been
integrated into climate decision-making, this chapter also opens up the broader
question of how we can integrate gender throughout all (intersecting) policy in a
way that is transformative and sustainable (i.e. not just inserting the word gender
into policy documents, as Sherilyn MacGregor fears (2014, p. 624). If, as the SDGs
suggest, gender equality is a prerequisite for achieving sustainable development,
peace and security, and climate change mitigation and adaptation, then it must be
integrated into all of these policy areas, including the intersections between them. 
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4 How to make Germany’s climate 
policy gender-responsive 
Experiences from research and advocacy 
Gotelind Alber, Diana Hummel, Ulrike Röhr, 
and Immanuel Stieß 
Introduction 
A cornerstone to open the political perspective of the German climate policy
to gender and gender justice was a research project titled: ‘The contribution
of gender justice to successful climate policy: impact assessment, interde-
pendencies with other social categories, methodological issues and options
for shaping climate policy’ (Gender and Climate research project) commis-
sioned by the German Federal Environment Agency (UBA). It was carried out
from November 2016 to October 2019 by three partners: Wuppertal Institute
Environment, Climate, Energy, ISOE-Institute for Social-ecological Research
and GenderCC-Women for Climate Justice. The project aimed at reviewing
existing fndings on the gender and climate change nexus in industrialised
countries, examining the added value of the gender perspective for climate
policies and developing recommendations for action for the German national
framework, in line with the UNFCCC provisions on gender. Moreover, the
knowledge of obstacles towards a gender perspective in climate protection and
adaptation was to be enhanced (Röhr et al., 2018; Spitzner et al., 2020). The
study was based on the assumptions that, a) a gender perspective supports the
development of policies tailored for different target groups, thereby improving
the effectiveness of climate policy in particular in terms of acceptance; b) a
gender-responsive climate policy can counteract gender inequality; and c) in
this way, synergies can be created between climate protection/adaption and
gender justice. In the frst step, a systematic literature review of national and
international literature on sex and gender aspects in climate-relevant areas of
action in countries of the Global North, as well as an analysis of gender provi-
sions and mandates accruing from the UNFCCC process, have been conducted
(Röhr et al., 2018). In a second step, a ‘Gender Impact Assessment’ (GIA)
has been conceptualised for climate policies and measures, and developed in a
participatory process. As a third step, the prerequisites for gender analyses and
requirements for gender-responsive climate policies have been determined in
order to derive action and policy recommendations at the federal level. The
outcomes of the research project resulted in some advocacy activities within the
ministry (Spitzner et al., 2020). 
DOI: 10.4324/9781003052821-4 
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The research project as well as the developments in the German Ministry for 
the Environment, Nature Protection and Nuclear Safety (BMU) were backed 
by the latest gender-outcomes of the UNFCCC, which urge all governments to 
develop gender-responsive climate policies. 
In the following section, we provide an overview of how gender considera-
tions evolved in German climate policy. Then, in the next section, we look at 
two potential paths to integrate gender into climate policy. Finally, we discuss 
these options and, in conclusion, suggest next steps for working towards gender-
responsive climate policy. 
The starting point: Climate policy and gender in Germany 
German governments have generally considered themselves as forerunners in 
climate policy. Germany has been successful in presenting and advocating for 
ambitious climate goals and thereby pushing the climate agenda forward at EU 
and international levels, but it has not, however, been as successful in achieving 
these goals. It should, nevertheless, be noted that Germany is currently striving 
for emissions reductions of 55% by the year 2030 while at the same time phasing 
out nuclear power and also – in the longer term – the use of coal energy. 
The Federal Ministry for the Environment (BMU), run by a Minister from the 
Social-Democratic Party, has the lead in national climate policy. Yet, it is not in 
charge of central felds of action for implementing the climate protection goals. 
Therefore, even if the BMU was a pioneer in terms of attempts to integrate gen-
der into climate policy approaches and goals, it has little infuence on the imple-
mentation in the various sectors. Energy policy, for instance, is located in the 
Ministry of Economic Affairs, while transport, agriculture, housing and construc-
tion are in the hands of three other ministries. All these ministries are currently 
run by the conservative Christian Democratic Union (CDU) or Christian Social 
Union of Bavaria (CSU) and are working very closely with the private sector in 
the respective areas. They are not yet ready for a transformative policy in general, 
let alone for a gender-equitable policy. Thus, this fragmentation of climate policy 
is diffcult in terms of effective climate change mitigation and it also hampers the 
integration of gender and intersectional approaches. 
Mainstreaming gender into Germany’s climate policy 
The road to mainstreaming gender into climate policy in Germany started to look 
promising in 1995, when the frst Conference of the Parties to the Framework 
Convention on Climate Change (COP1) took place in Berlin. It was chaired 
by the (at that time) German Environment Minister and former Minister for 
Women Affairs, Dr Angela Merkel, who later on, in 2005, became Chancellor of 
the Federal Republic of Germany. Theoretically, this could have been the ideal 
condition for advancing gender-equitable climate policy. 
Furthermore, in 1998, the frst red-green Federal Government agreed to imple-
ment gender mainstreaming and to recognise the realisation of equality of men 
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and women as a universal guiding principle for policy planning in all ministries. 
These regulations are still in place. Since then, governmental coalitions have 
changed several times, and the strong efforts for an organisational anchoring of 
gender mainstreaming in the BMU have had only very limited success (Sauer, 
2014). 
With the exception of a few selective measures, gender-responsive climate 
policy has not been an issue in the German Environment Ministry in the past 
20 years. Particularly, it is still striking that the gender mainstreaming process 
had not found its way into climate policy. So, despite the mandate to mainstream 
gender into all policy areas, it was only recently and in connection with and 
supported by UNFCCC decisions on gender, that it gained more attention in 
German national climate policy. 
So, while the importance of gender relations for an effective climate policy 
was largely underestimated by the government for a long time, some progress has 
been made in the last few years, giving a reason to hope for a move towards a 
gender-equitable climate policy in the near future. After the federal elections in 
2017, at the beginning of the current legislative period, Svenja Schulze came into 
offce as the new Environment Minister. She placed greater emphasis on gen-
der equality, both in terms of gender balance and of gender-sensitive or gender-
responsive policy. She set up, or reactivated, internal networks and training for 
the staff, particularly at decision-making levels, installed a new department deal-
ing with gender aspects of environmental policy, and announced the develop-
ment of a gender strategy for environment, nature protection and climate policy 
(BMFSFJ, 2020). Moreover, the current Minister Schulze holds regular meetings 
with female leaders of environmental non-governmental organisations to discuss 
diffculties in, and solutions for, addressing gender and gender equality in the 
organisations, as well as to present and discuss up-to-date environmental policies 
and programmes. Considerable steps have been taken to make staff aware of the 
added value of integrating gender into the climate policy feld, namely due to 
more effective emission reductions measures that address the needs and prefer-
ences of all sections of society and, thereby, might gain a higher acceptance by 
citizens. 
The updated UNFCCC Gender Action Plan (GAP), adopted in 2019 
(UNFCCC, 2019), added momentum to these efforts. While the vast number of 
earlier UNFCCC decisions (Röhr et al., 2018, p. 90ff) that call for the consid-
eration of gender equality and the broad gender mandate provided by the Paris 
Agreement (PA) of 2015 (UNFCCC, 2015) were considered as applying mainly 
to developing countries, the enhanced GAP functioned as an eye-opener for the 
relevance of gender mandates for industrialised countries. Internal meetings in 
the BMU were held in order to identify core felds of action to implement GAP 
provisions. This involves, for example, capacity-building on the gender dimen-
sions of climate policy which plays a prominent role in a number of UNFCCC 
decisions and the GAP (Röhr et al., 2018, p. 90ff; UNFCCC, 2019). 
The advancing introduction of gender in the UNFCCC process was the con-
text in which the research project ‘Interdependent gender aspects of climate 
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policy’ was commissioned by the UBA. The project underpinned the new move 
at the BMU towards gender-responsive policies and it provided evidence to the 
importance of integrating gender into climate policy and the need for relevant 
data. As a result, at present (October 2020) there is a growing openness towards 
gender equality in environment and climate policy in the ministry, as well as 
in environmental organisations that adopt the minister’s perception regarding 
gender equality in climate policy – yet, do not necessarily point out gender issues 
actively. 
Two potential paths for climate institutions to bring gender into 
climate policy 
As a frst option, in the next section, we present and discuss our experience with 
raising gender issues in participatory processes, organised by the BMU to involve 
a broad range of stakeholders and citizens in the development of German cli-
mate protection programmes. With these extensive participation processes, new 
ground was broken in Germany. The following evaluation is based on personal 
involvement in the processes and – where available – evaluation reports from 
other organisations and researchers. 
Thereafter, we present, as a second option, gender analysis as an attempt to 
strengthen a gender perspective within administrative processes. On an institu-
tional level, gender mainstreaming requires governments to assess ‘the implica-
tions for women and men of any planned action, including legislation, policies 
or programmes, in all areas and at all levels’ (UN, 1997). This is usually done 
by integrating gender analysis in the policy process in order to analyse and eval-
uate the impact of political measures on gender justice. As a cornerstone, the 
‘Gender and Climate’ research project developed a Gender Impact Assessment 
(GIA) tool to strengthen a gender perspective in the German Climate Protection 
Programmes. Hence, the second path we describe is based on our experiences in 
adapting and improving a GIA to the feld of climate policy. 
Implementing gender-responsive climate policy in participatory 
processes 
‘Stating a policy objective is no guarantee that it will be realised in practice’ 
(Rose, 1984, cited from Engeli and Mazur, 2018, p. 117). Thus, how is the goal of 
gender equality operationalised in climate policy in Germany? The following sec-
tion will shed light on the participation processes that support the development 
of German climate change programmes. Since 2015, the federal government has 
launched two participation processes, one of which (initially) focused on achiev-
ing the short-term emission reduction targets for 2020, the other focused on the 
more long-term target of 2050. Both processes were led by the BMU, and are very 
different, which is also due to the time horizon of emissions reduction targets for 
2020/2030 and 2050. Such extensive participation processes previously have not 
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The Action Alliance for Climate Protection (Aktionsbündnis 
Klimaschutz) 
The frst participation process, the Action Alliance, had its frst meeting in spring
2015 upon invitation of the BMU. It is organised in the ‘Vienna setting’, which
means that the various stakeholder groups are divided into so-called thematic
‘benches’. Initially comprised of 15 benches in number, in 2019 ‘youth’ was added
as the 16th bench. Each bench consists of various organisations that appoint speak-
ers for the meetings to represent the positions of the bench. All other representa-
tives of the bench take part as listeners. The ‘members of a bench exchange views
on their respective climate protection positions, strive to understand the positions
of other bench members and try to fnd synergies and similarities in their positions’.1 
Gender issues do not have a separate bench, but some gender expertise is 
involved in the process. Currently, there are three women/gender-focused organ-
isations regularly participating, all of them are part of the Environment, Nature 
and Climate Protection bench. 
The Action Alliance meets twice a year for one-day meetings. At the frst 
session, one of the women/gender-focused organisations, GenderCC-Women 
for Climate Justice, representing the bench for the Environment, Nature and 
Climate Protection, had the opportunity to explain fundamentally how gender 
relations and climate protection are linked. Since then, there have only been 
opportunities for very brief statements. As the speaking time per subject (usu-
ally two or three per session) is limited to fve minutes per bench and about 
30 organisations are represented on the environmental bench, the chance to 
introduce gender aspects to the agenda items is extremely limited. 
In terms of content, until 2017 the Action Alliance dealt with short-term meas-
ures aimed at achieving the CO2 reduction targets for 2020. Before the sharp emis-
sion decline due to the 2020 coronavirus pandemic, Germany was far from meeting
its target, thus there was a high pressure to achieve as much emission reduction as
possible in a very short time. This might have been one reason why the measures
presented, and later on decided by the German Bundestag, focused mainly on tech-
nical solutions, respectively, solutions the government coalition could agree on. A
transformative (gender) perspective, questioning the economic system and growth
paradigm, criticising the focus on technical effciency, and demanding actions for
addressing suffciency, was brought into discussion by gender representatives and
some environmental organisations, but had no chance of being recognised, neither
by most of the other benches, nor by the ministries responsible for the measures.
This broader and more holistic perspective was postponed to the programmes deal-
ing with the mid and long-term goals for 2030 and 2050. 
Participation process for the development of the Climate 
Protection Plan 2050 
The process for developing the climate protection programme for 2050 took 
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support the 2020 programme of measures for climate protection. This very com-
plex process started with inviting 550 people as representatives of stakeholders. 
Representatives of women’s associations, such as the German Women’s Council 
– a major umbrella organisation which perceives itself as the lobby for women 
in Germany – was invited but, unfortunately, they did not participate in the 
process, and neither did other women’s associations. Most German women’s 
organisations focus on more traditional women and gender equality issues, like 
the gendered labour market, care economy, violence against women and health 
issues, etc. This might have been a reason why they didn’t feel familiar with cli-
mate change issues and did not participate. 
In addition to the stakeholder dialogue, 100 randomly selected citizens were 
each invited to a citizen dialogue in fve cities, which later on resulted in two 
online dialogues to propose a number of climate protection measures and vote for 
the preferred actions. Without being able to go into the process in further detail 
here, the effort to participate was extensive. Particularly for civil society organi-
sations relying on volunteer work, participation in this process was extremely 
challenging. 
The process ended in March 2016 with the handover of a catalogue of
97 proposed measures to achieve the long-term climate protection goals to the
BMU, but the impact was limited, as in the end, the Federal Government’s climate
protection plan was drawn up ‘in 2016 on the basis of scientifc studies and sce-
narios and in the light of the Paris Agreement. The results and recommendations
of the broad dialogue also informed the process’2 (accentuated by the authors). 
Three evaluations of this process were undertaken. Greenpeace commissioned 
a rather critical assessment of the impact of the process (Rucht, 2016), the BMU 
commissioned the overall process evaluation (Bohn and Heinzelmann, 2017) and 
an evaluation of the citizen participation also took place (Faas and Huesmann, 
2017). All three evaluations came to a cautiously positive assessment of the 
process. Despite this, Greenpeace (Rucht, 2016) criticises that there has been a 
signifcant shift of weight in favour of economic interests by clearly weakening 
and watering down a number of sectoral targets and proposed measures from the 
participation process (Rucht, 2016, p. 6). None of the three evaluations took 
notice of the lack of gender expertise in the whole process and in developing or 
assessing the measures. A content-orientated analysis of the Climate Protection 
Programme 2050 from a gender perspective can be found in the fnal report of the 
research project (Spitzner et al., 2020, Chapter 5.5.1). 
In 2018, the two processes were merged in the Action Alliance for Climate 
Protection. The Action Alliance is now described on the BMU website as 
the central dialogue forum for the continuous discussion of climate protection 
policy positions between social groups and with the Federal Government. It 
supports the Federal Government in achieving the climate protection goals 
for Germany and recognises the shared responsibility of its members for the 
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In conclusion, both processes might have been important and innovative from 
the point of view of the German Government, as they led to the involvement 
of more stakeholders in defning Germany’s climate policy. One expectation was 
to achieve acceptance for ambitious emission reduction measures and sectoral 
reduction targets. But these processes were, and still are, completely insuffcient 
in terms of addressing the need for gender justice in climate policy and action. 
In order to establish a connection between the climate policy process and 
the gender mainstreaming process, which run independently of one another, 
the research project ‘Gender and Climate’ has created a ‘handout for gender-
appropriate evaluation and updating of the 2030 climate protection program’4 
for BMU-internal use (Röhr and Stieß, 2019). This refers to the Climate Action 
Programme5 fnally adopted by the German Parliament at the end of 2019, its 
evaluation and update, as well as the envisaged (and meanwhile adopted) climate 
protection law. The handout recommends taking into account the social impacts 
including their gender differences, in the implementation, evaluation and updat-
ing of the programme, and where and how the corresponding expertise is to be 
included in the basic structures implemented by the law. 
Gender Impact Assessment as an analytical tool in the area of 
climate policy in Germany 
This section introduces Gender Impact Assessment (GIA) as a tool for research-
ers and practitioners in climate institutions for analysing the equality impacts of 
climate policy and discusses how GIA can be re-designed in order to introduce an 
intersectional and non-binary perspective on gender into climate policy-making. 
GIA is rooted in the feld of impact assessment which is the ‘process of identify-
ing the future consequences of a current or proposed action’ (IAIA, 2020, n.p.). 
In contrast to other impact assessment procedures (e.g., technology, environ-
mental, or health impact assessment), a GIA takes up the basic idea of gender 
mainstreaming that gender equality should be promoted as a guiding principle 
through all policy measures. Gender is taken as the central category of analysis 
and the investigation is oriented towards the normative goal of gender equality.6 
The objective of GIA is to produce recommendations for political decisions, the 
outcome of GIA is usually binding and applied to a specifc policy intervention. 
According to this, a GIA is a structured application of procedures and meth-
ods aiming to assess whether a political project – for example, a draft law, regula-
tion, programme, or concept – and the day-to-day administrative action takes 
adequate account of gender aspects and the command for equality. This assess-
ment can take place at different points in the policy cycle: as ex-ante evaluation, 
but also as ex-post evaluation or during the implementation of a policy measure. 
The implementation of a GIA after the completion of a measure can reveal 
‘gender gaps’, but in the case of measures that have yet to be developed or 
are ongoing, it is possible to identify gender aspects and then integrate them 
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integrating gender aspects is far greater than in a retrospective GIA. If the 
GIA is integrated into the development of a measure, gender aspects can be 
systematically introduced into decision-making processes, negative impacts 
and unintended side-effects on gender equality can be identifed before the 
political measure is implemented, and alternative solutions can be presented. 
(Life e.V./FrauenUmweltNetz, 2004, p. 10f) 
A GIA can be applied to different policy areas at the level of ministries, as well 
as subordinate authorities and administration. 
Applying intersectionality and gender dimensions to a GIA 
guidance for climate policy 
In Germany, a regulatory GIA baseline tool was adopted in 2006 to support gen-
der mainstreaming by the federal government (BMFSFJ, 2007),7 but the general 
practice of GIA has proven to be diffcult in terms of practitioners’ receptivity 
and the institutionalisation of the instrument. In the past 20 years, only a few 
policy GIAs were fully executed and documented in public administration (Veit, 
2010; Lewalter, 2013; Sauer, 2018). There was a certain stickiness within the 
administration preventing them from including new ideas such as feminist con-
cepts in the policy-making process (Sauer and Stieß, i.p.). 
The GIA design for climate policy took the regulatory GIA baseline tool as 
the starting point. The re-design was based on a non-binary understanding of 
gender and also took intersectionality into account. The tool acknowledges dif-
ferent genders (‘male, female, diverse’), in order to consider the diversity of gen-
dered identities. Gender is conceived as an interdependent category – which is 
marked by the term ‘Gender+’.8 
The basic idea of the GIA is that gender and other social differences that
generate inequality are to be considered on a case- and context-specifc basis;
the categories and their signifcance must be worked out in the process of analy-
sis itself (cf. Hankivsky, 2014, p. 3). The GIA tool, therefore, applies an itera-
tive procedure. Starting from the gender perspective, ‘internal’ intersections of
gender with other categories of inequality are examined in an iterative process.9 
For the concrete subject of investigation, this does not claim to include all
categories involved in the constitution of social inequality, but rather focuses
on those that are most relevant to the respective area of action. In a frst step,
the impact on the hierarchical relations between the genders is examined.
In a second step, further characteristics/categories of social inequality can be
introduced into the analysis – for example, to examine the effect of a project
with regard to further discrimination and exclusion due to socio-economic or
socio-cultural characteristics such as age, income, religion, etc. – in the sense
of ‘where the difference done, matters the most’ (Sauer, 2018, p. 146). Taking
housing and energy poverty as an example, a frst step of analysis could focus on
differences between genders and then add income and place as further catego-
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As a second task, the GIA tool was thematically adapted to the policy area
of climate protection and climate adaption. The tool’s thematical structure
is built on the so-called ‘gender dimensions’ which provide a framework for
gender analysis. The gender dimensions are analytical categories for investi-
gating the structurally unequal power relations between the genders and their
causes and characteristics. They are linked to central areas or felds of societal
structuring by which hierarchical gender relationships are established, main-
tained and reproduced (Verloo and Roggeband, 1996; Verloo and Lombardo,
2007). These interconnected structures include norms, values, institutions
and organisations. Drawing on the seminal work of Mieke Verloo and Connie
Roggeband and insights from GIAs in the feld of environmental, research and
transport policy (cf. Schultz et al., 2001; Turner, Hamilton and Spitzner, 2006;
Alber and Röhr, 2011), the conceptual framework was elaborated. Finally, six
gender dimensions and a seventh cross-sectional dimension (‘symbolic order’)
were devised, representing areas of life in which a sex- and/or gender-specifcity
can still be discerned and which are relevant for climate policies. These gender
dimensions describe the social areas of the care economy and caring work,
employment, shaping of public infrastructures, institutionalised rationalities,
participation in decision-making and physical integrity. The gender dimen-
sions include: 
• Symbolic order (as a cross-sectional dimension): hierarchisations, attributions 
and positions of meaning, gender-hierarchical narratives and modernisation 
strategies 
• Care economy/care work: attribution, signifcance, distribution and instru-
mentalisation in societies’ economies 
• Market-driven/labour economy: horizontal and vertical segregation, economic 
job evaluation, poverty, property, fnancial capabilities 
• Public resources/infrastructures: provision, alignment, prioritisation, accessi-
bility, usability 
• Institutionalised androcentrism/power of defnition: masculinity models set as the 
standard and benchmark in action-feld-specifc rationalities, problem per-
ceptions, methods, etc., institutionalised gender hierarchisations 
• Shaping power at the actors’ level: participation and consideration of gender 
expertise in decision-making in science, technology, and politics 
• Body/health/safety/privacy (intimacy): the social organisation of sexuality, 
health, freedom from violence, privacy, sexual self-determination 
For each gender dimension, main gender aspects like the unequal distribution of 
care, income, wealth, or resources are presented. These general topics are linked 
to specifc issues of climate change using the results of the literature analysis on 
gender and climate change carried out in the frst step of the project as a reference 
(Röhr et al., 2018). For each gender dimension, specifc questions are provided, 
linking the more general dimensions to specifc topics of climate change (Stieß 
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The GIA contains two-stages of evaluation: 
• The preliminary or relevance test (screening) checks whether the analysed 
project has gender-relevant implications and decides whether a GIA is to be 
carried out or not. In the frst step, the given measure or project and its target 
groups are identifed. The relevance of gender equality is determined on the 
basis of key questions referring to the different gender dimensions. If gender 
equality relevance is noted, the main examination is carried out. 
• The main examination builds upon the questions of the relevance check. 
Gender aspects that were identifed in the frst step are scrutinised further 
in an in-depth examination, comprising of both qualitative and quantitative 
methods such as expert interviews or the analysis of statistical data. For each 
gender dimension, a detailed analysis of the policy impacts is carried out on 
the basis of a set of questions. As a result of the assessment, concrete oppor-
tunities for improving the outcome on gender equality are identifed. On this 
basis, recommendations are formulated. 
The re-design of the GIA tool was carried out in a participatory process. A pro-
totype of the tool was tested in a workshop in order to adapt it to the require-
ments and needs of the future users of the instrument. Employees from different 
departments of the UBA were invited to the testing. Ongoing projects of UBA 
were used as examples to examine how the set of questions can be applied to 
make the signifcance of gender for climate policy visible. The selected projects 
covered topics from the felds of climate protection and adaptation with a high 
gender relevance: scenarios for reducing the degree of motorisation in cities as a 
contribution to a compact mixed-function city (climate protection), and recom-
mendations for behavioural heat protection in connection with the preparation 
of heat action plans (climate adaptation). Drawing on the literature review on 
gender and climate (Röhr et al., 2018), main fndings in the respective felds 
were collected and structured with the help of the gender dimensions. Examples 
are the different mortality and morbidity rates of women and men in the case of 
heatwaves and the gendered distribution of car ownership in cities in the case of 
the motorisation scenario. These fndings were presented in a test workshop. In 
a second step, the participants were encouraged to analyse the selected examples 
with the help of the questions of the GIA tool. The workshop yielded valuable 
insights and suggestions about how to improve the practical suitability of the 
tool and facilitate its application. These fndings were taken into account in the 
revision of the tool as well as the recommendations gleaned from the comments 
of gender experts. Finally, a second test was carried out in a workshop with UBA 
employees and external gender experts. 
In summary, the GIA tool proved to be useful to assess the gender impacts of 
climate policy. It has the potential to assess the impact of climate policy measures 
with regard to gender/’Gender+’, and can support knowledge transfer between 
societal stakeholders and political and administrative stakeholders on gender 
topics. 
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Until now, no full GIA of a climate policy measure has been executed. 
However, the tool was applied in a consulting assignment. The assignment had 
the objective of identifying gender-relevant aspects in an early stage of climate 
policy-making. In the context of the implementation of the climate protection 
programme 2030 of the German Federal Government, selected measures of the 
package were analysed. The results were communicated in consultancy papers 
and presented and discussed in an internal expert hearing in 2019. These frst 
experiences show that the tool is well suited for screening gender aspects and 
identifying relevant aspects/questions from a gender perspective. 
However, a crucial prerequisite for the implementation of GIA in German 
climate policy would be conducive governance structures in the institutions. As 
Sauer (2018) states ‘gendered analysis is rarely executed without strong insti-
tutionalised equality governance structures within and knowledgeable, par-
tial actors to carry it’ (Sauer, 2018, p. 510). In terms of governance structures 
required, Sauer suggests a helpful distinction between ‘embedded’, ‘embodied’ 
and ‘entrenched’ governance structures. ‘Embedding’ of gender or gender justice 
refers to processual aspects within institutions. ‘Embodied’ refers to the required 
gender expertise within relevant institutions. ‘Entrenched’ refers to the need for 
gender to be rooted in the knowledge cultures of institutions. ‘Creating account-
ability is an effective method for entrenching gender equality’ (Sauer, 2018, p. 
516). However, such governance structures within institutions would have to be 
refected in corresponding policy structures and processes of climate policy. 
Discussion and outlook 
Even if there is progress in mainstreaming gender into climate policy in Germany, 
there are still a lot of institutional challenges. The provisions adopted in the 
international process defnitely support gender-responsive climate policy in 
Germany. But because of the limited scope and character of provisions in the 
GAP and ‘the clash between the rhetorical commitments to gender mainstream-
ing and the actual gender norms embedded within an institution’ (Mergaert and 
Lombardo, 2017, p. 106), the progress at national levels will continue to depend 
strongly on further factors, such as the engagement of individuals in decision-
making positions and civil society interventions. 
Which factors are decisive for a transition to a more gender-responsive cli-
mate policy? Based on studies in the feld of institutional resistances (e.g. Waylen, 
2013; Kaijser and Kronsell, 2014; Mergaert and Lombardo, 2017; Göldner, 2018) 
and experiences in our research and advocacy work, we identifed the following 
drivers that could help to overcome resistance to change. 
One of the institutional drivers is, of course, a certain tradition of address-
ing gender, and this is the case in Germany, although early efforts have been 
suspended for quite a while (Göldner, 2018). A fundamental requirement is a 
political will to implement a climate policy geared towards gender equality. This 
is currently the case in the Federal Ministry for the Environment and is shown, 
particularly, in the establishment of a ministerial unit on gender issues and in the 
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planned development of a gender strategy. Furthermore, there is some awareness 
for this topic in the management levels of the BMU that supports the framing 
of climate change issues from a gender perspective. Also, there is an internal 
feminist agency in the ministry and the subordinate authority UBA, which can 
back the efforts. Another driver would be the involvement of ministries or other 
bodies in charge of gender equality, the so-called ‘gender machinery’ (Göldner, 
2018). 
For the sustainable, long-term implementation of gender-responsive policies, 
however, further structural changes are required. As stated by Arora-Jonsson 
(2014), it needs ‘to remedy the “invisibility” of privilege – whether of men, class, 
caste that discriminates. The structures and relations that cause disadvantage to 
persist need to be challenged’. This includes ‘making visible the mechanisms by 
which environmental governance takes place – the daily practices of knowledge 
production and action’ (Arora-Jonsson, 2014, p. 306). Usually, it takes at least 
fve to ten years after a policy has been put into place for it to make change vis-
ible. Thus, if the intended gender strategy of the BMU and, in particular, the 
GIAs are implemented in climate policy and if these actually lead to gender-just 
climate measures, it will only happen and be assessed in the long term (Engeli 
and Mazur, 2018, p. 120). Thus, it is important to follow up on the implementa-
tion with research in the next years. 
Androcentrism is deeply embedded not only in the structures of institutions, 
but also in the framing of problems and solutions (Sauer, 2010; Spitzner u. a., 
2020). A transition to a gender-just, low-carbon society would require challeng-
ing these norms (Mazur and McBride, 2010; Kronsell, 2013; Kaijser and Kronsell, 
2014). 
In the climate change process, the ‘Fridays for Future’ movement has shown 
how quickly external pressure can lead to changes, at least at the level of dis-
course. Whether these changes are refected in real political effects or only result 
in including more youth representatives in participation processes is still an open 
question. Likewise, the advocacy of women and gender civil society groups would 
be key to emphasise the gender-climate-justice nexus. Yet, in Germany, there are 
only a handful of organisations and experts who deal with these topics. As noted, 
the German Women’s Council – the most important actor at the national level 
– deals exclusively with more ‘traditional’ women’s and gender equality issues. 
Previous attempts to get them on board with climate policy issues have so far 
failed. On the other hand, environmental organisations are showing increasing 
openness to gender issues, although this is still in its infancy. 
Data and facts on the gender aspects of climate policy measures are fundamen-
tal to designing them in a gender-just way. For the frst time, these were sum-
marised for industrialised countries in the research project ‘Gender and Climate’ 
presented here, which also points to the large data gap and shows that there 
is still a long way to go to make climate policy sound and evidence-based in a 
gender-responsive manner (Spitzner et al., 2020). 
Besides data, developing gender-responsive policies and measures – e. g. in the 
energy, transport, or agriculture sectors – requires challenging current priorities 
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fundamentally, especially, but not only with regard to economic growth. A 
stronger focus on public services and common welfare is needed. If the political 
will is lacking to tackle these issues, the consideration of gender equality might 
decay into ‘gender greenwashing’. 
These restrictions, particularly the data gap, also hamper the application of 
the GIA in climate policy. Still, data, the expertise of the persons in charge, and 
above all resources (staff, time, money) are missing while climate protection spe-
cialists in the ministry are chronically overloaded. Even though there is a willing-
ness to work on gender, it is desired that it ‘should not take much time’. Hence, 
again, without providing resources for the gender mainstreaming process to the 
ministerial departments dealing with climate change (as well as with other envi-
ronmental issues) – additional staff and money for external expertise for example 
– there is little room for implementing a gender-responsive climate policy. 
A genuine intersectional approach would make it even more diffcult. 
Hankivsky (2012) points out that the aim of an Intersectionality Based Analysis 
(IBA) is to identify how different policies address the inequality experiences of 
different social groups. An intersectional perspective ‘changes the policy ques-
tions that are asked, the kind of data that is collected, how data is collected and 
how it is disaggregated and analysed to produce evidence-based policy making’ 
(Hankivsky, 2012, p. 177). In view of the existing powerful political pragmatism, 
however, she sees diffculties in introducing even more complicated policy pro-
cesses. Changes would therefore have to take place gradually (ibid., p. 178). 
Next steps 
In order to pave the way for gender mainstreaming in climate policy, the research 
project ‘Gender and Climate’ developed a wide range of recommendations 
(Spitzner et al., 2020). It included demands in the felds of methodology, data 
requirements and data collection, research needs and regulations. Moreover, 
the project’s conclusions included principles for integrating gender equality into 
climate policy, general policy recommendations and recommendations for the 
implementation of the Gender Impact Assessment. 
One of the demands is that the development and adoption of a national climate 
policy gender action plan that should defne concrete steps for the coming years, 
including responsibilities, deadlines and deliverables, in order to strengthen com-
mitment and clarity for all stakeholders. This national GAP might be included in 
the projected Gender Strategy of the BMU. 
More generally, it is necessary for the planning and development of climate 
policy programmes and measures to be based on the state of gender-responsive 
specialist research. It is also advisable to draw on specialist gender expertise (in-
house or external) when planning and implementing climate policy measures. In 
order to secure gender competence in the long term, it should be integrated into 
the training of civil servants in institutions and administration. 
Binding and regular application of the GIA or similar instruments makes 
an important contribution to taking gender consistently into account in the 
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development of climate policy projects. Appropriate resources should be avail-
able for this purpose. Accountability ensures that the instrument will be embed-
ded within the institution. 
And, fnally, ongoing monitoring and evaluation with well-defned gender cri-
teria and indicators to be developed from the gender dimensions elaborated in 
the research project are necessary (Spitzner et al., 2020, p. 39f). Particularly, the 
monitoring and evaluation might help to shed further light on the institutional 
and individual resistances and obstacles in the development of a climate policy, 
that is gender-just and addresses intersectional discriminations. Due to stake-
holder participation and lobbying and a political will from the head of the admin-
istration, gender justice reappeared on the climate policy agenda of the German 
Federal Government. However, in order to make considerable progress towards 
gender-responsive climate policies, deeply embedded routines and knowledge 
cultures in the administration still need to be challenged. Experience so far has 
shown that this transformation will take time and appropriate governance struc-
tures and resources are necessary to make climate policy administrations more 
responsive and accountable for gender justice. 
Notes 
1 https://www.bmu.de/themen/klima-energy/climate protection/national-climate pol-
icy/action program-climate protection/action alliance-climate protection/ 
2 https://www.bmu.de/en/topics/climate-energy/climate/national-climate-policy/gree
nhouse-gas-neutral-germany-2050/ 
3 https://www.bmu.de/themen/klima-energie/klimaschutz/national-climate policy/ 
action program-climate protection/action alliance-climate protection/ 
4 An important intermediate step to the 2050 climate protection programme. 
5 The measures of the plan were developed in the ministries responsible for transporta-
tion, energy, housing, agriculture and forests, etc., according to their sectoral emission 
targets. They were presented and (critically) commented on in the meetings of the 
Actions Alliance, though with very little impact. 
6 The concept of GIA originated in development cooperation and was applied mainly 
at a project level. Later, this concept was transferred to other policy areas and levels 
(cf. Verloo/Roggeband, 1996; EC 1997/98, p. 3). In the Netherlands, Mieke Verloo 
and Conny Roggeband (1996) developed a GIA for impact assessment of political 
programmes in the feld of social policy and education. The authors based their work 
on existing instruments of impact assessment, especially environmental impact assess-
ment, and regarded the GIA as ‘an instrument designed to analyse potential effects of 
new government policies on gender relations’ (Verloo/Roggeband, 1996, p. 3). 
7 The predecessor of this instrument was developed originally by the Institute for Social-
Ecological Research (ISOE), in a project for and with the UBA and the German 
Federal Ministry for Environment, Nature Conservation and Nuclear Safety (BMU) 
in 2002 and emulated environmental impact assessment (EIA). This early BMU GIA 
was successfully tested in the case of radiation (Hayn and Schultz, 2002); however, it 
was not routinely applied afterwards. 
8 The term ‘Gender+’ (Gender plus) was frst used in the European research project 
QUING (‘Quality in Gender+ Equality Policies in Europe’ [2006–2011]) (www.quing
.eu). The authors of the QUING project apply the concept of intersectionality to the 
analysis of policy felds and use the concept of ‘Gender+’ to describe the relational 
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‘GIAClim’ – Gender Impact Assessment in the context of climate change adaptation 
and natural hazards also uses the term ‘Gender+’ with reference to QUING: ‘The 
term “Gender+” includes other individual factors such as age, origin or special needs 
in addition to gender in the analysis and thus makes multiple discrimination visible. 
Gender+ includes knowledge about the complexity of gender and structural inequali-
ties’ (Damyanovic et al., 2014, p. 23). 
9 In addition to the differences, both concepts – intersectionality and interdependencies –
also have signifcant commonalities: both are directed against an additive understanding
of gender and inequality and the notion of a homogenous female or male subject. Both
concepts consider it necessary to analyse the category of gender in its historically specifc
entanglement with other aspects of social and economic inequality. 
References 
Alber, Gotelind and Röhr, Ulrike. (2011) Gender Analysis of the Policy Initiatives of the 
Member States in Relation to Climate Change in the Sectors of Transport and Energy. Milieu 
Ltd/LIFE e.V. Brussels, Berlin (unpublished). 
Arora-Jonsson, Seema. (2014) ‘Forty Years of Gender Research and Environmental 
Policy: Where Do We Stand?’ Spec. Issue Gend. Mobil. Soc. Change—Guest Ed. Lena 
Nare Parveen Akhtar 47(Part B), pp. 295–308. 
Bohn, Axel and Heinzelmann, Susanne. (2017) Evaluierung der Stakeholder-Beteiligung an 
der Erstellung des Klimaschutzplans 2050. Abschlussbericht. Berlin: prognos. 
BMFSFJ Bundesministerium für Familie, Senioren, Frauen und Jugend (2007) Arbeitshilfe 
geschlechterdifferenzierte Gesetzesfolgenabschätzung. “Gender Mainstreaming bei der 
Vorbereitung von Rechtsvorschriften”. Berlin: BMFSFJ. 
BMFSFJ Bundesministerium für Familie, Senioren, Frauen und Jugend (2020) 
Gleichstellungsstrategie der Bundesregierung. Berlin [online]. Available at: https://www
.bmfsfj.de/blob/jump/158356/gleichstellungsstrategie-der-bundesregierung-data.pdf
(Accessed: 19 July 2020). 
Damyanovic, Doris et al. (2014) ‘GIAKlim—Gender Impact Assessment im Kontext 
der Klimawandelanpassung und Naturgefahren. Endbericht von StartClim2013.F’, 
in Startclim (ed.) StartClim2013: Anpassung an den Klimawandel in Österreich— 
Themenfeld Wasser. Wien. 
Engeli, Isabelle and Mazur, Amy. (2018) ‘Taking Implementation Seriously in Assessing 
Success: The Politics of Gender Equality Policy’, Eur. J. Polit. Gend., 1(1), pp. 111–129. 
Faas, Thorsten and Huesmann, Christian. (2017) Die Bürgerbeteiligung zum Klimaschutzplan 
2050. Ergebnisse der Evaluation. Gütersloh: Bertelsmann Stiftung. 
Göldner, Lisa. (2018) The Integration of Gender Considerations into National Climate Policies.
Factors Driving the Integration of Gender Equality and Women’s Empowerment into Nationally
Determined Contributions (NDCs) to the Paris Agreement. Master Thesis, FU Berlin. 
Großmann, Karin. (2017) ‘Energiearmut als multiple Deprivation vor dem Hintergrund 
diskriminierender Systeme’, in Großmann, Karin, Schaffrin, André and Smigiel, 
Christian (eds.) Energie und soziale Ungleichheit. Zur gesellschaftlichen Dimension der 
Energiewende in Deutschland und Europa. Wiesbaden: Springer VS, pp. 55–78. 
Hankivsky, Olena. (2012) ‘The Lexicon of Mainstreaming Equality: Gender Based 
Analysis (GBA), Gender and Diversity Analysis (GDA) and Intersectionality Based 
Analysis (IBA)’, Can. Political Sci. Rev., 6(2–3), pp. 171–183. 
Hankivsky, Olena et al. (2014) ‘An Intersectionality-Based Policy Analysis Framework: 
Critical Refections on a Methodology for Advancing Equity’, Int. J. Equity Health, 13, 
pp. 1–16. 
  
               
        
    
 
                       
                
 
 
Making Germany’s policy gender-responsive 67 
Hayn, Doris and Schultz, Irmgard. (2002) Gender Impact Assessment im Bereich 
Strahlenschutz und Umwelt. Abschlussbericht im Auftrag des BMU. Frankfurt am Main: 
ISOE [online]. Available at: http://www.genderkompetenz.info/w/fles/gkompzpdf/gia
_abschlussbericht_strahlenschutz.pdf (Accessed: 12 August 2020). 
International Association for Impact Assessment (IAIA) (2020) IAIA. The Leading Global 
Network on Impact Assessment. IAIA. https://www.iaia.org/about.php (Accessed: 
17 February 2021). 
Kaijser, Anna and Kronsell, Annica. (2014) ‘Climate Change Through the Lens of 
Intersectionality’, Environ. Polit., 23(3), pp. 417–433. 
Kronsell, Annica. (2013) ‘Gender and Transition in Climate Governance’, Environ. 
Innov. Soc. Transit., 7, pp. 1–15. 
Lewalter, Sandra. (2013)Gender in der Verwaltungswissenschaft konkret: Gleichstellungsorientierte
Gesetzesfolgenabschätzung. Speyer: Hochschule für Wirtschaft und Technik. 
Life e.V./Frauenumweltnetz. (eds.) (2004) Gender Mainstreaming in Deutschland. Auf dem 
Weg zu geschlechtergerechter Umweltpolitik in Deutschland. Frankfurt am Main. Available 
at: http://www.genanet.de/fleadmin/user_upload/dokumente/Infopool_Publikatione
n/Broschuere_GMainstreaming_Deutschland_LIFE_FrauenUmweltN.pdf (Accessed: 
28 February 2018). 
Mazur, Amy G. and McBride, Dorothy E. (2010) Gendering New Institutionalism. in 
McBride, Dorothy E., Maruz, Amy G. (eds.) The Politics of State Feminism. Philadelphia: 
Temple University Press, pp. 217–237. 
Mergaert, Lut and Lombardo, Emanuela. (2017) ‘Resistance to Implement Gender 
Mainstreaming in EU Research Policy’, in McRae, Heather, Weiner, Elaine (eds.) 
Towards Gendering Institutionalism: Equality in Europe. Feminist Institutionalist 
Perspectives. London: Rowman and Littlefeld, pp. 101–120. 
Röhr, Ulrike. (2017) Geschlechterverhältnisse und Nachhaltigkeit. Abschlussbericht. Dessau-
Roßlau: Umweltbundesamt. 
Röhr, Ulrike, Alber, Gotelind and Göldner, Lisa. (2018). Gendergerechtigkeit als Beitrag zu 
einer erfolgreichen Klimapolitik. Forschungsreview, Analyse internationaler Vereinbarungen, 
Portfolioanalyse. Dessau-Roßlau: Umweltbundesamt. 
Röhr, Ulrike and Stieß, Immanuel. (2019) Handreichung für eine geschlechtergerechte 
Evaluation und Fortschreibung des Klimaschutzprogramms 2030. Berlin: Frankfurt a.M. 
Rucht, Dieter. (2016) Der Beteiligungsprozess am Klimaschutzplan 2050. Analyse und 
Bewertung. Hamburg: Greenpeace. 
Sauer, Arn. (2014) ‘Gender und Nachhaltigkeit—Institutionalisierte Gleichstellungsarbeit 
und Gender Mainstreaming im Umweltbundesamt’, GENDER, 1, pp. 26–43. 
Sauer, Arn. (2018) Equality Governance via Policy Analysis? The Implementation of 
Gender Impact Assessment in the European Union and Gender-based Analysis in Canada. 
Dissertation/PhD thesis, Centre for Transdisciplinary Gender Studies Humboldt 
University, Bielefeld: transcript Verlag. 
Sauer, Arn and Stieß, Immanuel. (i.p.) Accounting for Gender in Climate Policy 
Advice—Adapting a Gender Impact Assessment Tool to Issues of Climate Change. 
In: Impact Assessment and Project Appraisal. IAPA. 
Sauer, Birgit. (2010) ‘Framing and Gendering’, in McBride, Dorothy E., Maruz, Amy G.
(eds.) The Politics of State Feminism. Philadelphia: Temple University Press, pp. 193–216. 
Schultz, Irmgard et al. (2001) Gender in Research. Gender Impact Assessment of the Specifc 
Programmes of the Fifth Framework Programme, Environment and Sustainable Development 
Sub-Programme. Frankfurt am Main Bruxelles: ISOE und Directorate-General for 
Research, Energy, Environment and Sustainable Development. 
  
      
                         
        
               
                         
           
               
 
                  
68 Alber, Hummel, Röhr, and Stieß
Spitzner, Meike, Alber, Gotelind, Röhr, Ulrike, Hummel, Diana and Stieß, Immanuel. 
(2020) Interdependente Genderaspekte der Klimapolitik. Gendergerechtigkeit als Beitrag zu 
einer erfolgreichen Klimapolitik: Wirkungsanalyse, Interdependenzen mit anderen sozialen 
Kategorien, methodische Aspekte und Gestaltungsoptionen. Abschlussbericht. UBA-Texte 
30/2020. Dessau-Roßlau: Umweltbundesamt. Available at: https://www.umweltbu
ndesamt.de/sites/default/fles/medien/1410/publikationen/2020-02-06_texte_30-202
0_genderaspekte-klimapolitik.pdf (Accessed: 22 February 2020).
Stieß, Immanuel, Hummel, Diana and Anna, Kirschner. (2019) Arbeitshilfe zur 
gleichstellungsorientierten Folgenabschätzung für die Klimapolitik. Projekt Gendergerechtigkeit 
als Beitrag zu einer erfolgreichen Klimapolitik: Wirkungsanalyse, Interdependenzen mit 
anderen sozialen Kategorien, methodische Aspekte und Gestaltungsoptionen. Frankfurt am 
Main: ISOE. Available at: https://www.umweltbundesamt.de/sites/default/fles/medi
en/1410/publikationen/2020-02-06_texte_30-2020_genderaspekte-klimapolitik.pdf
(Accessed: 07 August 2020).
Turner, J., Hamilton, K. and Spitzner, Meike. (2006) Women and Transport in Europe. 
Strasbourg: European Parliament.
UNFCCC (2015) Paris Agreement. o.O. Available at: http://unfccc.int/fles/essential
_background/convention/application/pdf/english_paris_agreement.pdf (Accessed: 
27 October 2017).
UNFCCC (2019) Enhanced Lima Work Programme on Gender and Its Gender Action Plan. 
Bonn: United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change. Available at: https
://unfccc.int/sites/default/fles/resource/cp2019_13a01_adv.pdf. (Accessed: 10 October 
2020).
[UN] United Nations General Assembly (1997) Report on the Economic and Social Council 
for 1997. New York: United Nations.
Veit, Sylvia. (2010) Bessere Gesetze durch Folgenabschätzung? Wiesbaden: VS Verlag für 
Sozialwissenschaften.
Verloo, M. and Lombardo, E. (2007) ‘Contested Gender Equality and Policy Variety 
in Europe’ in M. Verloo (ed.) Multiple Meanings of Gender Equality. A Critical Frame 
Analysis of Gender Policies in Europe. CEU Press, Budapest and New York, pp. 21–51.
Verloo, Mieke and Roggeband, Connie. (1996) ‘Gender Impact Assessment: The 
Development of a New Instrument in the Netherlands’, Impact Assessment, 14, pp. 
3–20. 
Walgenbach, Katharina, Dietze, Gabriele, Hornscheidt, Antje and Palm, Kerstin. (eds.) 
(2007) Gender als interdependente Kategorie. Neue Perspektiven auf Intersektionalität, 
Diversität und Heterogenität. 2nd Ed. Opladen: Leske + Budrich.
Waylen, Georgina. (2013) ‘Informal Institutions, Institutional Change, and Gender 























5 Promoting a gender 
agenda in climate and 
sustainable development 
A civil servant’s narrative 
Gerd Johnsson-Latham and Annica Kronsell 
Prologue 
I, Annica Kronsell, became acquainted with Gerd’s work on gender, sustainability
and development when reading her report from 2007 (discussed below) and invited
her to a conference on Gender, Power and Climate Change, at Lund University in
2010. Gerd’s participation at the event was not in an offcial capacity; nevertheless
Gerd’s perseverance in pushing gender issues onto the governmental agenda on sus-
tainability, climate and development issues truly impressed me. We have met many
times since and Gerd continues to amaze me with her tireless work on gender and
climate, whether it is in government or civil society organisations. Over the years, I
have been particularly curious about her work in the institutional context of govern-
ment offces, asking myself if Gerd can be seen as femocrat, as an outsider within, or
an activist inside? Her experiences are important; thus, I asked Gerd to write them
down as an input to this book. This being an academic text, we agreed that I would
take her story and interpret it in relation to feminist institutional theory. The text
presented in this chapter is, thus, the result of the encounter between a civil servant
and an academic. 
Introduction 
This chapter discusses the promotion of gender perspectives in the sustainable
development and climate agenda from the unique perspective of a civil serv-
ant with gender expertise, refecting on a long career. Gerd Johnsson-Latham
has been working with international (development) cooperation for the last
four decades, primarily in the areas of gender equality, women’s rights, climate
justice and sustainable development in her role as a civil servant. Her main
employer has been the Swedish Ministry for Foreign Affairs (MFA), but she
has also worked with the Swedish Government Offces in other capacities, and
served in the UN and the World Bank. Her knowledge of the multilateral con-
text is solid and genuine and her competence broad as she has also pursued
women’s rights, gender and climate policies by virtue of her work in civil soci-
ety: at the international level through the Association for Women’s Rights in
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Klimatriksdagen (The Climate Parliament). The narrative which constitutes the
material for this analysis was provided by Gerd herself, then edited and framed
by me, Annica Kronsell, in close dialogue with Gerd. The chapter aims to
use Gerd’s narrative to provide refections on the institutional challenges that
government offcials face when promoting gender equality within government
offces and, particularly, in international fora and how they navigate that space
in order to gender mainstream the agenda. The refections come from the per-
spective of feminist institutionalism (Chapter 1, this volume). The text which
is indented is Gerd’s own words, while the rest of the text is the analysis devel-
oped from the dialogue between us. 
Feminist institutionalist analysis demonstrates that institutions – like minis-
tries and multilateral organisations – organise power inequalities through formal 
as well as informal rules and practices (Mackay et al., 2010; Krook and Mackay, 
2011; Ljungholm, 2017). Gerd’s narrative sheds light on the power relations 
affecting the gender, sustainability and climate nexus of ministries and the mul-
tilateral institutional context. It tells a story of path dependencies (Kenny, 2007, 
p. 93; Waylen, 2014) in terms of the specifc notions of what ‘gender’ tends to 
imply, or be understood as, basically concerning women – e.g. as not privileged 
men – and also how gender objectives are placed in relation to other compet-
ing objectives like trade, development and administrative principles. Gerd’s nar-
rative recognises that gender is nested in other power categories (Kaijser and 
Kronsell, 2014), such as economic status and place. Most importantly, Gerd’s 
long experience as presented through her narrative also provides hope in that it 
shows that change is possible. Her story gives us valuable knowledge of how it is 
possible to affect the agenda, by pointing to critical acts that primarily female, 
gender-focused civil servants take. The critical acts that stand out in Gerd’s nar-
rative are: a) the reports that underscore the importance of going into depth, 
and generating new knowledge – on gender relations and privileges of males – as 
a way to push policy-making and action forward, b) the importance of being 
part of, and taking advantage of, networks of gender experts and political oppor-
tunities and c) the value of the everyday nitty gritty, hard institutional labour 
of analysing documents and fnding ways to include gender in as many places as 
possible, because this can become a platform for action. Through the narrative, 
Gerd alerts us to the institutional inertia that affected her work and, fnally, she 
concludes with visions for a transformative agenda, only really possible through 
political mobilisation. 
The critical acts of a gender expert 
Gerd describes her career in the following way: 
I started working at the Swedish Ministry for Foreign Affairs (MFA) in 1976. 
At the time, there were few female civil servants. In 2020, there was an equal 
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the organisation and a female foreign minister, the sixth female to hold the 
title. 
My different posts have taken me to numerous international conferences, 
organised by both the UN and the World Bank, including the Fourth UN 
World Conference on Women in Beijing in 1995. In my role as gender advi-
sor and civil servant I have been part of negotiating teams on broader mat-
ters, at times with a focus on women, at times with a focus on economic 
development, on sustainability and climate, where the aim was to highlight 
effective strategies for how women in different segments of society can play 
a key role in such endeavours. 
During her career, she has witnessed a dramatic increase in the representation of 
women in the MFA, both among civil servants and politicians. Although pro-
viding a critical mass (Chapter 1, this volume), according to Gerd this has not 
necessarily meant an increase in critical acts, that is, a gamechanging increased 
focus on women’s rights or gender issues. She speaks of several challenges: 
In my professional experience I have faced various challenges when pro-
moting gender equality and women’s rights, primarily within international
development cooperation, but also in areas regarding human rights, rule
of law and disarmament. The same goes for my two-year assignment with
the High Commissioner for Refugees (1980–1982), in Hanoi, and in my
two years at the Nordic Offce of the World Bank (WB), in Washington
DC (1986–1988). In the 1980s, neither gender nor the environment were
prominent in international cooperation but the WB had begun to address
environmental issues (partly as a result of massive demonstrations against
huge dam-building projects in Brazil and India fnanced by WB) and had
just established a position to work on ‘Women in Development’ (WID)
with Karen Mason as one of the frst offcers on the gender desk. However,
WID’s efforts must be considered largely insignifcant in relation to the
overall hardship of poor women, often aggravated by the harsh condition-
ality that typifed the Structural Adjustment Lending (SAL) of the WB at
that time. 
In refecting on the critical task of mainstreaming gender, Gerd compares her 
work with that of other gender advisors across the globe – i.e. the work involved 
in scrutinising policy documents, policy speeches and budget proposals from a 
gender perspective. It implied ardent work and long hours and was not always 
rewarding. The more satisfying undertakings, she explains, were those that lead 
to innovative thinking and empowered women in different areas and educational 
processes, including dialogues with colleagues in various departments of the 
MFA, looking for relevant entry points and processes in daily and strategic work 
where gender could easily be applied and be helpful to outcomes. One such exam-
ple is how women could be actively involved in defning priority areas for disaster 
relief, or how women’s rights could be put more to the forefront in multilateral 
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negotiations, primarily within the UN but also in national legal reforms. As a 
gender expert, Gerd was also charged with a typical task of such a position, that 
of educating the staff: 
At the request of the political levels at the MFA (Pierre Shori and his politi-
cal advisors), I organised and led the ministry’s gender training efforts for 
a number of years. Through various seminars, I tried to disseminate gen-
der awareness in different departments focusing on topics like multilateral 
and bilateral development cooperation, disaster relief, promotion of human 
rights, democracy, etc. A challenge in this context was – and still is – to get 
staff to prioritise gender training, keeping in mind their busy daily agendas 
and sharp deadlines. 
Gerd’s experience illustrates how gender mainstreaming can take many forms and 
encompass truly critical acts, but also be superfcial; to be compared to “green-
washing” in the environmental area where the concept “sustainability” often 
aims at obscuring unsustainable practices. 
The importance of in-depth knowledge as critical acts 
Gerd’s demonstrated expertise on gender gave her the unique opportunity to 
engage in three in-depth studies on various aspects of gender equality/women’s 
empowerment. These became critical acts – i.e. acts that civil servants can per-
form in order to elicit change. Gerd pushed the limits for each topic she under-
took to study, not the least in terms of how she pinpointed male privilege and 
power and contrasted with and challenged the understanding of gender in the 
institutions, at least in the MFA and in the Ministry of Environment. However, 
in the Ministry of Justice, the framing was totally accepted, probably as a result of 
the practice within legal systems to explicitly pinpoint perpetrators. It should be 
highlighted that the studies Gerd presented tended not to be fed into the overall 
work of the ministry, but that was actually the case for many other strategic stud-
ies at the MFA. This is, of course, unfortunate but refects the fact that the ‘slow 
path’ of these learning processes never really ft into the daily hurry at ministries, 
where speed often is prioritised. Yet, through these studies Gerd managed to con-
vey her feminist perspective on gender power which she describes as follows: 
Male violence is crucial to gender power and often aims to subdue and con-
trol women. It is seldom a sign of pure rage, but rather a means to maintain 
power and privileges. The privileges are, of course, more evident among the 
richer and more infuential men. Basically, all males are granted privileges in 
their capacity as males, for example in given roles as ‘heads of family’. It fol-
lows the pattern of the feudal system, where every man, even at the bottom 
layers, gets rewards for obedience in preserving the overall power-structure. 
Thus, while poor men are deprived by more infuential and richer males, 
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men have in return by tradition been entitled to control their own family 
members. 
My framing stressed ‘privileges’ and not only ‘power’ and was not neces-
sarily shared by other colleagues, who pointed to the fact that ‘male privi-
leges’ was not a commonly used concept at the time. My frst study ‘Power 
and Privileges: On Gender-Based Discrimination and Poverty’ was given 
considerable attention within civil society but failed to infuence conven-
tional approaches to pursuing gender equality within the MFA. For instance, 
the planned press-conference to launch the study was both questioned and 
delayed several times. 
Hence, while Gerd’s frst study (2004) is an example of a critical act in that it 
pushed gender perceptions out of the comfort zone, according to Gerd its actual 
impact within Swedish Government Offces is doubtful, in contrast to Swedish 
civil society where Gerd was invited to present her fndings in numerous areas 
such as within the Swedish Church community, Forum Syd (a major umbrella 
organisation for development cooperation). However, her work was evidently 
also recognised at ministerial level as she was asked to conduct a second study the 
following year, this time hosted at the Ministry of Justice. 
The report was published in 2005 as ‘Patriarchal Violence as a Threat to 
Human Security’. Again, my ‘framing’ of he problem did not focus on vio-
lence against women in armed confict but in everyday life, an issue that was 
not regarded as a self-evident part of the human security agenda. Instead, a 
prevalent framing of that problem was in the family arena, generally labelled 
‘domestic’ violence, or possibly ‘violence against women’ – but not language 
pointing out men as perpetrators. It refects the fact that male violence 
against women was often socially and even legally accepted in many socie-
ties – though women, on the other hand, regularly pointed out male, often 
spousal violence as the major aspect of deprivation in their lives. 
Her third study ‘Gender Equality as a Prerequisite for Sustainable Development’, 
connected to sustainability and the climate issue, had the purpose of demon-
strating how, and to what extent, awareness of gender-based differences could 
inform and improve undertakings to enhance sustainable development. It was 
published in 2007 by the Swedish Environment Advisory Council (Johnsson-
Latham, 2007). 
At the time, there were few if any studies demonstrating how, and to what 
extent, awareness of gender-based differences pinpointing men could inform 
and improve undertakings to enhance sustainable development. Through 
gender-disaggregated statistics and data, the study showed how male behav-
iour affected carbon dioxide emissions, compared with emissions from groups 
with less economic power and resources. It highlighted how the lifestyles of 
well-to-do males tended to set a pattern for men (and some women) across 
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the globe. As such is was one of the frst studies to direct attention to the 
question of male privilege in relation to gender and connect it to climate 
change and sustainability issues. Further, it argued that lack of attention 
to these gender differences would jeopardise efforts to promote sustainable 
development. 
This report has become a seminal text in the feld of gender and climate change, 
and is widely cited among scholars, civil society actors and governments with 
143 Google Scholar citations including key works in the feld and 668,000 hits 
on Google including OECD, UNDP, UNFCC. 
I was very pleased to also note considerable media interest in my study on 
gender as a prerequisite for sustainable development. In Sweden, the study 
was referred to on the front page of the second-largest daily newspaper, I was 
invited to a fagship news programme by the Swedish national television, 
and I was interviewed by at least a dozen smaller magazines covering gender 
and/or environmental issues. I also noted that uncountable articles high-
lighted my report and they emerged from all across the globe: Asia, Europe, 
Latin America, and the USA. I was further invited to present my fndings 
in a paper for UNRISD (Johnsson-Latham, 2012). All these interventions 
pointed to the fact that this was the frst time in history that a governmental 
publication had addressed male lifestyles as a cause of unsustainable develop-
ment and carbon dioxide emissions. 
Indeed, the report provided a new perspective and as Gerd explains: 
In 2006, there were few – if any – policy papers within governmental offces 
(or research, for that matter) that pointed at males – especially wealthy 
males – as a problem. With my background in studies of male power and 
privileges in the context of poverty alleviation, I was given the task to study 
male lifestyles and consumption patterns as a key area for addressing sustain-
able development. Studies on gender and climate had, up until then, mostly 
studied women in the South as victims of drought and foods. I decided – 
with the experiences from my previous two studies – to shift the lens on the 
discourse on gender and sustainable development in a completely new direc-
tion and scrutinise male behaviour. (While I initiated this new framing, the 
idea was fully supported at political levels.) 
Gerd’s report (Johnsson-Latham, 2007) presents a transformative agenda for 
engendering climate politics and a convincing argument for why this is neces-
sary. Due to assigned gender roles, women and men often have very different 
lifestyles and consumption patterns. This is evident in terms of mobility and 
transportation: a sector with some 25% of all global carbon emissions. In general, 
men enjoy greater freedom of movement, have more economic resources, work 
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means such as air and automobiles. Women – in every income segment – tend to 
focus more on their homes and families, earn and own less, and have less freedom 
of choice compared to men. Referring to studies in richer countries, the report 
shows that while men dominate decision-making fora, the tax resources socie-
ties spend on infrastructure primarily tend to beneft wealthier men, with the 
bulk of investments provided for aviation and highways. Fewer investments are 
provided to public transportation (trains, buses, metro, etc.), the use of which is 
more prevalent among women without driving licences and cars who often rely 
on more sustainable modes of transport. 
While the trajectory of the report seems out of the league of a civil servant’s 
action space, it can defnitively be perceived as a critical activity that aims to 
transform conventional thinking on gender. Gerd could be considered to be a fem-
ocrat given the fact that her actions seem to ft into that description (Chapter 1, 
this volume). While Gerd’s ideas sometimes were perceived as controversial, the 
reliance on in-depth knowledge in her pursuit often won acceptance. 
Of course, my position within the MFA was infuenced by my strong stand 
on gender policies, and though I wanted my action to ft into the overall 
– often unspoken – cultural norms at the ministry, I have often been con-
sidered as head-strong; a person who does not avoid challenging prevailing 
policy options. In spite of this, I feel that I have by and large been respected, 
and even appreciated. Not least for a sharp pen and analysis. 
The 2007 report’s analysis and results were widely spread outside the govern-
ment offces, but its precise paths of infuence in the foreign ministry or its input
to its feminist foreign policy from 2014 remain unclear or vague. Gerd worked
at the MFA Department for Human Rights 2012–2017, as the Chief Editor
for Swedish reports on adherence to human rights, rule of law and democracy
across the globe. This included pursuing women’s rights and pressing for sexual
and reproductive health and rights (SRHR) in multilateral fora such as the UN
Commission for Human Rights. It seems safe to say that Gerd has taken her
role as a gender advisor seriously and has also accomplished important acts of
gender politics. 
Networks enable critical acts 
Clearly, Gerd’s ambition has been to realise goals set out at political levels to pur-
sue gender equality. She was well aware all along that these goals sometimes con-
ficted with other goals also set out at political levels, particularly economic interests 
which, in general, indeed tend to be more decisive for government actions than 
gender equality. However, though she understood the diffculties, Gerd generally 
interpreted her role as gender advisor to be the one to push for options which 
were as benefcial as possible for gender equality. Critical acts of gender experts 
should not be perceived as individual pursuits as they are highly dependent on 
collaboration with others. A support network of gender advisors can be critical 
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for any success or even the possibility to carry on work. This is strongly argued by 
Gerd and she exemplifes it with her experience in the Development Assistance 
Committee (OECD-DAC) and its gender group, in particular, providing a key 
source of support and inspiration for gender advisors across donor countries. 
Several members of this group played a leading role in the international nego-
tiations on women’s empowerment, notably the complicated and controversial 
deliberations on SRHR as evidenced in for instance, the UN World Conferences 
in Vienna, Cairo and Beijing in the 1990s. Facing similar institutional challenges 
the gender experts shared valuable experience – in coping with diffcult processes 
– widely within the network. 
An Italian colleague, Bianca Pomeranzi, later a member of the CEDAW-
committee provided me with critical support in areas such as dominating 
epistemologies and the need to critically analyse ‘knowledge’ as knowledge 
at worst can be used for perpetuating power structures. Dr Carolyn Hannan 
Andersson – a world-leading gender advisor at SIDA and, later on, head 
of the UN Division for the Advancement of Women gave me most valu-
able insights on both advantages and shortcomings with gender mainstream-
ing. While conducting the study on poverty, I was also lucky to learn from 
many colleagues, including Amima Mama at the African Gender Institute 
in Cape Town on how power-relations within the Military often are repli-
cated in civilian institutions. From IDS in the UK, notably researchers and 
experts on female poverty such as the professors Naila Kabeer, Sylvia Chant, 
Andrea Cornwall and Diane Elson, I learned about the similarities – regard-
less of geographical areas – in gender-based power-structures, in families as 
well as at national level. Diane Elson was, and is, one of many prominent 
experts within the Commonwealth who has developed tools for engendered 
budgeting – mechanisms applied by many, including the Swedish Ministry 
of Finance. 
The importance of politics 
Gerd’s narrative also discloses how the potential of critical acts must be under-
stood against the broader context of politics, i.e. beyond the institutions. Politics 
offer opportunities, but also throw up challenges. According to her, it was crucial 
for the work in the MFA that gender equality as a goal and gender mainstreaming 
as a means was furthered during Pierre Schori’s time as Minister for Development 
Cooperation (1997–1998), when he and his political advisor, Lena Ag (now 
Director-General of the Swedish Gender Equality Agency), requested all depart-
ments of the MFA to produce gender equality plans: 
Some of these plans lasted longer in the institutional memories of the depart-
ments, while others had shorter lifespans. By and large, many plans – notably 
the parts most easily put into practice such as disaster relief focusing among 
other things on SRHR – had a reasonably lasting effect. 
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It was also the political level – with Minister Mona Sahlin and her political advi-
sor, Stefan Engström, both committed to gender equality (and Sahlin had played 
an active role at the Beijing Conference in 1995) – that commissioned Gerd 
to produce the study on gender and sustainable development discussed above. 
Mona Sahlin also opened a high-level, well-attended seminar when a draft of 
the study was presented in New York, in the context of the UN Commission 
on Sustainable Development in 2006. Gerd used that occasion to push a more 
transformative gender agenda and explains: 
During my years in development cooperation, the approach when address-
ing gender had been to strategically address women as victims in need of 
assistance. In general, that meant poor women were objects – but could also 
imply looking at women as agents, and even to apply an intersectional per-
spective. However, the gender approach very seldom meant that men and 
male behaviour were the focus of analysis and interventions with two excep-
tions to that rule: when men were the main perpetrators of violence against 
women and when highlighting men as fathers. I felt that the time was ripe 
and I seized the opportunity to introduce a new perspective in the sustain-
ability discourse. To me, it was logical, based on my experiences from the 
poverty study, which had highlighted male privileges – and how these male 
privileges often deprived women of essential rights and resources. 
The presence of political will – among leading politicians and gender experts 
– offers support and opportunities to push gender issues on agendas in a trans-
formative way much beyond – albeit also important acts – of ‘add women and 
stir’ strategies or the inclusion of gender in important texts. Political will was 
declared strongly when the Swedish Government launched its Feminist Foreign 
Policy (FFP) in 2014. The FFP has attracted scholarly attention (e.g. Aggestam 
and Bergman-Rosamond, 2016; Aggestam et al., 2019; Robinson, 2019) and has 
been appreciated in government circles in many parts of the world (e.g. Rosén 
Sundström and Elgström, 2019). France and Canada (e.g. Thomson, 2020) have 
followed suit in establishing similar goals and policies. The launching of the FFP 
has given a strong and important signal – and remains a beacon – in a time when 
women’s rights are contested, often violently, in very many parts of the world. 
In the FFP, women in peace and confict were a priority and SRHR was of par-
amount importance but climate issues were not. A notable change with the FFP 
is that the normal order of procedure would be that embassies and representations 
in multilateral arenas, such as the UN, would be requested to submit suggestions 
for gender action. In the 1990s, this standard was only applied to some depart-
ments; with the FFP it has become more all-encompassing, stretching across all 
departments. Gerd, however, has some strong objections to the FFP: 
The FFP is not a transformative agenda. For example, several Swedish NGOs 
have criticised the Swedish MFA for acting in manners inconsistent with the 
goals of the FFP. One example is the MFA allowing arms sales to countries 
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like Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates where women are gravely 
discriminated and while both countries are also heavily engaged in warfare 
in Yemen. 
The Swedish FFP emerged from a long engagement of the MFA on gender issues. 
Already, the Fourth UN World Conference on Women in Beijing 1995 was an 
example of Swedish leadership in the multilateral context. This implied work to 
include gender-relevant text in platforms and convention text. Gerd gives an 
account of her frst-hand experience: 
Sweden (then a recent addition to the European Union), played a key role 
for attaining a ground-breaking and far-reaching Platform for Action (PFA). 
A major Swedish achievement was to include a recurrent paragraph in each 
and every section of the text, with the aim of ensuring that gender would be 
a key aspect in poverty reduction, education, health, violence, peace and 
confict, economy, etc. The Swedish team – with gender expertise in a num-
ber of areas such as sexual and reproductive health and rights, international 
law, economics, confict resolution and UN negotiations at large – was one 
of the stronger actors in Beijing in 1995, together with several other actors, 
including in the global south. It could be noted that one paragraph in the 
PFA gives special attention to women facing double or triple discrimina-
tion, such as migrant women, older women, women with disabilities and 
Indigenous women (though at that time the concept of intersectionality was 
not used). 
Conservative politics as an obstacle to gender equity 
There is much contestation on gender in the multilateral context in 2021. The 
Swedish position – stressing gender equality and later feminist foreign policy – 
stands in sharp contrast to an international system plagued by populist/national 
conservative winds and increased infuence of anti-gender movements, e.g. in 
Russia, USA, Brazil, India and Eastern Europe. 
A refection on the challenges I have faced when working multilaterally for 
the MFA is that there are radically diverging political views on gender, more 
than on most political matters. Over the years, the major obstacle to advanc-
ing gender equality has been the harsh resistance from several states, as well 
as the Vatican, a non-state observer within the UN, all endorsing conserva-
tive religious views. The most ferce political objection to gender equality 
relates primarily to SRHR; women’s, young persons and LGBT-persons 
rights to their own bodies and sexuality. Many actors have worked closely 
together to resist secular approaches and all aspects of SRHR, regardless of 
faith (but often most vocal from the Russian Orthodox Church and also by 
the USA during Republican administrations). Their efforts have been par-
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conferences organised by both the UN and the World Bank, and not least 
in fora set up to enhance human rights, such as the UN Commission for 
Human Rights. 
Since 2000, gender equality has, according to Gerd, faced increasing challenges 
due to conservative political forces becoming more prevalent. 
As I see it, reactionary forces were taken by surprise in Beijing 1995 regarding 
the achievements made in just two decades since the frst UN World 
Conference on Women in terms of women’s rights, in a direction that they 
did not favour. So, from then onwards, those who objected to gender equality 
and SRHR, have gathered support and collected huge amounts of money to 
pursue their agendas. This provides a stark contrast to the limited resources 
of women’s rights groups. Even the EU has become less active in pursuing 
gender concerns since it expanded to include Hungary and Poland as mem-
ber states in 2000. To include these states was part of a security agenda – 
but in reality, it became contrary to women’s or gender security, notably in 
countries like Hungary and Poland. While it had previously been diffcult 
to gain consensus within the EU on SRHR – due to objections from Malta 
and Ireland, supported by the Vatican – today with Poland, and Hungary 
as members, the EU has become a far weaker advocate for SRHR on key 
matters such as legal abortion, sexual education for adolescents, measures to 
reduce violence against women and permitting abortion for women and girls 
who have been raped, including during armed confict. 
Gerd also notes that misogyny has become more common as autocratic forces 
defend ‘traditional’ gender roles (cf. Chapter 12, this volume) which challenges 
Sweden’s positions in multilateral fora. An example is the Geneva-based UN 
Commission for Human Rights, where since 2010, many states have given high 
political priority to stopping gains made in the previous 30–40 years related to 
advancing women’s rights. 
We have seen it with political leaders such as Orban, Kaczynski, Erdogan, 
Putin, Khamenei, bin Salman, Modi, Trump and Pence. We’ve seen it in 
countries across the globe, among populists and, nationalist groups, in politi-
cal parties and on social media, and among ‘lone wolves’ and incels, who 
are prepared to kill to ‘defend’ their masculine privilege as well as – very 
often – their perceived white supremacy. While these leaders question and 
dismantle women’s and LGBT rights within their own jurisdiction, they also 
collaborate internationally against those rights. Interestingly, many of these 
actors have also collaborated as climate change deniers including in negotia-
tions in COP (Conference of the Parties) regarding the Paris Accord. 
Thus, many men – and some women – who advocate a so-called tra-
ditional role for women also reject action to combat climate change
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mainstream and integrate gender in already established agendas such as
economic development or legal reforms and in trying to integrate climate
awareness and sustainability in relevant areas of concern. In doing so, I found
that the same types of resistance surfaced in both areas – gender and global
warming – when I and others tried to change the framing of problems. I
think that the reason is that both gender and climate change is frequently
perceived as a threat to many current male defnitions of progress – and
discourses which also challenge the expertise and status of well-established
economists and policy-makers.
(cf. Chapter 12, this volume) 
While the importance of political support for gender issues has been crucial for 
the work of gender advisors like Gerd, in the multilateral context, the strength 
and emergence of conservative politics is a counterpoint. It makes it not only 
diffcult to advance gender equity, LGBT and SRH Rights but also implies that 
some of the victories won have been reversed or risk being reversed. In this con-
text, pursuing a climate-related gender agenda and pointing to men and male 
privilege, may be particularly diffcult. 
Institutional path dependencies 
As noted in the introductory chapter (Chapter 1, this volume), historically 
derived notions of gender tend to persist resulting in a path dependence that 
hampers opportunities for innovation and change (Kenny, 2007). Gerd refects 
on her experiences of institutional path dependencies from the inside of the gov-
ernment offces and the foreign ministry: 
The main institutional challenge government offcials face when promoting 
gender equality within government offces is the odd constraint of insisting 
that the purpose is to address women in need of help – because this means 
it is not possible to address the real problem of masculine structures and the 
mostly male actors depriving women of means and rights. 
The failure to recognise masculine structures is an institutional path dependence 
that works against transformation (e.g. Krook and Mackay, 2011; Mackay et al., 
2010; Waylen, 2014) and instead leads to weaker, more superfcial measures, such 
as increasing the representation of women, or ‘mainstreaming’. 
Gerd tells us that this applies not only in multilateral institutions but also 
within Sweden, where gender equality is generally accepted in society and SRHR 
has been a Swedish priority for decades, not the least in terms of pushing abor-
tion rights and young people’s access to sexual education. The Swedish Foreign 
Ministry has been pursuing women’s rights, empowerment and (from the 1990s 
and onwards) LGBT interventions with considerable political and institutional 
backing. However, these issues remain prioritised only as long as desired pro-
jects and interventions ft within other overarching agendas, for example, if 
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they ft with development efforts, peace-making, or confict resolution and only 
as long as those agendas are not drastically changed by including gender con-
cerns. Institutional inertia relating to the prominence of trade for Swedish wel-
fare has strongly impacted sustainability issues. Gerd worked at the Ministry for 
Sustainable Development for two years (2006–2007), in a secretariat established 
to enhance sustainable development and experienced this frsthand: 
First, the secretariat had been placed in the prime minister’s offce but was 
later transferred to a less crucial part of the government offces. The sec-
retariat had representatives from a handful of ministries, bringing together 
experts to create a multidisciplinary unit, in the hope that this would be con-
ducive to creative thinking. While the secretariat gave a signal that Sweden 
continued to pursue the active role on environmental issues, a strong driv-
ing force behind Sweden’s pursuit of sustainability was growth and trade-
oriented and a way to demonstrate that Swedish technology and innovations 
can contribute to solving environmental problems and climate change. 
Our task was to mainstream sustainable development in key policy docu-
ments such as policies and speeches, at the national level, in the EU and 
globally in the UN and World Bank. Generally speaking, it was a question 
of adding some smartly formulated sentences and subject matters in order to 
place a reminder of the sustainability perspective – not really to transform 
the message as a whole. 
Priority of trade 
Sweden’s economy relies heavily on international trade and its workforce is 
largely dependent on trade exports, thus the support for exports is robust and 
non-partisan. Swedish governments have strongly supported Swedish export 
industries, portraying Sweden as a modern country with technical solutions that 
are extremely conducive for the environment – i.e. the idea of ecological mod-
ernisation which has become an institutional path dependence. As an example, 
in the national country strategies of the MFA which are established to defne the 
main features of Sweden’s relations to other countries and facilitating exports, 
constitute the backbone and overarching concern in the strategies, while sustain-
ability, the environment and climate issues are secondary. With an economy and 
labour force heavily oriented towards exports, Sweden often balances ambitions 
regarding gender equality with concern not to offend important trade partners, 
demonstrated in the past with the case of Saudi Arabia and the United Arab 
Emirates, countries which pursue gender apartheid. 
Limiting frames 
Other limitations had gender effects. In Gerd’s view, gender-based discrimina-
tion constitutes examples of unsustainability in several areas, in terms of damage 
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to both the physical and the social environment, something diffcult to pursue 
fully due to the way the issues were framed and dealt with: 
While the aim of climate and sustainability efforts was to engage a multidis-
ciplinary approach, the reality was that we often had to work with addressing 
forestry, water, energy and so on, in separate agendas. This gave very limited 
room for addressing gender and intersectionality in terms of who has access
to sustainable forestry, to water resources, energy etc. The framing of the 
problems which conformed to a technical, rather than a social approach to 
sustainability failed to determine who was causing the problems. One conse-
quence is that it gives the impression that men in their role as experts and 
engineers have the solutions to the problems; not the women. Thus, female 
experts are rarely called upon in this context, even when they could have 
given a voice to different segments of women and men, for example on the 
need for more public transportation. 
Gerd demonstrates that how sustainability and climate change are framed can 
be limiting, as the frame prioritize specifc topics and actors and excludes others. 
One of my suggestions is thus that a gender-equality perspective helps to 
enhance innovative thinking and can help us see that moving to carbon-
free societies could for many – women as well as men - not mean a sacri-
fce but instead lead to emphasis on more crucial and sustainable aspects of 
well-being. One such example, could be to press for zero-tolerance regarding 
male or societal violence; to be secured by legal provisions, law enforcement, 
adequate funding etcetera. 
In her work on sustainability and climate issues Gerd discovered that although 
she had support from political levels as we noted above, there was less support 
from what she calls the ‘line’ particularly to her report ‘Gender Equality as a 
Prerequisite for Sustainable Development’. There was a trio of female senior civil 
servants at the Ministry for Environment who decided that the report should not 
– unlike her previous reports on poverty and violence – be published within the 
government offces, but was instead diverted to a government subsidiary agency 
(Miljövårdsberedningen). It seems as if the ministries were not ready for this new 
framing of gender issues proposed by Gerd. 
The ‘line’ of civil servants at the ministry – primarily females, at all levels 
– were far less enthusiastic about the study. Instead, they prioritised time 
within the secretariat to focus on daily tasks such as commenting on EU or 
UN statements to be held in Brussels and New York on matters relating to 
sustainable development. There, they would concentrate on a sentence or 
two to be inserted in texts that could, for instance, address poor women as 
victims of environmental degradation – but certainly not to address males as 
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the Ministry of Sustainability was, among many things, involved in several 
working groups under the UN Commission on Sustainable Development to 
promote sustainable lifestyles. Generally, however, these working-groups – 
a part of the so-called Marrakesh-process – followed the overall more cau-
tious approach of mainly dealing with innovative techniques and women as
victims who should be more involved in decision-making. 
Administrative practices 
Through Gerd’s narrative, we learn that politicians may support a transformative 
perspective and in particular that women at the political level share a strong 
common commitment to advance gender equality and women’s rights and to 
the extent possible seek to transform the political agenda to attain those goals. 
However, politicians come and go, and what prevails is an administrative logic 
in the workplace enacted by both males and females in senior, managerial levels. 
With the exemption of gender advisors, they do not necessarily support a trans-
formative agenda. Gerd explains about this path dependence: 
According to my experiences, an impediment for more far-reaching trans-
formation is often civil servants, mainly at senior, managerial levels, who 
are unwilling or afraid of being considered driven by personal agendas. They 
point – often rightfully – to the fact that the task of civil servants is precisely 
that: to be ‘servants’ of the politicians, not to be activists. That is, of course, 
a rule not followed by all, the breaking of which is often appreciated by some 
politicians who are prepared to promote gender equality even while such 
paths confict with other political goals. 
Ministries are maybe more advantageous for people who go by the book 
and follow the rules, not for strong-headed enthusiasts. Mostly, staff prefer to 
go by the book. The same goes for many young civil servants, notably within 
the MFA, who do not want to risk their future and career by being consid-
ered headstrong. All in all, at least in the MFA, it is more important – and 
appreciated – among peers never to make a mistake, even at the expense of 
not being brilliant, and even at the expense of not saving lives. 
To follow such administrative logic means that civil servants will not advocate any-
thing that challenges power structures, even if civil servants in the MFA, for the
most part and regardless of their gender, are committed to addressing the needs
of poor women and enhancing women’s rights. However, at best it means that
women can be considered as actors, agents, addressed in all their multitude through
advanced intersectional analysis. Such analysis would still be insuffcient in address-
ing the real problem: male privileges, male ‘rights’ and unsustainable male consump-
tion and lifestyles (Gore, 2020). In speculating why this is the case Gerd writes: 
I am convinced that the reason that senior-level offcials within government 
offces do not advocate transformative approaches is that the overall agenda 
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is to always focus on helping those at the bottom – but never challenging 
those at the top. Further, this approach is also a means to promote economic 
growth – perceived as a prerequisite for providing resources for less advan-
taged groups – even if it is detrimental for the climate, whereas obliging the 
rich to share their resources with those less well off would be much better for 
both climate and biodiversity. 
Conclusion 
Gerd’s narrative highlights the committed and zealous labour that gender advi-
sors put into diverse institutional contexts of multilateral organisations and gov-
ernment agencies, work that consists of analysing documents and fnding ways to 
include gender in relevant texts that can then become platforms for further action. 
Such activities are well served by expert knowledge, coming from commissioned 
studies and research often advanced through networks of gender experts. These 
are imperative and critical acts. Gerd suggests that to gender mainstream climate 
change issues effectively, more knowledge and data are needed it is imperative 
to address excess consumption of rich males. She points to the necessity of pro-
viding sex-disaggregated data and data on wealth and income to identify who 
is causing CO2 emissions and specifc data on the benefciaries of the fossil fuel 
economy. 
Through her narrative, Gerd alerts us to the institutional inertia of specifc 
framings of gender in relation to economic priorities that affected her work and 
how gender equality in reality is just one of many political goals set out to be pur-
sued by means such as ‘gender mainstreaming’. She also pointed to the limitations 
of political and administrative institutions with embedded restrictions on civil 
servants in terms of their roles and tasks largely determining their scope of action. 
Nevertheless, Gerd’s narrative also signposted that opportunities could arise for 
civil servants to take action, and to the necessity of being brave enough to seize 
those opportunities (as also argued in Chapter 6, this volume). While all acts that 
have been discussed in the chapter can potentially advance gender issues, politics 
plays a crucial role both in terms of supporting transformative gender concerns 
and in obstructing them. Gerd maintains that for real transformation, another 
kind of politics is necessary. Gerd’s visions for a future transformative agenda 
for gender, intersectionality, climate and sustainability, is that it ‘is only really 
possible through political mobilisation. Transformative ideas have to become 
part of the ideas supported by the dominant political parties and governments of 
democratic countries’ and mobilise the needed broader support, she continues: 
‘It is important to identify those who promote and advocate transformation as 
to enable collaborations and alliances between actors both inside and outside 
government and across societies’. 
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6 Take a ride into the danger zone? 
Assessing path dependency and the 
possibilities for instituting change at 
two Swedish government agencies 
Benedict E. Singleton and Gunnhildur Lily 
Magnusdottir 
Introduction – The need for institutional change 
With the exception of the community of climate change deniers, there is largely 
consensus that global human society needs to go through a variety of changes 
in order to ensure continued sustainability. The UN’s sustainable development 
goals (SDGs) emphasise the urgency of these changes and provide an incentive 
to recognise the importance of social differences, including gender differences, in 
climate politics (see also Morrow, this volume). Furthermore, the necessary soci-
etal changes needed for a successful climate transition call for deeper understand-
ing of the complex social, economic and environmental effects of any climate 
action on different social groups, defned by intersectional climate-relevant fac-
tors such as gender, age, class, education and location. This means that the soci-
etal changes needed for sustainable climate politics will have diverse, disparate 
effects within the population (Magnusdottir and Kronsell; Bipasha, this volume). 
Gender, nested with other intersecting social differences, has been shown to be 
of relevance for consequences of climate action (Alston and Whittenbury, 2013; 
Magnusdottir and Kronsell, 2015, 2016; Nagel, 2012; Resurrección, 2013). As 
such, how to transition to sustainable societies is a topic of considerable scientifc 
debate as is the discussion of the importance of social justice in climate transi-
tion. Whilst ‘Green Radicals’ may argue for substantive, wholesale changes to 
the underpinnings of contemporary economies and societies, still ‘environmen-
tal problem-solvers’ argue for a more pragmatic stance, i.e. reorientation rather 
than revolution (Dryzek, 2013). In this context, we argue that it is important to 
explore the role and possibilities that climate institutions and the civil servants 
embedded in them can play in orienting society in a more sustainable and socially 
just direction. This chapter examines the possibilities for action among civil 
servants within two Swedish climate institutions, with a specifc focus on their 
potential to recognise and work with climate-relevant social differences, such as 
gender, age, location and class, in their policy-making. The climate institutions 
in question are two government agencies: the Swedish Environmental Protection 
Agency (Naturvårdsverket, SEPA) and the Swedish Transport Administration 
(Trafkverket, STA). Based on interviews with agency staff, we draw on feminist 
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institutional theory to examine the extent that respondents consider themselves 
bound by the path dependency of their institution and the extent to which they 
report potential action towards change. The purpose of this analysis is to high-
light the potential ways that agency staff may be empowered to make use of a 
feminist or intersectional understanding of social differences in order to develop 
socially inclusive and just climate policy and potentially overcome institutional 
path dependency. 
To be successful, climate transition strategies need to acknowledge social dif-
ferences and thus consider the needs of different social groups. Otherwise, they 
not only risk being deemed undemocratic but also ineffective in their attempts 
to drive forward the large-scale societal changes needed for climate transitions 
(Laestadius, 2018). Our intention is to contribute by signalling the steps climate 
institutions could take in order to achieve their transformational potential (cf. 
Eckersley, 2020). 
The chapter is structured as follows. In the next section, we discuss our guid-
ing theoretical tool – feminist institutionalism – and its relevance to our case, 
e.g. how a ‘gendered logic of appropriateness’ might prevent the full inclusion 
of gender into climate policy-making. We then discuss the cases in question and 
the material and methods employed. Thereafter, we analyse the collected data, 
with the help of feminist institutionalism, highlighting how respondents framed 
their activities in terms of following a top-down and historical trajectory, while at 
other times they would describe how they are able to act on their own initiative. 
We conclude by suggesting that efforts to orient Swedish Government agencies 
towards a just climate policy require tools designed both to ‘convert’ senior staff 
to adopt the approach and to demonstrate civil servant initiatives fall within the 
agencies’ legitimate purview. 
Following a well-beaten path: institutional changes, path 
dependency and the ‘stickiness’ of institutions 
We make use of institutional literature, especially including feminist institution-
alism in our analysis. We are inspired by intersectionality literature on climate 
change (Kaijser and Kronsell, 2014) and we expand the traditional gender lens 
of feminist institutionalism to include climate-relevant social factors, such as 
education, class, age and geography, which intersect with gender (see further in 
Magnusdottir and Kronsell, in this volume). 
Institutionalist approaches study institutions. Separate strands of institutional-
ism defne institutions differently and we defne them broadly, including both 
formal and informal climate authorities. Thus, our defnition of ‘climate insti-
tutions’ also includes: ‘rules, norms and practices embedded in historical tradi-
tions and legacies, giving some stability and predictability to political and public 
life’ (Hysing and Olsson, 2018, p. 9; cf. March and Olsen, 1996; Mackay et al., 
2010). Put another way, as social beings, humans coproduce understanding of the 
world with institutions through which they live and act (Douglas, 1987). People 
perform social relationships concomitantly with narratives of the world, which 
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together comprise institutional patterns (Thompson, 2008). As social organisa-
tions, what people embedded in institutions 
assume to be true shapes what they value. This shaping occurs through the 
processes of proactive manifestation through which assumptions provide 
expectations that infuence perceptions, thoughts, and feelings about the 
world and the organization. These perceptions, thoughts, and feelings are 
then experienced as refecting the world and the organization. Members rec-
ognize among these refections, aspects they both like and dislike, and on 
this basis they become conscious of their values (without necessarily being 
conscious of the basic assumptions on which their experiences and values 
are based). 
(Hatch, 1993, p. 662) 
A key concern of institutional theorising is how institutions change. In this, it 
echoes wider social scientifc discussions about the relationship between social 
structures and individual agency or power (Mahoney and Thelen, 2009). Within 
feminist institutionalism, institutional practices are understood to be based on 
a logic that may make the inclusion of gender appear less appropriate and less 
desirable. This builds on March and Olsen’s (1996, pp. 21–38, p. 161) new insti-
tutionalist ideas about how institutions are reproduced through patterns of action 
in a ‘logic of appropriateness’. In the context of this chapter, this might, for 
example, mean that dominant economic and technical solutions to societal prob-
lems are ‘sticky’ or deemed more appropriate than solutions focusing on climate-
relevant social differences such as gender. The fact that Swedish environmental 
politics have historically been framed in the context of ‘ecological moderniza-
tion’ (Lundqvist, 2004), which prioritises economy over social concerns might 
lead to path dependency in Swedish climate institutions and limit the scope for 
inside activism. Thus, economic solutions might be reproduced and normalised 
within institutions, limiting space for innovation and civil servant activism. Put 
differently, individual policy-makers are assumed to follow embedded rules and 
routines, according to what is appropriate for their social and professional role 
and individual identity. What is considered appropriate in any given situation 
is not trivial. ‘Actions are ftted to situations by their appropriateness within a 
conception of identity’ (March and Olsen, 1996, p. 38). 
‘Well-established institutions are even taken for granted and tend to produce 
path-dependent action’ (Hysing and Olsson, 2018, p. 9). What this means is 
that those embedded in institutions act based on past institutional actions, with 
positive feedback from successful earlier actions encouraging the development 
of a particular institutional ‘path’ or ‘mission trajectory’ (Goodsell, 2006). Put 
another way, an institutional worldview represents a paradigm within which 
particular actions are encouraged or constrained, providing a framing of how 
the world should be. They may also function to retroactively maintain or alter 
existing assumptions (Hatch, 1993, p. 664). In this chapter, we are interested 
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transition with reference to the institutions within which they are embedded 
(the government agencies). 
Path dependency may potentially be challenged by actions in the wider world; 
however, endogenous change is also possible. Not all institutions proceed along 
a static trajectory until an external crisis precipitates change. Institutional theo-
rists have highlighted that those within institutions, including civil servants, do 
not necessarily agree with an institution’s worldview and are able to work overtly 
or covertly to engender institutional change (cf. Johnsson-Latham and Kronsell 
in this volume). As such, civil servants can be ‘inside activists’ seeking to fur-
ther their values within an institution or, in contrast, toe the institutional line 
(Hysing and Olsson, 2018). Governing authorities are of particular interest, as 
the offcials within them necessarily require adaptation and discretionary power 
to carry out their role in dynamic situations where offcial direction may be vague 
and/or conficting (Applbaum, 1992). However, concomitant to this discretion-
ary power is the need for a certain legitimacy. If this is lost then public confdence 
in government may be undermined (Hysing and Olsson, 2018, p. 141). Linked 
to this, as the rise of Trump in the US illustrates, politicians may make politi-
cal capital by depicting public offcials as part of a ‘deep state’ opposed to what 
they consider the will of the people. As such, public offcials walk a fne line and 
become involved in various societal conficts through the actions they take. This 
highlights two dimensions relevant to institutional change. Firstly, institutions 
must be mindful of their social legitimacy – their standing within broader society 
affects their actions (Hatch, 2018). Secondly, and linked to the frst point, insti-
tutional worldviews will contain assumptions about their place and role in soci-
ety. Both of these usually entail a certain path dependency as agencies are steered 
by their own and outsiders’ ideas about what they can and should do. 
At the individual level, civil servants do make decisions and periodically can 
act against dominant institutional structures, which suggests individual agency 
and room for ‘inside activism’ (Chapter 5, this volume). This is one of the ways 
that institutions change. Within dynamic contexts, actors and structure thus 
hang together within processes of structuration (Giddens, 1984). As such, there 
are times when actors embedded in institutions display path dependency whereas 
at others, they are able to act with limited reference to the organisation (Hysing 
and Olsson, 2018). 
Identities and role expectations 
Feminist institutionalism has almost exclusively focused on gender, but we suggest,
as already stated, that the intersectional understanding of identities and social
factors other than gender is needed for our analysis. This means that we expand
the gender lens of feminist institutionalism to include factors such as education,
class, age and geography, when exploring both the role of professional identities
of policy-makers and their understanding of climate-relevant social differences. 
Professional identities in climate institutions are important to study since cli-
mate actions and policies are not only the product of path-dependent, sticky 
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institutions but also determined by how individual policy-makers make sense of 
their position and professional identities. Feminist institutionalism argues that 
institutions organise power inequalities in two main ways. Firstly, through formal 
as well as informal rules and practices. Secondly, through co-production of iden-
tities intertwined with the daily life and logic of institutions. In most Western 
states, including Sweden, climate policy-making primarily takes place in the 
energy, environment or transport sectors. As such, the norms and path depend-
encies expressed in the rules and culture of the institutions active in that sector 
will affect understandings of how social power relations work within policy-
making. In addition, the professional identity of the policy-makers, perhaps edu-
cated as engineers or economists, might make technical and economic solutions 
seem most appropriate. In our analysis, we side with Arora-Jonsson and Sijapati 
(2018) and propose that professional identities of civil servants and institutions 
are of considerable signifcance when studying climate institutions. As outlined 
above, climate policy has been criticised for being overly reliant on technical and 
economic action instead of also acknowledging the social dimension of climate 
change. Further recognition of the social dimension of climate change would, for 
instance, mean that climate-relevant differences in behaviour, adaptation, views 
and vulnerability of different social groups are taken into further consideration 
in climate policy-making. This limited recognition of social difference arguably 
limits the possibilities for institutional action, with consequences for the possibil-
ity of just sustainable climate transitions. 
Of particular relevance to this chapter is the notion of ‘green inside activism’ 
(Hysing and Olsson, 2018), not dissimilar to the notion of femocrat or gender 
activist, referred to in other chapters in this volume. Inside activists are individu-
als ‘engaged in civil society networks and organizations, who hold a formal posi-
tion within public administration, and who act strategically from inside public 
administration to change government policy and action in line with a personal 
value commitment’ (Olsson and Hysing, 2012, p. 258). In our study, we look 
for such inside activism in terms of how these civil servants describe their pos-
sibilities for initiating climate acts – e.g. critical acts built on an intersectional or 
gendered understanding of climate change. 
Cases and methods 
We collected the data for this chapter through an interview study in the spring 
of 2020, of civil servants in Swedish climate institutions, and based it upon the 
responses of two government agencies, the Swedish Environmental Protection 
Agency (EPA) and the Swedish Transport Administration (STA). We briefy 
present these agencies in turn. The Swedish governmental system is character-
ised by relatively small government ministries (headed by elected politicians) 
and relatively large and rather autonomous government agencies (myndigheter, 
staffed by public offcials). Agencies fall under the direction of the government, 
but have a certain amount of their own infuence, dealing with actors at all social 
scales. Agencies typically have a sector of responsibility, within which they 
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are infuential. In their work, agencies provide evidence for policy, act to real-
ise government policy and respond to Swedish and international climate goals 
(e.g. Agenda 2030) (Swedish Government, 2017). Notable to Swedish climate 
policy is the absence of a specifc climate agency. Instead, climate action is dis-
persed within different agencies as considered relevant. This structure is similar 
to how climate politics are organised in many other European states, including 
other Nordic states with the exception of Norway (Magnusdottir and Kronsell, 
2015), the EU (Chapter 3, this volume) and the German Federal Government 
(Chapter 5, this volume). However, governmental agencies in Sweden might 
be considered more autonomous in their decision-making than many of their 
European counterparts. 
The Swedish Environmental Protection Agency is the state agency for envi-
ronmental issues, employing around 600 people across two offces in Stockholm 
and Östersund (Oscarsson, 2020). It supports Swedish governmental action plans 
every four years alongside other activities (Persson et al., 2019). This includes 
(but is not limited to) monitoring Sweden’s environment in terms of pollutants, 
invasive species and so forth, and collating knowledge. It also carries out work 
maintaining Sweden’s network of nature reserves. The SEPA also develops and 
implements environmental policy, cooperating with other agencies. The SEPA 
was selected for this research project due to it’s heavy involvement in climate 
activities across the board. In contrast, the Swedish Transport Administration, 
(STA) is responsible for long-term transport infrastructure planning, construc-
tion and maintenance, and as such works with climate policies in relation to 
transport. Transport is one of the heaviest contributing sectors to Swedish carbon 
emissions, rendering the STA relevant to this project (Naturvårdsverket, 2012). 
The STA is an extremely large agency, with around 9000 employees. Based in 
Borlänge it has regional offces in six other Swedish cities (Trafkverket, 2019). 
Initially, we selected respondents purposively, with individuals at each selected 
agency previously signalling their interest in participating in this study. We then 
selected further respondents utilising snowball sampling. We continued to seek 
out new respondents until we reached a saturation point, with the same people 
repeatedly suggested to us (Bryman, 2004). In total, we conducted nine inter-
views with SEPA staff (iEPA01-09, four women and fve men) and six from the 
STA (iSTA01-06, two women and four men). Respondents held different levels 
of seniority within their respective organisations. SEPA respondents held vari-
ous relevant roles, such as investigators and analysts around carbon emissions, as 
well as policy advisors. STA respondents included investigators, project manag-
ers and goal directors. Because of the ongoing Covid-19 crisis, we conducted all 
interviews online using Zoom or Skype for Business software. Having acquired 
informed verbal consent, we recorded each interview. We organised each inter-
view in a semi-structured manner around a research guide. Questions focused 
upon a) respondent background and experience; b) interpretations of social jus-
tice within each agency; and c) the institutional contexts within which agen-
cies operate. Following the recordings, we transcribed each interview and utilised 
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were originally conducted in Swedish, but we have translated the extracts utilised 
here. 
Several writers have tried to theorise the links between institutional world-
view and institutional activity and change (cf. Hatch, 2018). For example, 
Hatch (1993) describes a dynamic system where assumptions and values of the 
world manifest in cultural symbols and artefacts. This research does not directly 
utilise such a framing but shares with it the basic ontological standpoint that 
respondents’ interview discourses are refective of their organisational cultures, 
coproduced with their institutional worldviews. We, thus, pay attention to the 
assumptions and values evidenced by respondents. 
Top to bottom, bottom to top? Change possibilities at the SEPA 
and STA 
Respondents from both the SEPA and STA made various statements about 
their ability to change their agencies’ emphases around climate change action 
and social justice. The picture painted was, at times, seemingly contradictory. 
Respondents would frame dominant approaches towards climate and social 
justice as dependent on instructions laid down elsewhere, predominantly from 
the government. However, at other times, respondents would also assert that 
they had space for individual and institution-instituted action. The following 
paragraphs discuss this dissonance. We then turn to the implications this picture 
presents for efforts to overcome institutional path dependency and incorporate 
social justice into the SEPA and STA’s climate change action. 
When questioned on the possibilities for incorporating broader conceptualisa-
tions of social justice in their climate change work many respondents asserted 
that a key factor was their agencies’ remit and the tasks (uppdrag) that they 
received from the government. Respondents would characterise the historical 
trajectory of their agencies’ involvement with climate change work as a product 
of Swedish governmental decisions. This could be in the form of direct assign-
ments of tasks, or it could be through the governments’ undertakings regarding 
international agreements (such as Agenda 2030) and climate targets, which may 
express social sustainability goals: 
Either you get your assignments via the instruction [Swedish government
rules about each agencies remit], or you get it every year when you receive a
regulation letter [from the government] or you get different types of govern-
ment assignments during the year. … We get [assignments] not only from
the Ministry of the Environment, but we get it from … the Ministry of
Finance or… [The orders] That we together with other authorities should
do things. 
(iEPA04) 
We have taken Agenda 2030 to our hearts … It was a government assign-
ment that was about what can [STA] do to achieve Agenda 2030? We have 
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interpreted this as partly what should the transport system do. We call it 
Target 2030, ten aspects and fourteen goals. … we call it which piece of the 
cake we should make, what is it that the Swedish Transport Administration 
can contribute to, for example, achieving the climate goal or traffc safety, 
or accessibility throughout the country or accessibility for everyone … [the] 
more social sustainability goals. 
(iSTA04) 
This also meant that respondents voiced an unwillingness to act on things that 
they perceived as outside of the agencies’ purview. This presented a particular 
challenge when it came to issues such as social justice that cut across multiple 
actors’ jurisdictions within the Swedish governance system. 
The Swedish Transport Administration is not allowed to work to infuence 
behaviour, so this means that [social justice] requires close cooperation with 
other actors, such as municipalities. So that it is they who, as it were, are 
allowed to carry out these frst steps to infuence behaviour …. yes, talking 
about norms and values and so on. It is not a mission we have. 
(iSTA01) 
Personally, I try to achieve a transparent basis for decision-making. We are 
not politicians, we are not decision-makers, we are civil servants, so we must, 
as it were, show politics what the consequences will be of their decisions. 
(iSTA04) 
This also meant that when social justice did come in the fact that it was neither 
agency’s main focus meant that it was dealt with in an ad hoc fashion. Thus, for 
example, some SEPA respondents described social justice as more of an add-on 
to their broader environmental role. 
We do some analysis; we look at distributional effects as far as possible … 
Most recently, I looked at tax deductions for work journeys, looked at how 
it affected different geographical areas. However, I must say that it is some-
thing that we need to develop, we discuss it a lot: how we should incorporate 
additional distributional effects into our analysis … We look primarily at the 
emissions effect. 
(iSEPA02, our emphasis) 
Repeatedly, respondents would thus paint a picture of top-down decision-making 
directing their activities. A distinct normative assumption emerged that agencies 
work under the government, and concomitantly values around maintaining this 
relationship were in evidence (which is expanded on later). 
However, it would be inaccurate to state that agency staff do not have a 
role in shaping and carrying out policy (Svara, 2001). At certain other times, 
respondents from both the SEPA and the STA would also indicate that they had 
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a certain amount of innovative freedom. This would involve the formation of 
internal networks to discuss issues beyond the offcial remit as well as anticipating 
the agencies’ future roles. 
But the government has never really had to tell us directly … ‘we want you 
to make [climate-based] demands in your procurement’. Without it, we have 
ourselves [made the decision]. However, [the government] was very inter-
ested when they saw that we started making such demands. But they have 
never said anything about ‘you should not do that, or you should do that’. 
(iSTA02) 
But we also do some self-initiated analysis where we try to be a little proac-
tive and see what the things are that we will need to work on in the future. 
And do not just sit and wait for the assignments to come. Because they can 
have a fairly short response time, and then it is good that you have done as 
much analysis of the problem as possible. 
(iEPA07) 
Furthermore, while the agencies’ roles include responding to requests for 
information from the government, they also had a role in screening what infor-
mation the government receives from them. Thus, respondents also described 
making judgements about the amount and nature of information policy-makers 
need as well as consideration about what issues they need to raise to prominence. 
Respondents, thus, highlighted that agency staff had a certain discretion in their 
action (Applbaum, 1992). 
What we do is that we work with regard to our taskmaster, the government, 
and then give them the analysis that they need to have, or what we judge they 
need doing. 
(iSEPA02, our emphasis) 
But then I think this pressure to work with social sustainability now, it prob-
ably comes both from above and below, I think. A bit like the environmental 
issue has been, that there are also interested people, it is enthusiasts in the 
organisation who think it is important. 
(iSTA05, our emphasis) 
Likewise, this involved some awareness of the way broader political winds 
were blowing, and at times respondents voiced an unwillingness to becoming 
embroiled in broader left-wing/right-wing politics. In these cases, issues of social 
justice and indeed, environmental issues, were framed as part of left-wing poli-
tics. However, this implied tying the hands of the agency staff. As employees 
of expert-driven, theoretically non-political agencies, such questions were not 
theirs to discuss. There was also a further element to this; respondents admitted 















Take a ride into the danger zone? 95 
and needs in their work. So, for example, one respondent described the SEPA 
preparing for future information requirements around European climate action 
by starting analysis early, before requests for information started coming in. This 
is suggestive of institutional values encouraging creativity rather than simply rote 
bureaucratic obeisance to established routines. 
Such behaviour speaks of the potential of agency staff to be ‘inside activists’
in the sense that they can overtly and covertly act to further their own political
agendas to a certain extent, independent of the directions of their taskmasters
(cf. Hysing and Olsson, 2018). However, in this ability to make judgements
and act independently of government direction, respondents were also open
and refexive about their own limitations in this regard. Respondents described
how their own professional and academic backgrounds played an important
role in their approach to their work and the need to incorporate social justice
issues. Thus, this contributed to a tendency to follow extant ways of doing
things. 
When I started there in the 00s, you already have a form of … policy instru-
ments … in place. And we have that as a starting point when we write our 
report, we describe that we have a carbon dioxide tax in Sweden, because we 
already had that then. … So, it is probably some form of path dependency, 
that we already from the beginning have … certain instruments in place. 
(iEPA05) 
Several respondents characterised agency employees as often coming from natu-
ral scientifc, economic, or engineering backgrounds and this affected how they 
understood their role, which is in line with the institutional literature (Arora-
Jonsson and Sijapati, 2018, Hysinge, 2018). Thus, an agency’s own backgrounds 
and interpersonal networks would affect how they approached particular issues 
or assignments. 
I think there are many at the Swedish Transport Administration who are
engineers and thus, the culture is like engineering culture. We probably
have many other professions as well, but the culture is engineering culture.
Then you want to measure, you want it a little simple, you want little neat
tables. 
(iSTA04) 
There are still large parts of the Swedish Transport Administration who 
believe very much in technological development as the solution to the cli-
mate issue, for example. Little boys’ toys, like this [laughs]. 
(iSTA05) 
The question of ‘activist behaviour’ within government agencies was, to a cer-
tain extent, considered ambivalently. When queried on their action, respondents 
would voice a respect for their role following the government’s direction. Indeed, 
  96 Singleton and Magnusdottir
one respondent in particular articulated that there were risks to agency workers 
following their own personal passions rather than doing their job. 
[T]he most common disease is civil servant activism. That you want so much 
with your own agenda so that you push something very hard yourself, more 
than what you actually have a mandate for, either from a political or civic 
point of view. And to be honest, it is actually very common in the environ-
mental feld, and that’s probably because it is so important. 
(iSTA06) 
The same respondent asserted that different agencies seemed to have differ-
ent organisational cultures in this regard, with some agencies’ staff being in the 
respondent’s eyes ‘too activist’, which brings with it the risks that they base their 
work solely upon their own experiences/preconceptions, rather than decisions 
in a rational manner upon a scientifc basis. One of the stated risks of such an 
approach was losing touch with the reality of policy effects upon people’s lives, in 
turn causing iniquities and/or fomenting public resistance (iSTA06). This echoes 
concerns of unchecked civil servant activism making their actions more manipu-
lative than simply facilitating the smooth running of Sweden’s systems (Bellone 
and Goerl, 1992; Irvin and Stansbury, 2004). Thus, while a certain independence 
was valued, this was also shackled by concerns about the legitimacy of agency 
action and its relationship to democracy. 
This combination of top-down and bottom-up governance had direct implica-
tions for respondents’ views on the possibility of organisational change. Thus, 
when asked to consider ways of incorporating the understanding of intersection-
ality as a way to develop socially just climate policies, the respondents repeatedly 
asserted that change should come from above, either in the form of government 
direction, or from senior agency staff. At the same time, respondents’ were also 
interested to learn more about an intersectionality approach in climate policy-
making and expressed a preference for concrete examples having direct relevance 
for their work. Indeed, several respondents felt that there was a need to fnd ways 
to better incorporate social justice into their agencies’ climate work. 
Discussion: implications for institutional change 
These data suggest an immediate frst interpretation, in the case of the SEPA 
and STA, that institutional change is dependent on top-down guidance from the 
Swedish Government. Respondents framed institutional values around the legit-
imacy of government direction and their limitations in acting independently. 
Whilst this top-down view of agency work is the formal framework for Swedish 
state agencies, it misses the undoubted action possibilities that government agen-
cies have. The study also found that agency staff take an active position in inter-
preting their role and guiding the government by making judgements about what 
information the government needs and anticipating future work and research 
directions. Values around creativity and expert-based predictions of future needs 
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were thus extant. Agency staff were seen to have the potential to push particu-
lar issues that they themselves were passionate about, highlighting the possibil-
ity for ‘inside activism’ (Hysing and Olsson, 2018). However, in this, staff are 
also constrained by the particular historical trajectories of the institutions that 
enfold them (cf. Hatch, 1993) and the extent that they may exercise discretion 
in their professional roles is a long-standing debate (Applbaum, 1992). These 
constraints, or alternatively, the agencies’ institutional path dependency might 
make the inclusion of gender and other social factors appear less desirable or 
appropriate and thereby limit the room for inside activism (Mackay et al., 2010; 
Magnusdottir and Kronsell, this volume). 
Agencies very seldom attempt to address problems in completely novel fash-
ions; past experiences affect both interpretation of their various assignments by 
agency staff, as well as the way they innovate and institute institutional change 
(or not). As such, path dependency was evident on a number of levels. Firstly, 
the tendency to follow previous practice directly affected the types of informa-
tion that agencies accessed and utilised in their work. In the Swedish context, 
where climate policy-making primarily takes place in the energy, environment, 
or transport agencies, the norms and path dependencies expressed in the rules 
and culture of those institutions might make technical and economic solutions 
seem most appropriate and, thereby, information and knowledge about the rel-
evance of gender and other climate-relevant social factors might be excluded. 
Secondly, the institutional frames employed had a normative feature – how 
respondents framed Swedish society affected how they approached different tasks 
(cf. Singleton et al., forthcoming). Thus, path dependency is infuential even 
in situations where respondents are able to take action towards institutional 
change. Put differently, respondents mentioned that, at times, it was hard to 
know what they missed because their epistemological positions were informed by 
their institutional embeddedness and experience. 
All this has direct implications on any efforts to inculcate change. This sec-
tion discusses these implications with particular reference to Swedish agencies 
as institutions. Particularly, we focus on what we have established as a par-
ticular identity that many respondents framed in their interviews. We call this 
their identities as civil servants (ämbetsmänniskor) that they perform (or aspire 
to perform) in their work roles. To varying degrees, many respondents framed 
an ideal that civil servants should be neutral in their work and this limited the 
extent to which they should be ‘activists’ for social justice within their climate 
activities. At times, they evidenced a certain pride in this role (cf. Olsen, 2006). 
Throughout the interviews, there was a distinct preoccupation with the legitimacy
of respondents in their role as civil servants, which one could also interpret as 
the logic of appropriateness of the role. While the institutions that civil serv-
ants fnd themselves in are not totally and completely controlling (cf. Goffman, 
1961), they do affect how those embedded in them go about action. For example, 
iSTA06 argued, in effect, that too much discretionary activism would push agen-
cies into a danger zone with civil servant acting illegitimately. These institutions 
can likely affect several of the dilemmas that may arise for them in their work, for 
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example how ‘radical’ they can be – for instance, do the institutional norms allow 
a gendered or an intersectional approach in their work? Or how much action 
they can take without explicit direction/collective agreement and how open any 
activist activities can be (Lowi, 1993; cf. Hysing and Olsson, 2018, pp. 110–114). 
Respondents articulated norms of agencies as apolitical units, seeing their legiti-
macy in part as linked to their separation from ‘politics’ (Svara, 2001; cf. Olsen, 
2006). Fortunately, the literature on public administration suggests several ways 
in which civil servants may take legitimate action. These, combined with the 
data, provide potential avenues for engendering institutional change without 
endangering the social legitimacy of government agencies (cf. Hatch, 2018). It 
should, however, be noted that these suggestions are rooted in the collected data, 
which constitute respondents’ representations of their agencies. As such, more 
in-depth (ideally feld-based) work is required for more precise, targeted sugges-
tions (e.g. along the lines of Hatch, 1993). 
The frst, and most obvious, strategy for institutional change suggested by 
the data is to enlist allies further up in the hierarchies of the agencies, in the 
form of politicians or senior agency fgures. Legitimacy could thus be garnered by 
involving those with democratic legitimacy (Hysing and Olsson, 2018, p. 150). 
Respondents expressed a desire for clear direction on the integration of social 
justice in their climate change work. Practically, however, this may prove chal-
lenging and indeed, the idea of a neat separation of politicians and bureaucracy 
(i.e. change is simply a matter of top-down direction) is an inaccurate portrayal of 
the interwoven reality (Svara, 2001, 2006). Nevertheless, limited recognition of 
social justice or climate-relevant social differences could be perceived as a matter 
of a democratic defcit, potentially affecting the legitimacy of institutions. 
Secondly, on a simpler level, respondents’ views on integrating social justice 
into climate work stress the importance of following the direction of politicians. 
In effect, legitimacy in their eyes links to following the decisions of those with 
a democratic mandate. A frst simple step, then, is to highlight how desired 
institutional change – rather than embodying revolutionary action – actually 
involves following the direction of the agencies’ political masters. For example, 
in the case of our ongoing research on Swedish climate institutions,1 we will seek 
to frame an intersectionality approach as following government policy, rather 
than agency activism. Going forward, we will highlight how intersectionality has 
direct relevance to Sweden’s climate obligations (for example, Agenda 2030), in 
turn directly related to social justice issues and concepts (Swedish Government, 
2017). Legitimacy is thus conferred by highlighting how apparent change con-
forms to established rules and norms of sticky institutions (March and Olsen, 
1996; Beetham, 2013, p. 15). By establishing that change is evolutionary within 
an agency’s legitimate ‘mission trajectory’, respondents’ concerns that they are 
acting out of turn will be ameliorated by illustrating that it falls within estab-
lished rules and norms (Goodsell, 2006). The feminist institutionalist literature, 
however, points out that institutions organise power inequalities through their 
formal as well as informal rules and practices. This might mean that efforts to 
institute ‘legitimate’ institutional change based on established norms and rules 
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only reinforce social power inequalities, excluding new intersectional knowledge. 
Linked to the second point, one can also make appeals to arguments about how 
agencies taking action may be legitimate. Margaret Stout (2013) has identifed 
three ways that bureaucratic actions may be shown to be legitimate. These are 
by ‘(a) decentralising authority and responsibility to the people; (b) defning 
public interest in relation to specifc situations in dialogue with affected stake-
holders; and (c) engaging in processes in which citizens can actively hold off-
cials accountable’ (quoted in Hysing and Olsson, 2018, p. 155). As such, where 
appropriate, one can make arguments that a change will improve the institu-
tional accountability and thus add legitimacy. Accountability has four dimen-
sions ‘Transparency, liability, controllability, responsibility and responsiveness’ 
(Koppell, 2005, p. 94). Based on our intersectional and feminist institutionalist 
starting points, we can argue that greater nuance in framing Swedish society will 
allow for greater representation and acknowledgement of marginalised groups in 
agency work and thus improve institutional legitimacy (cf. Hysing and Lundberg, 
2016). Public administrations also gain legitimacy through their roles as collators 
and providers of expert knowledge for government use (Goodsell, 2006, p. 630). 
As such, we can argue that by integrating intersectional understanding into their 
work, respondents will be developing needed-expertise and, thus, gain greater 
legitimacy as the experts on the various sectors of Swedish society. Along similar 
lines, we will also point to research highlighting the robust support within the 
Swedish population for multiculturalism, for example (Ahmadi et al., 2016). We 
can thus stress the democratic legitimacy for seeking broader framings of Swedish 
society. 
Conclusion 
In this chapter, we have presented data and analysis drawn from interviews 
with staff at the Swedish Environmental Protection and the Swedish Traffc 
Administrations. As a part of our research project seeking to fnd ways to integrate 
intersectional insight into agency work on climate change, we were interested in 
how institutional path dependency manifests in respondents’ representations of 
their roles. Our fndings reveal that, in varying degrees, respondents agreed that 
their possibilities for action were limited both in a top-down manner by the direc-
tions of the Swedish Government and by sticky norms and values within their 
organisations. There was also strong emphasis on values of democracy, account-
ability and legitimacy, which according to many of the civil servants limited their 
room for potentially critical action leading to further recognition of social differ-
ences. This is interesting since one may interpret the limited representation of 
different social groups in climate policy-making, as well as lack of understanding 
about the intersectional nature of climate effects, as a form of democratic defcit. 
However, at the same time, many respondents also revealed that agency staff 
had certain discretionary powers to infuence both research and policy and, at 
times, could play a steering role for governments by making decisions about the 
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positively around creativity and problem-solving. Both of these sets of values 
embody a certain path dependency. In the former, external prescriptions regard-
ing agency roles set the path on which the institutional worldviews develop; 
in the case of the latter, staff drew upon their professional and academic back-
grounds, favouring the types of initiatives and the policy research and implemen-
tation tools they were receptive to and used. This contradictory picture leads to 
suggestions about how to develop a more just and sustainable climate policy in 
a path-dependent institutional environment, which still allows for some critical 
initiatives. These are: frstly, gathering and including various types of knowledge 
and information on climate-relevant social factors early in the policy-making 
process. Secondly, increasing civil servants’ awareness, with the help of feminist 
institutionalism, about challenges in institutional environment. Thirdly, enlist-
ing high-level allies (top-down governance) to encourage particular directions. 
Finally, highlighting how the proposed tool of intersectionality can both sustain 
and even increase the legitimacy within the agencies’ extant remits and within 
wider Swedish society as embodying widely held values. This would prevent civil 
servants from feeling that such action entails entering a ‘danger zone’ of illegiti-
mate action. In future, we will seek to do this by designing educational materials 
and methods to illustrate that bringing a wider view of social justice into agency 
climate work is evolutionary and revelatory rather than revolutionary, with soci-
etal legitimacy. 
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7 Towards a climate-friendly turn? 
Gender, culture and performativity 
in Danish transport policy1 
Hilda Rømer Christensen and Michala Hvidt 
Breengaard 
Introduction 
Transport has become an explicit part of climate policy and CO2 reductions, 
and in 2019 the Danish Government set up an ambitious target of reducing CO2 
emissions by 70% by 2030. Currently, we see transport policy and electric cars as 
vital components of broader environmental and climate policy agendas. A fresh 
example of how cars are still being prioritised in this new climate policy agenda 
can be seen in a recent report from the government-appointed Climate Council. 
In Denmark, transport has been explicitly moulded into the broader agenda of 
climate policy; yet with the potentials of electric cars still being considered as the 
sole avenue of transport change, in tandem with pressure from big energy sup-
pliers and wind power companies (Cyklistforbundet, 2020; Klimarådet, 2020.2 
All in all, it is hard to see how the targets of 70% CO2 reductions will be met. 
In Denmark, major political parties – from social democrats to liberals to con-
servatives – support the development and modernisation of ‘climate-friendly’, yet 
still car-centric, transport solutions (Venstre, 2016; Socialdemokratiet, 2019). 
Furthermore, many studies and surveys demonstrate that both non-motorised 
mobility, as well as gender and other social categories, are still by and large miss-
ing from the tone-setting agendas, councils, strategies and surveys ( Christensen 
and Breengaard, 2019; TINNGO, https://www.tinngo.eu/). 
This chapter will focus on how transport policy, perceived by many as a dull 
subject, is dramatically conveyed by the media. It includes the representation of 
certain roles and performances of a group of central agents, which are acting and 
enacting certain policies and preferences according to gendered norms of appro-
priateness (Krook and Mackay, 2011). They seem to connect to and reproduce an 
unquestioned matrix of soft and strong, climate-friendly or unfriendly transport 
practices and values. The omission of gender and other socio-cultural practices 
appear as impediments to change and climate-friendly initiatives. 
As for the structure, we begin the chapter with a short prelude to feminist 
approaches to transport studies, ending with the introduction of useful concepts 
related to the cultural and performative turn of transport policy studies. In the 
next section, we present a mapping of the entangled gendered and social codes 
of transport policy – addressing the general relevance of gender representation, 
DOI: 10.4324/9781003052821-7 
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the question of substantial gender policy interests and gender mainstreaming as 
a tool of limited success. In the fnal section, we conduct an empirical case study 
of communicative events connected to the frst female Minister of Traffc in 
Denmark, Sonja Mikkelsen. She was a warm supporter of public transit and the 
analysis reveals that gender, power and environment/climate issues are hot top-
ics that cut across policy at all levels, including language, bodies, food, festivals, 
etc. In the last section, we refect on the usefulness of gendering the cultural and 
performative turn in policy analysis. 
Theoretical and methodological departures 
The gendered dimensions of transport and car culture is a vital but also neglected 
feld, which is lagging behind more sustained scholarly and political equality 
concerns about equal opportunities in family life, workplace, health and educa-
tion. Geographer Susan Hanson has pointed to signifcant gaps both in existing 
feminist studies and in mainstream transport research and has called for refned 
analysis in either feld (Hanson, 2010). According to Hanson, feminist analysis 
has focused too heavily on gender and has underplayed the specifcities of mobil-
ity and transport. Feminist research, she argues, based on qualitative analysis has 
mainly focused on how mobility shapes gender but lacks perspectives on how 
gender shapes mobility. Several studies along these lines have pointed to trans-
port and mobility as producing gender stereotypes, indicating women and femi-
ninity as synonymous with immobility and aligned with home and domesticity. 
It is claimed that this is an enduring feature that surfaces in everyday practices as 
well as in multiple cultural and political forms (Edensor, 2004; Cresswell, 2006; 
Transgen, 2007). The neglect of the institutional gendered dimensions of trans-
port policy-making comes to hide the unequal distribution of resources, for exam-
ple, in prioritising of cars rather than public transportation and non-motorised 
transport, and hampers the recognition of different kinds of mobility. It is vital, 
therefore, to study the gendered and cross-political character of such cultures and 
hegemonies. As well as throwing light on how gendered norms have been shaped 
and nurtured within these institutional and hegemonic structures. 
In the feld of feminist transport research, new trends are underway, addressing 
both issues of equal access and transport justice as well as methodological chal-
lenges in transport studies. Caren Lévy, a UK transport researcher, for example, 
appeals for broader and more complex ideas of transport and social identities and 
for what she calls the ‘deep integration’ of social identities in all areas of trans-
port (Lévy, 2013). The social identities of transport ‘users’, she argues, are deeply 
imbedded in social relations and urban practices, ranging from the everyday lives 
of people to urban policies and planning. Even in studies of multiple identities 
of urban residents, such categories are often referred to the margins as the ‘social 
and distributional’ aspects of transport. Transport, Lévy contends, is not an iso-
lated and delimited feld, but one which has critical implications for how diverse 
citizens – men and women, girls and boys, young and old and non-binary persons 
– are able to exercise and use ‘travel choices’ both as individuals and collectively. 
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As we will show later, it seems as if these more structural perspectives on trans-
port use are only gaining very fragile grounds in and around Europe. 
In this chapter, we widen such perspectives and apply them to transport policy 
research. In doing so, we connect to recent approaches in the feld, which can 
be clustered under the ‘cultural turn’ in policy studies and, furthermore, we con-
nect such perspectives with central concepts of gender and diversity developed 
in feminist studies. 
Several scholars have pointed to the need for taking policy studies beyond 
established theories and methods, such as overcoming dualism between structure 
and individuality, and replacing ontologies of substance with more dynamic and 
processual ontologies, as well as rethinking power as productive and as acting in 
many felds. Also, methodological break-ups have been urged for, from the focus 
on text and talk to the inclusion of wider mundane materialised and embodied 
experiences and affects (Lissandrello, 2015, 2016; Adler-Nissen, 2016). In order 
to assist the analysis, we use the notion of transport policy as a performative act. 
More specifcally, we would like to connect to the distinct ideas of gender per-
formativity, which at its initial stage was developed by the American philosopher 
Judith Butler. According to Butler, gender can be seen as a particular type of 
process; a ‘set of repeated acts within a highly rigid regulatory frame’. The subject 
is not free to choose which gender it is going to enact. Yet, the subject is already 
determined within a cultural regulatory frame and has, therefore, only access to 
a limited number of choices. The idea of choice has been compared with a ward-
robe, which consists of a limited selection of outfts, depending on gender as well 
as class, ethnicity, geography, etc. (Salih, 2002, p. 63). Following this feminist 
approach, acts can – from a broader perspective – be understood as ‘shared expe-
rience and collective actions’ (Butler, 1988, p. 525 cited in Lissandrello, 2015). 
Translated into the feld of transport policy, this means that there are nuanced 
and individual ways of executing policy. The acts of policy-making are performed 
by gendered individuals, who act in accordance with certain cultural, political 
and social apparatuses. Therefore, this is not a fully individual matter.3 
The idea of performativity relates to core ideas in feminist institutionalism, 
which has to do with how power is reproduced through acts of normalization 
and the ways in which institutions are reproduced through a certain logic of 
‘appropriateness’ (Kronsell, 2015; Magnusdottir and Kronsell, this volume). It is 
a certain logic that makes the inclusion and analytical refection of gender less 
appropriate in policy-making and institutions. While at the same time, it makes 
certain masculinity norms and stereotypical gender notions the most accepted 
and hegemonic. We conclude the chapter with refections on the potentials of 
institutional opportunities and challenges for opening up new windows of cli-
mate-friendly transport politics for all. 
In terms of methods, we apply a critical discourse analysis in a broad and open-
ended approach. Following Norman Fairclough, the approach suggests that the 
world is constituted by both discourse and other social practices. (Fairclough, 
1995; Winther Jørgensen and Phillips, 1999). Along this line, studies of com-
municative events take centre stage in forms of representations, such as text, 
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talk, images and other forms of social practices, such as meals and networking 
styles. This provides a methodology that complies with the analytical require-
ments of the broader and more complicated ideas, agendas and practices related 
to governance and public sensibilities today. We have combined qualitative and 
quantitative methodologies of data analysis. We have combined language with 
other cultural expressions including cultures of meetings and transport as part of 
broader lifestyles and preferences. In this manner, our methodology is character-
ised by a widening of analytical attention and tools in the representation which 
turns out to be highly relevant in transport and climate policy-making. 
More precisely, this chapter builds on screenings of the Danish Infomedia´s 
online archive (https://infomedia.org/). We have conducted searches on a range 
of person-related keywords connected to ministers and central civil servants, 
such as ‘Sonja Mikkelsen transport minister’ (123 hits), ‘Sonja Mikkelsen Traffc 
Minister’ (4063 hits), ‘Ole Zacchi, head of traffc department’ (235 hits), ‘Jørgen 
Halck, head of traffc department’ (27 hits).4 In order to widen the scope of media 
data we also searched topical keywords such as alternative transport, congestion 
ring, climate panel, etc. From this voluminous material we identifed approxi-
mately 100 articles which we used as key data for the qualitative study. A smaller 
selection of them will be referred to explicitly in the analysis, while the others 
repeated or confrmed the claims and trends in these articles. The material was 
extended with an online interview with Sonja Mikkelsen in spring 2020 where 
the media information was supplemented and sustained. Throughout the chapter, 
we have enhanced this material with general reports on transport and research as 
well as public lists of ministerial appointments and scholarly articles. 
Gendered representations in transport policy – Do women in 
transport policy make a difference? 
A feature running as a distinctive undercurrent in transport policy is that it is 
a ‘male’ policy area and has remained so even in recent decades. Transport and 
mobility count as an old policy area in Denmark as well as throughout Europe. 
The frst Danish minister for traffc was appointed as early as 1900. Environmental 
policy came about in the 1970s, following growing mobilisations and concerns 
and gained its own ministry in 1971. Climate has had a ministry of its own since 
2007, following rising concerns and political attention. The issue of gender rep-
resentation and women’s participation is important for discussions of inclusive 
climate-friendly transport strategies. From a gender representational perspective, 
transport from the very beginning has fgured as a manifest policy area conducted 
by men as argued in the introduction to this volume (Magnusdottir and Kronsell, 
this volume). This somehow differs from environment and climate, which seem 
more open and have already presented more female ministers than the area of 
transport has over the last 120 years.5 
Gender representation and the question of fairness in elected assemblages is a 
longstanding issue in feminist theory as well as in political practices. Anne Phillips 
in her path-breaking study The Politics of Presence challenged the dominant idea 
  
  





















































































Figure 7.1 Number of articles about Westh and Mikkelsen during their time in offce 
of representation as only concerning ideas and not the people representing ideas 
(Phillips, 1998). We see the presence of diversity and gender as a participatory 
democratic dimension, which is currently aligned with the strategy of gender 
mainstreaming. Gender mainstreaming requires equal participation of women as 
well as the integration of other social groups in political and public life. Gender 
mainstreaming emphasises broad and mobilizing strategies, such as networking, 
dialogue, social mobilization and the involvement of NGOs in all stages of pol-
icy-making. The focus on equal representation responds to a deeper democratic 
defcit and the problem of gender imbalances in policy-making, which poses par-
ticular problems and gaps in transport policy. Since people tend to spot their 
own needs while not necessarily recognizing or knowing about the needs of other 
people, a lack of a wider representation in the various transport councils and min-
istries might easily end with the omission and ignorance of the diversity of travel 
patterns and needs (Christensen and Breengaard, 2019). Even though gender has 
been addressed in the EU since the mid-1980s, the gendered imbalances are still 
striking in current European transport councils and committees as demonstrated 
in the present EU project TiNNGO, focused on a game changer in European 
transport policy and practice. In the recent TiNNGO mapping of national 
parliamentary committees across the EU countries UK, Portugal, Romania, 
Germany, Spain, Sweden, France and Denmark, the proportion of women in 
2019 varies between 7% and 40%. Similar mapping of transport ministers in 
the same countries shows that since 1945 only 23 out of a total of 245 ministers 
were women (Christensen and Breengaard, 2019). One explanation, provided 
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powerful e, which aligns more with masculine performance and, therefore, is hard 
for women to access (Mikkelsen, 2004). A related explanation circles around 
gender-specifc interests where transport traditionally counts as unattractive and 
as a ‘male feld’. This view was shared by Ritt Bjerregaard, another powerful social 
democratic politician, who in 1992 declined the offer to become minister for 
transport; an offer which she regarded as less than attractive and as an embarrass-
ment (Carlsen, 2018). 
The low prestige of the position as transport minister is also seen in the fact 
that many of them only stay in offce for short periods. Denmark provides a good 
example, with no less than 46 transport ministers since 1945. The constant fow 
of new transport ministers should not conceal the fact that the ministry handles 
huge budgets, projects and agencies. In reality, transport policy is conducted by a 
less visible, but powerful group of civil servants, who in alliance with politicians 
and other agents, represent various interest groups and private enterprises, most 
of whom are explicitly or implicitly in line with the dominant car regime. As we 
will show in the case study, this situation has allowed for the development of a 
particular culture and masculine style, which has not been gainful for the inclu-
sion of diverse groups or for new and fresh climate-friendly politics. 
Such fgures and assumptions about transport as a low-key resort and male-
dominated sector have been confrmed by a recent network study of the power 
elite in Denmark (Larsen, 2015). Transport, it is shown, does not fgure as a pres-
tigious or particular visible area in Danish societal and policy context. According 
to the extended mapping and network analysis of the Danish elite, the minister 
for transport fgures at the margins of the elite network. Moreover, the network 
study shows that not only is the feld of transport and infrastructure marked by 
an extremely high proportion of men, but it also stands out even in general male 
dominance in the elite in which only two out of the 100 most powerful persons 
are women (Larsen, 2015, pp. 62–63). From a sectorial perspective, transport, 
infrastructure and their related felds also proliferate as some of the most gender-
divided sectors. In the topical elite network analysis, women make up under 10% 
of the subjects in the sectors of roads (7%), car sales (8%), shipping (9%), travel 
(9%) and cars (10%). In contrast, women dominated in the ‘soft’ areas of public 
institutions, such as health care, education, humanities and in terms of transport 
as cyclists. Following Bourdieu’s interpretation of hard and soft subjects and of 
left and right wings of the state, this hardline gender division also places men in 
a favourite position related to the ‘right hand’ of the state, which is tied to the 
general patterns of dominance in the political feld (Bourdieu, 2017, quoted in 
Larsen, 2015, p. 65). 
The question is if and how such imbalances affect substantial policy and here
specifcally on the enhancements of sustainable and climate-friendly transport
policy-making. In contrast to Sweden, available data is scarce and fragmented
and points in several directions (Kronsell et al., 2015). In parallel with Swedish
studies of transport policy, a fresh Danish analysis from 2019 shows how gen-
der affects political priorities and representations in Danish municipalities. It
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lines support more resources to childcare, healthcare and people with disabili-
ties (Hermansen, 2019). What is more, female politicians in municipal councils
favour collective transport higher than their male fellows, while policy areas
such as ‘roads’ and ‘environment’ show a lower level of interest among women.
While the study does not provide any explanations of this phenomena, we might
assume that it relates to women’s generally higher dependency on public transit
as well as their transport responsibilities for children and elderly relatives. It
is also shown in the study, that women only have a particular impact on their
favourite policy issues in municipalities where they make up both a critical mass
and where they are in powerful positions – for example, as mayors (Hermansen,
2019). 
At the national level, the manifested gender gaps in transport are not only 
something of the past but seem to continue. In a recent list of appointments to 
councils and institutions associated with the ministry of transport, there have 
only been minor changes in gender representation. A count in 1998–1999 showed 
that approximately 10% of all 300 appointments were women (Mikkelsen, 2004, 
pp. 72–73). While a count in 2020 showed approximately 20% or 32 women out 
of a total of 154 members appointed to all committees affliated to the transport 
and housing ministry. This conveys the message of enduring male dominance 
(Mikkelsen, 2004, pp. 72–73; Trafkministeriet, 2020).6 
The strategy of gender mainstreaming has been the answer to address such 
imbalances both at European and global levels. Gender mainstreaming has been 
developed as an institutional method and consists of a range of tools to identify 
imbalances and inequalities in processes where gender, so far, has been invisible 
or regarded as not important.7 The strategy helps to uncover how resources are 
used, how some groups beneft more from efforts than others, or how approaches 
can hide gendered imbalances. Besides, gender mainstreaming has been sug-
gested as a tool for mobilisation and participation and for addressing gender 
and diversity in new and forward-looking ways (Squires, 2005; Christensen and 
Breengaard, 2011). So far, however, it does not seem as if gender mainstreaming 
and associated knowledge production has had any substantial impact on integrat-
ing gender and diversity in Danish or European transport planning and policy 
(Transgen, 2007; Christensen and Breengaard, 2019; Magnusdottir and Kronsell, 
this volume). Again, this refers to the reluctance in institutions and policy-mak-
ing to further alternative priorities of non-motorised mobility and to go beyond 
the norms of addressing other than genderless (male) car drivers in the political 
priorities and institutions. 
In the following section, we will explore how these complex confgurations 
of gender and transport policy-making have unfolded in Denmark by examin-
ing a range of communicative events related to gender and the enhancement 
of more climate-friendly transport practices. A particular focus of attention is 
Sonja Mikkelsen’s arrival and time as the frst female traffc minister in Denmark. 
Her time as minister embodied the contested intersections of female gender- and 
climate-friendly politics. While the time she held offce turned out to be very 
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In general, Danish transport policy does not fgure as a well-researched or com-
prehensive theme in policy or historical studies (Toft et al., 2000). This means 
that we had to collect evidence and establish both the context and the specifci-
ties and interpretations of the cases in question. 
Sonja Mikkelsen: ‘The frst lady minister’ 
Sonja Mikkelsen was appointed as minister for traffc in Denmark during the
social democratic–social liberal government transformation in 1998. Her
appointment was subject to keen media interest. Not only was she the frst
female minister for traffc, she was also a social pattern breaker with a back-
ground in a working-class family from the rural area of Thy in Jutland, known
for its scenic beauty and remoteness from the ‘capital culture’ in Copenhagen.
At the time of appointment, her hometown and constituency were Aarhus
in Jutland and she left behind a husband and two young children to work in
Copenhagen – something that, at the time, was unusual for a female minister
(Mikkelsen, 2020). By her time of appointment in 1998, she was already an
experienced politician, and had spent around 14 years in parliament and as a
former member of the parliamentary research and traffc committees. Besides
this, Sonja Mikkelsen was known as a left-winged and determined social dem-
ocrat, a warm supporter of public transit. She had voted against one of the
big transport compromises, as well as her own party line, when highways in
Northern Jutland were exchanged for support to the Great Belt Bridge by some
of the politicians from Jutland. 
The Ministry of Traffc routinely fgured among the low-prestige institutions 
– also in terms of media attention. Yet Sonja Mikkelsen’s entrance was followed 
with a keen interest in the print media. ‘Highway hater’ was an informal quote 
from one of the nervous civil servants, at her inaugural reception. Other informal 
claims were circulated such as: ‘She is a solid left winged social democrat, she 
hates highways, anyway in Northern Jutland’ and ‘She seems to be guided by 
higher (political) powers – she needs to moderate that’ (Rehling, 1998). The 
press immediately noticed the masculine atmosphere of the reception and the 
well-known fact that the transport sector was dominated by men: 
Surrounded by men, men and men and men again, the frst female transport 
minister was welcomed in the ministry … among the guests were the chiefs 
of the DSB (Danish State Railways, the Rail Council, Post Denmark, the 
Road Directory, the Traffc Council, the State Car inspection and A/S Great 
Belt … all males. 
(Ritzau, 1998) 
The head of the traffc department in 1998 was experienced and infuential. He 
was known as both ‘colourful’ and powerful as well as as ‘cheeky as a butcher’s 
dog’. When he left his position in 2000, he was called ‘the oldest male baboon’ 
in parliamentary circles (Dahlin, 2000; Politikken, 2000). He was unusually 
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outspoken as a civil servant and was, as chief head of the department, said to have 
seriously outmaneuvered a number of both fellow civil servants and ministers. A 
style which was also demonstrated in the appointment of Sonja Mikkelsen where 
he welcomed her as minister in gendered and patronising terms: 
You are the frst lady [sic] as minister in the long history of the ministry. 
We are looking forward to seeing if you prioritise other values. We know 
that you have the courage and dare to express your opinions opinion unre-
served. This can make us all sweat. Please remember that you are member of 
a government. 
(Rehling, 1998) 
He also reminded Sonja Mikkelsen that the Ministry of Traffc was an empire 
that included 20 councils and ten companies, counting also the recently estab-
lished Øresund company ‘and often you will read in the newspapers what happen 
in them’ (Rehling, 1998). 
The Department of the Traffc ministry was known as a particular world of its 
own. The ministry and various governments had for decades granted their chief 
heads of department a level of autonomy which was unseen in other ministerial 
departments. Chief heads of departments or permanent secretaries, according to 
Danish democratic administrative rules, are routinely held under parliamentary 
and committee control. In this particular ministry, however, they seemed to have 
established their own rules and value regimes.8 
On this occasion, the Head of the Traffc Department in the said goodbye to 
the tenth minister and hello to the eleventh minister. 
The Ministers forgo, but the ministry survives’, was a standing joke in the 
ministry and he was in the routine of welcoming and saying goodbye to min-
isters. He himself had been the head of the department in the traffc min-
istry since 1993 after 11 years as head of the department in the ministry of 
housing. 
(Kjær, 1999; Nielsen, 1999; Politiken, 1999a) 
An early goal of his as head of the department was to ‘become master in my own 
house’ which was an easy task due to the ministry he was serving in, which was 
seen by many as weak. Another reason for the weakness of the ministry was its role 
as a ‘swing door’ to more attractive political posts and resorts (Politiken, 1999a). 
He was a self-proclaimed social democrat but differed from Sonja Mikkelsen in 
his commitment to the conservative car-loving segment. In spite of growing 
attention from the social-liberal and conservative governments during the 1980s 
and 1990s to CO2 emissions and environmental problems caused by private cars, 
in 1996 he bluntly claimed: ‘We love private car-drivers in the Traffc Ministry. 
We regard cars as the best friends of humans. One cannot work in the ministry of 
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The central position of private car-driving was a clear indication that in 
1996 traffc policy and the atmosphere of the Ministry of Traffc was still 
closely equated with cars. This horizon was, however, challenged during Sonja 
Mikkelsen’s two-year reign as a minister. Sonja Mikkelsen was described as a 
‘warm supporter of public transit’ and her clear aim as minister was to strengthen 
public transit and to give access and provide mobility for groups without cars in 
order to protect the environment (Toft et al., 2000). 
Disruption of privileges 
Many people fnd transport policy a dull subject. In general, the Danish popula-
tion has only a vague feeling of who holds the power when it comes to trans-
port and daily mobility. According to the media representations in Denmark, 
the power of transport politics around the year 2000 seems to have been identi-
cal with the parliamentary transport committee, a group of middle-aged or older 
white men. They were criticised for primarily feeding their own interests as well 
as the interests of a rather unspecifed ‘car lobby’ consisting of various interest 
organisations in the feld.9 
The traffrc committee/members in question, in the media bluntly nicknamed
as a mafa and as ‘ronkedors’ (‘old male elephants’), consisted of a small group of
male politicians with a long track of frst-hand knowledge of major traffc policies
in the 1980s and 1990s. They were not only used to special treatment but also spe-
cial catering when they routinely attended their Friday meetings in the ministry.
Meetings were – according to media accounts – held with high coated open sand-
wiches and accompanied by beer and ‘at least one shot of aquavit’ (Lautrup-Larsen,
2017), an ‘old boys’ network’, which the new minister, Sonja Mikkelsen, thought
she could put an end to. When she invited the committee to the frst meeting in
the ministry, the menu had changed to carrot sticks and caulifower forets with
dip. Sonja Mikkelsen later recalled the conficts with the committee, saying that: 
They acted as a couple of fools, and in my experience, they never have fos-
tered their own ideas. I think they became very offended when they found 
out that I removed their sand box and that I did not want to continue their 
food club. 
(Aarhus Stiftstidende, 2005) 
There were several occasions where the head of department and the department 
did not provide adequate professional support for Traffc Minister Mikkelsen, 
which explains one of the reasons why she as minister ended up in one politi-
cal storm after another. Several members of the parliamentary traffc committee 
criticised the ministry and the department for lack of damage control as well as 
lack of adequate briefng (Abild, 1999b). Mikkelsen recalls it as a relief when in 
2000 the head of department was catapulted into a new position as head of a new 
research institute for transport. The idea of the new research institute was, ironi-
cally, enough to galvanise and qualify the knowledge basis of transport policy in 
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Denmark, something which up until this point he found no need for as head of 
the department (Mikkelsen, 2020). 
The particular institutional landscape, which Mikkelsen entered as a minister, 
was both epitomised and disrupted during her two years as transport minister. Her 
presence from day one was perceived as a disturbance of the traditional order, 
both because she embodied a difference to the dominant image of the minister as 
male and due to her broader take on traffc politics and support of social concerns 
and public transit. By the late 1990s, the main actors in the landscape consisted 
of a strong triangle of males in the parliamentary traffc committees, a strong and 
independent group of civil servants in the ministry, and those in transport coun-
cils, according to Mikkelsen, were all car driving, middle-aged or older men, who 
did not understand the importance or signifcance of public transit (Mikkelsen, 
2004, 2020). The media, headed by an infuential press, eagerly covered every 
confict and contributed to the image construction of Mikkelsen as a muddler. 
Traffc policy and endless conficts 
Traffc policy was, when Mikkelsen became minister, far from being conducted as 
transparent policy processes, based on qualifed knowledge. Traffc policy-mak-
ing, as demonstrated, was to a great extent part of a special culture of informal 
meetings and particular close ties between some ministers and members of the 
parliamentary policy committee. Policy decisions seem to have taken place at the 
informal weekly meetings between tone-setting liberal and conservative politi-
cians and various members of the ‘blue block’ and shifting ministers. Those infor-
mal arrangements made policy discussions at the parliamentary level a kind of 
political window dressing, since decisions and agreements had been horse-traded 
beforehand. What is more, Danish transport policy lacked a coherent strategy 
based on knowledge and research. A tradition, which differed from the other 
Nordic countries where transport policy was guided by major political and long-
term strategies (Sørensen and Gudmonsson, 2010). In the Danish context, trans-
port policies, therefore, were marked by random and short-sighted projects and 
decisions. One case in point here was the Great Belt Bridge against new highways 
in Northern Jutland and other compromises, which contributed to the general 
mistrust and disillusion about transport policy.10 
Sonja Mikkelsen arrived with the whole package of antidotes to this male-
dominated Maverick-like culture. Not only in terms of policy but also in terms of 
lifestyle – a contrast which was immediately represented and pinpointed in the 
media as entertainment. The situation in the ministry – and her contrast with 
it – made her time as a minister very turbulent. In the media, she was nicknamed 
‘muddling Sonja’ and with a range of other degrading labels. 
The day-to-day political initiatives and compromises turned out to be trou-
blesome during Mikkelsen’s time as minister. It seemed as if one scandal and 
confict followed after the other. Often, these scandals were related to the dif-
fcult transition of the public transport units from state-run to more independ-
ent companies, but they also related to internal competition and disagreements 
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between powerful public stakeholders and the government. For example, DSB, 
the Danish state railway department, time and again played a counterproductive 
role. Besides this, Mikkelsen broke the routine of compromising with liberal and 
conservative representatives in the traffc committee and started to include the 
left-wing parties – to the extraordinary regret of the blue representatives. 
Among the most attended media events, was the ‘tunnel case’, which was con-
nected to the construction of a tunnel between the new Copenhagen Metro and 
the old S-trains at Nørreport Station, one of the busiest stations in Copenhagen 
with 60,000 daily commuters. The metro was constructed and run by a new com-
pany, independent of the old national rail company, DSB. Not only did the price 
double during the construction process from 5 billion to 10 billion DKK, but 
DSB opposed the tunnel and positioned the new metro and the old S-train sys-
tems as simply incompatible. The issue was subjected to tense media attention 
and lengthy and humiliating accounts of the minister as powerless and unable 
to solve such a simple case. In the end, however, the confict was overturned by 
Mikkelsen as the minister in charge and the two rail systems were connected by 
a tunnel, an intervention she recalls as one of her successful results (Mikkelsen, 
28.4.20). Another spectacular case concerned Combus – a reconstructed bus 
company and a successor to the old state-run busses by DSB. When Combus, in 
1999, ended with a large defcit and fear of bankruptcy, Mikkelsen ‘rescued’ the 
company with a 300 million DKK grant without the consent of the parliamentary 
traffc committee (Juel, 1999; Politiken, 1999b). 
Yet, the single most contested event in the time of Mikkelsen as Minister of 
Traffc was the negotiation of the Finance Act in 1999, which planned to include 
a major transport change and a long-term agreement of improving the DSB, the 
national rail provider. Politiken, one of the tone-setting capital newspapers 
referred to the dramatic negotiations as follows: ‘First Sonja Mikkelsen shows 
the liberal and conservative members out of the door. Next she contributed to 
the creation of a proposal to fnance improvements of public transport with input 
from the left winged and Christian people’s parties’ (Politiken, 1999b). 
The idea of Mikkelsen and the left-wing members of the traffc committee 
was to create a red/green solution with taxes aimed at fnancing public transport. 
The proposal was regarded as a provocation both by the conservative members 
and tone-setting social democratic ministers, because they were against transfers 
between transport and tax policy. The incident was eagerly reported in detail in 
the press, that foresaw her dismissal. Both the minister of fnance and the prime 
minister 
were very upset, when she on Wednesday night chose to do it alone and 
presented a catalogue of green charges, aimed at fnancing an extended rail 
network. In other words, she went far beyond her mandate. Shortly before 
both the Liberal and the Conservative representatives had left and slammed 
the door; they under no circumstances could accept the proposals from the 
‘greens’. 
(Havskov, 1999)11 
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The unfnished negotiations were then removed from Mikkelsen’s roles and 
responsibilities and fnalised by the powerful minister of fnance. The agreement 
still implied a six billion DKK budget to improve the railway tracks, but not the 
longstanding investment in an electric railway (Buksti, 2005). 
Sonja Mikkelsen was, during her entire period as minister for traffc, subjected 
to both verbal and parliamentary attacks – in particular from the ‘blue’ represent-
atives of the traffc committee. The subtext was that the transfers made in favour 
of public transit were seen as an attack on private car owners. The opponents 
often addressed her and her political allies as children and for ‘stealing money’ 
from the car owners. As said by one of the representatives: 
If she continues her car hunt, we do not want to create compromises with 
her in other felds. We have reached the bottom level. We do not want to 
enter into compromises with her – when she consequently spent the savings 
on (public transit). 
(Abild and Westh, 1999)12 
The car policy, which referred to higher charges for diesel cars, was seen as a 
witch-hunt on car owners – a perception which was echoed in readers’ letters: 
As a car-owner one has become a target of the hunt issued by the current 
traffc minister Sonja Mikkelsen and others are in the process of limiting 
our right to motorised mobility in the cities … it is called environmental 
regards’. 
(Ekstra Bladet, 1999a) 
The events from car charges to metro mistakes were placed not only as a political 
mistake, but as a national catastrophe: 
If this was the private sector she would have been sacked a long time ago. 
Sonja Mikkelsen might not be a burden for the government, but she is a 
catastrophe for the country – one needs to look for long after a bigger mistake. 
(Ekstra Bladet, 1999) 
While Mikkelsen’s visions of broader and more knowledge-based transport policy 
was acknowledged, both foes and friends regretted her lack of interest or abilities 
to form alliances. This tended to leave her as a lonely and contested rider for her 
policies. 
Sonja Mikkelsen evaluated – A bracket or a new beginning for 
transport policy? 
In general, the Danish media seems to have had an arrogant and convicting atti-
tude towards the long and shifting row of transport ministers. ‘The truth is that 
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cupboard’ (Palle, 2009) and ‘the ministry of transport has been marked by an 
endless row of incompetent predecessors in this resort’ (Jyllands Posten, 2011) 
are just a couple of examples of this harsh tune. Yet, the style – both in terms 
of vocabulary as well as the political assessments – was particularly sweeping 
towards Sonja Mikkelsen as minister. What is more, her political opponents in 
alliance with the media created an image of her time as minister as a bracket, a 
disruption in the otherwise smooth running of the ministry’s car-friendly politics. 
In 2001, a fellow social democrat succeeded Sonja Mikkelsen not as traffc, but 
as transport minister; a change intended to mark a broader horizon for the policy 
resort. The new transport minister, Jakob Buksti, was immediately appreciated 
– by a businessman from Jutland – for promoting new highway plans in Jutland. 
The positive welcome to the new transport minister was seconded by the chair 
for Danish transport and logistics: 
We have a very positive cooperation in every respect … Even though he (the 
minister) does not make any promises, he seems to be a much more popular 
personality compared with Sonja Mikkelsen, his predecessor. She did not do 
well with the transport sector, but also here we now hear new tunes. 
(Erhvervsbladet, 2001) 
Members of the parliamentary traffc committee also commented on their 
strained relation with Sonja Mikkelsen and appreciated the former social demo-
cratic ministers: ‘The working climate in the committee was substantially better 
with ministers such as Bjørn West and in particular with Jan Trøjborg’. On the 
one hand, left-wing politicians and environmentalists were critical and from time 
to time found Sonja Mikkelsen too weak on environmental issues. On the other 
hand, they tended to appreciate the efforts of Sonja Mikkelsen as: ‘The only one 
of a long row of transport ministers, who did a lot to handle transport as a whole. 
She fought courageously for more than roads and cars’ (Politiken, 2000). Her 
climate-friendly politics were acknowledged. ‘She is one of the best – she is the 
one who had prioritized public transit the most and also supported the repair of 
trains and tracks’ (Politiken, 2000). 
In Sonja Mikkelsen’s entry to the Ministry of Traffc, her break with the tra-
dition of forming alliances, the change in acts of policy-making, together with
the large critical media coverage of her as minister of traffc, there are ongoing
complex gender (im)balances at stake. Looking at the gender performativities and
gendered positions in this particular policy culture, shows several issues. One is
that the traditional dominance of male agents led to a culture in which groups
of male politicians regarded transport policy as a playground and a game – one
which belonged to them. Through talks and actions they enacted a suite of con-
servative and oppressive masculinities related to core virtues of traditional Danish
culture. Second, their acts were closely entangled with the fght for privileges of
private car owners and road transport. The older and powerful members of the
traffc committee regarded the new female minister, Sonja Mikkelsen, as an
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only policy-making but a whole way of life both in the ministry and outside. In the
aftermath of her time as Minister of Traffc, she positioned herself as the rational
actor, who wanted to enhance rationality and transparency in this complicated
policy area: ‘I am not a jolly type of person, I am more after the content and not
so keen on window dressing and trappings. That’s my way’ (B.T., 2000). An inter-
pretation of herself, which echoes the analysis of masculinity and car culture by
Catharina Landström, who argues that certain processes of interpellation initially
invite men into an imagined homo-social community and a shared culture of cars
and transport artefacts. Car culture, thus, becomes implied in the ‘doing’ of het-
erosexual masculinity and pleasure, and in such a stereotyped framework women
are often constructed as practising a rational femininity as opposed to, or even as a
threat to, this type of male sociality and pleasure (Landström, 2006). 
The question remains how transport policy and transport as a culture can be 
opened up and made useful and a climate-friendly playground not only for certain 
men, but for other groups as well, not least for a broader group of women with 
various backgrounds. 
Epilogue 
There is, by 2020, ample evidence that policy and planning are still in a circuit 
of knowledge produced by a neo-classical growth-oriented paradigm or a gender-
less sustainable paradigm. The critical paradigm, which highlights the structural 
inequalities in terms of privilege and disadvantages related to gender and other 
categories in transport and mobility is weak and still absent from political agen-
das (Kębłowski and Bassens, 2018; NOAH, Denmark). This means that alterna-
tive transport such as non-motorised and climate-friendly transport policy is still 
contested, and supporters have recently been addressed as ‘climate fools ‘in the 
Danish media.13. Yet, cycling and more attention to climate-friendly motorised 
and non-motorised transport are also gaining currency. The ideas of sustainabil-
ity and ‘bikeability’ in combination with a decent public transit system are not 
new but have persistently been advocated by NGOs such as the Danish Cyclist 
Association but with limited infuence on the governmental transport commit-
tee. Also, and currently, following the COVID-19 crisis, various forms of biking 
– not least e-bikes – are enjoying a growing popularity both inside and outside of 
Copenhagen. Last but not least, climate change has lately become a hot policy 
topic partly generated by a younger generation and revitalisation of critical social 
movements where young women are upfront. This seems to show promise for a 
game changer in the circuit of gender and diversity in transport and mobility as 
well as fresh and more diverse knowledge production. 
Notes 
1 This chapter forms part of the TiNNGO project, which received funding from the 
European Union's Horizon 2020 research and innovation programme under grant 






















                       
       
               
           
                    
      
120 Christensen and Breengaard
2 The Danish Climate Council is an ‘independent’ expert council which provides sug-
gestions for cost-effective climate solutions. 
3 The idea of transport policy and planning as a performative act has been applied by 
several scholars, but not refecting agents as gendered, see also Lissandrello (2016). 
4 The name of the ministry was changed from Ministry of Traffc to Ministry of Transport 
in 2005. – In this chapter we follow this chronology using traffc about the ministry, 
committee, department, etc., till 2005 and ministry of transport after 2005. 
5 From the 1990s, the environment and climate have been placed in various constella-
tions as political resorts, which also echoes political priorities of governments. 
6 In 2020, the list includes committee members in both Transport and Housing which 
might bring women’s participation levels up. 
7 The current EU Gender Equality Strategy 2020–2025 combines gender mainstream-
ing and an intersectional politics approach. EU Gender Equality Strategy, 2020. 
8 This is a particularity which also applied to the former head of the traffc depart-
ment, who served in the ministry all his working life (38 years in total, with the
last 20 years as chief head of the department). He was extremely unpopular among
male politicians and was nicknamed with degrading labels such as ‘Godfather’, ‘a
snake’ and ‘an intriguing emperor’ etc. The ideal public servant in Denmark is the
‘unpolitical person’, that at all times follows seated governments and ministers. ‘It is
a fundamental principle that public employees at all levels must both be and appear
to be impartial and that they must make decisions and rulings based on objective
grounds’ – these principles were updated in Code of Conduct in the Public Sector in
2017. 
9 Besides the interests of (e)automobility are catered for by, for example, the FDM 
(Association of Danish Motorowners, Danish car import/Danish Transport and 
Logistics (DLTL) and more lately by e-car associations: such as Association of Danish 
E-car Drivers and Danish E-car Alliance (from list of hearing partners related to the 
suggested climate law, 2.3. 2020). 
10 Denmark with many separated islands – and waterborne borders – has made big bridge-
building projects a main priority and a major issue of contestations. From the Great 
Belt Bridge in the 1980s and 1990s to the Oresund Bridge in 2000, up until today 
when big projects are also underway: with the Femern Belt Bridge linking Denmark 
with Germany and the projected Kattegat Bridge linking Copenhagen with Aarhus 
over water. The bridge projects are often backed onto other compromises – and there-
fore hard to change. 
11 Politicians later recalled that the confict also unfolded around the unspoken gender 
composition of the members of the transport committee/the team of negotiators con-
sisting of four women. 
12 14.2. 1999, Berlingske Tidende. (Lars Abild og Maria Westh). 
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8 Wasting resources 
Challenges to implementing existing 
policies and tools for gender equality and 
sensitivity in climate change–related policy 
Susan Buckingham 
Introduction 
Climate change policy-making has a broad reach into a range of scales and sec-
tors. It is, therefore, too limiting to discuss climate change policy-making in 
isolation from decision-making in the sectors which produce greenhouse gas 
emissions. Waste management is one such sector which contributes to green-
house gas emissions and, consequently, has the potential to make a signifcant 
impact on their reduction. Waste management can be considered as including 
waste prevention actions, waste collection, sorting, material separation, recycling 
and fnal disposal. Other than waste prevention, all other waste management 
activities produce greenhouse gas emissions. The European Union’s commitment 
to the circular economy emphasises the need for discarded materials to be treated 
in ways that mean they can be reused in products which are both long-lasting 
and can be dismantled for future recycling. This will eliminate the need for fnal 
disposal to landfll or incineration (European Commission, 2020b). 
As a profession and an activity, waste management is highly gendered, with 
unpaid waste work in the household mostly done by women, while paid work 
– particularly operative and senior decision-making – is mainly undertaken by 
men. Professionally, waste management is dominated by an engineering tradi-
tion, which determines how decisions are made. The resulting path dependency 
resembles the privileging of the climate debate as ‘scientifc, elitist, technical 
and masculinised’ – referred to in Chapter 1 of this volume. Recognising what 
structures the production, management and minimisation of waste is a critical 
step to achieving the drastic reduction of greenhouse gas emissions necessary 
to avoid a climate catastrophe; greenhouse gas emissions from the management 
of waste contribute almost 3% of the EU’s total. The EU’s dual commitment 
to both reducing greenhouse gas emissions and increasing gender equality has 
informed its environmental research programme Horizon 2020, which funded 
the Innovations project Urban Waste. This chapter uses Urban Waste as a case 
study to examine how open waste management organisations are to developing 
waste reduction innovations in a gender-sensitive way.1 Amongst other things, 
Urban Waste promoted and investigated the role of gender in developing waste 
reduction innovations by applying gender mainstreaming throughout the life of 
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proposal design stage, I was involved as a gender specialist to ensure that sensi-
tivity to gender was embedded throughout the project, which involved 11 pilot 
cities in eight European countries.2 The cities all depended on a tourist-based 
economy, which presents particular waste management challenges that the waste 
reduction innovations were designed to address. However, they were diverse in 
terms of geographical distinctiveness, size, and, of particular importance for the 
gender dimension of the project, social and economic profle, which included dif-
ferences in the degree of gender equality. 
My involvement in the Urban Waste project emerged from my work on gender 
and waste management in 2002, when I led a research project to explore the role 
of gender mainstreaming in waste management. This small-scale pilot of gender 
mainstreaming was initiated by the EU’s Environment Directorate to explore 
how the EU’s gender mainstreaming commitment could be introduced into envi-
ronmental policy. The study focused on three member states (Ireland, Portugal, 
and the United Kingdom), and broadly established that waste management 
Table 8.1 Gender considerations at each stage of the project, following EIGE methodology 
STAGE OF PROJECT (EIGE STAGE) GENDER INITIATIVES 
Proposal design Gender dimensions embedded throughout 
(DEFINE) proposal; gender specialist involved. 
Organisation of project Gender strategy developed 
(PLAN) 
Preparation/benchmarking Survey of pilot organisations to collect 
(PLAN) gendered employment data. 
Stakeholder groups assessed for gender balance. 
Surveys of waste managers, tourism By gender as well as by age, ethnicity, 
employees, and tourists education, and place of residence to assess 
(PLAN) socio-economic dimensions of waste 
attitudes and behaviour. 
Focus groups with waste managers, Specifcally on gender to explore attitudes 
tourism employees, and tourists and behaviour towards waste and waste 
(PLAN) management. 
Training and mutual learning First mutual learning (ML) event was 
(ACT) devoted to gender mainstreaming training; 
subsequent short sessions at various ML 
events. 
Three gender webinars on communication; 
budgeting; reporting. 
Measures Training on how measures will have gendered 
(ACT) impacts; 
measure evaluation forms gender proofed. 
Final evaluation Changes to gender balance of stakeholders; 
(CHECK) gendered changes to organisational structures; 
gender impact of measures; 
identifying good practices in and barriers to 
gender mainstreaming. 
Final report and deliverable Changes to the gender balance of stakeholders; 







teams which were gender (and professionally) diverse were more likely to develop 
broader strategies for waste management which led to diversions from waste dis-
posal to recycling (Buckingham et al., 2005). 
The scale of change needed to address what has now escalated to a climate 
emergency requires policy transformation rather than incrementalism. A femi-
nist gender analysis can inform and motivate transformative action in ways that 
a more co-opted form of gender mainstreaming may not. I open the argument 
which informs this chapter with a critique of gender mainstreaming as it has 
mostly been applied, and with a consideration of its transformative potential. 
In refecting on the role of gender mainstreaming in the Urban Waste project, 
I explain how gender was, or was not, recognised and included in case study 
programmes and their home organisations to explore ways in which this was 
variously used to ‘add on’, ‘gender-wash’, or, occasionally, to more fundamentally 
restructure waste reduction. I refect on the main challenges to including gen-
der in waste reduction policy-making and propose how these challenges can be 
understood and conceptualised. By considering the synergies between the avail-
able gender-mainstreaming tools and waste reduction programmes, I question 
where the challenges lie – the tools themselves and their transformative poten-
tial; their promotion; and/or resistance to their adoption. I propose that these 
lessons may well be transferable between sectors and institutions responsible for 
creating and needing to reduce greenhouse gas emissions. 
Specifcally, my aim in this chapter is to refect on the conditions under which 
gender mainstreaming can become a transformative process. The questions this 
process of refection asks are: 
• What conditions are necessary for gender mainstreaming to become 
transformative? 
• What work is necessary to encourage these conditions to be achieved? 
• What are the challenges that gender mainstreaming confronts at different 
stages of its implementation? 
• What can we reasonably expect gender mainstreaming to achieve in envi-
ronment – specifcally waste reduction – policy-making? 
Accordingly, this chapter will explain what is distinctive about waste manage-
ment as a sector, including how it is gendered, and why it should be considered as 
an integral part of climate change–related policy. It will then review what gender 
mainstreaming provides as a principle, process, and set of practical tools, and how 
effective these have been to date. Following these context-setting sections, the 
chapter will refect on how gender mainstreaming was applied and accepted (or 
not) in the Urban Waste project. 
Managing waste as a contribution to climate change policy 
A consumer society, in which most Europeans play a signifcant part, is a waste-
ful society. For example, over 80% of discarded textiles are sent to landfll and 
  
 
Wasting resources 127 
incineration (Labfresh, 2019) and only 46% of electrical and electronic equip-
ment waste, one of the fastest-growing waste streams in the EU, is recycled 
(Eurostat, 2020). It is also an unfair consumer society. While the 88 million 
tonnes of food waste in EU member states represent around 20% of all food pro-
duced in Europe, 43 million Europeans (around 8 %) are estimated to be in food 
poverty (European Commission, n.d.). And while consumption is determined by 
household income and related factors such as age, it is also important to note that 
consumption is a gendered activity (Buckingham, 2020). 
While reducing overall consumption requires legislation and behavioural 
changes beyond the scope of waste management policy, managing waste locally 
and encouraging residents to remove items from the waste stream are important 
contributors to climate change policy. 
In 2017, waste managed within the EU (not all that is produced, because of 
the global trade in waste) contributed approximately 2.7% of the emissions in EU 
countries,3 a drop of 42% in Kt CO2e since 1990, when waste represented approx-
imately 4% of the EU’s greenhouse gas emissions. Waste features in the European 
Green Deal, which is committed to making a ‘just and inclusive transition for 
all’, although the terms ‘women’ and ‘gender’ are not found in a search of the 
document (EU, 2019b). Waste, like all the other sectors recorded as being the 
main Kt CO2e emitters, is generally a highly masculinised and male-dominated 
industry, as this chapter will later demonstrate. 
Being the gender advisor on the EU waste reduction innovation project Urban 
Waste has given me access to data on gender in waste management organisations 
(mostly municipalities) not otherwise generally available, because it is not nor-
mally counted. This has enabled me to assess the role, uses, and limitations of 
gender mainstreaming across the 11 participating case study cities. As the chap-
ter will later discuss, the eight countries in which the pilot cities are located have 
very different gender profles including that for paid work, and these different 
experiences appear to have an impact on their recognition and understanding 
of gender difference. The project facilitated and evaluated the identifcation and 
introduction of locally determined waste reduction innovations in tourist cities 
across Europe. While this included research with and into tourists and tourism 
businesses, the refections in this chapter focus on the research with waste man-
agement institutions and staff. 
Gender mainstreaming critiqued 
Gender mainstreaming was adopted by the European Union (EU) in 1996 as 
a consequence of the Fourth United Nations World Conference on Women 
in 1995, which proclaimed the Beijing Declaration and Platform for Equality, 
Development and Peace as an agenda for women’s empowerment. This and the 
UN Conference on Environment and Development in 1992 argued that to address 
environmental damage, gender (and other social) inequality must also be tackled. 
Gender mainstreaming requires that policies take gender equality into account 
at all stages, from development through to enactment and assessing impact. This 
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becomes a cyclical process when the impact assessment informs the adjustment of 
future policies, and represents a signifcant departure from existing environmen-
tal decision-making, with the potential, and hope, to be transformative. 
However, in practice, the embedded or ‘sticky’ institutional structures which 
dominate environmental decision-making in Europe, as elsewhere, have been hard 
to penetrate and existing path dependencies have dominated (see Chapter 1 in 
this volume). EIGE has reported that ‘gender mainstreaming is strikingly weak 
within the EU’s environmental policies’ (EIGE, 2020, p. 18). In EIGE’s 25th 
anniversary review of the platform, it found that: 
Currently, women remain under-represented in environmental policymak-
ing, planning and implementation (European Parliament, 2017d). Women 
are also substantially under-represented in key sectors such as energy; trans-
port; water and waste; and agriculture, forestry and fshery. The low level of 
gender diversity in the energy sector is considered to affect innovation and 
restrict efforts to address climate change. 
(EIGE, 2020, p. 128) 
Not only are women underrepresented in environmental decision-making, but 
environmental policy areas are found to lack gender sensitivity or any kind of 
gender perspective. (EIGE, 2020b). 
Accordingly, gender mainstreaming has been variously welcomed and criti-
cised, and often both where it is valued as a tool to achieve gender equality but 
observed to have been used instrumentally to bolster policies which are inherently 
unequal. For example, Grosser and Moon have argued that gender mainstream-
ing benefts the corporate social responsibility agenda, ‘simultaneously good for 
both business and wider society’ (in Walby, 2005, p. 457). This sees a dual role for 
gender mainstreaming which, if effectively implemented, requires that women 
should have equal rights to men (for example, to participate in careers and civic 
engagement), and that operational benefts accrue to organisations which strive 
to achieve gender balance in decision-making. Mieke Verloo was positive about 
the aims of gender mainstreaming to prioritise the lives and experiences of indi-
viduals; in its potential to lead to better government, to involve women as well as 
men; in acknowledging the diversity amongst men and women; and to make gen-
der equality issues visible ‘in the mainstream of society’ (1999, p. 8). However, 
applying the tool that is gender mainstreaming is likely to refect the values 
which underpin the organisation implementing it, thereby reinforcing existing 
path dependencies in a ‘logic of appropriateness’ as introduced in Chapter 1 of 
this book. The EU has been observed to strategically frame the concept of gender 
mainstreaming within a discourse of competitiveness and employment policies 
(Vida, 2017), and this may have contributed to criticisms of the EU’s practi-
cal application of gender mainstreaming, including its reliance on ‘soft’ strat-
egies such as training, for implementing gender sensitivity, although this may 
change with the Gender Equality Strategy proposed for 2020 to 2025 (EC, 2020). 
Moreover, those expected to implement and ‘police’ gender mainstreaming are 
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not always well equipped to do so (Mergaert and Lombardo, 2014). Verloo has 
also been sceptical that suffcient expertise existed amongst professionals to chal-
lenge prevailing discourses, and to align the necessary interests from those ‘at the 
top’ with those ‘down under’ (1999, p. 8). 
While Verloo’s observation is now 20 years old, the same observations con-
tinue to be registered, which is interesting considering that a substantial body of 
expertise provided by feminists, consultants and trainers informs development 
policy and practice (Prugl, 2013). For example, while senior policy-makers and 
politicians have championed gender mainstreaming as a principle, and specialist 
organisations such as EIGE have developed mechanisms to encourage its appli-
cation, there has been a failure to do more than tinker with the design of major 
research policy structures – themselves embedded in institutions through path 
dependencies, as I discovered when invited to address the (mainly male) frst 
Horizon 2020 policy development team in 2013. Later, in the Urban Waste pro-
ject, our European Commission liaison offcer admitted that support and evalua-
tion teams lacked the expertise to assess the role of gender in research or to advise 
(EC, pers com, 2016), which was certainly evident in our experience of project 
evaluation. Minto and Mergaert (2018) remain unconvinced about the institu-
tional embeddedness of gender mainstreaming within the EU, observing a lack of 
resources for comprehensive gender-mainstreaming training and a lack of gender 
mainstreaming in evaluation at an institutional level. These technical challenges 
associated with gender mainstreaming can be overcome but are compounded by 
ideological diffculties. 
As global institutions have utilised ‘gender mainstreaming’ and employed 
higher numbers of women, a liberal version of feminism – individualised and fem-
ocratic – appears to have been co-opted as, in Nancy Fraser’s words, capitalism’s 
‘handmaidens’ (2013). Penny Griffn examines ‘the promotion of co-opted, gov-
ernance-friendly, “feminist knowledge”’ which can be applied to international 
political, as well as economic, activity. She specifcally refers to how a ‘crisis 
governance feminism’ is ‘a form of feminist strategy friendly to existing neo-lib-
eral governance and supportive of the resuscitation of neo-liberal global fnance’ 
(Griffn, 2015, p. 51). In the development context, Bernadette Resurreccion 
and Rebecca Elmhirst note how gender mainstreaming is ‘streamed away’ as 
it is framed ‘through a neoliberal discourse with a vocabulary of effectiveness, 
effciency, impact assessment and “smart” economics [which] diminishes any 
power to address feminist agendas’ (Resurreccion and Elmhirst, 2020, p. 2). They 
explore the tensions that gender experts face ‘as they seek transformative social 
change whilst working in technical-environmental contexts that demand simpli-
fcations and technical fxes’ (Resurreccion and Elmhirst, 2020, p. 4). Nowhere is 
this more apparent than in the need to address climate change both at the global 
scale and in local and sectoral organisations, where the transformative potential 
of feminism offers at least the possibility to make real and lasting change. For this 
to happen, however, institutional structures need to be receptive to the need for 
and scope of change, and alive to the necessity to include all women and not just 
white women who are disproportionately dominating promotions in academia 
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(Bhopal, 2020) or environmental organisations (Taylor, 2014). As Kalwant 
Bhopal suggests, it is politically easier to concentrate on what will enable more 
women to achieve equality in the workplace than to address institutional barriers 
to Black and minority ethnic women (Bhopal, 2020). For gender mainstreaming 
to be transformative, both the principles on which it is founded, and the practical 
ways in which it is applied, need to be intersectional. This means being attuned 
to the needs of Black and minority ethnic women, disabled women, women of 
different ages, religions, cultures, care responsibilities, sexualities and sexual 
orientation. In my own experience of working with Urban Waste city partners, 
acknowledging intersectionality has been particularly diffcult, especially when, 
as is generally the case, decision- and policy-makers are just adjusting to the need 
to address gender (in)equalities. Exclusively, the women managers who repre-
sented the pilot cities were ‘white European’ (as were the men). And as some of 
the women were the main carers of young children, this sometimes caused them 
diffculties in travelling to partner cities for quarterly meetings, and reduced the 
amount of time they were able to interact. 
That gender mainstreaming has not been transformative is found in the per-
sistence of gender inequality, and the disproportionate impact on women of the 
global fnancial crisis (Griffn, 2015) and more recently the COVID-19 pan-
demic (UN, 2020). Griffn quotes Otto as arguing that ‘crises everywhere are a 
particularly dangerous time for feminism, and indeed for all progressive ways of 
thinking’ (2015, p. 58). Beth Bee’s analysis of REDD+4 in Mexico illustrates how 
the appointment of urban senior professional women to the national programme 
ENAREDD+ has done little to promote the needs and interests of rural women 
who do not own land. She also reports that women are appointed as legal repre-
sentatives in order to score the points now needed for successful forestry appli-
cations but that while they can participate as agents of change, they can just as 
likely be included instrumentally, as signers of forms under the guidance of male 
fgures of authority (Bee, 2017). Bee’s work shows clearly how an emphasis on 
numerical parity does not, in itself, secure social equality. 
Griffn characterises a form of infuential international decision-making 
through groupings of individual states (G7, G20), supra-national bureaucracies 
(European Union), intergovernmental organisations (World Bank and IMF) and 
UN agencies as ‘neo-liberal global governance’ (Griffn, 2015, p. 53). She par-
ticularly focuses on recent global fnancial crises, and the international fnancial 
sector which, for centuries has been ‘dominated not just by men but by dominant 
models of behaviour… [that have concentrated] historical privilege in the hands 
of white men’ (ibid., p. 55). The persistence of such ‘masculine subjectivities’ 
encouraged Virginia Held to cite Carol Gilligan’s argument that women who 
‘advance occupationally learn to think like men’ (Held, 2006, p. 27), implying 
the existence of a dominant masculinity in occupational structures. A similar 
observation has also been made by Magnusdottir and Kronsell (2015) in their 
exploration of whether a numerical balance between women and men makes 
a difference to climate change planning policy; and it informs my own inves-
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profession through its most common training routes as well as its professional 
organisations and workplaces. The EU refers to descriptive and substantive equal 
representation, which recognises that while equal numbers are important to 
achieve a critical mass to provide a decision-making environment in which both 
women and men have the confdence to make effective interventions that are 
respectfully received, it is not in itself suffcient (EIGE, 2015). 
Gender mainstreaming and waste management in the EU 
As the gender advisor on Urban Waste, my responsibility was to ensure attention 
to gender and see that gender equality was achieved at all stages of the project, for 
which an EIGE gender-mainstreaming methodology was used (see Table 8.1).5 
This enabled any correspondence between greater gender sensitivity of waste 
management departments and higher CO2 equivalent savings to be observed. 
This relationship was also noted in an earlier European project which exam-
ined the potential for gender mainstreaming waste management. This identifed 
that municipalities where there were women in decision-making positions (and, 
interestingly, women who were not from the engineering backgrounds which 
normally dominate), were those that were recycling more and through gender-
sensitive activities. Notable amongst these was a project in southern England 
which was providing reusable nappies and nappy-cleaning services free of charge 
to low-income families (Buckingham et al., 2005). 
That waste management in the European Union is dominated by men is evi-
dent from Table 8.2 which provides the gender balance of jobs in ‘water supply, 
sewerage, waste management and remediation’ calculated by the OECD. Despite 
sex-disaggregated data being necessary for effective gender mainstreaming, gen-
dered employment data at the sector level is still not comprehensive (if available 
at all), and there is no cross-EU comparison of gendered employment in waste 
management.6 The OECD data is only available for fve of Urban Waste’s eight 
case study countries, and it does not breakdown jobs by seniority, although from 
data elsewhere it is probably safe to assume that senior decision-making and tech-
nical jobs are more likely to be held by men (see also Buckingham et al., 2005; 
EY, 2015), just as they are across science- and research-related jobs (European 
Commission, 2019a) and in the energy sector (Catalyst, 2018; IRENA, 2019). 
Table 8.2 Employment by gender in water supply, sewerage, waste management 
and remediation activities, 2017. Source: OECD, 2017 




















Table 8.3 Gendered attitudes and behaviour towards avoiding waste. Sources: European 
Commission, 2014; 2017 
GENDER % reduce % reduce Avoids Avoids over- Drinks tap Thinks reducing 
or separate consumption food packaged rather than waste is not 
waste waste goods bottled water important 
Female 73 59 85 65 70 12 
Male 68 52 81 59 63 20 
The EU’s own Eco-Management and Audit Scheme (EMAS) for the environ-
ment (which includes waste management) makes no reference to gender (Dri 
et al., 2018), although studies and reports, including those from the sector itself, 
have stated the importance of a gender-sensitive perspective (Charrington, 2017; 
EY, 2019). This also contrasts strongly with waste management attitudes and 
behaviour in the household, shown in Table 8.3. 
These gendered proportions have remained strikingly consistent across times 
and places (see, for example, Brough and Wilkie, 2017, for data beyond Europe, 
as well as earlier Eurobarometer surveys) and indicate the value of a waste 
management policy which is gender-sensitive and draws on the expertise and 
concerns of women and men equally. This point is reinforced by the gendered 
waste behaviour that was noted amongst those Urban Waste survey respondents 
working in waste management. Three of women employees’ top-four priorities 
related to behavioural change (behaviour change, awareness-raising and waste 
prevention), compared to three of men’s top four being to improve operations, 
but without necessarily reducing the amount of waste produced (improving waste 
collection, optimising recycling, reducing landfll). This suggests a beneft of gen-
der-balanced teams to have the potential to deliver a broader mix of policies, and 
proposes that women working in waste management may not be socialised into 
thinking the same way as men. This contradicts some of the literature reviewed 
earlier on the institutionalisation of women working in male-dominated felds, 
but concurs with fndings from the earlier gender-mainstreaming waste manage-
ment project conducted for the EU, and which will be returned to in this chap-
ter’s conclusion (Buckingham et al., 2005). 
Gender mainstreaming the Urban Waste project 
In addition to using the EIGE methodology for gender mainstreaming, the Urban 
Waste project adopted a participatory action research methodology. First, the 
gender expert was both actively participating in the project as well as researching 
the application and infuence of gender mainstreaming. Secondly, participating 
representatives from each of the 11 case study cities contributed to identifying 
the issues to be addressed, the design of online questionnaires, focus group discus-
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self-selected participants in the design of the initial project, each established a 
stakeholder group for their city, with the guideline to achieve gender balance. 
City partners also recruited for local focus group discussions, adapting the topic 
discussion guide to local conditions. With their stakeholders, partners identi-
fed waste reduction innovation measures to be piloted by stakeholders, which 
they then evaluated together. The project ran a ‘mutual learning’ programme in 
which city partners learned from each other. Bringing these actors together in a 
participatory research action, the gender expert conducted qualitative surveys of 
the partners at the beginning and end of the project to assess what had changed 
in terms of commitment to gender equality, and how this might have affected 
local practices. 
The countries that participated in the Urban Waste project (Croatia, Cyprus, 
Denmark, France, Greece, Italy, Portugal, Spain), had different profles of women 
in paid work, and experience of overall gender equality (see Table 8.4). This may 
have had a material impact on their enthusiasm to acknowledge and address gen-
der inequality. Within the project, the intersection of country of residence and 
gender appeared to signify differences in waste behaviour. 
Each pilot city was required to invite a (gender-balanced) group of stakehold-
ers to jointly identify, develop and implement a number of waste minimisation 
measures, innovative for its own city. This emphasis on a participative process 
created scope for gender-balanced stakeholder groups, or where there were male-
dominant staff teams in the municipal offce, to recruit more women stakeholders 
to counterbalance male dominance. In this chapter, I focus my refections on the 
data generated by surveys and focus groups, and qualitative surveys of city part-
ners conducted at the beginning and end of the three-year project.7 In addition, 
observations were made through a continuous programme of training and mutual 
learning for city partners, in which gender played a key part, particularly to ensure 
that the context for identifying and implementing measures was gender-aware. 
The departments in which the pilot city partner representatives worked dis-
played a slightly more complex gender profle than that revealed in the survey of
waste managers across each of the pilot cities (Buckingham et al., 2020). In the
participating waste management departments, men were marginally more likely to
Table 8.4 EIGE Gender Equality Index ranking of participating countries (2019) 
Participating Countries (case EIGE Gender equality Participation in paid 
studies) ranking in the EU workforce ranking in the EU 
Denmark (Copenhagen) 2 6 
France (Nice) 3 17 
Spain (Santander, Tenerife) 9 22 
Italy (Florence, Syracuse) 14 28 
Portugal (Lisbon, Azores) 16 7 
Cyprus (Nicosia) 20 9 
Croatia (Dubrovnik) 22 24 

























be dominant in the most senior posts, but not necessarily in professional, associate
professional and technical jobs. It was quickly apparent that the level of knowledge
about gender amongst most project participants was low, and there were many
misconceptions (including overestimations) about the extent of gender equality in
participants’ own countries and organisations. In some cases, there was an initial
indifference. For example, at the beginning of the project, only two partners col-
lected gender-disaggregated data, only one partner could (tentatively) respond to
the question about providing good practice of involving gender sensitivity in waste
management, and only three could provide me with the name of a woman on the
waste management team who might be able to talk to me about her experiences.
Three partner cities acknowledged that they had, or were about to launch, gender
equality training. These attitudes indicated that the pathways and power structures
already well embedded in institutions would not be easy to redirect. 
Using the outcomes of baseline data, cities could be categorised as (a) already 
or almost immediately gender-aware, which to a large extent informed processes 
and outcomes; (b) developed gender-awareness which impacted positively on the 
process; (c) developed direct gender-awareness amongst partners but had limited 
or no impact on the process; (d) insistently gender-denying, with no impact on 
outcomes. How the case study cities performed in terms of gender-awareness can 
be compared with their carbon emission savings. Although it is not possible to 
establish a causal relationship between the two, some correspondence can be 
noted which serves as instrumental encouragement for adopting gender main-
streaming, and this observation will be returned to later in this chapter. 
Gender-proofng waste reduction measures 
From the outset, gender mainstreaming was signalled as a key dimension of the project
which all partners were expected to incorporate. Indeed, it was a feature of the initial
proposal and commended by the European Commission representative assigned to
the project, aware of a lack of gender expertise in the Innovations programme (EC,
pers comm, 2016). Recognising the low level of gender awareness and gender exper-
tise amongst most participants, the frst mutual learning event focused on building
gender-awareness, with specifc training on how to run gender-sensitive focus groups.
The Danish partner also provided input into this training as the City of Copenhagen
had commissioned a survey of gendered waste behaviour. Copenhagen’s degree of
gender-awareness was signifcantly different to other partners, and they were in the
process of trying to engage more men in waste management both at citizen level and
in their waste management offce, which was dominated by women. This session
was followed by other mutual learning events, and three gender webinars on gender-
sensitive communication, gender budgeting and gender reporting. 
Each of the pilot cities was required to identify, through participatory stake-
holder decision-making, a number of potential waste minimisation practices 
which would be innovative to their area. They were asked to monitor how 
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in communication. It transpired that women were marginally more likely to
incur extra work compared to men. Mindful that ICT use is gendered (EIGE,
2016), much attention was devoted to ensuring that the ‘wasteapp’, designed
to locate recycling facilities and cafes, restaurants and hotels participating in
waste reduction, was developed in a gender-sensitive way. Notwithstanding,
the ‘wasteapp’ proved more popular among male tourists (Figure 8.1). However,
given the lower recycling and waste minimisation practices of men referred
to earlier, a tool which engages more with men could also be seen as a posi-
tive achievement. Just as Danish waste managers reported they had found,
one US/Chinese study also concluded that men are more resistant to environ-
mentally aware/sensitive behaviour, seeing it as too ‘feminine’ (Brough and
Wilkie, 2017). 
Correspondence between gender-awareness and sustainable 
environmental practices 
The extent to which observations about gendered work have led to changes in 
practices was identifed by the end-of-project survey. Eight pilot cities were iden-
tifed as introducing changes to ensure more gender-sensitive practice or greater 
gender equality in employment in the longer-term. One pilot region, Tuscany, 
reported no further changes from an employment practice they already claimed 
to be ‘family-friendly’ and supporting women, but reported that they had been 
prompted by the project to consider introducing a gender strategy in regional 
waste planning. The remaining two pilot cities did not complete this element of 
the survey, from which we conclude that no longer-term gender-sensitive meas-





Figure 8.1 Gendered use of ‘wasteapp’ (More details of the evaluation of all innovations 










Table 8.5 Case studies’ environmental performance relative to gender equality and 
sensitivity 
CASE Ranked by T CO2e % female Gender of senior Gender 
STUDY performance prevented/ stakeholders (= staff sensitive 
(average/ recycled (number remains same/ + changes to 
measure) of measures)* increased) practice 
Copenhagen §, 5 (3) *(1) 2.17 (1) 62 (=) Retains female √ 
majority 
Dubrovnik nd nd 47 (nd, 2016) nd None 
reported 
Kavala 7 (7) 0.57 (3) 20 (+) Retains male √ 
majority 
Lisbon 3 (5) 7.147 (4) 68 (+) Retains female √ 
majority 
Nice 6 (6) 2.11 (2) 40 (nd, 2016) Incomplete data None 
reported 
Nicosia 8 (9) 0.32 (1) 47 (+) Retains male √ 
majority 
Ponta 9 (8) 0.051 (1) 62 (+) Retains female √ 
Delgada majority 
Santander 4 (4) 4.228 (2) 44 (+) New female √ 
head 
Siracusa 10 (10) 0.025 (1) 46 (+) Retains male √ 
majority 
Tenerife 1 (2) 13.161 (4) 31 (=) Retains male √ 
majority 
Tuscany 2 (1) 13.12 (3) 53 (+) Retains female √ 
majority 
*Obersteiner et al. (2019) 
To explore the impact of gender balance on waste reduction strategies, an anal-
ysis was made of any correspondence between pilot cities which appear to be more
gender-aware (through reporting changes to practice, ensuring stakeholder and/ 
or employee gender balance), and those which have achieved the greatest gross
carbon dioxide equivalent (CO2e) reductions. It is clear from Table 8.5, that those
case studies which started the project with the greatest gender-awareness, and
where women had the strongest presence (Tuscany, Copenhagen and Lisbon),
were amongst the greatest CO2e savers (ranked by CO2e savings per measure they
rank frst, third and ffth, respectively; by total savings, second, ffth and third). 
Of the three cities which showed the greatest gender-awareness, Lisbon seems 
to have learned more from the emphasis on gender in Urban Waste, evident from 
the qualitative end-of-project survey. She also volunteered that other forms of 
discrimination needed to be tackled simultaneously: 
In my opinion, it’s important to keep addressing and raising this subject to 
ensure equal treatment, opportunities and respect regardless of gender but 
also race and religion. Also, and regarding the Stakeholders, since the UW 
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Project takes gender in consideration this might raise awareness in establish-
ments that don’t yet provide equal opportunities for all. 
(Female Waste Manager, Lisbon) 
Those cities which showed the least amount of gender-awareness, judged by the 
lowest percentage of female stakeholders, and retaining male-dominated senior 
waste management (Kavala, Nicosia, Siracusa), achieved some of the lowest 
CO2e savings (seventh, ninth and tenth gross savings; seventh, ninth and tenth 
per measure). The exceptions to this pattern were Tenerife and Ponta Delgada. 
Tenerife made the highest gross CO2e reductions overall and second-highest 
average per measure. One possible explanation for this is that Tenerife is located 
in the Canary Islands, the government of which led the project; it, therefore, may 
have had a particular interest in performing highly. Tenerife also instigated the 
highest number of measures. On the other hand, Ponta Delgada showed a strong 
commitment to gender equality but ranks low in both gross and average CO2e 
reductions (ninth and eighth, respectively). Ponta Delgada introduced one of the 
most radical employment changes during the course of the project that requires 
all external waste collection and street cleaning contracts to have a minimum 
percentage of jobs to be held by women (the lead in Ponta Delgada was female). 
This suggests caution in using arguments of effciency whereby gender equality 
is claimed as synonymous with better environmental performance, although it is 
also likely that such a move is likely to manifest environmental improvements 
in the longer term. Regardless, such a move towards gender equality in a heavily 
male-dominated sector should be seen as a positive achievement in its own right. 
The most interesting cities, as far as embedding gender mainstreaming is 
concerned, are those which increased their number of female stakeholders and 
changed the gender composition of their waste management team during the 
project, in the course of which they developed a strong commitment to gender 
equality. Santander, in particular, which ranks fourth by both gross savings and 
average by measure, found Urban Waste’s focus on gender helpful, stating that: 
‘the simple fact of taking into account gender equality in Urban Waste project-
related activities is a way of infuencing the organisation and the stakeholders’. 
The city is also recommending to: 
Follow the general strategy maintained throughout the project, bearing in 
mind gender equality in all tasks. For example, in convening stakeholders, 
in focus groups, in Communities of Practice, in communication campaigns, 
in data collection, statistics, surveys and surveys. 
(Female Waste Manager, Santander) 
It was also possible to detect positive shifts in cities whose statistics belied their 
enthusiasm. For example, while Nicosia is at an early stage of developing a gen-
der-awareness, they also identifed the utility of the gender approach for them: 
We found it very useful. Men and women must be able and have equal oppor-























in the workplace. Therefore, the manager of each department must remember
this issue/term. Even if we consider gender equality in our organisation/depart-
ment, the Urban Waste project through webinars, examples and via the imple-
mentation of the measures helped us to become more familiar with this factor. 
(Male Waste Manager, Nicosia) 
Five of the case study cities (two of which, Copenhagen and Tuscany, had already
provided evidence of high gender-awareness) claimed that their city/country was
already attending to gender equality. Three of these, however, had not provided
evidence of commitment to gender equality requested at the start of the project,
nor demonstrated particular enthusiasm for gender equality during its course. These
responses could, therefore, be interpreted as ‘blocking’ mechanisms for change,
especially as their employment and stakeholder data refected gender inequality.
An example of this likely overclaiming of attention to gender can be found from
the waste manager in Tenerife who, despite not increasing the 31% of women in
its stakeholder group nor changing the gender balance of a male dominant waste
management team, claimed that (emboldened by the author for emphasis): ‘Urban
Waste[’s] gender focus has been consistent with the strategy concerning gender
equality developed by the Cabildo de Tenerife from its cross-cutting approach’. 
One pilot city (Nice, with a male lead) failed to respond to the question
about how a focus on gender had infuenced their project, and another case study
(Dubrovnik, with a female lead) did not fnd the emphasis on gender at all help-
ful other than instrumentally to help secure grants in the future: ‘It is not very
useful. It is useful only in terms of future Horizon 2020 project where we can use
experiences from this project’. Dubrovnik’s persistent resistance to acknowledging
gender inequality is despite, and perhaps refects, Croatia being one of the lowest
(24th of 28) performing countries in the EU on gender equality (EIGE, 2017). 
Conclusion 
The aim of this chapter was to explore the conditions under which gender main-
streaming can become a transformative process within the context of a climate 
change–related policy area, and asked a number of questions. The frst question 
was what conditions are necessary for gender mainstreaming to become trans-
formative. It was clear from the experience of advising on gender for Urban Waste
that a prior awareness of and commitment to gender equality made a difference 
to performance on both gender-awareness and carbon emission reductions. One 
condition, then, for gender mainstreaming as a transformative process would 
seem to be a prior and evident commitment to gender equality. It is also clear 
that the more women who were involved as waste management decision-makers 
in the individual pilots, the better gender-sensitivity was achieved. This sug-
gests the importance of descriptive equality, and challenges some of the gender 
mainstreaming analyses reviewed earlier in the chapter which argue that women 
in occupations dominated by men overall tend to mimic male behaviours. 
It also challenges, to some extent, the notion that path dependency in waste 
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management institutions and the ‘stickiness’ of their masculine environments 
are universally resistant to change. Critical mass, however, can also be seen to be 
important as the pilot cities with larger numbers of women in decision-making 
positions were those more likely to support gender equality actions and climate-
critical acts. Descriptive equality would, therefore, seem to be a necessary condi-
tion for transformative change, but not in itself suffcient. 
The second question concerned the work necessary to encourage these condi-
tions to be achieved. One reason proferred for the failure of gender mainstream-
ing is a lack of resources for training (Minto and Mergaert, 2018). However, 
given the resources available to the Urban Waste project over an extended period 
of three years, and given the patchy success of achieving gender equality, let alone 
mainstreaming gender concerns across the pilots, resources alone cannot be seen 
as a pre-condition for transformation. Even in this three-year project, with many 
interventions to raise the issue of gender equality, and which was commended 
in the fnal evaluation for its work on gender, the success rate was limited. The 
responses which emerged during the life of the project spanned ‘embracing gen-
der equality’ to outright resistance. In between lay examples of compliance with-
out enthusiasm, and box-ticking. Certainly, Mergaert and Lombardo’s (2014) 
identifcation of resistances at the individual and institutional level resonates 
with some cases in the project, where either individuals resistant to the idea 
of promoting gender equality, or institutions which are not receptive, are able 
to block gender mainstreaming. This was certainly the case in Dubrovnik, but 
experience elsewhere was equivocal. These fndings support one of the concepts 
underpinning this book: that embedded and ‘sticky’ institutional structures can 
prevent transformative action regarding gender equality. This, then, is one of the 
challenges facing gender mainstreaming at different stages of its implementation, 
the third question posed by this chapter. Perhaps one of the problems is when 
gender mainstreaming is viewed as something which is added on to an existing 
workload which people feel ill-equipped and poorly resourced to manage, rather 
than an opportunity to re-envision how an organisation or part of an organisa-
tion might work. For example, Tuscany had provided the example of introducing 
family-friendly policies, such as fexi-time and working from home, which ben-
efted women and improved the workplace culture for all employees. 
The chapter’s last question relates to how gender mainstreaming can be 
expected to achieve change in climate change–related policy-making. The pro-
ject does provide some evidence that better gender-awareness and gender equality 
practices are linked with better waste reduction and environmental performance. 
This refects research at the global scale, where countries which perform highly 
on gender equality also do so on environmental measures (Ergas and York, 2012). 
Although the relationship between the two is not necessarily straightforward, 
there are indications that greater attention to gender balance and gender equal-
ity amongst stakeholders and employees could lead to improved waste reduction, 
which makes it all the more critical that policies such as the European Union’s 
Circular Economy Action Plan, or EMAS, do actually refer to gender and indi-
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Notes 
1 The Urban Waste project was funded by EU Horizon 2020: Grant Agreement Number: 
WASTE-6a 2015 690452. 
2 The participating cities/countries were: Dubrovnik in Croatia; Nicosia in Cyprus; 
Copenhagen in Denmark; Nice in France; Kavala in Greece; Florence/Tuscany and 
Syracuse in Italy; Lisbon and Ponta Delgada (Azores) in Portugal; Santander and 
Tenerife (Canary Islands) in Spain. 
3 The European Union combines sectors to compile annual greenhouse gas emission 
statistics; there are nine combined sectors, of which waste is currently the lowest emit-
ter of greenhouse gases (EU, 2019a). 
4 REDD+ refers to the United Nations ‘reducing emissions from deforestation and forest 
degradation in developing countries, and the role of conservation, sustainable man-
agement of forests and enhancement of forest carbon stocks in developing countries’. 
ENAREDD+ is the related strategic policy of Mexico. 
5 In this role, I ensured that the Urban Waste project was gender mainstreamed, and sup-
ported pilot cities to adopt gender mainstreaming as a principle and practice, at least 
for the waste innovations they developed. 
6 Although the EU considers sex-disaggregated data to be a decisive factor for the effec-
tive implementation of gender mainstreaming, the availability of sex-disaggregated 
data by employment sector is not yet mandatory and varies by country. It will be 
required by the Gender Equality Strategy 2020–2025, although this had not been rati-
fed at the time of writing (European Commission, 2020). 
7 Specifcally, this comprises baseline data on staff in the 11 case study waste manage-
ment offces; a survey of waste management staff in the 11 cities, and follow up focus 
groups; evaluations of gender, and tonnes of CO2 equivalent emissions prevented, in 
the waste reduction innovation measures adopted by each case study city; an end-of-
project evaluation which assessed gender impact in each of the case study cities. 
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9 Gender analysis of policy-making 
in construction and transportation 
Denial and disruption in the 
Canadian green economy 
Bipasha Baruah and Sandra 
Biskupski-Mujanovic 
Introduction 
Countries around the world are fguring out ways to make their economies less
carbon-intensive by creating new green jobs, developing less-polluting tech-
nologies and by retroftting existing sectors such as manufacturing, construction,
transportation, energy production, water and waste management (ILO, 2011). A
gender-focused analysis of such green growth and development strategies reveals
two major blind spots. First, women are known to have weaker access to new tech-
nologies almost everywhere in the world (Rosser, 2005; Hafkin and Huyer, 2006)
so there are likely to be unequal access issues inherent in the transition to low-car-
bon economies. Second, it is well-established that women are already very poorly
represented globally in some of the sectors that are deemed critical to the green
economy. For example, women account for 9% of the global workforce in construc-
tion, 12% in engineering and 24% in manufacturing (UN Women, 2012). In the
absence of appropriately targeted training, education, apprenticeships, employment
placement, fnancial tools and supportive social policies, transitioning to a green
economy may exacerbate existing gender inequities and reproduce existing norms
and path-dependent knowledge in governmental strategies in the green economy. 
In this chapter, we present fndings from our synthesis of existing scientifc 
and practitioner literature on promising programmes and policies for promot-
ing employment equity in two sectors, construction and transportation, that are 
deemed critical for the Canadian green economy and in which women are cur-
rently severely underrepresented. In Canada, women currently comprise only 
23% of those employed in transportation and 12% in construction (Statistics 
Canada, 2019). This could indicate a lack of commitment to equality in the 
green economy sector by state authorities and their policy-makers. 
We choose to focus on employment in construction and transportation1 in this 
chapter because these sectors tend to produce well-paid stable jobs, but they are 
extremely male-dominated in Canada and in other Organisation for Economic 
Co-operation and Development (OECD) countries. We analyse employment in 
these two sectors while fully cognizant that in addition to increasing women’s 
participation in male-dominated occupations that are well-compensated, we 
DOI: 10.4324/9781003052821-9 
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should be very concerned about how undervalued and underpaid women are in 
sectors like early childhood education, primary education, social work and health 
and library services that are already green. The care industry, for example, is 
30% less polluting (in terms of GHG emissions) than the construction industry 
and the education industry is 62% less polluting than the construction industry 
(Women’s Budget Group, 2020). As Hirshman (2008) notes: 
Maybe it would be a better world if more women became engineers and 
construction workers, but programs encouraging women to pursue engineer-
ing have existed for decades without having much success. At the moment, 
teachers and childcare workers still need to support themselves. Many are 
their families’ sole support. 
Improving the status, wages and working conditions for people working in femi-
nised green sectors is as important, if not more, as increasing women’s participa-
tion in well-compensated male-dominated occupations (Baruah, 2017). 
The remainder of this chapter includes the methodology and fndings of our 
research. We provide an overview of the major barriers and opportunities that 
women encounter in seeking, retaining and advancing within employment in 
the construction and transportation sectors in Canada. This is followed by an 
overview of the blind spots and oversights about employment equity in Canada’s 
green transition, and a description of promising practices and policies being pur-
sued in the Canadian context to improve women’s participation in construction 
and transportation. We conclude with a summary of the trends we observed in 
employment in these sectors in Canada and a refection on the policies, practices 
and social awareness necessary to close the gender gaps. 
This chapter is not intended as a comprehensive survey of women’s employ-
ment or gender equality in the green economy in Canada. We were unable to 
undertake an intersectional analysis of gender along cross-cutting identities such 
as class, ethnicity and sexuality because the empirical data does not currently 
exist to enable such an assessment. Thus, when we refer to gender equity in this 
paper, we are limited to discussing those who identify biologically and socially 
as either women or men. In fact, the need to collect more gender-informed and 
gender-diverse data to inform evidence-based policy-making is one of the clear-
est fndings from this study and those of others who have attempted to study the 
green transition in Canada (see, for example, Lieu Et al., 2020; MacArthur Et al., 
2020). We hope that the issues identifed by our research will provide the ground-
ing and detail against which other related issues and research, perhaps using very 
different methodologies as well as broader conceptualisations of gender equality 
(including those of gender-diverse LGBTQ persons) and intersectional gender 
analysis, can be tested, verifed and advanced. 
Methodology 
This knowledge synthesis is based on both scientifc and practitioner litera-
ture. Peer-reviewed scholarship on women’s employment in transportation and 
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construction is limited. Most of the information for this study was gathered from 
practitioner organisations. We drew upon information from websites, annual 
reports, policy reviews, position papers and survey results of Canadian govern-
mental and non-governmental organisations (NGOs), labour associations, pro-
fessional networks, public policy institutes, think-tanks, fnancial institutions 
and social enterprises. 
We asked ourselves several questions while reading the assembled academic 
literature and policy documents: Does this piece discuss employment equity? Is 
there mention of gender equity specifcally? Does it make a reference to green 
or sustainable employment in transportation or construction? Although we 
intended to specifcally collect data on women’s employment in green or low-
carbon transportation and construction, we found that most of the available 
employment information is from the ‘brown’ or traditional (fossil fuel–based) 
forms of these sectors. We found very few specifc examples of women’s inclu-
sion in employment in green transportation and construction, which supports a 
major fnding from this study that gender equality (or employment equity, more 
broadly) has not been meaningfully addressed or even considered in mainstream 
green transition policies and practices in Canada. 
Findings 
We have organised fndings from our knowledge synthesis under three themes. 
First, we identify and discuss the specifc barriers and opportunities faced by 
women in seeking and retaining employment in these two sectors in Canada. 
Next, we outline blind spots and oversights in Canada’s green transition that may 
contribute to women’s underrepresentation in construction and transportation 
employment. Finally, we selectively present promising programmes and practices 
undertaken by municipalities, provincial governments, corporations and NGOs 
in Canada in order to reduce the gender gap in construction and transportation. 
Barriers and opportunities for women’s employment in construction and 
transportation in Canada 
The challenges and opportunities women face in the transportation and con-
struction industries are similar given that they are both non-traditional occupa-
tions for women in Canada. A non-traditional occupation (NTO) is defned as 
any occupation in which women or men comprise less than 25% of the work-
force. Of course, it is important to emphasise that although certain occupations 
become male- or female-dominated over time in specifc contexts due to his-
torical and current processes of socialisation and the gendered ‘logic of appro-
priateness’ (Chappell, 2006), such categorisations are rarely static or stable. As 
evidenced by the parity or near-parity reached by women in felds such as medi-
cine and law that were previously male-dominated, different sectors of employ-
ment may change over time due to shifts in societal attitudes as well as economic 
and political necessity. Also, some occupations within male-dominated sectors 
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(for example, human resources, administrative and clerical services, public rela-
tions and communication, fnancial services) may have more than 25% (or 
even 50%) female workers, but women tend to be a minority in the most well-
compensated and stable positions, namely in trades and operations, in technical 
positions that require science, technology, engineering and math (STEM) train-
ing, and in management, senior leadership and boards of directors of companies. 
Women’s underrepresentation in executive and managerial positions is, indeed, 
often because experience in engineering and operations is considered a prerequi-
site for leadership roles. In other words, the presence of women in some roles in 
these sectors does not necessarily translate into, the representation of their ideas, 
needs and priorities at the institutional level (Phillips, 1998). The global shift to 
low-carbon economies demands a growing array of skills – technical, business, 
administrative, economic and legal, among others (Baruah, 2016). Widening the 
talent pool in these industries is, thus, an instrumental reason for boosting the 
participation of women, in addition to intrinsic reasons of gender equity and fair-
ness (IRENA, 2019). 
Findings from our knowledge synthesis point to four major barriers for women 
in these sectors, which need to be addressed both by state and local institutions 
as well as other stakeholders. The barriers are a lack of adequate information and 
awareness about these felds of employment, gender bias and gender stereotyp-
ing, male-biased work culture and working conditions, and concerns about sexual 
harassment and violence against women. 
Barrier: Lack of adequate information and awareness 
We found that women often lack information about the opportunities and pre-
requisites for employment in the transport industry because careers in transporta-
tion are rarely pitched to women and girls through avenues such as recruitment 
sessions and career fairs (APGST, 2017). Much more needs to be done to intro-
duce girls at an early age to the potential in these careers. Encouraging girls to 
study STEM felds is critical since employment in the most well-paid jobs in these 
two sectors (for example, installation, engineering and architecture) tend to 
require STEM training (Antoni Et al., 2015). Because these sectors were almost 
exclusively dominated by men for so long, employment information continues 
to travel disproportionately through male professional networks. Young men 
tend to fnd job opportunities in these felds through references from friends and 
relatives while women usually do not have similar social connections. Therefore, 
there is an urgent need to mainstream – i.e. improve equity in access to job infor-
mation (ILO, 2011). 
Male candidates tend to apply for jobs in these two sectors even when they 
meet some of the requirements, but most female candidates tend to not apply 
for jobs unless they meet all requirements (APGST, 2017). Women are also less 
likely to negotiate salaries and benefts. Women must often outperform men in 
male-dominated industries just to ft in and certainly to progress. The preference 
for male recruits in most transport jobs is very much a ‘chicken-and-egg’ problem 
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– women often lack the necessary educational qualifcations for many jobs in the 
transport sector, but these jobs have usually not been designed with women in 
mind and are, therefore, not particularly attractive (Turnbull, 2013). Thus, when 
it comes to selection, (male) managers are less likely to regard women as suitable 
candidates. Women appear to encounter both ‘sticky foors and glass ceilings’ in 
transportation (Turnbull, 2013). Careers may never get off the ground because of 
persistent and confning stereotypes of feminised roles. And the absence of role 
models and gender-balanced initiatives make moving up the ranks more chal-
lenging for women than men. 
Barrier: Gender bias and gender stereotyping 
Since transportation is presently such a gender-unbalanced industry, Turnbull 
(2013) emphasises that it is neither attractive nor welcoming to women. For this 
to change, the masculinist culture of the industry must be dismantled and career 
opportunities within the transportation industry must be publicised more directly 
to women. Women who do work in the transportation industry are routinely 
underestimated or discounted because of gender-based stereotypes. Of course, 
women are keenly aware of this and will often forgo applying for certain types 
of jobs, for example those involving feldwork, because they know gender stereo-
types will work against them. This explains, at least partially, why more women 
in these industries end up in administrative and clerical jobs rather than techni-
cal ones (APGST, 2017). Turnbull (2013) emphasises that social attitudes play 
a large part in discouraging women from pursuing careers in these felds when he 
writes: 
the fact that sex discrimination has not disappeared from the world of work 
may be due, in part, to a lack of political commitment and – in some contexts 
– legal laxity, but the underlying cause remains embedded in social attitudes. 
Thus, women in construction are either ridiculed as masculine or they are caught 
between expected roles and stereotypes – such as being treated as sexual objects 
or labelled as lesbian for choosing a more masculine feld to work in (Moir Et al., 
2011). Clearly, this issue highlights much broader gender inequities and prob-
lematic social attitudes based on misunderstandings and misperceptions about 
gender. 
The transportation industry is frequently referred to in the literature as hav-
ing a work culture and environment that include risks of sexual harassment and 
isolation. Turnbull (2013) traces the primary causes of women’s low participation 
in the transportation sector to working conditions and argues that working time, 
shift work (24/7) and location of employment (i.e. at sea, driving long distances 
from home) are often unappealing to women (especially those with childcare or 
eldercare responsibilities) and the transportation sector may not only be unwel-
coming, but hostile towards women. However, it is important to remember that 
although such factors may, to some extent, explain women’s underrepresentation 
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in transportation or construction employment, many women may already work in 
less-than-optimal environments for much less pay than they would make in the 
construction or transportation industry. Given the option, some women would 
probably prefer to work in construction or transportation simply because of the 
potential to earn higher wages. Because of persistent and entrenched male-biased 
norms in these industries, even women who are able and willing to work may not 
be given the option to choose between diffcult or dangerous working conditions 
with low pay and similar conditions with higher pay (McKee, 2014; Carpenter 
Et al., 2017). Instead, women are assumed not to want to work in such jobs and 
tracked into feminised occupations in administrative and support services within 
these sectors. The fact that women’s careers can be adversely affected by ‘benevo-
lent sexism’ has also been documented in other sectors of employment (Dizik, 
2016). 
Barrier: Male-biased work culture and working conditions 
It is impossible to neatly demarcate the barriers and opportunities women face in 
entering the construction and transportation sectors, from those that infuence 
their decision to leave or remain. Turnbull (2013) analysed the barriers women 
face in the transportation industry using the career-cycle model. He identifed 
issues women faced at every stage of career: attraction, selection, retention, inter-
ruption, re-entry and realisation. Attraction to the transport sector comes from 
exposure at school, home and community which he argues is ‘heavily infuenced 
by the HR policies of transport organisations (e.g. corporate image, commitment 
to equal opportunities) and societal values (e.g. prevailing views on what consti-
tutes “men’s work” and “women’s work”’. Most departures (resignations and dis-
missals) in the transportation industry appear to occur within the frst fve years 
of employment. Therefore, women’s initial experiences – how they are welcomed 
and treated, and whether they are supported and promoted – are critical. 
Women in these sectors tend to leave work more frequently after maternity 
leave than at any other point in their careers (Baruah, 2018). Success in the 
retention of female employees, especially in the aftermath of interruptions for 
childbearing or other caring work, appears to be dependent both on the support 
of the organisation and the support of co-workers. Attitudes of male co-workers 
were deemed particularly important in retaining women after career interruptions. 
While studying the transportation sector, Peter Turnbull distinguished between 
gender-specifc barriers, such as stereotypes about men’s and women’s work, 
and gender-intensifed barriers, such as the absence of working arrangements to 
accommodate childcare and other reproductive responsibilities. Gender-specifc 
barriers tend to interact with gender-intensifed barriers in infuencing women’s 
decisions to leave these sectors. An example that was presented frequently in 
the literature was the double standard women faced when they returned to work 
after parental leave. While men who took parental leave were welcomed back to 
work and often valourised for their commitment to parenting, women were more 
likely to fnd their commitment to work being implicitly or explicitly questioned, 
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to be taken less seriously by colleagues and superiors and to feel that they were 
no longer competitive or competent in their positions (Baruah, 2018). Such fnd-
ings shed light upon why ostensibly gender-neutral institutions have differential 
effects upon women and men. Feminist institutionalist approaches are used to 
answer questions about power inequalities, mechanisms of continuity, and the 
gendered limits of change (see e.g. the introduction to this volume). Feminist 
institutionalist literature emphasises that it is crucial to identify how informal 
norms and behaviours interact with formal institutions and policies in order to 
understand wider processes of continuity and change as well as variable outcomes 
for women and men (Krook and Mackay, 2010). 
Arcand (2016) arrives at similar fndings about women’s experiences in the 
construction industry: 
Women tend to enter the industry with fewer skills than their male counter-
parts, not having access to informal networks commonly used to fnd work, 
being let go once diversity quotas have been met, and encountering hostile 
work environments and sexual harassment on the job. 
The fact that informal networking is still the norm rather than the exception for 
seeking apprenticeships and employment in the trades is identifed repeatedly 
as a barrier to women’s entry into and advancement in these felds (National 
Women’s Law Centre, 2014). Thus, female construction workers refer (not face-
tiously) to their inability to access FBI (friends, brothers and in-laws) networks 
as a major impediment in gaining full-time employment in the trades (National 
Women’s Law Centre, 2014). Gender-disaggregated data on the number of new 
registrations in apprenticeship programmes in Canada paint a stark picture. In 
2015, for example, there were just 66 women enrolled as machinists, compared 
to 1,545 men. There were 54 women registered as sheet metal workers, compared 
to 1,476 men (Smith, 2017). The need for policies aimed at enabling fair and 
equitable access to apprenticeships is urgent and critical for promoting equity in 
these sectors. 
Barrier: Concerns about sexual harassment and violence against 
women 
Violence against women transport workers is frequently reported as a factor limit-
ing women’s ability or willingness to seek and keep transportation jobs (Turnbull, 
2013). Moir Et al. (2011) emphasise the same about the construction industry. 
They suggest that because construction work is carried out autonomously or with 
minimal supervision and often in dark corners, trenches, and small or secluded 
spaces, there are concerns about safety, especially for female workers. The Health 
and Safety of Women in Construction (HASWIC) Workgroup reported that 
88% of female construction workers surveyed had experienced sexual harassment 
at work (Moir Et al., 2011). The immediate safety risks for women can certainly 




















150 Baruah and Biskupski-Mujanovic
pairs, for example) but eliminating violence against women will require much 
deeper and more proactive engagement with the social structures and power rela-
tions that sustain and reproduce it. We found very little engagement in the lit-
erature on construction and transportation with the structural causes of violence 
against women. 
As more jobs are created in these sectors due to the transition to low-carbon 
economies, equitable representation of women in transportation and construc-
tion is becoming even more important. In Canada, women’s employment in the 
transportation industry ranges between 22% and 25% while women’s employ-
ment in the overall labour force is 48% (APGST, 2017). The lowest employment 
rate for women is in rail and truck transportation, 13% and 14% respectively, 
while the postal service and air transportation have the highest representation of 
women, at 50% and 39%, respectively. Canada will create 200,000 new jobs in 
the construction industry over the next decade but women only account for 4% 
of new registrants in the construction trades (Status of Women Canada, 2017). 
Retroftting and upgrading residential buildings will make up a third of projected 
global green jobs (Sustainlabour, 2009). Additionally, the transportation sec-
tor is expected to contribute substantially to green growth through fuel-effcient 
vehicles, new infrastructure and public transport. 
Opportunities 
We found wages in construction and transportation to be more gender-equitable
than wages in other sectors of the economy. For example, women in construction
earn 98 cents for every dollar earned by a man compared to earning just 75 cents
for every dollar earned by a man in the personal care and services feld (Arcand,
2016). The gender wage gap can be narrowed further by encouraging women’s
participation in construction and other non-traditional occupations. Hegewisch
and O’Farrell (2015) argue that women may be especially valuable in green con-
struction because of their higher interest in environmental issues compared to
men. They write that in the US and Canada women represent more than one
in fve environmental engineers, but only one in eight civil engineers. The same
study reports that people who are already employed in the traditional construction
industry can access training in green construction skills quite easily. Since women
are a minority in the traditional construction sector, their ability to access green
construction training is signifcantly weaker than their male counterparts. Most
women who are in the traditional construction sector in North America indicated
that green training and work is part of their construction trade and not a separate
route into the trades. This highlights the need to infuence equity practices in the
traditional construction sector and not just in green construction. Thus, our fnd-
ings from Canada echo those of Clarke and Sahin-Dikmen (in this volume) from
the European Union, who emphasise that there is scant evidence to suggest that
gender has even entered mainstream green transition approaches in construction. 
In a report about good practices for the construction sector, Peters and 
Katalytik (2011) emphasise that companies with more women on their boards 
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fare better than their rivals, with a 42% higher return on sales, 66% higher return 
on invested capital and 53% higher return on equity. This data should encourage 
employers not just to recruit women for entry-level positions but also to make 
the effort to retain and promote them to leadership positions. Better gender bal-
ance in male-dominated professions has been demonstrated to contribute to the 
improvement of working conditions for both men and women, with positive 
effects on wellbeing, work culture and productivity. A respectful workplace is a 
workers’ issue, not just a women’s issue (Kong, 2020). 
There is tremendous potential in Canada, and globally, to create and optimise 
livelihoods for women in transportation and construction. However, women can 
gain optimal traction from employment in these felds only within the context 
of wider socially progressive pro-women policies, as well as more transformative 
shifts in societal attitudes about gender roles. This is as true for developing coun-
tries and emerging economies as it is for industrialised nations (Baruah, 2016). 
The green transition in these two sectors should beneft both women and men, 
but policy-makers must be proactive about enabling women to establish a stronger 
equity stake to compensate for historical and contemporary economic injustices 
and unequal outcomes. This will require more concrete and proactive actions and 
policies. As evidenced by our fndings from Canada, simply creating opportuni-
ties for training and employment in new felds and suggesting that women are 
not unwelcome in them is not enough (Baruah and Biskupski-Mujanovic, 2018). 
Blind spots and oversights about employment equity in the green 
transition in Canada 
Some of the challenges faced by women in transportation and construction may 
be exacerbated by blind spots and oversights in the green transition in Canada. 
Planning and implementing measures for employment equity in the green econ-
omy is critical for Canada. Most green initiatives in Canada have been driven 
by the private sector, municipalities and provincial governments. The federal 
government has, at least until very recently, not played an active role in fram-
ing and implementing effective policies to enable the transition to a low-carbon 
economy. Despite growing evidence of the potential for the green economy to 
generate a larger volume of employment than the ‘brown’ (fossil fuel–based) 
economy, even organisations committed to advocating for equity and social 
justice in environmental sustainability in Canada have never specifcally men-
tioned or addressed gender inequity. As an example, the One Million Climate 
Jobs Campaign – an alliance of labour, social movements and other civil society 
organisations in Canada – is mobilising for practical solutions to the threat of 
climate change. Although the campaign claims to place the interests of workers 
and the poor at the forefront of strategies to combat climate change and demands 
that governments work to create ‘one million climate jobs’, it makes no men-
tion whatsoever of the importance of addressing gender inequity. Reports that do 
highlight opportunities to employ underrepresented groups, including women, in 
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required to ensure gender equity (see, for example, Blue Green Canada, 2012; 
Katz, 2012). We found more evidence in such reports for calls for equity meas-
ures to improve the representation of other underrepresented groups in Canada, 
namely, workers with disabilities and Indigenous peoples, than for improved rep-
resentation of women. 
It is diffcult to identify straightforward explanations for why gender inequality
has not permeated the public or policy consciousness in the transition to a green
economy in Canada. The conversation about gender issues in the green economy
has been much more prominent in the context of developing countries (see, for
example, ILO, 2011; IUCN, 2011; UN Women, 2012), where the gender gaps in
education and employment may be more prominent and visible. The lack of atten-
tion paid to gender equity in the green economy in Canada and other industrialised
countries may be a result of the assumption that because women and girls increas-
ingly enjoy parity with men and boys in educational opportunities and employ-
ment, they cannot possibly be underrepresented or marginalised in some sectors.
The fact that women represent more than 50% of university students and almost
half – 48% – of the labour force in Canada (Statistics Canada, 2019) may have
obscured their extreme underrepresentation and marginalisation in traditionally
masculinist trades and occupations. Several authors have also noted that popular
mythologies about Canada being a ‘post-gender’ and ‘post-racial’ society often end
up encouraging complacency among policy-makers and defecting attention away
from persistent social, economic, and political inequalities between Canadians
based on gender and race (Subramaniam, 2020). Recent developments such as
the COVID-19 pandemic in 2020 – which is being described as a ‘she-cession’
(Trichur, 2020) because of the disproportionate job losses in feminised sectors
such as retail and hospitality services compared to male-dominated industries such
as construction, transportation, and manufacturing (that are more easily adaptable
for social distancing requirements) – may lead to a reckoning that compels more
attention in the future to gender inequity in the green economy. 
Some of the most well-paid future green jobs in Canada will be in occupations
in which women are currently underrepresented, such as engineering and the
skilled trades (Katz, 2012). A Statistics Canada study found that in 2007 women
only accounted for 1–2% of completions in apprenticeship training in major trade
groups (McMullen Et al., 2010). In 2018, women made up only 18% of newly
licensed engineering graduates in Canada (Engineers Canada, 2020). According
to a 2016 report by the Canadian Apprenticeship Forum (CAF-FCA), in
2012 women accounted for only 14.2% of all registrations in the trades. However,
most women in the trades are employed in the feminised service sectors, includ-
ing some green trades (as bakers, hairstylists, nail technicians, and pet groomers,
for example), not in the male-dominated manufacturing and construction trades
– especially those governed by the Red Seal Interprovincial Standards Program.
Red Seal tradespeople have been trained to the same standards across the country,
allowing them to move more easily between provinces. In fact, women’s represen-
tation in many trades – including as automotive service technicians, electricians,
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to women of colour. The same CAF-FCA report says, ‘nearly half of Red Seal
trades have no visible minority women, and the other half only between one and
12%’ (quoted in Kong, 2020). Since tradespeople have been known to transi-
tion from jobs in the ‘brown’ economy (which is heavily male-dominated) to the
‘green’ (Baruah and Gaudet, 2016), it seems inevitable that women will also be
underrepresented in green jobs unless gender equity in employment is planned
and implemented proactively. Recent media reports confrm this trend, indicating
that 25% of students studying to be wind turbine technicians in Alberta, Canada,
were once oil and gas workers (Canadian Press, 2017), and that laid-off oil and
gas workers in Alberta are using their unemployment benefts to retrain and fnd
employment in the clean energy sector (Bickis, 2016). 
The conversation about gender equity or social justice (more broadly) in 
Canada’s green economy is at best incipient and tokenistic. Raising awareness is, 
therefore, urgent and critical. In 2016, the OECD reported that although Canada 
performs better than the OECD average for the gender employment gap (6.1% 
compared to 11.7%), the gender wage gap is above the OECD average (19% 
compared to 15.5% overall). Not only does Canada have a large gender wage gap, 
but women are severely underrepresented in all green growth sectors (Thirgood 
Et al., 2017). The types of policies and programmes put in place by governments 
and corporations will promote or impede opportunities for women. Although 
employment in the green economy in Canada is a growing topic of research and 
policy engagement, the need to promote gender equity in green jobs is rarely a 
topic of conversation. For example, the One Million Climate Jobs campaign pro-
poses a 5% investment of the annual federal budget in renewable energy, energy 
effciency and public transportation in order to create one million new jobs while 
reducing greenhouse gas emissions by 25–35%. Although this campaign discusses 
the types of jobs that will be created through such an effort quite extensively, 
there is no explicit or even subtle mention of employment equity. 
A 2015 report prepared by the Steering Committee of the Green Economy 
Network in Canada identifes priority areas to stimulate the transition to a green 
economy, including a renewable energy development strategy, improved energy 
effciency of homes and buildings, and expanded public transit. The report 
emphasises that millions of new decent jobs would be created by transitioning to 
a green economy. In order to ensure social equity, this report suggests creating a 
transition fund to assist workers displaced by the phasing out of fossil fuel produc-
tion, to promote affrmative action for members of marginalised communities, 
and to enable consultation with Indigenous peoples. Among the suggested equity 
measures, there is no mention of gender and no consideration of the underrep-
resentation of women in the industries that will help Canada reduce greenhouse 
gas emissions. 
Promising policies and programmes in Canada 
In 2019, the Canadian Apprenticeship Forum (CAF-FCA) published a labour 
market report that showed that from 2019 to 2023 an estimated 67,000 new 
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certifed workers will be required to sustain workforce certifcation levels across 
the ten largest Red Seal trades in Canada. Keeping pace with the demand for 
skills and workforce certifcation will require attracting 167,739 new apprentices 
over the next fve years (Kong, 2020). This will not be possible or sustainable 
without concrete efforts to bring in populations that are currently severely under-
represented: namely women, Indigenous peoples, and people with disabilities. 
Despite evidence of severe skill shortages in construction and transportation, 
and adequate knowledge about the barriers to entry and retention for women 
(described in a previous section of this chapter), we did not fnd much evidence to 
suggest that concerted effort was being made in Canada, especially at the federal 
level, to design policies or to establish targets to attract and recruit more women 
to the trades. As with the invisibility of gender issues during the green transition, 
it appears that the tremendous gains made by Canadian women in post-secondary 
education and the labour market in recent decades may have obscured the fact 
that they remain severely underrepresented in the trades. There is some evidence 
of trade schools and educational institutions trying to alleviate fnancial barriers 
women may face. Conestoga College’s School of Engineering and Technology, 
for example, provides free training for women in the skilled trades. These are 
called pre-apprenticeship programmes since they provide basic training that pre-
pares women for entering a trade and securing an apprenticeship (Kong, 2020). 
The Centre for Skills Development and Training, which has fve locations 
in the province of Ontario offers resources for women looking to enter the resi-
dential construction industry with its Women in Skilled Trades (WIST) pro-
gramme. Women learn about tools, energy star building practices, the building 
code, and marketing and communications. Pre-apprenticeship programmes that 
provide women with fexible childcare, fnancial aid, and wraparound supports, 
from counselling to subsidies for equipment and boots, also help. Something as 
simple as providing women with safety clothing can make a difference since there 
are safety hazards for women working in men’s clothing. 
There is also some evidence of efforts aimed at addressing other challenges 
women face in transportation and construction. In most instances, the efforts are 
driven by provincial and municipal governments, non-proft organisations, and 
private sector companies. For example, violence against women has been identi-
fed as a barrier for women’s equitable access to and employment in public transit. 
The city of Toronto has initiated the Metropolitan Toronto Action Committee 
on Violence against Women and Children (METRAC), a collaborative relation-
ship formed by community-based women’s organisations, the Toronto Transit 
Commission, and the Toronto Police Department, to conduct safety audits of the 
city’s transport system. The Toronto Transit Commission (TTC) has a mandate 
to staff its workforce with ‘employees as diverse as the riders it serves’ (McIntyre, 
2015). The City of Toronto’s benchmark for women’s employment in transporta-
tion in 48.7%. While women account for 57% of ridership, they only accounted 
for 15% of its workforce in 2014. To respond to this unimpressive number, the 
TTC has introduced the Diversity and Inclusion Lens and Toolkit to guide 
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and initiatives on diverse employees and customers’ (TTC, 2017). The toolkit 
includes a guide to inclusive language on disability, race, ethnicity, Indigenous 
peoples, gender, gender identity, and gender expression, sexual orientation, and 
LGBTQ+. One guideline from the toolkit states: ‘Avoid making assumptions 
based on stereotypes/unconscious biases, such as assuming clerks are female, or 
assuming mechanics are male’. 
Some provincial governments in Canada have also made efforts to improve 
employment equity in construction and transportation. For example, the govern-
ment of Alberta began an outreach initiative called ‘Women in Non-traditional 
Occupations: Stories to Inspire’ to make role models visible for women. This initi-
ative reaches out to women who are interested in, but wary of, careers in non-tra-
ditional occupations by sharing stories of how successful women addressed issues 
of feminised stereotypes, attitudes of men, physical requirements, and assumed 
incompetence for non-traditional work (Alberta Human Services, 2013). Also, 
in the same province, the Alberta Council of Turnaround Industry Maintenance 
Stakeholders (ACTIMS), which includes oil sands owners, heavy industrial 
maintenance contractors and labour providers run the Women in Trades Awards/ 
Bursaries Program to recognise female members of the Canadian Building Trades 
and to create awareness about opportunities for women in the skilled trades. Each 
year, this organisation provides three recipients with $1,500 (one for any woman 
Journeyman,2 and two for apprentices). Although the intent of the project is 
laudable, ACTIMS should take note of the power of language in their quest to 
combat women’s underrepresentation in the feld; ‘woman Journeyman’ is not as 
inclusive as ‘journeywoman’ or ‘journeyperson’. 
In British Columbia, Cohen and Braid (2000) conducted research on the
Vancouver Island Highway Project (VIHP) and its efforts to integrate women
and Indigenous communities as part of its commitment to equity initiatives. They
found that at its peak production periods, the equity hires constituted more than
20% of the workforce, ten times higher than usual. Women’s participation in the
project reached 6.5% and Indigenous workers reached 7.5% (9% and 11% at peak
times, respectively). Further, 93% of the workforce consisted of local hires. The
equity provisions in this programme had support at the highest levels, including
from the Premier of British Columbia, and they were continually monitored and
supported by women’s groups and Indigenous peoples’ organisations on Vancouver
Island. The local community strongly supported the initiative since local hires
dominated the workforce of the project and all labour on the VIHP was union-
ised. Initially, few members of the targeted equity groups applied but recruitment
practices were changed as a result. Active recruitment on Indigenous reserves and
in women’s centres was a remedy to this barrier and the interview process was
even adjusted to consider volunteer or other non-paid labour as work experience.
Cohen and Baird note that the workplace culture on the VIHP project changed
over time. Female workers were frequently reported to have better attitudes and
work ethic. The project also had an Employment Equity Coordinator, whose role
was to advocate for employment equity, and an Equity Integration Committee,
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Another example of a Canadian provincial programme that encourages wom-
en’s employment in transportation is in Newfoundland and Labrador, where the 
Offce to Advance Women Apprentices offers a wage subsidy of up to 75% for 
two contracts as an incentive for employers to hire female apprentices. However, 
we were unable to fnd any evidence to understand what happens to these wom-
en’s careers once the subsidy runs out. Speaking more broadly about fndings from 
this research project, we found very little information about the long-term sus-
tainability or outcomes of gender equity initiatives in construction and transpor-
tation. Future research should address the long-term impact of these programmes, 
identifying where there is room for improvement, providing detailed documenta-
tion of what has worked well and what has not, and evaluating the potential to 
scale up successful initiatives at the provincial or national level. 
The non-proft sector in Canada has also driven some equity initiatives, 
sometimes in partnership with provincial and municipal governments. For 
example, Building Up and BUILD Inc. are two non-proft social enterprises that 
offer employment and training in the construction trade to those with barriers 
to employment (i.e. visible minorities, those with criminal records, high school 
dropouts). Building Up is based in Toronto. It provides energy and water retro-
fts in affordable housing while employing those living in poverty, often from 
within the public housing units they live in. Building Up calls itself a ‘social 
contractor’ and specifcally trains and employs those with the most barriers to 
employment. They offer 16-week paid apprenticeships and 90% of their gradu-
ates go on to full-time employment in the skilled trades. BUILD Inc. partners 
with Manitoba Hydro (the provincial utility company) to improve insulation in 
low-income housing to reduce carbon emissions and to lower utility bills. They 
offer a six-month paid training programme for those who ‘would often be deemed 
unemployable’. BUILD Inc. also offers life skills, vocational training, and reme-
dial education on topics such as math and money management. Although there 
is no explicit focus on gender, there is a very clear mandate to work with those 
who have the most signifcant barriers to employment, often including women 
and Indigenous workers. 
The record of trade unions and industry associations in Canada has been
somewhat erratic in promoting employment equity. For example, Canada’s
Building Trades Union (CBTU) released a report in July 2017, the frst original
study on the impacts of Canada’s transition to low-carbon development upon
the construction industry. The report identifes new employment opportunities
that will emerge if Canada meets its commitment to the 2015 Paris Agreement.
The report contained no sex-disaggregated data and no mention of women, gen-
der, or equity. It proposes that moving to an electrical supply grid would result
in over 1.75 million jobs but fails to consider who might get these jobs and who
might be left out. Despite such glaring oversights, CBTU does run Women in
the Building Trades, an initiative that promotes creating ‘the space for con-
versation on how to engage women’ in construction. The initiative focuses on
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‘Build Together’, a Canadian national programme focused on the recruit-
ment and retention of workers from underrepresented portions of the popula-
tion, has compiled a list of suggestions for what a union or employer can do in 
order to attract women to the construction sector. Their recommendations to 
unions and other representative organisations for building a more inclusive and 
diverse construction sector include training for diversity and respectful work-
places, putting pressure on industry leaders to promote inclusivity, mentorship 
programmes, networking and conferences to build community and ease isolation, 
ensuring proper safety equipment and gear for women, fexible hours to navigate 
childcare and family needs, and starting a women’s committee. Unions and other 
organisations that represent workers do have the opportunity and responsibility 
to play an important role in promoting women’s employment in transportation 
and construction. With 80% of female apprentices participating in union-spon-
sored programmes, union apprenticeship programmes have had greater success at 
recruiting women and ensuring completion of training than non-unionised pro-
grammes (Arcand, 2016). However, as several researchers writing about unions 
have pointed out (see, for example, Baker and Robeson, 1981) unions are often 
themselves masculinist organisations that have historically ignored women and 
other socially marginalised groups. Depending on the setting, unions may be in 
as much need of institutional reform as other organisations. 
Conclusion 
In Canada, women make up only 23% and 12%, respectively, of those employed
in transportation and construction. Concerns about climate change and fossil
fuel insecurity have ensured that there is signifcant interest in the technolo-
gies and fnancing for transitioning to a low-carbon economy, but far too little
attention is being paid in Canada to the employment equity implications of
such a transition. Although we intended to specifcally collect data on women’s
employment in green or low-carbon transportation and construction, we found
that most of the available data and information on employment is from the
‘brown’ or traditional (fossil fuel–based) forms of these sectors. We found very
few specifc examples of women’s inclusion in employment in green transpor-
tation and construction, which supports a major fnding from this study that
gender equality (or employment equity, more broadly) has not been meaning-
fully addressed or even considered in mainstream green transition policies and
practices in Canada. 
In the absence of appropriately targeted training, education, apprenticeships, 
employment placement, fnancial tools, and supportive social policies, transition-
ing to a green economy may exacerbate existing gender inequities and social 
hierarchies. This chapter synthesised and assembled existing scientifc and prac-
titioner literature on promising programmes and policies for promoting and opti-
mising women’s employment in two sectors that are critical for the Canadian 
green economy and in which women are currently severely underrepresented, 
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currently signifcant gender inequities in employment trends in these sectors in 
Canada. 
Our fndings suggest that people who are already employed in the traditional 
(fossil fuel–based) versions of these industries can access green skills and training 
more easily than people who have never worked in these sectors. Since women 
are severely underrepresented in the traditional construction and transport sec-
tors, their ability to access green skills and training is signifcantly weaker than 
men. Further, our fndings confrm that although green training is part of the 
existing trades in these sectors, it does not presently constitute a separate route 
into them. This highlights the need to infuence and implement equity practices 
in the traditional construction and transport sectors in order to ensure equitable 
representation of women in the low-carbon iterations of these industries. 
Most existing equity initiatives in Canada in these two sectors have been 
driven by the private sector, municipalities, and provincial governments. The 
federal government has, at least until very recently, not played an active role in 
framing and implementing effective policies to enable the transition to a green 
economy. Canada has been hindered in this regard by a political structure that 
divides responsibility for policies related to climate and energy between the fed-
eral government and the provinces. This has led to a patchwork of policies at 
the provincial level exacerbated by an absence of federal leadership on the issue. 
The current Liberal federal government has made more explicit commitments to 
a green economy and climate change mitigation. But there has been virtually no 
effort from the federal government to initiate policies on employment equity in 
the transition to a green economy. The federal government must play a stronger 
leadership role in implementing employment equity policies in order to motivate 
and optimise the efforts of other actors in the green economy. 
Our fndings highlight the need for a collective and cohesive national strat-
egy that has measurable outcomes and actual numerical targets monitoring
to improve women’s access to, and retention, in the growing green economy.
Since women are already underrepresented and marginalised in key sectors of
the green economy, growth in green industries may further exclude women
if proactive measures are not adopted. McFarland (2013) argues that given
women’s current pattern of participation in jobs and training in the trades,
almost none of the green jobs we expect to be created would go to women. She
stresses the dire need for equity programmes and quotas that are monitored
and enforced. In addition to federal and provincial leadership on policy issues,
Canada needs all stakeholders, including federal, provincial, and municipal
governments, civil society organisations, corporations, labour associations,
public policy institutes, and think-tanks to work together to ensure that women
are not further marginalised as more green jobs are created in transportation
and construction. 
While emphasising the need for effective policy interventions to ensure 
employment equity in the transition to low-carbon economies, our fndings sug-
gest that even well-planned and well-designed policy interventions may not ade-
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place. Most policies designed to address women’s underrepresentation in these 
felds tend to be reactive responses that do not engage adequately with structural 
social, economic, and political inequality. Improving the lighting in construction 
sites in order to prevent sexual assaults against women and requiring women to 
work in pairs instead of alone are classic examples of reactive policies that have 
already been adopted by some employers but that may, ironically, end up rein-
forcing and institutionalising gendered social hierarchies rather than challenging 
them (Connell, 1990; Krook and MacKay, 2010). We found that the most com-
mon response to women’s underrepresentation in these felds has been to ‘add 
women and stir’, simply adding women to industries with unchanged masculinist 
values and work cultures (Harding, 1995). Policy responses also often reinforce 
affrmative gender essentialisms. Women tend to be valourised in essentialist ways 
that reinforce existing social hierarchies. For example, assumptions that women 
are gentler with machinery than men and therefore maintain machinery better or 
that women bring specifc valuable qualities and skills (empathy, patience) to the 
job simply by being women reinforce social hierarchies since most women acquire 
these skills because of historical and current social oppression and not because 
they are biologically female. 
Our fndings suggest that although the formal realm of law and policy can and 
does play a signifcant role in optimising women’s employment and retention 
in the labour force, legislation, and policy cannot be the sole vehicles for social 
change because they are not enough to alter entrenched gender roles, social hier-
archies and entitlements. Consciousness-raising initiatives that raise awareness 
among women, as well as men, about the benefts of greater equity and women’s 
equal entitlements to employment in all felds are as crucial as policy reforms 
and state or corporate actions that protect women’s interests and facilitate their 
agency. 
Notes 
1 The energy sector, which is both critical for the green economy and in which women 
are also extremely marginalised, is not included in this chapter because we have 
already published extensively on this topic elsewhere (see, for example, Baruah, 2016; 
Baruah and Gaudet, 2016). 
2 ‘Journeyman’ is a term used in Canada to describe a skilled tradesperson who has suc-
cessfully completed an offcial apprenticeship qualifcation. 
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10 Why radical transformation is 
necessary for gender equality 
and a zero carbon European 
construction sector 
Linda Clarke and Melahat Sahin-Dikmen 
Introduction 
Under capitalism, the domination and exploitation of labour are inseparable 
from those of nature (Parsons, 1977), and there is perhaps no sector where this 
is more apparent than in construction, an industry with often poor working and 
employment conditions and one responsible for a high proportion of carbon emis-
sions, including through extensive use of cement (Bataille, 2019). Construction 
is also a male-dominated industry where it has proved very diffcult to improve 
women’s historically low levels of participation, averaging around 10% in Europe 
although varying between countries and occupations. This chapter identifes 
both the constraints involved in meeting zero energy targets and those that have 
served to exclude women. It seeks to show why and how incorporating women’s 
interests and experiences will help to ensure equitable outcomes and contribute 
signifcantly to the successful transformation of the construction sector into an 
eco-industry. 
The climate emergency has highlighted many of the weaknesses of the indus-
try, in particular the priorities of healthy and safe employment and working con-
ditions, and together with the 2020 arrival of a coronavirus crisis, these have 
prompted an urgent, long-overdue drive for change. Construction is a sector set 
to gain more employment than any other from the transition to a green economy 
through policies and programmes for nearly zero energy building (NZEB), renew-
able energy installations and retroft across Europe (ILO, 2018). This opens up 
opportunities for women and, at the same time, for overcoming the structural, 
organisational and cultural obstacles to their inclusion. However, the pursuit of 
the European Union’s (EU), green transition policy for the built environment 
is focused on ecologically modernising an industry without addressing the social 
relations and structures that characterise the sector and hinder its ability to 
reduce carbon emissions (Foster, 2002; Hampton, 2015; Lundström, 2018). At 
the same time, the mainstream approach to achieving gender equality in the sec-
tor is narrowly focused on recruiting more women and similarly fails to address 
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The chapter begins by outlining women’s participation in construction and 
approaches to addressing gender inequalities. Also drawing on the experiences of 
women themselves, the reasons for the failure of policies and practices to improve 
the participation of women are pinpointed, both in the vocational education 
and training (VET) system and the labour market. There follows a review of the 
EU’s policy to reduce carbon emissions associated with the built environment, 
revealing its premises and consequent gender blindness and lack of attention 
to the social aspects of building production. The crucial importance of address-
ing these for effectively implementing the European Performance of Buildings 
Directive (EPBD) is then addressed, both in relation to VET and the labour pro-
cess requirements for low energy construction (LEC). Finally, examples of good 
practice are presented, highlighting the role of different stakeholders and point-
ing to what is required for gender-sensitive, equitable, and socially sustainable 
employment in a green construction sector. The chapter concludes by suggesting 
that a comprehensive retroft and new-build NZEB programme can be the means 
of transforming the industry to become socially useful and carbon-neutral, driven 
by social concerns and involving women and their representative organisations 
in shaping institutional strategies at all levels. 
Why are so few women found in the construction sector? 
Women’s participation in the construction sector is low across Europe, averaging 
10% in 2018 and ranging from 13% in Germany and Austria, 11% in the UK and 
10% in France down to only 7% in Denmark and Greece and 6% in Italy, Poland, 
Romania and Ireland (ECSO, 2020). These fgures include, however, both those 
in the professions and in the operative workforce and participation is higher for 
the professions, as apparent from Table 10.1, particularly in Eastern European 
countries. Women represented 43% of graduates from engineering, manufac-
turing and construction in Poland and 37% in Romania, in contrast to central 
Table 10.1 Graduates in engineering, manufacturing and construction 2018 
Country Number Number Total % of women % women 
of women of men graduating employed in narrow 
graduating graduating construction sector 
Denmark 2,607  7,188  9,795 27 7.2 
France 2,512 84,421 110,933 24 9.6 
Germany 26,379 94,449 120,828 22 12.8 
Italy 19,415 42,014  61,429 32 5.9 
Norway 1,846  5,458  7,304 25 
Poland 29,049 39,321  68,371 43 6.3 
Romania  7,997 13,622  21,619 37 6.2 
Switzerland  2,276 11,801  14,077 16 
UK 18,136 55,953  74,090 25 10.7 
Sources: Eurostat (2018), ECSO (2020) Improving the human capital basis, European Construction 
Sector Observatory: 28 
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European countries, Scandinavian countries and the UK at between 22% and 
27%, with only Italy faring better at 32% and Switzerland worse at 16%. Across 
Europe, too, Eurostat fgures on female engineering workers employed as a share 
of the total engineering workforce show relatively high proportions, including in 
Bulgaria (30%); Slovenia, Poland and Italy (20%); Belgium and Hungary (19%), 
Spain (17%); and Germany, Ireland and Finland (15%) (Clarke et al., 2015). 
And in the UK, a signifcant proportion of women is found in technical positions 
in construction (24%), such as quality assurance technicians (39%) and quality 
control and planning engineers (19.1%) (Clarke et al., 2019). 
Of those employed in the energy sector, 22% are women and these are gener-
ally in lower paid and not managerial jobs, though there is an increasing require-
ment for those with scientifc knowledge and specialist expertise (EIGE, 2016a). 
In the renewables sector, too, though women are estimated to represent 35% of 
those employed across Europe, in Germany, Italy and Spain they hold less than 
30% of jobs, most of which are similarly low paid, non-technical, or adminis-
trative rather than technical, managerial, or involving policy-making (IRENA, 
2019). Occupations belonging to the operative workforce in the renewables sec-
tor, many of which are construction, tend to be heavily male-dominated, includ-
ing metal workers, insulation specialists, plumbers, pipeftters, electricians and 
heating and cooling experts (Clancy and Feenstra, 2019). 
Though there has been more progress in the professions, what is surprising 
concerning the participation of women in the construction operative workforce 
is the shockingly slow or non-existent pace of change. In 2016, only 3% of those 
employed across the EU were women (Eurostat, 2016), a fgure that has remained 
relatively stable, apart from during the world wars, for well over a century. The 
reasons for this poor representation have been well-researched and are gener-
ally attributed to: structural, organisational and cultural obstacles, including 
the lack of formalised recruitment practices and procedures and inappropriate 
selection criteria; employment conditions, in particular the fragmented nature 
of employment and lack of support and work–life balance possibilities; infexible 
and hazardous working conditions, such as long working hours and inappropriate 
equipment; and less tangible obstacles, such as the lack of knowledge and poor 
image of the sector, traditional stereotypes, sexist attitudes and a male-dominated 
culture, network, and environment (Fielden et al., 2000; Clarke et al., 2004, 
2015; Worrall et al., 2010; Sang and Powell, 2013; Baruah, 2018; Clancy and 
Feenstra, 2019). In terms of ability, however, equal competence has been shown 
(e.g. Arditi et al., 2013). 
The most pervasive reason for exclusion is the working conditions, above 
all the long working hours, both on sites and in the professions (Watts, 2009; 
Styhre, 2011; Caren and Astor, 2013). Indeed, in a ‘virtual’ meeting with women 
working in construction from the USA and different European countries held 
during the coronavirus pandemic, working conditions, above all related to health 
and safety, were the dominant source of complaint, including shift hours, lack 
of washing, toilet and changing facilities and of personal protective equipment 
suitable for women, social distancing, site cleansing and risk assessments. The 
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increasing fragmentation of the construction process through subcontracting 
and self-employment have also aggravated the exclusionary nature of the indus-
try, but its stubborn persistence, despite all the efforts to increase the number of 
women, suggests deeply embedded structural obstacles and a gendered division of 
labour that is unlikely to change without a social transformation. 
The solutions to greater female participation also vary, with much empha-
sis placed on corporate social responsibility and human resource management 
(HRM), including mentoring and networking (Clancy and Feenstra, 2019; 
ECSO, 2020). In addition to these, Worrall et al. (2020, p. 280), in a perfect 
illustration of ‘neo-liberal’ onus placed on women themselves to accommodate 
to male domination (Fraser, 2013; Rottenberg, 2018; Ferguson, 2020), advocate 
support systems and continuing professional development: 
providing women with the necessary ‘soft skills’ in communication, people 
management and confdence building that equips them to negotiate diffcult 
working environments and male-dominated organisational cultures. 
The remit of the unfortunately named EC-funded initiative, High heels: build-
ing opportunities for women in the construction sector (ECSO, 2020, p. 81), cover-
ing Bulgaria, Greece, Romania and Cyprus, follows this advice, seeking to train 
women to ‘strengthen their soft skills in order to improve the performance of the 
construction sector’. Such strategies, in their acceptance of gender discrimina-
tion, devalue women and fail to challenge – and even succeed in maintaining – 
the gendered nature of construction and engineering (Powell et al., 2009; Watts, 
2009). Other HRM-inspired solutions involve awareness-raising, including 
through training trainers in ‘gender sensitivity’ (ECSO, 2020, p. 81). As Clarke 
et al. (2018) argue, such employer-led, top–down, ‘business case’ approaches to 
achieving diversity in STEM occupations lack effectiveness through the absence 
of involvement from other stakeholders, especially employees and target groups, 
allowing only a fraction of diversity-related issues to be ‘visible’ in the organisa-
tion, while others remain ‘suppressed’. 
Stronger and more systematic solutions have been more successful, if only 
temporarily. These include targeted measures and monitoring and enforcement 
to improve access to and retention in green jobs, though too often employers 
meet procurement diversity requirements only to let women go as soon as the 
contract is secured (Baruah, 2018). Incremental measures are also proposed that 
seek to directly alleviate and improve working conditions for those women work-
ing in construction, including working in pairs and improved lighting. Overall, 
however, despite all the efforts over many decades, little has changed. As Baruah 
(2018, p. 3) complains, most policies are ‘reactive responses that do not engage 
adequately with broader societal structures and institutions that produce and 
maintain inequality’. Indeed, over two decades ago, Dainty et al. (1999) ques-
tioned efforts to increase the number of women in construction given that 
workplace practices were geared to men’s needs, including long working hours, 
geographical instability and the subordination of personal lives. They showed 
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how men progress in the industry vertically through networking and informal 
mechanisms, whilst women focus on coping with a male environment, and con-
cluded that the only way for women to further their careers was to leave. In rais-
ing doubts as to whether women should be attracted to an industry ‘ill-equipped 
for employing them’, therefore, Dainty et al. (1999, pp. 356–357) challenged 
existing measures and insisted that: 
It is only through a genuine commitment to the development of a more 
equitable industry from the highest level, that women are likely to be able to 
develop their careers in parity with men. 
But how does gender inequality in construction fare in policies formulated at the 
highest level in the EU today? Does gender feature in visions of a future sustain-
able industry? More specifcally for the purposes of this chapter, to what extent 
does the EU green transition policy for the built environment address gender 
inequalities? 
The EU energy-effciency policies and gender 
Being responsible for 36% of CO2 emissions and 40% of energy consumption, 
the built environment is targeted for a major transformation as part of EU climate 
change action plans, (EC, 2019a). The energy strategy up to 2020 is set out in 
EU2020 development plans and designed in accordance with Paris Agreement 
targets, aiming to reduce energy use, improve energy effciency and the use of 
renewable energy, each by 20%, compared to 1990 levels (EC, 2010). For 2021– 
2030, adaptation measures for the built environment are set out in Clean Energy 
for All Europeans (EC, 2019a). In the medium term, these include a package of 
initiatives with the aim of improving energy effciency by 32.5%, increasing the 
share of renewable energy by 32% and reducing CO2 emissions by 40% by 2030. 
It is planned to be progressed in tandem with the European Green Deal (EC, 
2019a), the EU’s strategic programme for implementing the UN’s 2030 Agenda. 
Improving the energy effciency of buildings is fundamental to achieving these 
targets and this is driven by the EPBD (2010, 2018), which requires that all new 
buildings are NZEB by the end of 2020. The EPBD provides the overarching 
legislative framework, setting out the technical defnition of NZEB and guidance 
for its implementation, whilst member states are responsible for its transposition 
into national law. Thus, although the exact technical specifcations vary, NZEB 
means higher energy performance standards for all EU countries. 
On closer review, it is apparent that these key policies concerning the green 
transition in the built environment are underpinned by the logic of consensus of 
the technologically driven ecological modernisation approach, which is oriented 
to innovation and argues for the economic benefts of environmentalism (Mol 
et al., 2009; Machin, 2019). This approach is evident from the stated objectives 
of the energy policy over the last two decades of achieving an energy-effcient 
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transport) and a fully integrated pan-European energy market by 2050 by ensur-
ing energy security through cooperation between EU countries, increasing renew-
able energy, supporting research and innovation into clean energy technologies, 
empowering consumers and strengthening the EU’s external energy relations 
(EC, 2015, 2019a). The Green Deal (EC, 2019b) similarly sets out decarbonisa-
tion strategies and emphasises the role of technology in increasing the share of 
renewable energy and the potential of renovating Europe’s building stock, giving 
further considerations to the legislation, public investment and private fnancing 
and education and training. Both the energy policy and the Green Deal highlight 
job creation as an anticipated outcome, particularly through energy effciency 
improvement measures in buildings and growth in the renewable energy sector, 
which alone are expected to employ two million people by the end of 2020, 
mostly in the construction industry. 
EPBD implementation measures and plans required of the member states, 
such as setting minimum energy performance standards, adaptation of technical 
building systems, energy performance certifcates and inspection regimes, further 
illustrate the technocratic framing of the transition to sustainable construction. 
For example, between 2007 and 2020 implementation was facilitated by National 
Energy Effciency Action Plans (NEEAPs), setting out the adapted defnition 
of NZEB, the energy effciency measures to be pursued, energy performance 
certifcation, inspection schemes and fnancial incentives, as well as develop-
ing renovation strategies and other complementary measures to achieve the 
now superseded EU 2020 targets (EPBD, 2010, 2018; EC, 2016a). The ten-year 
National Energy and Climate Plans (NECPs) for the next decade are required to 
outline, in a similar way, what legislative, fnancial and regulatory measures will 
be put in place to meet the 2030 targets and indicate a long-term strategy towards 
2050 (EC, 2019a). 
In none of these policy documents on energy, the EPBD, or the NECPs is
there any reference to women or gender. The energy effciency strategy of the
last two decades has made no provision to address women’s participation in this
transition, neither catering to their education and training needs nor taking
measures to ensure that they gain advantage from emerging employment oppor-
tunities. The only nod to the social aspects of the transition is the Build Up
Skills initiative (BUS), launched to increase the number of building workers
trained in the competencies needed for low energy construction (LEC) and sub-
sequent Horizon 2020 funded training programmes (EC, 2014, 2016b, 2018).
However, these made no provisions to address gender inequalities in the sec-
tor, despite EU attempts to ‘add’ gender (Allwood, 2014) to existing policies,
focused on increasing the number of women particularly in STEM (science,
technology, engineering and mathematics) education and the renewable energy
sector (EIGE, 2016a, b). 
This does not mean that the EU does not legislate for gender equality. On the 
contrary, gender equality remains an explicit objective and gender mainstream-
ing has been a commitment since 1996, following the formation of the Beijing 
Platform of Action (EIGE, 2012). This commitment is articulated, for example, 
  170 Linda Clarke and Melahat Sahin-Dikmen
in Article 23 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights (European Parliament, 2012c) 
and in calls by the European Parliament for gender equality in the green econ-
omy and for the inclusion of women at all levels of decision-making (European 
Parliament, 2012a, b). Further, gender equality is comprehensively covered by 
the European Pillar of Social Rights (European Parliament, 2017) in terms of 
employment (access, progression, pay), equal opportunities (non-discrimination 
to cover education and all other social services) and work–life balance. The 
recently updated Gender Equality Strategy (EC, 2020) renews the commitment 
to gender mainstreaming to ensure women’s participation in decision-making, 
including on climate change, and acknowledges intersectionality as critical to 
understanding the complexity of disadvantage and inequality, away from essen-
tialising male–female binaries. 
There is, therefore, a seeming contradiction between formal and loud commit-
ment to gender equality on the one hand and the ‘silence’ (Bakker, 2015) of green 
construction policies on gender inequalities on the other. For explanation, femi-
nist institutional analyses turns the lens to institutions and the structures, power 
relations and formal and informal processes that work to prevent a gender per-
spective from being integrated into specifc public policies (Weiner and MacRae, 
2014). Whilst women’s presence is no guarantee that a gender perspective will 
have a fair hearing, what difference are women participating in climate policy 
actually making? Few ministers of energy, within which the green construction 
strategy is subsumed, are women, and the construction sector too is particularly 
male-dominated (Clancy and Feenstra, 2019). Even when women are present, 
power imbalances within institutions, established and taken for granted prioriti-
sation of sector-specifc issues, and the interpretation of gender mainstreaming 
by the different actors involved, all contribute to the marginalisation of gender 
issues in the policy-making process (Weiner and MacRae, 2014). Organisations 
are ‘sticky’ and path dependent and there is a limit to how far institutional agen-
das can be challenged. The result is that gender equality, rather than being a fun-
damentally cross-cutting issue, continues to be tackled as an add-on to discreet 
areas of policy and gender mainstreaming becomes a box-ticking exercise that 
does not lead to change on the ground (Arora-Jonsson, 2017; MacGregor, 2017). 
This discretion is exemplifed in documents produced by the European 
Institute for Gender Equality (EIGE), in particular on Gender and Energy (EIGE, 
2016a) and Gender in environment and climate change (EIGE, 2016b). These recog-
nise the serious underrepresentation of women in higher technical and scientifc 
education and employed in the energy sector, including in renewable energy and 
climate change decision institutions. They call for: a ‘more balanced representa-
tion of women’ at all levels in the feld of climate change mitigation; support for 
women in science and technology; the elimination of gender stereotypes and pro-
motion of gender equality in education, training, and working life; and the inte-
gration of the principle of gender mainstreaming into relevant legislation, policy 
measures and instruments related to climate change mitigation (EIGE, 2016b). 
However, there is no consideration given to social and economic relations, such 
as the gendered division of labour, which give rise to the low participation of 
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women in the frst place or to structural problems in the sectors themselves that 
perpetuate gender inequality and need to be transformed. Policy is, instead, 
directed to inserting women and increasing participation in sectors structurally 
aligned to reproduce gender segregation and falls far short of the social transfor-
mation needed. 
Whilst the democratisation of and equal representation in environmental 
governance are critical, therefore, a deeper challenge to the dominant policy 
paradigm is necessary to put gender equality at the centre of visions for a sustain-
able Europe. The current EU approach to gender mainstreaming is, on one level, 
a manifestation of the underlying neo-liberal political and economic rationale 
that externalises social reproduction and separates gender inequality, which is 
dealt with as a question of equal rights and opportunities and discrimination, 
from issues of the ‘real economy’, including industrial, economic, or climate pol-
icy-making (Mellor, 2017; McGregor, 2010). Relegating gender inequality and 
the gendered division of labour in society to a separate platform is, thus, predi-
cated on giving individual women the equal opportunity and ‘support’ they need 
to compete for jobs, while the patriarchal structures and practices and existing 
exploitative and unsustainable employment practices that shape their participa-
tion and progress in paid employment, including in construction, are ignored 
(Fraser, 2013; Rottenberg, 2018; Ferguson, 2020). This lack of attention to the 
gender implications and context of construction parallels and is not separate from 
the neglect of entrenched problems of construction labour markets and VET, 
which also hinders the pursuance of green transition policies. 
Putting the ‘social’ back into green construction policies: Labour and 
VET 
EU green construction policy is thus gender blind and generally lacking a social 
perspective; climate change, energy transition, and energy effciency are for-
mulated as neutral, scientifc systems and processes with little social context or 
implications (Machin, 2019). The EU’s ecological modernisation approach and 
climate change policies, driven by technical targets and market priorities, are all 
the more disquieting given that the transition to NZEB has signifcant conse-
quences for the employment, education, and training of the construction work-
force. LEC is fundamentally different from the traditional construction process as 
it introduces the concept of energy performance into a production system driven 
by building to time and budget. Buildings must meet specifc energy performance 
targets through such measures as airtight building envelopes, thermal-bridge free 
construction, and on-site renewable energy sources. LEC, thus, needs a greater 
degree of precision and careful co-ordination so that building components are put 
together to constitute a system and function to restrict energy use to pre-deter-
mined limits. For the construction labour process, these requirements imply over-
coming interfaces between different occupations, integrated team working, and 
improved communication given the complex work processes involved (Clarke 
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expertise distinct from that developed in traditional construction VET, calling for 
broader qualifcation profles, deeper theoretical knowledge, and higher technical 
competences to acquire thermal literacy, interdisciplinary understanding, and a 
broad range of transversal abilities such as project management and problem-
solving. Incorrect and poor-quality installation results in a performance gap, the 
difference between the energy standards intended and those actually achieved, 
jeopardising the EPBD stipulated emission savings (Zero Carbon Hub, 2013; 
Johnston, 2016). Evidence suggests that failure to build to standards required 
indicates structural problems in terms of work organisation, employment, and the 
quality of VET (EC, 2014; Gleeson, 2016; Clarke et al, 2017a, 2019). 
The BUS EU initiative (2010–2017), launched to develop NZEB compe-
tencies in the workforce, illustrates the complexity and the sheer scale of the 
task facing the industry (EC, 2014, 2016b, 2018). The BUS national status quo 
analyses, completed by member states highlight weaknesses in national VET sys-
tems and reveal that the number of construction workers in need of training runs 
into millions across the EU, with many having low general education levels and 
lacking formal training or qualifcations. The overview report shows that most 
EU countries have a long way to go in upgrading occupational competences and 
learning resources, developing new courses and qualifcations, and training the 
trainers, entailing a major programme of work. These challenges are compounded 
by under-resourced VET systems in many countries, with several also undergoing 
major reforms. Moreover, the scale of what is needed varies substantially between 
countries, and evaluation of VET for LEC reveals distinctive approaches, not all 
adequate for providing the expertise needed (Clarke et al., 2019). 
Other imperatives also drive the requirement for more and improved VET,
including an ageing workforce, the ‘skills drain’, increasing digitalisation and auto-
mation, changes in work organisation and the division of work, and the develop-
ment of a circular economy (EFBWW and FIEC, 2020). In criticising the EU skills
agenda for its ‘homogeneous vision’ and neglect of ‘responsible partnership’, the
European construction social partners – the European Federation of Building and
Woodworkers (EFBWW) and the European Construction Industry Federation
(FIEC) – stress that the skills and VET agenda are interconnected with collective
bargaining discussions on wages and working conditions. Indeed, the structure of
the industry and its labour market characteristics – dominated by micro frms and
casual and self-employment, facing a severe recruitment crisis, reliant on migrant
labour, with many employers neither valuing nor seeing the need for qualifca-
tions – present a momentous challenge to VET and to retraining the construction
workforce (Clarke et al., 2019). The challenge, therefore, is not simply a techni-
cal one of adapting to the demands of construction at a time of climate change,
but of transforming the structure and organisation of the industry and the agency
required of workers and reforming VET systems to take account of increased
requirements for worker autonomy, integrated teamwork, project management
awareness, and applied knowledge, as well as specifc skill gaps. 
Some of these problems are recognised, as recently highlighted in a report
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human capital basis, which estimates that between three and four million work-
ers need to develop energy effciency–related skills in the industry. It identi-
fes structural obstacles to this, including the fragmentation of the market and
of construction value chains, cyclical factors, and the fact that ‘many compa-
nies adopt a temporary employment model … limiting incentives for long-term
investment in the workforce’ (ECSO, 2020, p. 53). Moreover, 75% of compa-
nies struggle to follow occupational safety and health (OSH) requirements and
40% do not work safely, so that OSH-related training must increase by 60%
(ECSO, 2020). This is detrimental to the ‘attractiveness’ of the industry, whose
poor image is associated with low job security, tough working conditions, and
health and safety concerns. However, these obstacles and detrimental factors
are not then the direct target of policy, and increasing women’s participation
in construction is even seen as one solution to improving the attractiveness of
the sector (ECSO, 2020, p. 9). Just as policies to achieve a zero carbon built
environment fail to address employment and working conditions, similarly, so
too do those seeking to increase female participation and improve the ‘image’ of
the industry, even though these conditions are underlying obstacles to achieving
both gender equity and NZEB. 
The very use of the term ‘human capital’ in the title of the ECSO (2020) 
report helps to explain why the social structures forming and constraining the 
quality and quantity of labour and the complexities of ‘skill formation’ at dif-
ferent levels are neglected. Human capital theory (Becker, 1993) has long been 
challenged for regarding the ‘skills’ or ‘human capital’ of the workforce as the 
property of individual workers and associated only with the work processes of par-
ticular frms (Maurice et al., 1986). This narrow conception of ‘skills’ inevitably 
ignores the socialisation of labour, including women, into production through 
structures of employment, wage relations, and training (Campinos Dubernet and 
Grando, 1991). Just as the ecological modernisation approach to a green transi-
tion of the European Commission (EC) is without concern for the quality of 
labour and employment involved or worker agency, so too is the human capital 
approach taken by ECSO, under the EC’s Competitiveness of Enterprises and 
Small and Medium-sized Enterprises (COSME) programme on market condi-
tions and policy developments in the European construction sector. 
Learning from examples of good practice 
Embedding gender equality in policy and enabling women to shape and partici-
pate in the emerging green transition in construction require a paradigm shift, 
implying a re-defnition of terms. It has also been suggested that greater female 
participation could make for more sustainable practices, enhancing women’s 
opportunities, and accelerating social and technical change (Pearl-Martinez and 
Stephens, 2016). Examples of the extensive involvement of women in the green 
transition are, however, rare and more common in the professions than for the 
operative construction workforce. There are, though, local and organisational 
cases where women have been employed on a sustained basis in construction 
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which, on examination, serve to identify some of the ingredients necessary for 
their successful participation. Where these ingredients are also conducive to 
effective LEC, and above all where organisations are also actively engaged in 
NZEB, a model is given for developing an eco-friendly and inclusive sector, in 
particular in terms of the coalition of actors involved. 
One of the frst ingredients needed for women’s successful involvement in 
LEC is their ability to acquire the necessary qualifcations. Given the require-
ment for high-level qualifcations with LEC, good communication, and coordina-
tion skills, and the ability to manage the project, the way is potentially opened up 
for greater involvement of women, especially considering their generally higher 
educational achievements and greater presence on environmentally oriented 
courses and in technical, professional, administrative, and clerical functions 
(Clarke et al., 2017b). However, as indicated, any involvement is predicated on 
good and inclusive employment and working conditions. In this regard, large 
infrastructure projects in which women have been signifcantly involved, espe-
cially in the more professional areas, are useful for drawing out the measures 
that can facilitate their employment. These have included UK projects such as 
Heathrow Terminal 5, the 2012 Olympics, Crossrail, Thames Tideway Tunnel, 
and Hinkley Point Nuclear Power Station (Clarke et al., 2015; Baruah, 2018). 
The longevity, size, complexity, and nature of such major infrastructure projects 
mean that they are often highly regulated and subject to scrutiny, opening up 
the possibility for a more inclusive employment policy, setting ambitious targets, 
and new ways of working. For instance, the all-embracing Common Framework 
Agreement between EDF (Électricité de France) and unions at Hinkley Point 
places great emphasis on establishing integrated teams and new working practices 
and is structured to optimise opportunities to bring new people into the work-
force (EDF, 2013). For the Olympics, contract compliance, continuous monitor-
ing, and the guarantee of direct employment were critical to meeting equality 
targets (Wright, 2014). All in all, from examining these different mega projects, 
particular factors critical to the achievement of greater inclusivity are indicated – 
the roles of public procurement; the signifcance of regulated agreements secured 
with key stakeholders, including local authorities and unions; the involvement of 
the workforce and women’s groups; systematic, targeted, and controlled recruit-
ment, proactively applying equal opportunities policies; guarantees of direct 
employment; close monitoring; well-conceived training programmes, facilitating 
broader occupational profles, formal links with colleges and universities, work 
placements and work experience; and good working conditions, including struc-
tured working hours, childcare provision, fexible working arrangements, and 
mentoring (Clarke et al., 2015). 
Whilst these examples point to some of the measures required for the success-
ful involvement of women, they are at the same time short-lived and without sig-
nifcant environmental credentials, especially concerning the use of concrete and 
the building of nuclear power stations and airports. More sustained participation 
of women in construction in the UK is found in the building departments of local 
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prided themselves on good employment and working conditions. These have 
made concerted attempts to include women since the 1970s, particularly follow-
ing the introduction of the Sex Discrimination Act (1975), making it illegal to 
discriminate on the grounds of sex in employment or education, and grassroots 
campaigning by women to set up women-only training workshops. Women, con-
sequently, accessed training in construction occupations, which was consolidated 
by joining DLOs. By the mid-1980s, Hackney DLO in London, for example, was 
running one of the largest training schemes for building workers in Britain, in 
which over 50% of the adult trainees were women, many going on to perma-
nent jobs in construction (Clarke et al., 2015). Local authorities committed to 
changing their male-dominated construction workforce created a framework of 
support for women through the provision of designated women’s offcers; regular 
meetings; placing more than one woman on any site; fexible hours of work; and 
a clear and transparent set of equal opportunities guidelines backed up by internal 
procedures to address grievances. The success of these measures is evident in the 
presence of 266 women in construction operative occupations in seven Inner 
London DLOs in 1989. This legacy of the 1980s survives, despite political chal-
lenges, and DLOs have continued to address the low numbers of young women 
seeking construction training. For example, of the 283 apprentices at Leicester 
DLO between 1985 and 2002, 84 (30%) were women and, by 2012, 123 of its 
431 strong workforce were women, as were 18 of the 75 apprentices employed 
in all occupations – as carpenters, electricians, plasterers, painters and decora-
tors, bricklayers, heating and ventilating engineers, gasftters, and metal workers 
(Clarke et al., 2015). This, therefore, provides us with further aspects necessary 
for the sustained employment of women: the involvement and commitment of 
public authorities, stable and direct employment, and a framework of support. 
The different ingredients implied for the successful inclusion of women in 
construction can, therefore, be summarised as: 
• Public sector involvement, especially, as in the aforementioned cases, the 
municipal authorities 
• Good organisational employment and working conditions, targeted recruit-
ment and retention, family-friendly policies 
• Stakeholder involvement, as recommended in the Beijing Platform for 
Action, including women’s organisations, professional bodies and unions 
• Comprehensive training linked to employment 
Whilst less impressive in terms of the participation of women, one organisation 
discovered in Scotland that fulfls most of these different criteria and has, at 
the same time, a clear commitment to NZEB is City Building Glasgow, which 
represents a sustained alternative employment model to the private sector. City 
Building Glasgow is a not-for-proft organisation, jointly owned by Glasgow City 
Council and the Wheatley Group Housing Association, and formed in 2006 from 
the original DLO of Glasgow City Council. Most of the 2,200 permanent con-
struction employees of City Building Glasgow are unionised and the Joint Trade 
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Union Council is actively engaged in the organisation and underpins its strong 
social ethos (Clarke et al., 2018a). The organisation is unique in directly employ-
ing, under decent standards, a large construction workforce, regulating and moni-
toring subcontracting through a framework agreement, and running an in-house 
training centre providing a comprehensive and acclaimed four-year programme 
for a diverse intake, including women, with most trainees staying on as employ-
ees. The organisation’s LEC schemes built to varying energy effciency standards 
include social housing, care homes, schools, hostels, and retroftting social hous-
ing estates, including through the installation of district heating using air source 
heat pumps, as part of efforts to tackle fuel poverty. Environmental measures are, 
thus, intertwined with employment and training practices that prioritise workers 
in a model shaped by the enhancement of labour capacity and opportunities for 
direct engagement in the green transition and underpinned by the traditions of 
municipal socialism. 
These case studies suggest that the transformation of construction into an 
inclusive, eco-industry needs the input of a range of other stakeholders such as 
public authorities, VET institutions, unions, women in construction and their 
representative organisations, environmental organisations, and employers and 
their associations. Thus, even though gender is given scant attention and women 
rarely sit around the table in European and national energy policy-making, stake-
holder involvement and institutional interventions at more local, sectoral, and 
organisational levels can be exemplary and indicate potential and effective driv-
ers of change. 
Conclusion 
The lack of gender diversity in construction is a critical issue, one that relates to 
barriers in terms of the nature of VET and employment, human resource poli-
cies and practices for the industry, and the lack of employee engagement. Many 
of these are also barriers to achieving effective NZEB, including the need for a 
comprehensive and high-standard VET system and a stable, safe, and healthy 
system of employment. The suggestion is that meeting the challenge of a green 
transition in construction opens up the possibility to include women. Raising 
standards in construction VET and in employment and working conditions will 
also help address the current Europe-wide recruitment crisis in construction. 
Technologically up-to-date, well-resourced and high-level VET leading to quali-
fcations valued in the sector could make a career in construction an attractive 
option for women. And interesting, eco-friendly, socially useful, not-for-proft 
and challenging construction work, including large-scale retroft programmes, 
can turn that option into a reality over which women can have a decisive say 
and impact. What is needed to strike a blow at carbon emissions in construction 
is a major retroft initiative in which women and men, trained and employed on 
an equal basis, play a decisive role – one that serves as a demonstration of how 
the industry can be transformed to become inclusive and socially useful through 
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This chapter has sought to show how the EU’s ecological modernisation
approach and gender-blind policies in relation to energy mean that implemen-
tation of the EPBD is regarded as a technological fx. Yet, without addressing
the social and structural problems besetting the construction industry, it will
not only be impossible to achieve gender equality but also diffcult to realise
NZEB. Transforming the employment and working conditions that serve to
exclude women and impede LEC is necessary both in order to meet energy-
effcient and low carbon emission targets and to become an inclusive eco sec-
tor. It is also essential to develop VET systems capable of qualifying the many
thousands of construction workers required for NZEB and retroft programmes
across Europe. While some countries, including Germany and Belgium, are
well on the way to upgrading their VET systems to incorporate LEC elements,
their construction industries continue to exclude women. The examples given
show where women have been successfully included and where NZEB has
been achieved, and suggest the combination of factors and the coalition of
stakeholders that will be needed to transform construction into an inclusive,
socially useful eco-sector. These factors include direct employment, good work-
ing conditions, comprehensive and targeted VET for LEC programmes, NZEB
and measures to support the inclusion of women, whilst the actors include local
authorities, not-for-proft building organisations, unions, colleges and training
centres and, above all, women. In this way, the chapter reveals how a gendered
analysis helps to identify the structural problems in the sector that need to be
overcome if a green transition and gender equality in construction are to be
accomplished. 
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policy-making and gender in 
transport plans and strategies 
The case of Oslo, Norway 
Tanu Priya Uteng, Marianne Knapskog, André 
Uteng, and Jomar Sæterøy Maridal 
Introduction 
Land use and travel behaviour remain closely conjunct and, since the 1990s, 
European nations have developed planning guidelines for integrated land use and 
transport development. These planning guidelines have also addressed overarch-
ing themes like universal design, improving conditions for children and youth 
and a more sustainable society. Lately, efforts have been directed towards exam-
ining the overlaps between sustainable planning and the climate policy-making 
agenda, but fne-grained analyses are largely lacking. To this end, gendered travel 
behaviour and its impacts on climate goals present a glaring research gap. 
We begin with analysing the Norwegian planning and climate policy agenda 
by focusing on the case of Oslo. The scope of investigation is limited to present-
ing a quantifable base for analysing gendered travel behaviour, both the existing 
patterns and in light of upcoming solutions like electrifcation and shared mobil-
ity, which are being posited as sustainable solutions. The topic is analysed under 
two thematic domains – administrative and demographic – which are sewed 
together in the end. 
Through analysis of planning documents and information available to the 
public and private sector planners, the intention is to uncover the presence of 
(climate) strategies in plans, tools and other essential factors on the national, 
regional and local scale and then to analyse the results in light of gendered pat-
terns of daily mobilities. 
Three types of plans are especially important to climate policy-making –
land use plans, climate action plans and mobility plans. These three different
types of plans address crucial aspects of climate policies. In Norway, strategies
for modifying travel behaviour saturate the plans and form a core component
of strategic land use and mobility plans. Electrifcation comes across as part of
the solutions to abate emissions and become fossil-free. At the European level,
other types of sustainable fuels like hydrogen and biogas are more prominent,
but Norway has concentrated on electrifcation. The voluminous growth of
electric cars in Oslo is often used as a benchmark for electrifcation of vehicles
across the world. 
DOI: 10.4324/9781003052821-11 
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Distribution impact and acceptability of land use and transport solutions are 
not explicit in the planning documents. On the surface, the plans treat the entire 
population as a homogenous unit. The most important organising principle in the 
plans is the national zero-growth objective (ZGO)1 for private car use, prioritis-
ing those who drive less and use more sustainable modes of transport. Gendered 
and segregated analyses, however, do not form part of the current approach and 
discussions. There is much to gain from disaggregated analyses. For example, 
travel patterns for the city of Malmö in Sweden highlighted that if women were 
to adopt the travel patterns of men, the modal share by car would increase by 
17% and CO2 emissions from car traffc would increase by 31%. Further, an addi-
tional demand for driving and parking space would add up to 190 standard town 
squares (Svanfelt, 2018). Building on these arguments, this chapter explores the 
nexus between gendered travel behaviour and climate policy-making by concen-
trating on the following question: How can transport and climate policy-making 
be better understood and conceptualised in light of gendered travel behaviour? 
The chapter is structured as follows: the second section briefy introduces 
gendered travel behaviour and the third, the theoretical framing informing this 
study. The fourth section outlines the method, while the contextual background 
of the case city Oslo is presented in the ffth section. A brief content analy-
sis of the major policy documents guiding Oslo’s climate policy-making in the 
feld of urban-transport planning is outlined in the sixth section, and a quantita-
tive assessment of current and future travel behaviour, based on a macro-based 
prognosis-model called DEMOTRIPS, is summarised in the seventh section. The 
fnal section presents the concluding discussion and argues for more nuanced, 
disaggregated analyses to be made integral to climate policy-making exercises 
undertaken in future. The overall framing of the chapter is guided by an acknowl-
edgement that current climate policy-making exercises will fail to deliver the 
desired results if policies and programmes do not recognize the contextual reali-
ties of current and future travel behaviour. Men and women show a consistent 
difference in their needs, preferences and practices of daily mobility which pro-
duces different bundles of climate effects at an aggregate level and, thus, differ-
ential marketing and targeting of future interventions are required to align travel 
behaviours with the goals of climate policies. 
Gendered patterns of daily mobilities 
In order to build a case for linking gendered travel behaviour and climate goals, 
this section presents the main fndings emerging from a literature review of 
research and projects with direct impacts for climate policy-making. It is notable 
that there is a consistent pattern of women’s daily mobility across the world with 
evident differences on a range of topics characterising the travel behaviour of 
women versus men (Priya Uteng and Creswell 2008). 
Though car license-holding for women in the Global North has risen sharply 
in recent decades (Hjorthol, 2008), this development has not automatically led 
to an equal distribution of car-driving between men and women. Women are 
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still, to a greater degree, car passengers than men (Polk, 2003). Women have a 
strong preference for sustainable modes of transport as they both use more public 
transport and have higher walking frequency compared to men. Given their pro-
pensity to use more public transport, to walk more and their high incidences of 
trip-chaining, women use multiple modes rather than a single mode (Heinen and 
Chatterjee, 2015). Women travel shorter distances, and their trip duration is also 
limited compared to men. This is evident in their commuting or work-related trip 
patterns but holds true for other trip purposes as well (Hjorthol, 2008; Sandow 
and Westin, 2010; Scheiner et al., 2011; Kim et al., 2012). In comparison to men, 
long-distance commuting remains much more restricted for women (Sandow, 
2008; Scheiner et al., 2011; Hjorthol and Vågane, 2014). 
Given the unabated development of car-based societies, it is not surprising 
that certain travel trends exhibit converging tendencies over time for the respec-
tive genders. As Konrad (2015) and Scheiner (2018) comment, elements of 
license-holding, car availability, mode choice (car driving), trip distances and 
trip duration seem to be converging over time. However, we need to analyse 
these converging tendencies in light of what Scheiner (2018) calls attention to 
– women are perhaps less habitual, more responsible, more sustainable and more 
sociable (Matthies et al., 2002; Polk, 2003; Hjorthol, 2008). This effectively 
means that the converging and shifting of women’s sustainable travel behav-
iour towards a car-based, unsustainable one could be in response to the struc-
tural conditions that have underpinned city planning in the past decades. These 
trends also indicate that there has been a gradual evolution of an unsustainable 
path dependency (overlapping with the feminist institutional approach discussed 
in the introduction chapter) toward car-use in city planning which has pushed 
women to choose unsustainable transport mode. This shift has some serious 
implications, both from the perspectives of climate change (in line with the zero-
growth objective) and the inclusivity agenda which insists the cities should be 
designed to be more inclusive and cater to the needs of its various demographic 
groups – women, children, elderly, disabled, immigrants etc. However, research 
simultaneously indicates that this (unsustainable) shift can be steered towards a 
more sustainable direction through the creation of conditions conducive to walk-
ing, cycling, and public transport (Priya Uteng et al., 2020). The ongoing global 
discussions on creating 15-minutes post-COVID-19 cities also rest on the modus 
operandi of increasing accessibility by walking and cycling to core facilities like 
grocery, health and other basic amenities (C40 cities climate leadership group 
2020). 
Gender and climate policy-making 
The literature review highlights that a substantial amount of discussion so far has 
veered towards the gendered nature of the politics and management of climate 
change agenda. Findings suggest that females have greater awareness and concern 
about climate change than males (McCright, 2010; McCright and Dunlap, 2011) 
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and care, frequently associated with women (Gilligan, 1982; Beutel and Marini, 
1995). Mavisakalyan and Tarverdi (2019) note that there is a positive correla-
tion between a country’s female representation and the ‘stringency of its climate 
change policies’. For example, in Denmark, with a female representation of 37%, 
the stringency of climate change policies is eight times more than Bahrain with 
a female representation of 2%. An attempt to quantify this relationship high-
lights that a ten-unit increase in female representation results in a decrease of 
0.24 metric tonnes of carbon dioxide per capita (ibid). This correlation provides 
substantial support to the claim that increased female representation in national 
parliaments results in more stringent climate change policies, thereby resulting 
in lower carbon dioxide emissions and campaigns targeting climate policy change 
are more successful in nations with higher female representation. 
Other fndings from Scandinavia problematise a simple correlation between 
female representation and a more sustainable climate agenda (Magnusdottir and 
Kronsell, 2014; Winslott Hiselius et al., 2019). Kronsell (2013, p. 12) issues an 
advisory remark: 
Gender sensitivity will not come about simply through the inclusion of 
women in policy-making. The practice of regimes, and the norms that con-
stitute the social order of the landscape are all important to climate govern-
ance, and hence, they too, have to be actively scrutinised for gender and 
other injustices. 
Kronsell (2013) argues for the adoption of the following three processes to bol-
ster this interlocking: to strengthen female participation, to deal with oppressive 
power relations, and to challenge institutionalised norms. The core message is 
that there is a categorical lack of knowledge on how to deal with the topic of 
‘gender’, and following Kronsell’s claims (2013), for equal representation to have 
a substantial effect, we need actors who are knowledgeable on gender relevance 
of climate issues and who are interested in change and transformation, but were 
previously excluded from climate governance. 
A second strand of focus in research builds on gender mainstreaming, which 
ECOSOC (1997) describes as following: 
The process of assessing the implications for women and men of any planned
action, including legislation, policies or programmes, in all areas and at all
levels. It is a strategy for making gender an integral dimension of the design,
implementation, monitoring, and evaluation of policies and programmes in
all political, economic, and societal spheres so that women and men beneft
equally, and inequality is not perpetuated. The ultimate goal is gender equality. 
Alston (2014) argues that while gender mainstreaming has been widely accepted, 
there exists a lack of understanding of its goals. This argument resonates with the 
transport feld as well. Bacchi and Eveline’s (2010) claim, that there is a lack of 
understanding of the actual problem and therefore the need to perform a rigid 
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gender analysis of policies and outcomes and identify the actual problem being 
solved, hits the bullseye for the problem at hand in the transport domain. For 
example, the framing and understanding of the actual problem – how to decrease 
car use and thus address the zero-growth objective in Norwegian urban areas – is cur-
rently not being sieved through a gendered lens and consequently gender analy-
ses do not inform the current climate policy-making exercises in Oslo. 
Thus, though the frst argument about the politics and management of climate 
policy-making in light of gendered positioning remains important, it needs fur-
ther bolstering. This argument is repeated in the gender-mainstreaming agenda 
as well. Alston (2014) argues that whilst gender mainstreaming strategies include 
providing gender-disaggregated data, gender auditing, gender budgeting and 
greater transparency on factors such as the number of women in leadership posi-
tions, this is not enough to promote substantial change. Gender-mainstreaming 
goals often confict with conservative bureaucratic processes and norms in terms 
of path dependencies (Chapter 1, this volume) which reduces the ability to make 
substantial changes (Wittman, 2010). Alston (2014) stresses the need to review 
and reassess policies and actions to ensure that they do not reinforce or create 
new gender inequalities. 
A third line of enquiry is rooted in the gender role congruity theory which 
proposes that men and women engage in behaviours that are congruent with tra-
ditional gender roles (Eagly, 1987; Eagly et al., 2000). Swim et al. (2018) propose 
that climate policy arguments that focus on science and business are associated 
with men, whilst climate policy arguments that focus on ethical and environ-
mental justice systems are associated with women. 
Relying on any one particular strand might render the arguments unbalanced 
and, thus, it becomes important to attend to the question of how to bring these 
strands together. The feld of transport provides a unique opportunity to sew 
together the science–business and ethics–justice frames when discussing climate 
change policies (Sovacool et al., 2018). Analyses presented in this chapter con-
frm that, both in current times and in the future, women exhibit sustainable 
travel behaviour and a higher usage of walking, cycling and public transport, 
while being less dependent on cars compared to men. These fndings demonstrate 
that rather than being mere proponents of the ethics–justice frame being applied 
to discussions on climate change, women’s travel behaviour makes them active 
agents of the science and business of designing transport policies. And it is utmost 
essential that these fndings are taken forward in the practices and the norms 
guiding the designing of transport policies to cater to climate goals. 
Methods 
The chapter combines the qualitative method of content analysis with a quan-
titative prognosis model. In order to provide an overview of the connections 
between gendered travel behaviour and climate policy-making strategies, we 
employed content analysis of planning documents. The intention was to highlight 
the climate strategies in plans, tools and other essential factors on the national, 
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regional and local scale, and check if and how the gender component is being 
taken forward. Though the primary focus was on strategic planning documents of 
the municipalities, due attention has also been paid to the regional and national 
plans as they are an integral part of the framework for climate policies. The con-
tent analysis investigated the plans and not the planning processes or political 
discussions per se. Plans and strategies are crucial as the starting point for further 
discussions and are, therefore, an essential part of the framing, formulating and 
providing a vocabulary for possible solutions in designing climate policies. 
The second method focuses on a macro-based prognosis-model called 
DEMOTRIPS, a model used to assess the travel trends and demographic changes 
of men and women in the city of Oslo. The model uses current travel data, elas-
ticities refecting the relationship between transport modes, logistical growth 
modelling and the expected demographic development within specifed geo-
graphical areas to create a prognosis for future travel behaviour. Additionally, 
DEMOTRIPS extends the analysis beyond women and men to include the inter-
sectional category of age. 
The case of Oslo 
Oslo, Norway’s capital, is the largest city and urban region of the country. The 
current platform for city council, cooperation between the Labour Party, the 
Green Party and the Socialist Left Party in Oslo (2019–2023), has employment 
for everyone, abatement of climate change and social equity as the most critical 
priorities. An important goal is to become the world’s frst emission-free city by 
2030. The red–green coalition aims to govern the city according to a climate 
budget to reach 95% cut in greenhouse gas emissions by 2030, along with reduc-
ing Oslo’s contribution to greenhouse gas emissions outside the municipality and 
an approximately one-third reduction in Oslo’s car traffc by 2030 compared to 
the 2015 level. The city council aims to make explicit climate change effects and 
consequences in all relevant plans that are submitted to the city government. 
Oslo is both a county and a municipality. The municipality is responsible for 
implementing the national, regional and local policies and translating them into 
local solutions along with attending to budgetary details. Most of the strategic 
planning takes place at the municipal level. In the frst half of the four-year local 
election period, each council adopts a political strategy for municipal planning 
and decides ways to revise the municipal master plan. The adopted municipal 
master plan comprises the framework for preparing local plans and processing 
cases and is legally binding. 
Further, though the regional plans could have been legally binding after 
the Planning and Building Act was modifed in 2008, the county chose not to 
make the regional plan legally binding. So, in the case of Oslo, the regional plan 
remains advisory and provides the foundation for the municipality plans guiding 
the ZGO. For transport-related tasks that cover larger areas or overlap between 
municipal levels, there are two relevant items to be discussed – Ruter and the 
urban growth agreement for Oslo and Akershus. 
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Ruter is the public transport agency in charge of the administration of the 
tram, metro and buses in Oslo. Oslo and parts of the neighbouring county of 
Viken own Ruter. As a rule, Ruter oversees both tendering of public transport 
services and drafting the public transport strategy. In 2019, the national govern-
ment, the county of Akershus (now part of Viken), the transport agencies, the 
municipality of Oslo as well as neighbouring municipalities of Skedsmo, Bærum 
and Ullensaker agreed to sign an urban growth agreement. The aim is to reach 
ZGO by implementing the regional plan and extending one part of the public 
transport network. 
Table 11.1 shows the relationship between the main plans for climate pol-
icy-making on different levels that are valid for Oslo. As a rule, the laws, rules 
and guidelines come from the national government. At the regional level, the 
regional plan for land use and transport and the public transport plan is valid 
both for the city of Oslo and the Akershus region. The municipality oversees the 
land use, thematic (action) plans, and climate budget. 
Content analysis of policy documents 
This section presents the results of the content analysis of the policy documents 
outlined in Table 11.1. 
Regional plan for land use and transport 
The regional plan for land use and transport in Oslo and Akershus was approved in 
2015 by both the Municipality of Oslo and the neighbouring county of Akershus 
(now part of Viken) (Plansamarbeidet, 2015). The plan, a joint strategic plat-
form outlining the strategies to achieve effcient coordination between land use 
and transport in the region, is not legally binding but provides the foundation for 
further strategic planning in Oslo and the municipalities of Akershus County. 
The plan, gaining further momentum by an urban growth agreement that is 
accepted at all government levels, covers the following issues: densifcation, 
Table 11.1 Strategic climate policy framework for Oslo 2020 
Government level Area Plans and policies 
State/national National Laws including rules and regulations, National 
level transport plan, thematic initiatives, zero-
growth goal (private car use), urban growth 
agreements 
County/regional Oslo and Viken Regional plan for integrated land use and 
level (and the wider transport, public transport plans (Ruter), 
Oslo region) Policy package for transport (Oslopakke 3) 
Municipality Oslo Municipal master plan, climate budget, thematic 
plans and strategies including climate budget, 
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multicore development and zero-growth in transport demand, supported through 
better accessibility for walking, cycling and public transport. 
The ZGO is the overarching goal implying that private car travel demand 
should be gradually diminished, in addition to halving greenhouse gas emissions 
by 2030. The plan seeks to modify travel behaviour through denser land use, 
prioritising some urban centres or nodes and local communities for development 
over others, leading to better integration between land use and public transport. 
The plan envisages increasing public transport supply as a vital measure to lower 
emissions. Cycling and walking are also posited as necessary tools to get a sus-
tainable transport system and emphasis is put on improving the system, mainte-
nance of the bicycle infrastructure and snow clearing in winter. Besides, the plan 
instructs municipalities to introduce more restrictive parking regulation that is 
adapted to the local context. 
In summary, the regional plan has a focus on local accessibility in some nodes 
and towns aiming at access to services, jobs, housing and public transport within 
walking distance as an organising principle. However, it is not discussed how dif-
ferent demographic groups will be affected by the proposed plan. Further, there is 
no mention of gendered analyses or upcoming shared modes of travel. 
The municipal master plan of Oslo 
Oslo City Council approved the municipal master plan for Oslo in 2015 along
with the regional plan. The master plan for Oslo is divided into social and land
use elements where the latter is legally binding and consists of thematic maps,
regulations and guidelines. The social element of the municipal master plan was
revised in 2018 and renewed the urban strategy to guide revisions of the land
use plan (Municipality of Oslo, 2015 and 2019). The plan, fnalised by the Oslo
City Council in 2019 and valid until 2040 (Municipality of Oslo, 2019), covers
the following main issues: changing the pace of adoption of climate and envi-
ronmental policies, active and sustainable municipality and equity (or social
sustainability). 
The plan aims at making Oslo a zero-emission city by 2030, and the strategies
include building the city from the inside out and locating businesses in climate-
friendly locations with good public transport access. According to the plan, the city
has a signifcant potential to reduce pollution if the vehicle feet becomes emission-
free and there is a modal shift from cars to public transport, cycling and walking. 
The plan seeks to modify travel behaviour by making car travel more dif-
fcult and at the same time making travel by public transport more acces-
sible and improving the urban structure around the public transport nodes. 
Neighbourhoods are to become self-suffcient so that the need for daily travel 
(apart from commuting to work) will be reduced or based on sustainable forms of 
transport. Additionally, the plan talks about the electrifcation of the car feet. 
The municipality will change its car feet to electricity, hydrogen, or biogas and 
facilitate private (primarily electric) car use by supplying charging stations. The 
electric car facilitation is also a part of Oslo’s Smart City project. Further, the 
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plan integrates shared mobility (car sharing, bike sharing) and new modalities 
(for example, MaaS – mobility-as-a-service) in its outlook to mobility. 
In summary, the municipal plan repeats the focus on local accessibility and 
embraces electrifcation and upcoming smart mobility solutions. But even though 
this plan makes explicit mention of equity and social sustainability, it does not 
delve into how different demographic groups and their travel behaviour will be 
affected by the proposed plan. There is no mention of gendered analyses even 
though the focus is at the municipal level and detail, disaggregate, gender data is 
readily available. 
Climate and energy strategy and climate budget 
Another important plan for Oslo is the climate and energy strategy (valid from 
2016 to 2020) (Municipality of Oslo, 2016). The main themes deal with reduc-
ing car traffc, densifcation along the railway network and public transport hubs, 
increased bicycle share and reduced vehicle kilometres. The climate manage-
ment part aims at integrating climate budgets into the municipal budget pro-
cesses, practising environmentally effcient procurement, working closely with 
citizens and assisting organisations and other public authorities to develop and 
implement the right climate solutions. 
Implementation is undertaken through the climate budget. In addition to the 
normal budget focusing on the municipal economy, Oslo has a climate budget 
highlighting the importance of sustainable development. The climate budget of 
2019 was the third budget for Oslo and was essentially a list of measures the city 
council plans to implement for one year. The plans calculate the impact of emis-
sions for each measure. The overall aim of the climate budget is twofold. Firstly, 
the climate budget highlights if the set targets will lead to an estimated reduc-
tion in emissions. Secondly, the budget stipulates the different municipal units 
responsible for reporting the results during and after the implementation. 
In summary, the principles of gender budgeting are yet to intersect with Oslo’s 
climate budgeting processes. It is a relatively simple exercise to include a gen-
dered analysis of the proposed measures and ways to prioritise and tackle the 
outcomes if a certain measure favours one demographic group over another. But 
such calculations haven’t been undertaken in Oslo’s climate budgeting exercises. 
For example, Oslo has spent a substantial amount of public money in creating 
dedicated bike lanes but initial analyses reveal that the relative location of these 
dedicated bike lanes might be favouring men who undertake high-speed cycling 
over women who don’t (de Jong et al., 2018). 
Public transport strategy 
The public transport strategy, conceived by Akershus County and Oslo 
Municipality in 2016 and valid until 2020 (Ruter, 2016), is also rooted in the 
regional plan with a focus on densifcation. The strategy suggests combining mass 
transport with individual solutions. Ruter has calculated how the areas covered 
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Table 11.2 The public transport company Ruter’s estimate of reaching the zero-growth 
goal by 2030 































































Car 18% 10% 45% 34% 59% 50% 69% 69% 48% 40% 
Source: Ruter (2016) 
innovations have led to new shared solutions that Ruter plans to integrate with 
traditional public transport. The plan shows that car traffc has stagnated while 
the bicycle and walking share remains unchanged in Oslo. Ruter believes that 
the substantial growth in public transport needs to be sustained through further 
investments in infrastructure, capacity enhancement and better connection with 
both existing and upcoming shared modes of transport. 
Bicycle strategy 
Oslo does not have a sustainable urban mobility plan or a walking strategy at pre-
sent but is in the process of making a walking strategy. However, Oslo has a bicycle
strategy (Municipality of Oslo, 2014) that was adopted by Oslo City Council in
2014 and is valid for ten years. It aims to increase the bicycle share to at least
16%, which effectively means tripling the current bicycle share. The plan provides
the foundation for a systematic working method to continuously improve condi-
tions for cyclists in Oslo. Controlling emissions is a part of the overall strategy, and
it is calculated that a bicycle trip that is fve kilometres long emits 105 grams of
CO2 (lifecycle analysis for the bicycle and bicyclist’s calorie needs) while the same
emission for a private car trip is 1,355 grams. The plan addresses shared mobility
as well, and the municipality continues to play an active role in the city’s bike-
sharing scheme. It is the only plan or strategy which recognises gendered behav-
iour, and highlights that men travel more with bicycles than women. And though
the plan further acknowledges that increasing cycling shares will require different
approaches for men and women, it is not able to engage with the topic in greater
detail than a simple acknowledgement (Municipality of Oslo, 2014). 
Summing up 
A consistent fnding throughout these different hierarchies of plans, guiding 
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make perfunctory mentions of different areas and contexts, they do not engage 
with the gendered nature of travel behaviour. The framing of solutions relies 
heavily relies on a shift in travel behaviour without understanding these behav-
iours. Secondly, the technological domains of electrifcation, shared mobility, 
digitalisation and mobility-as-a-service (MaaS) are gaining traction in realising 
the overarching ZGO, and the domain of social sustainability in realising ZGO 
is lagging behind. 
The point of contention is that none of the plans and strategies guiding future 
transport growth in Oslo undertakes a gendered approach to support the ongo-
ing initiatives directed at increased usage of sustainable modes. The only plan 
or strategy that acknowledges gender at all is the bicycle strategy. Outside Oslo, 
the gender perspective is found in the walking strategy (that is still under con-
struction in Oslo) in the small Norwegian town of Haugesund (Municipality of 
Haugesund, 2014). The walking strategy in Haugesund addresses disaggregated 
travel patterns, and the issue of safety, suggesting a more gendered walkability 
planning. But overall, the gendered perspective is almost non-existent in the 
current plans. Gendered analyses should be made an integral part of the planning 
strategies and planning documents ranging from the regional to the local levels. 
Not only will it ensure public support, but also give a grounded basis for infra-
structure planning and provision. 
DEMOTRIPS analyses 
In light of the above conclusion, this section presents gendered analyses of Oslo’s 
current and projected travel behaviour by employing the DEMOTRIPS model. 
DEMOTRIPS utilises the current travel data, elasticities between transport 
modes, logistical growth modelling and the expected demographic growth to 
create a prognosis for future travel behaviour. Through combining different ele-
ments, the model estimates how trends in mode usage within specifed age groups 
and gender affect the usage of competing modes and the overall mode distribu-
tion in the area (model details available in Saeteroy Maridal 2018). 
In order to discuss the gendered implications of current and future travel 
behaviour, we present two distinct travel scenarios for Oslo – the frst is the busi-
ness-as-usual (BAU) scenario which is built on the assumption that each age 
group and gender carries forward its present travel behaviour and is not affected 
by policies and programmes directed at ZGO; the second, or the zero-growth, sce-
nario is built on the perception that car usage will reduce signifcantly but will be 
disproportionately divided among the different demographic groups given their 
ability to adopt other modes. The analyses are based on the following datasets: 
• Population projections (extracted from Statistics Norway) 
• Distribution of daily trips on different transport modes split by gender and 
trip length (extracted from The National Travel Survey [NTS] 2013/14) 
(Hjorthol et al., 2014) 
• Mode substitution factors split by trip length 
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Figure 11.1 Oslo population by gender and age groups, 2020 versus 2040 
Both scenarios contain short, medium and long trips, disaggregated by gender and 
age, as analyses based on travel behaviour surveys have consistently revealed that 
transport mode usage is highly dependent on the interaction between gender, age 
and trip length. Similar graphical representations and analyses are presented for 
the long, medium and short trips, providing a level of convenience to read and 
compare the results. Population projections indicate that by 2040, the disparity 
between youth and elders is larger in women than in men, although both gen-
ders are projected to have a spike in their elderly population. Women are also 
projected to see a stronger growth of established workers (40–64 age group) than 
men. These disparities feed into the scenario results and amplify the deviations 
in the existing gendered mobility patterns. 
Scenario Set A: Business as usual scenario (BAU) 
We present the BAU projections for short, medium and long trips disaggregated 
by gender and age. The frst scenario explains and lays out the context of the data 
in detail to avoid being repetitive. 
Long trips 
Figure 11.2 illustrates an excerpt of the mobility data, denoting the mean num-
ber of daily long trips (> 7.5 km) each age group currently undertakes on dif-
ferent modes of transport. What immediately stands out is that men are much 
more car-dependent than women on long trips. The disparity in the number of 
long-distance car trips, both in 2020 and 2040, is signifcant between the genders 
while the reverse relationship for public transport is not as strong, meaning that 
men travel at a higher rate on long daily trips than women. The implications of 
this, in a BAU framework, is that men’s travel habits and population projections 
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Figure 11.2 Oslo mean number of daily long trips per capita, BAU scenario 
Figure 11.3 Oslo mean number of daily medium trips per capita, BAU scenario 
terms of car travel, this is negative for the zero-growth objective because men are 
more car-dependent than women according to the current modal distribution. 
However, as the population’s median age shifts towards the older demographics, 
overall mobility falls on account of a reduction in the mean number of trips. Still, 
car traffc growth is higher than public transport towards 2040. 
Medium trips 
Deviations between the genders are present in medium trips (2.5–7.5 km) as 
well (Figure 11.3). Women have a much higher public transport modal share 
than men and the difference in car dependence between men and women is also 
furthered by women being car passengers at a much higher rate than men. It 
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in medium trips than in short trips in terms of distribution across age groups, 
women lack the car-use spike between the ages of 25 and 34 as seen in men. This 
is, however, present in public transport, where women have considerably more 
trips at the aggregate level than men, illustrating that in the medium trip length 
as well, men are much more car-dependent than women. However, the fact that 
the number of car trips is relatively high in the older age groups as well as amongst 
25–34-year-olds, for both genders, is challenging with respect to the zero-growth 
objective. An even distribution of car ridership combined with the skewed dis-
tribution of sustainable mode ridership towards younger age groups may translate 
into an increased car dependence in the years to come due to the population’s 
rising median age. 
Short trips 
Deviations between men and women’s mobility patterns exist for short trips (< 2.5
km) as well (Figure 11.4). It is evident that for short-distance trips, men are driv-
ing considerably more than women. The distribution in walking trips, on the other
hand, is surprisingly similar between the two genders although the overall walking
mobility is also higher amongst men than women. The only deviation that stands
out is that women over 75 years of age walk considerably more than men. 
Summary 
With respect to the zero-growth objective, mobility patterns of both men and 
women will result in a strong relative increase in car ridership vis-à-vis other modes, 
but in different ways: women have a broader age group spike in car ridership than 
men, which means that even though the population’s median age is projected to 
move upwards, it will still fall within one of the age groups where car ridership is 
high. For men, the ridership spike is narrower (consigned to 35–44-year-olds) but 
Figure 11.4 Oslo mean number of daily short trips per capita, BAU scenario 
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the elder demographics in men that today constitute a smaller share of the overall 
population are even more car-dependent than 35–44-year-olds, according to cur-
rent mobility distributions. The infux of men aged over 45 will, thus, increase 
the overall car share for men relative to other modes. 
According to the BAU trajectories presented, total car travel is expected to 
rise by 11% from 2020 to 2040 which means that 39,824 daily long, medium and 
short car trips need to be substituted by either walking, cycling, or public trans-
port by 2040 if the zero-growth objective is to be met. 
There are, however, both positive and negative aspects of the BAU scenarios 
with respect to the zero-growth objective. On a positive note, overall mobility per 
capita is projected to fall which means that at the aggregate level, slightly fewer 
daily trips will be undertaken in 2040 than in 2020. This is derived from popula-
tion projections where the median age is expected to rise. Across the three sce-
narios, 25–34-year-olds conduct the highest number of daily trips and an ageing 
population means that these demographics will soon constitute a smaller share 
of the overall population, resulting in lower rates of mobility. This is, of course, 
assuming that the age groups’ rates of mobility remain constant towards 2040. 
As for negative implications, the projected car traffc growth is disproportionally 
high relative to the projected growth in sustainable modes of transport across the 
three categories of trip lengths. This is because cars, in general, make up a larger 
share of overall mobility amongst the elder age groups (cf. men). A rising median 
population age combined with a general population infux thus translates into 
elders’ travel habits increasingly affecting overall mobility, making Oslo’s future 
mobility more car-oriented. 
Scenario Set B: Achieving a zero-growth objective (ZGO) 
In presenting the zero-growth scenarios, we plotted the trajectories where the 
sustainable modes identifed by the Nation Transport Plan (NTP) have been set 
to grow and where mode substitution factors have been introduced to the model 
framework. The goal is to analyse how a zero-growth development in car traffc 
could unfold with an emphasis on the gendered responses to the growth rates and 
constraints set in terms of their projected mobility outputs. 
Long trips 
The main ‘problem’ for the elder groups in general and those above 75 years of 
age, in particular, is not that the trips are not transferred away from cars, but 
rather that the population increase is so massive in this demographic group that 
the overall number of trips conducted for all modes will grow despite the trans-
fers to more sustainable modes. Analyses clearly demonstrate that public trans-
port is absorbing prospective car trips for all demographics. The differing rates of 
car ridership transfers between the age groups are due to two factors: population 
increase and its associated rising median age, and the mode substitution factors’ 
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of probability for elders to shift onto public transport in long trips than what is 
the case for the younger age groups. The implication of this is that the habitual 
change needed to substitute public transport for car travel becomes even higher 
with increasing age. 
Medium trips 
On medium trips, there is a decreasing rate of relative transfers from car travel
in older age. The total number of car trips is up for men over 75 years of age in
2040 compared to 2020. Women also demonstrate the same tendency, but the
overall number of car trips still falls across all age groups for women. The same
mechanisms are at play here as in long trips – the projected population growth,
skewed towards the older age groups, results in these demographics having more
trips than before. Note that amongst 25–34-year-olds, the relative decline in car
trips is much stronger for women than for men. The same transfers happen to a
lesser extent for men, while women in this age group are seemingly easier to shift
from cars to the other sustainable transport modes in this scenario. Women, in
almost all age groups, will have gone from being relatively car-dependent to relying
on public transport, cycling and walking for their trips by 2040, but the same cannot
be said for men. Middle-aged and older men are projected to remain car-dependent
on account of their mode substitution factors,2 which explains the lower rate of
transfers from cars to other modes like public transport, bicycling and walking. 
Short trips 
The decreasing rate of negative transfers from cars to sustainable modes is also
present for short trips, but only for men. Here, 75+-year-olds end up having
slightly more car trips in total in 2040 than in 2020, partially due to this age
groups’ relatively high population growth. This development is, however, not
present in the same way amongst women, where car ridership falls considerably
for all age groups. Both in men and women, the relative fall in car ridership is
the strongest amongst 20–29-year-olds who seem to be particularly ready to
substitute cars for sustainable modes in short trips, and 40–44-year-old women
also demonstrate this tendency. It is worth noting that women, in general,
conduct much fewer daily short-distance car trips than men. The total number
of cycling trips is also projected to fall for 25–39-year-olds. The driving factor
behind this projection is not that these age groups do not transfer car trips onto
cycling trips, but because the overall population within these groups is pro-
jected to decline. There are also strong rates of substitution between walking
and cycling on short trips. 
Summary 
The zero-growth scenarios found a clear indication that growth rates for sustain-
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Table 11.3 ZGO Scenario growth rates and aggregate mode shares, long trips 
Cycling Walking Car Car- El-car Car- Public El-cycle 
passenger sharing transport 
Yearly growth 4% 3% 0% 0% 0% 0% 7% 4% 
rate 
Mode shares 3.5% 2.9% 39.1% 9.5% 1.2% 0.9% 42.8% 0.1% 
2020 
Mode shares 3.5% 2.8% 22.0% 7.5% 1.2% 0.9% 61.8% 0.1% 
2040 
Figure 11.5 ZGO Scenario number of trips on select modes by age group and gender, long trips 
achieve zero-growth in car traffc. This applies across all trip lengths. Three fac-
tors cause the above effect: older people, in general, being more car-dependent
than younger people, the demographic shift in terms of an ageing population,
and elders having weaker mode substitution factors from cars onto sustainable
modes on some trip lengths. The population effect in particular will make it
hard for elders to maintain overall car travel at today’s levels. The age groups
corresponding to established workers generally have a high car dependency per
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Table 11.4 ZGO Scenario growth rates and aggregate mode shares, medium trips 
Cycling Walking Car Car- El-car Car- Public El-cycle 
passenger sharing transport 
Yearly growth 7% 4% 0% 0% 0% 0% 6% 7% 
rate 
Mode shares 8.3% 16.3% 25.6% 4.6% 0.7% 0.6% 43.5% 0.3% 
2020 
Mode shares 9.7% 17.7% 12.6% 3.0% 0.7% 0.6% 55.3% 0.4% 
2040 
Figure 11.6 ZGO Scenario number of trips on select modes by age group and gender, 
medium trips 
to achieve zero-growth in car traffc because its population growth is expected to
be somewhat weaker than the oldest age groups. In general, men prove harder
to shift away from cars and to sustainable modes than women, partly due to men
being more car-dependent than women. This is particularly true for medium
trips (2.5–7.5 km). 25–34-year olds, while having the highest rates of mobility of
all age groups, are relatively easily transferred to sustainable modes on account
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Table 11.5 ZGO Scenario growth rates and aggregate mode shares, short trips 
Cycling Walking Car Car- El-car Car- Public El-cycle 
passenger sharing transport 
Yearly growth 7% 5% 0% 0% 0% 0% 3% 7% 
rate 
Mode shares 5.6% 72.2% 11.4% 1.8% 0.4% 0.3% 8.1% 0.2% 
2020 
Mode shares 5.3% 81.9% 2.8% 0.8% 0.5% 0.3% 8.0% 0.3% 
2040 
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this demographic goes a long way in reaching the zero-growth objective at the
aggregate level because they constitute a large part of overall daily mobility.
The rising median age, however, counters some of the effects in ease of shift-
ing 25–34-year-olds onto sustainable modes because, by 2040, this group will
constitute a smaller share of Oslo’s overall population and number of daily trips
than today’s scenario. 
Concluding discussion 
Our analyses reveal that Oslo has a vision, but it has not successfully linked 
mobility plans with climate action plans. Strategies for modifying travel behav-
iour saturate the plans targeting climate goals and are the central component of 
plans for lowering emissions. The path adopted for modifying travel behaviour 
for the city includes reducing car use through tolls, parking restrictions, land 
use specifcations, locating businesses in the right place, nodal/hub development, 
densifcation, and a strategy for bicycling. This science–business frame is further 
bolstered by an active implementation of ‘electrifcation of the transport sector’ 
as part of the solutions to abate emissions and become fossil-free. Shared mobil-
ity, again a part of the science–business framing, is seen as part of a future which 
will operate with reduced car use. 
On the surface, the plans and strategies for Oslo at all levels, and even those
with a consolidated focus on climate strategies, do not prioritise building a
knowledge base on different demographic groups and fails to acknowledge the
persistent differences between the travel characteristics of men and women and
across age groups. For instance, gendered travel patterns and their intersection
with age is neither mentioned nor taken into cognizance in the different plans
and strategies. It seems that gender balance is taken for granted, and there is
a categorical lack of knowledge among planners on how to sharpen the focus
of the proposed plans. The hypothesis that planners might think that it is not
their jurisdiction to differentiate between demographic groups in the conceptu-
alisation and drafting of plans is deeply problematic, and tends to lean towards
the fssure identifed in literature review of ignoring the ethical-justice frames,
often associated with feminine characteristics. The plans will inevitably affect
men and women differently and it is a lost opportunity if the already established
clientele base for sustainable transport – i.e. women – are not given priority in
the upcoming plans. 
For example, the implementation of a bike-sharing scheme in Oslo was found 
to be lacking in being a viable option for women at its initial stages (Priya Uteng 
et al., 2020). Through trials and errors, a better understanding on how men and 
women are using the system differently is emerging and, consequently, women’s 
use of Oslo’s bike-sharing scheme has gone up in recent years (ibid). Similar 
fndings have been recorded for car sharing around the world, putting women at 
a disadvantageous position compared to men in their uptake of these upcoming 
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is lacking in the transport sector, which if applied can certainly strengthen the 
climate goals. 
In short, the case of interlocking between climate goals and transport plans
in Oslo has, to date, not been analysed from a gendered perspective. Building
on Kronsell’s (2013) words, the practice of regimes, and the norms that con-
stitute the social order of the urban transport landscape, remain important for
climate governance and, hence, need to be actively scrutinised for gendered
outcomes. If the core principles of the plans addressing climate change and
ZGO are taken in alliance with the discussions on gender and made more
explicit, climate change mitigation and adaptation strategies can be better
debated and addressed. Hiding these underlying trends is not only irresponsible
but creates serious chasms between public policies and public acceptance of
proposed plans. 
Further, distribution impacts are not explicit in most of the planning docu-
ments. The need for a shift has been seen as necessary at all levels of government, 
but a disturbing aspect is that the combined plans for Oslo indicate that regional 
development would continue as before, regional car dependency would continue 
to increase and the targets for greenhouse gas reduction as well as the regional 
competitiveness would most likely not be reached (Plansamarbeidet, 2015). 
From a methodological perspective, the usage of results from models like 
DEMOTRIPS should be routinised for municipalities and regional authorities 
based on regular feeds from different sources of big data, travel surveys and projec-
tions from Statistics Norway. In order to plot future travel behaviour scenarios for 
different regions and cities, disaggregated analyses of passenger transport in light 
of ageing, gendered travel patterns and preferences, societal megatrends (like 
digitalisation, etc.) and transport sector trends should inform both transport and 
climate plans and strategies. 
To conclude, the existing knowledge gap on both the gendered profle of daily 
trips, portfolio of age-groups and their interaction with the different policy efforts 
aiming at modal shifts means that the current policies run a risk of being much 
less effective. Seeing that the entire zero-growth objective rests on the ration-
ale that travellers can be simply steered towards alternative modes constitutes a 
real problem. For creating effective climate policies in the urban-transport plan-
ning sector, further empirical research is needed to design targeted measures and 
interventions addressing both gender and age, based on the principles of gender 
mainstreaming, in climate policy-making. 
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Notes 
1 The zero-growth objective was introduced by the National Public Roads 
Administration in the National Transport Plan in 2014 for Norway’s largest urban 
regions. The goal entails that the future growth in transport must be absorbed by pub-
lic transport, cycling and walking and not by private car. In short, vehicle kilometres 
driven by private cars should either remain constant or go down in future. 
2 The mode substitution factors are based on the likelihood of one mode replacing 
another depending on the prevalence of various trip purposes on the different modes. 
This was based on the Norwegian Travel Survey (NTS) 2013/14 which specifes the 
age, gender, trip purposes, trip length and mode used for each trip recorded in the 
NTS. The rationale for calculating mode substitution factors is that if, for example, 
cycling trips according to NTS constitute a high number of school trips and a low 
number of medical trips for a particular age group, one can assume that any new sub-
stituted cycling trip for that age group is more likely to be a school trip than a medical 
trip. These likelihoods are calculated across modes, age groups and trip purposes in the 
ypurposex
following way: LH (purpose = x y) = 
ån 1 ypurposeii= 
The equation denotes the likelihood (LH) f a . trip on mode y. aving trip purpose 
x. . or each age group. In short, it refects the probability of a trip on transport mode 
y. aving travel purpose x. 
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12 When gender equality 
and Earth care meet 
Ecological masculinities in practice 
Robin Hedenqvist, Paul M. Pulé, Vidar 
Vetterfalk, and Martin Hultman 
Introduction 
The global social and environmental problems of today are gendered. They are 
products of the complex multiple and slow violences of masculinist social injus-
tices and environmental degradation. Accordingly, this chapter considers the 
fawed aspects of malestream masculinities and research on ecological masculini-
ties, seeking an alternative path forward to a vibrant, living planet that celebrates 
the intrinsic value of all life. The frst part of this chapter provides a conceptual 
overview of ecological masculinities, which advocates for a transformation from 
masculine hegemonisation1 to ecologisation.2 In their monograph, Ecological 
Masculinities: Theoretical Foundations and Practical Guidance, Hultman and Pulé 
(2018, pp. 53–54) positioned ecological masculinities as a conceptual shelter for 
conversations about men, masculinities and the Earth.3 The arguments presented 
here are based on the premises conveyed in that text. 
As a growing feld of study with accompanying pluralised praxes, ecologi-
cal masculinities prioritise concurrent systemic and personal transformations.
Hultman and Pulé (2018, Chapter 8) recognised that further feld research
testing the practical manifestations of ecological masculinites were needed.
This led to the development of an education material4 and workshop series
designed to help accelerate the ecologisation of masculinities throughout civil
society, to promote shoulder-to-shoulder work with women and non-binary
individuals, and organisations in support of gender equality and ending men’s
violence against those humans and other-than-humans who are traditionally
marginalised. Notably in support of environmental justice, girls and women
have been the principle international leaders of grassroots movements. The
clear lack of male engagement is problematic since men, being the main per-
petrators of violence against the planet and people, carry the lion’s share of
responsibility to change these fatal and unjust social and ecological realities.
With this in mind, the second part of the chapter discusses research and analy-
ses of the education in question piloted at a community garden space in Järna,
Sweden, called ‘Under Tallarna’ (or ‘Under the Pine Trees’). An assessment of
participant experiences of the education revealed ideological and behavioural
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masculinities that they harbour. Interviews were conducted with the all-male
participants at the end of the workshop series. All interviewees participated
voluntarily and were supportive of gender justice and environmental care to
varying degrees from the outset of the workshop series. The following personal
themes emerged from the interviews as increased outcomes of the education:
interconnectivity, accountability, emotional literacy and embodied knowledge.
On a systemic level, the effcacy of this education was considered for its capac-
ity to help male participants integrate the realities of our social and ecological
crises, and become proactive contributors to creating a gender-equal and eco-
logically sustainable world for all. 
Politics in the (m)Anthropocene 
This is a critical moment; a time where the destructive forces of human socie-
ties on the Earth’s living systems are irrefutable. Anthropogenic global heating
has become a disastrous consequence of human industrial activities. What was
for decades an intellectual exercise, a concern, a fear, a prediction, an ominous
warning, a cautionary tale, is now our cumulative global reality (Lindvall et al.,
2020). During the modern industrial era, transnational institutions have categori-
cally avoided moving the planet closer to the necessary solutions (Allen et al.,
2018). In fact, awareness and mitigation of these challenges have been met with
unapologetic inaction and denial, which accompanies what Hultman and Pulé
(2018) referred to as industrial/breadwinner masculinities.5 Industrial/breadwin-
ner masculinities are defned as ‘malestream patriarchal, hegemonic and norma-
tive masculinities (which we apply primarily to men, but also to the masculinities
adopted by some women and non-binary/genderqueer people as well)’ who back-
ground the social and environmental implications of industrialisation for the sake
of capital growth and its associated accesses to power and privileges (Hultman and
Pulé, 2018, pp. 40–41). This defnition stands with the tepid actions that attempt
to regulate our problems away, which Hultman and Pulé (2018) referred to as
ecomodern masculinities. Ecomodern masculinities have their origins in initia-
tives such as the Brundtland Report (1987; Hultman, 2013). This categorisation
is aligned with calls for long-term sustainable development policies and practices
that, when combined with measured responses to global emissions6, have resulted
in reforms that pay lip service to the costs of industrialisation on human societies
and the ecological integrity of the Earth. Ecomodern masculinities are the gen-
dered identities that dominate systemic pathways that aim to protect and preserve
economic growth while also offering nominal care for society and environment
(Hultman and Pulé, 2018, pp. 45–46), which, for example, align with the ecologi-
cal modernisation model for global climate governance. For many individuals (of
all gender identities) who beneft from hegemonies that fourish through indus-
trial/breadwinner and ecomodern masculinities, ecologisation can ignite an exis-
tential crisis that generates resistance in, at times, extreme forms – for example,
the misogyny (and other forms of marginalisation, such as transphobia), pseudo-
science and conspiratorial vitriol that commonly accompanies climate denial. 
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Both aforementioned masculinities categorisations rely heavily on hegemonic 
masculinist global economics.7 They also give us insight into the comprehensive 
barriers that prevent transformational change towards greater care for the planet 
and people. Hultman and Pulé (2018) noted that the path dependencies that 
convey power and privileges to industrial/breadwinner are enmeshed with the 
fossil-fuelled economy (also see Daggett, 2018). They noted the similar ineffcacy 
of ecomodern masculinities, replete with its reformist responses to climate change 
action through ecological modernisation that pervades global governance, at 
least in parts of Europe (Chapters 1 and 10, this volume). In combination, both 
masculinities illuminate the ways that humanity struggles to break free from 
the gravitational pull that shapes pursuits of consumer-driven self-gratifcation 
and, in doing so, places select groups of an advantaged few (particularly Global 
Northern, straight, white, middle- and older-aged men) ahead of the ‘glocal’ 
(global through to local) commons. Seeking solutions beyond these destructive 
socialisations, Hultman and Pulé (2018) posited a third categorisation called eco-
logical masculinities, which looks beyond the enmeshment between masculini-
ties and the global economic, political and social dependency on industrialised 
extractivism. They defned this relational categorisation as a material feminist 
and semiotic ‘gathering point for previous conversations on men, masculinities 
and Earth’ which prioritises and dramatises the transformation of masculinities 
from hegemonisation to ecologisation on political and personal scales (Hultman 
and Pulé, 2018, p. 53). Ecological masculinities – as conceptualised here and 
elsewhere (Hultman and Pulé, 2018, 2019; Pulé and Hultman, in press) – seek 
philosophical alignments with the hard-fought victories of feminists and ecologi-
cal feminists in controverting men’s habitual domination of marginalised groups 
and individuals along with other-than-human nature. 
The view that the world is here for humans, and for a privileged few in par-
ticular, to beneft from is an obscene consequence of masculinist hegemonisation 
(Hultman and Pulé, 2018). Di Chiro (2017) has similarly considered that the 
(m)Anthropocene with its domination of ‘white northern male voices’ has cre-
ated and driven the planet into an epoch of human-induced (male-dominated) 
global heating along with geological and ecological perturbations, as a nuanced 
interpretation of what is now broadly referred to as the Anthropocene (also see 
Raworth, 2014). Ironically, those who stand to lose the most from the knock-on 
effects of global heating have rushed to pump and mine oil, gas and coal, as if to 
suck as much wealth from the Earth as quickly as possible (perhaps an indica-
tion of their surreptitious acknowledgement of the climate science). In doing 
so, they have accelerated the severity of the social and ecological consequences 
needing to be urgently addressed (Anshelm and Hultman, 2014; Dunlap et al., 
2016; Pulé and Hultman, in press). Those individuals of the aforementioned, 
largely Global Northern, straight, white, middle- and older-aged men, are deeply 
embedded within global industrial and economic systems (Demelle, 2019) and, 
thereby, are the common embodiments of industrial/breadwinner masculinities 
and the group most responsible for causing global and intergenerational destruc-
tiveness. Notably, some of these individuals have successfully fused ideological 
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climate change denial with right-wing nationalist political agendas around the 
globe (Anshelm and Hultman, 2014).8 
The actions of these individuals and the groups they represent, are being con-
tested with increasing levels of ferce grace. Consider Sweden’s Greta Thunberg 
who, since 2018, has gained considerable prominence in the global youth-led 
climate justice movement. That movement has acutely challenged sceptics and 
deniers, even employing legal means in some instances (Arnoldy, 2019), making 
bold demands of international leaders to reverse the social and ecological trends 
of anthropocentrism (McCall, 2019). Thunberg has applied persistent pressure 
on international leaders to step up, and in doing so she and her colleagues have 
brought concerns about the growing climate emergency to the hearts and minds 
of a broader audience of global citizens – effectively mainstreaming the conver-
sation and inspiring many to action. Youth-generated protests (e.g. Friday’s for 
Future; Extinction Rebellion) have been met by climate change deniers, whose 
abundance of funds and lobbying effcacy, has fipped into high gear (Crowe, 
2019). Commonly associated with right-wing nationalist political agendas and 
buoyed by denialist pseudo-sciences (Holland, 2014), the climate change denial 
machine has achieved wide-reaching infuence over public debate (Hultman 
et al., 2019; The Climate Reality Project, 2019). The successes of these vocal 
minority views are highly funded and organised. They call attention to the need 
for proactive responses to the growing climate emergency. As an example, con-
sider the increased scholarly attention that exposes these resistances towards 
effective mitigation politics, such as citizen’s democracy, human rights, and the 
celebration of intra- and trans-species diversity as deeply masculinist (Kaiser and 
Puschmann, 2017; Forchtner et al., 2018). Some two years into regular youth-led 
climate strikes around the world, global governments are still in a state of dith-
ering as a result of the bulwark created by these increasingly organised deniers 
(Thunberg et al., 2020). 
Here, consider the global social and environmental terrains to be profoundly 
gendered precisely because they are steeped in economic inequalities that are cor-
related with race, class, geopolitics and age. The planet’s most privileged groups 
and individuals are being challenged by the straightforwardness of young people 
in the climate justice movement who are calling denialism and right-wing nation-
alist political agendas to account. Their actions have exposed the obfuscating 
of injustices that accompany industrial/breadwinner masculinities, which have 
been illuminated by feminist and ecofeminist scholarship and activism for some 
time (Ruether, 1975, p. 204; Hultman and Pulé, 2018). From these trends, we 
can conclude that the (m)Anthropocene has a long heritage of gendered Global 
Northern invention. Our species’ energy addiction, which has been fed by fossil 
fuelled economies for little more than a century, is only one (although a severe) 
example of the masculinist hegemonies and their associated practices that have 
weaponised and industrialised masculinist primacy (Hultman and Pulé, 2018). 
This is not a new phenomenon; the origins of this trend can in fact be traced back 
to the 17th century as our species transitioned towards the Industrial Revolution 
(Merchant, 1980). With a seemingly limitless bounty of the earth’s resources, 
  When gender equality and Earth care meet 211 
boundless Indigenous lands to conquer and machinery to replace human labour, 
Global Northern imperialists have enacted settler colonial strategies to stretch 
the reach of their nations, ensuring a one-way fow of wealth from the Earth in its 
then farthest reaches, through the extracted, colonised, enslaved and dominated, 
back to Western Europe. 
Ecofeminist scholars such as Susan Buckingham (2017), Greta Gaard (2014), 
Sherilyn MacGregor (2009) and Carolyn Merchant (1980) have illuminated this 
confuence of gendered characteristics and the dire social and ecological conse-
quences of Western industrialisation over time. Such are the protracted failures 
of Western modernity. But these failings cannot defne our future as a planet or 
species. Rather than ignoring or freezing in overwhelm in the wake of the social 
and ecological impacts of the (m)Anthropocene, this chapter argues in favour of 
masculine ecologisation and considers how this process can be manifested practi-
cally. The following sections introduce the case study of select participants from 
the men’s refective groups that piloted the education material. 
The organisation MÄN and its work with gender equality and 
the environment 
MÄN is a feminist non-proft organisation that was founded in Sweden in 
1993 to engage men and boys with gender equality and action against men’s 
violence against women. MÄN’s vision is a gender-equal world without violence. 
An important part of its work for change is to challenge destructive masculinities 
norms as they impact men’s and women’s relational exchanges, provide a space 
for self-refection and discussion, educate in favour of violence prevention meth-
odologies and promote gender-equal parenthood. MÄN is both a national fed-
eration with about 1,800 members and 20 local groups and associations around 
Sweden and a professional organisation with approximately 30 staff members 
(MÄNa, n.d.). MÄN currently has projects in Sweden and Eastern Europe, and 
is part of the international network, MenEngage, which involves men and boys 
in this work globally (MÄNb, n.d.). 
In 2014, MÄN began looking at the intersection between gender equality, 
masculinity and the environment. The organisation acknowledged that ecofem-
inism has long identifed the intersections between patriarchal structures and 
destructive norms around masculinity, resulting in environmental degradation. 
This was prompted by the organisation’s recognition that men as a group have the 
largest ecological impact – leading to worsened conditions for women and chil-
dren in particular – while it is mainly women who are assuming the responsibility 
to challenge ecological degradation and its social implications. MÄN started to 
use this insight to bring about change in masculinities norms in pursuit of gender 
equality and pro-environmental behaviour, concurrently (MÄN, 2019). MÄN 
proceeded to host seminars on men, gender equality and the environment, joined 
the Swedish Climate Network, wrote a discussion paper titled Men, Masculinities 
and Climate Change (Kato-Wallace et al., 2015) together with several MenEngage 
partner organisations, and initiated the Gender and Environment Network for 
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Inspiration (GeMiNI) – which is a ‘meeting place to explore and learn about 
the interlinked issues of gender, environment, climate and the related theory 
and practice’ that aims to ‘contribute to the public debate through regular joint 
activities, by increasing the awareness about gender and environment as inter-
linked issues that need to be addressed together’ (GeMiNI, n.d.). 
By the end of 2017, the #MeToo movement commenced in response to multi-
ple sexual abuse accusations, most acutely (but not exclusively) brought into the 
light by the sexual violations of Harvey Weinstein. Under the hashtag #MeToo 
on social media, many women testifed to men’s sexual harassment and, thus, 
clarifed the magnitude and normalisation of the problem (Sayej, 2017; The 
Everyday Sexism Project, n.d.). With this, about 1,000 men in Sweden turned 
to MÄN with questions about what they could do to contribute to change. 
Therefore, MÄN brought forward the conversation guide #AfterMeToo for men’s 
groups, where men got to refect on their roles in patriarchal structures and the 
violence towards their surroundings. During four sessions of two hours each, men 
were encouraged to break with the male culture of emotional restraint and invin-
cibility and feel and refect on topics of masculinities norms, relations, sex, por-
nography and objectifcation of women, with a norm-critical approach. A central 
element is the specifc format that promotes active listening and a fair distribu-
tion of sharing/speaking time (MÄN, 2018).9 The #AfterMeToo workshop guide 
has since been expanded to include an additional four sessions linking men’s vio-
lence against women and genderqueer people to the structural violence against 
other-than-human nature. This conversation guide, called Men in the Climate 
Crisis, was piloted at the permaculture garden ‘Under Tallarna’ (‘Under the Pine 
Trees’) in Järna, Sweden. 
The men in the climate crisis refective groups 
Data were collected to assess and analyse the effectiveness of the initiative 
MÄN Under Tallarna; a pro-feminist workshop that was designed and imple-
mented with men at this permaculture venue. In these refective groups, men 
were encouraged to embrace the severity of the ongoing global ecological crisis, 
express feelings about it, refect on their role in ecological degradation and fnd 
diverse ways to contribute to change. The groups explored how to choose reci-
procity and care in the making of an equal and sustainable world without violence 
(MÄN, 2020).10 Men in the Climate Crisis focuses on how to feel strengthened and 
engaged, rather than afraid and passive, about the crises and challenges of our 
times (MÄN, 2020).11 
Between 2018 and 2020, MÄN Under Tallarna has hosted seven refective 
groups, leading them through the Men in the Climate Crisis workshop – with six to 
eight participants in each group, spread over eight sessions (one session a week) 
of two hours each. The participants had actively sought out these groups, which 
suggests that they were positively attuned to pro-feminist and pro-environmental 
messaging. Robin Hedenqvist (2020) reached out to all these men to conduct 
interviews about their experiences. Half of them wanted to participate and, by 
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the end, the research resulted in in-depth interviews with seven participants. 
Those fndings, accounted for in the following section, are based on these inter-
views and were summarised in his master’s thesis (Hedenqvist, 2020). The seven 
participants were chosen based on their willingness and availability to meet in 
person for the interviews. The fact that these men were self-selected (interviews 
were only conducted with participants who were intrigued by the general request) 
had an impact on the study. For example, it could be that these men were keen to 
participate in the study just because of their strong opinion about the refective 
groups and/or simply because they perceived personal change. If so, there would 
be a bias against experiences that are less dedicated or transformative. 
The men interviewed gave several reasons for participating in the refective 
groups: being environmentally and socially concerned; wanting to contribute to 
gender equality and a healthy environment; being curious about the male role 
and masculine identity; wanting to associate with other men; to develop as a 
person; and getting recommended to join. They were quite diverse in terms of 
age (between 30 and 65) and profession (e.g. in healthcare, professional com-
munication, construction and engineering). Most, however, could be described 
as Western, white, middle-class, middle-aged, cisgender men. This is a privileged 
group within prevailing power structures that tend to have a socialised preposses-
sion (or internalised sense) of feeling superior and entitled. In general, this group 
benefts from the socio-cultural role of industrial/breadwinner masculinities, rein-
forces it, and has a large socio-ecological footprint (Hultman and Pulé, 2018). 
Therefore, it is particularly vital to promote personal and structural change 
amongst this group of men. To study their experiences in the refective groups is 
a potential pathway towards ecologisation. 
Perceptions of global social and ecological crises, and men’s roles 
in them 
There was a view amongst several participants that patterns of personal and 
internalised superiorisation of male domination, and the patriarchal structures 
that manifest them, are responsible for the abusive culture of industrial/bread-
winner masculinities; a culture replete with its justifcations of violence against 
marginalised people (especially women and genderqueer people) and other-than-
human nature. In this culture of abuse, other-than-human nature is rendered a 
mere resource, deprived of intrinsic value, and is accompanied by disproportion-
ately large levels of travel, meat and energy consumption. Caring for the glocal
commons tends to be associated with traditionally feminine and womanly traits, 
thus offering a legitimate critique of hegemonic masculinities and manhood. 
The emotionally restricting norms of toughness and stoicism promoted by 
hegemonic masculinist socialisations shun vulnerability internally and externally 
through social constraints that condition boys to suppress feelings and lose touch 
with their inner emotional life, and other people, as they grow up (Hultman and 
Pulé, 2018). Upon reaching adulthood, this lack of emotional comfort and ability 
to be earnest is in many men’s lives expressed through domination and control, 
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effectively oppressing their surrounding environments in a similar manner to 
the suppression of personal feelings. To adopt a bully mentality and be violent 
against oneself, other men in dominant groups, marginalised people, and other-
than-human nature can become a strategy to compensate for such emotional and 
personal insecurity. The double-ended suppression noted here is indicative of 
the emotional emaciation that commonly accompanies masculinist socialisations 
which are, of course, most acutely internalised by cis-males but can pervade the 
lived experiences of women and genderqueer people as well. These masculinist 
norms restrain feelings and intuition by reifying logical problem-solving, trust in 
economic rationalism, seeking technological fxes to social and ecological prob-
lems, and amplifying competitive and individualistic approaches to life that infer 
a materialistic narcissism (Mellström, 1995). These values have been imperatives 
for the institutionalisation of industrial capitalism and its associated ecological 
destruction, in which people (their labour) and other-than-human nature are 
considered sole resources for proft maximisation (Merchant, 1980). 
The patriarchal/capitalist principle of domination, combined with the mas-
culinist norms championed by industrial/breadwinner masculinities, block many 
men’s abilities to acknowledge and deal with the pain and suffering that comes 
from abusive behaviour, effectively obstructing personal and structural change. 
In order to counteract these patterns of command and control that aim to ‘tame’ 
and subordinate the surroundings in similar ways to those who are ‘otherised’, it 
is vital to focus on and reconcile the lack of emotional and relational proximity 
amongst men as an important starting point in the transition from hegemonisa-
tion to ecologisation (Hultman and Pulé, 2018). In other words, men must feel 
the despair and loss associated with our global social and ecological problems 
(Pease, 2019). 
Vulnerability and emotional literacy 
Interestingly, the participants in the workshops viewed the ability to care for the 
Earth, others and ourselves as deeply linked to the ability to be emotional and 
feel empathy and connectivity with others. One participant noted that: 
How we are taking care of our Earth is linked to how we are taking care of our 
inner emotional life and how we are taking care of our relationships. It has a 
very strong connection. (Interviewee 6, our translation). 
(Hedenqvist, 2020, p. 35) 
Through the workshop series at Under Tallarna, it became evident that a vital 
frst step towards ecologisation is to expose the costs of social inequalities and 
ecological destruction on the men themselves and the relationships that they 
hold most dear. The case study demonstrated that, from this starting point, facili-
tating broader, deeper, and wider care was not only made possible but became a 
natural series of next steps to be taken as the participating men were able to touch 
their inner despair about the state of the world. This may, on some level, seem 
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like more of the same; of making it all about the individualised man in situ and 
attempting to redefne masculinities norms, which runs the risk of enabling the 
reinvention of masculinist hegemonies dressed up in new and more caring forms 
(Pease, 2019). However, our research demonstrated that to go too far, too fast by 
breaking with masculinity altogether runs a great risk of cauterising many men’s 
curiosity and willingness to fnd ways to be integral to solving our conundrums, 
beyond being blamed for the planetary problems. The male refective groups wel-
comed the creation of a safe space in order to let one’s guard down and be vulner-
able for a change. In effect, they created a forum for the kind of ‘learn[ing] how 
to express their emotions and concerns about the looming ecological crisis facing 
the planet’ that Pease (2019, p. 121) called for. The participants were asked to 
refect on the sense of entitlement, encouraged by masculine socialisations, that 
stands at the core of men’s violence (against the Earth, others and the self) and 
made explicit through MÄN’s #AfterMeToo foundational training. This resulted 
in expressions of grief concerning social and ecological exploitation and a will to 
scrutinise personal behaviour more closely. 
Because … I think as a man … and I myself have previously in my life … 
have taken a lot of criticism like it is me who is wrong. I’ve done wrong, I 
am wrong. And when you end up in that place, there is no room for develop-
ment. And for further … to open up and dare to be vulnerable. (Interviewee 
4, our translation) 
(Hedenqvist, 2020, p. 40) 
Some participants discussed the ways that, before participating in the refective 
groups, in-grained defence mechanisms laid into their psyches from a young age 
prohibited attempts to be open-hearted and get truly close to another person. 
A similar defensiveness was felt whenever criticism of specifc (and relatable) 
behaviours was raised – invoking emotionally charged responses such as guilt, 
shame and anger, which were commonly suppressed, but through the workshop 
were encouraged and brought forth. These expressions of autonomy and tough-
ness, aligning with traditionally masculine characteristics (‘manliness’ being 
defned by being ‘unwomanly’ [sic]), make it diffcult to acknowledge the personal 
impacts of one’s choices and/or behaviours on others. The research demonstrated 
that, for some men, this was a key source of resistance to change. Criticism 
became a threat to self-identity control and accumulated power, prompting some 
to aggressively reject or resist the ecologisation process. Notably, violent and 
oppressive behaviour was exposed for the way some men can use these traits to 
conceal the negative feelings evoked by criticism and accountability to planetary 
problems. These gendered responses preserved the status quo and the patriarchal 
social order. 
The workshop series helped to illuminate the banal normality of industrial/ 
breadwinner masculinities as a globally dominant unmarked categorisation and 
the role of these socialisations in securing power and control through the institu-
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2014). These revelations helped participants register the degree to which climate 
change denial was directly correlated in destructive ecological, familial and per-
sonal actions that disregarded the levels of care needed in a truly sustainable 
world. In this sense, the participants struggled to defend identities that are deeply 
tied to the self-gratifying and presumed right to dominate. 
Relationality, care, and embodiment 
Several participants adopted a wider relational point of view through the refec-
tive groups. The practices of active listening, problematising norms of masculin-
ity, discussing how they have affected oneself and others while embracing the facts 
and experiences of oppressed ‘others’, and sharing intimate stories and feelings 
on these topics seem to have contributed to a greater sense of interconnectivity 
(illuminating the ways that everyone/everything is connected and constitutive 
of nature) and emotional literacy. It was made evident to participants in the 
workshop series that those behaviours and actions that they considered normal 
and harmless, might be experienced entirely different by others. In other words, 
the adage that ‘no man is an island’ became increasingly self-evident. When they 
became aware of the structural problems and the limitations they imposed, their 
willingness to challenge prevailing power structures increased. 
While the workshops had the effect of exposing blind spots associated with 
white male privilege, shifting attention away from blaming and shaming the men 
made it easier to move towards more attentive and ecologically attuned senti-
ments and actions. It facilitated an openness where criticism could be construc-
tively considered, not as a threat, but as an opportunity for self-development 
towards better social and ecological impact individually and societally. This men-
tal shift was transformational and a vital ingredient in fostering accountability 
for personal actions, awakening the courage to question those who sustain an 
abusive culture and minimising the risks of future harmful social and environ-
mental actions. 
But then it also helped me … the frst male refective group I joined last
fall. It helped me a lot … the step from the relationship with people, with
take-off points in #Metoo, to the relationship with nature. That it wasn’t
just intellectual, but rather … I just felt that I wanted to act in other ways.
I stopped fying because it felt right, more than it was an intellectual deci-
sion. … It helps me a lot that it doesn’t feel like a sacrifce not to fy or not
to watch porn for example, but it just feels … right. (Interviewee 1, our
translation) 
(Hedenqvist, 2020, p. 38) 
Most of the participants interviewed perceived themselves as conscious about 
issues of gender and the environment. A common assertion after completing 
the workshop series suggested that accumulating more factual knowledge about 
the climate crisis was not a priority, but rather emphasises the importance of 
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developing emotional literacy and relational connectivity with the other partici-
pants. This increased the ‘contact awareness’ (as referred to by one interviewee) 
and enhanced participants’ abilities to practise their knowledge in everyday life, 
particularly with their loved ones. This represented a starting point from which 
the participants could then develop deeper emotional bonds with the Earth, oth-
ers and themselves, motivating the participants to move away from destructive 
practices as a virtuous act rather than as a sacrifce. For example, awareness about 
heavy pollution associated with fying has become wider knowledge, but it was 
not until this knowledge became grounded in emotional connections to the envi-
ronment that the pledge to never fy again could be made by some of the men 
who participated. Similarly, awareness existed about the domestic and societal 
violence and abuse associated with pornography but consumption and support 
for that industry had become a habit for some and this only subsided once emo-
tional connectivity was forged in the self and with the group. Thus, building 
proximity with others (rather than dwelling in isolation) made it easier to break 
with destructive, privileged patterns and truly act according to values considered 
soul-serving rather than soul-destroying. Hence, to go from an isolated and intel-
lectualised approach to building mutual and emotional ties to the Earth, others 
and the self, accelerated the development of ‘embodied knowledge’ and from that 
the implementation of caring behaviours in everyday life. To feel relational (as 
opposed to autonomous) became synonymous with feeling included, connected 
and part of something bigger than the self, making it harder to ‘otherise’ and 
dominate and easier to care. 
(Re)connecting with nature 
Seemingly having improved the relational and emotional comprehension of par-
ticipants, the workshop series served as an effective counterpoint to the myopic 
care and masculinist sentiments of industrial/breadwinner masculinities. Most 
participants expressed increased enthusiasm and action towards (re)connections 
with human and other-than-human others. This included reduced support for the 
physical and emotional distancing and alienation promoted by globalised mar-
kets and global ways of being (e.g. worldwide commodity chains, globetrotting, 
etc.) accompanied by a reclaimed and localised sense of place. One participant 
described how he discovered this underlying urge to be in the forest – a missing 
piece from his childhood that he had lost contact with – which has inspired him 
to go into the woods as often as possible: 
the sessions have probably made me realise just how much nature means to 
me … I grew up in the woods basically. But I came to the insight that I live 
so far away nowadays. I live so far away from nature. I’m never in the forest 
anymore. And it became very powerful for me that I feel a longing for those 
parts. So it’s had the effect that I now on a principally daily basis look for 
the opportunities to go outdoors. … And that, in turn, brings about more … 
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You think twice. In the small things. I don’t take the car short distances. I 
try to go by public transport. A little more in that direction. And then also 
like I began to do with gender equality, to raise the issue in my everyday life 
and question those in my near surroundings. (Interviewee 7, our translation) 
(Hedenqvist, 2020, p. 46) 
Apart from bringing him more energy, he proclaimed that the strengthened phys-
ical relationship with the outdoors gave him an increased sense of engagement 
with pro-environmental behaviour; to adopt continuous personal and interper-
sonal engagements that reduced ecological footprints and infuenced others to 
do the same. He also stated that he used to think all problems were other men’s 
fault, which stopped him from seeing his role in patriarchal structures, awakening 
personal accountability and responsibility, which he had not experienced before. 
Realising that he, too, must actively work against these structures in order to 
change things – not just point at others – became a pivotal motivator to become 
part of a core team at his male-dominated workplace to promote gender equality. 
Another participant asserted how he previously sought personal and profes-
sional affrmations by being conscious and enacting what he believed to be pro-
gressive masculine traits. Through participation in the workshop series, he noted 
that personal appearances were previously overriding his deeper understanding 
and support for feminist and environmental progress on the structural level. 
This kind of superfcial activism was registered as similar to ecomodern business 
strategies where more resources are put on ‘pink-’ and ‘green-washing’ than on 
contributing to authentic structural change. Think, for example, of how inter-
national apparel companies brand their products as sustainable and pay feminist 
celebrities to promote them, while having women and girls in South East Asian 
sweatshops making them for low wages under dreadful conditions that also pol-
lute the surrounding environment with chemical discharge (ITGLWF, 2011). He 
noted that being open, vulnerable and self-refexive developed his awareness of 
the differences between shallow and deep activism, and with this insight, enabled 
him to focus on actual change – such as practising a gender-equal relationship 
and parenthood with his partner. 
It has defnitely been a start to … a work, a process and maybe above all, a 
spiritual part of the environment. Like it also was a lot about … like con-
necting, getting in touch, feeling a birch or something. Finding something 
… that we also belong together in some way. More gratitude about every-
thing I get … that I eat less meat than I did before since it just feels right. But 
if I do, not always, but quite often, I can think that this has been a cow or a 
deer and send a small thought of thankfulness that I get to eat a little piece. 
(Interviewee 1, our translation) 
(Hedenqvist, 2020, p. 45) 
Other participants inferred an elevated concern for (other-than-human) animal
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bless the other-than-human animal on the plate, reducing meat and dairy con-
sumption, as well as a desire to become self-suffcient where meat was still pro-
duced by developing skills in animal husbandry in order to raise the animals at
home, under less cruel conditions than in industrial farming. These expressions
indicate a further relational viewpoint where the connection to – and care for –
other-than-human animals increased and represented a frst step towards recognis-
ing their intrinsic value. However, a reticence towards veganism and plant-based
diets was noted, suggesting that patterns of masculinist entitlement to the ‘oth-
erised’ bodies of other-than-human animals persisted in this instance (cf. Aavik,
in press). A less anthropocentric perspective was held by one participant who
promoted the rights of other-than-human animals as well as plants, after having
claimed that the lack of biodiversity visible in monocultures implicates a kind of
suffering for them. The small-scale (g)local community was, nonetheless, viewed
as a place to challenge alienation and social and ecological exploitation through
elevated engagement in meaningful relations with the environment. The closer
relationality and emotional bond to nature (animals included) were believed to
facilitate caring behaviours as the impacts of one’s actions become increasingly
visible and relatable. It was highlighted that such integrated (g)localised living
would be simpler but also healthier and more fun than the idealised but de-ani-
mated (Global Northern) lifestyles and conditions that are revered today. 
Ultimately, the way in which these men narrated their experiences at Under 
Tallarna, the global ecological crisis and their role in it, positions social and 
environmental justice as ideal. Their narratives indicate that pro-feminist and 
pro-environmental refective groups can be used to strengthen the relational and 
emotional bonds to nature; bonds that facilitate a sense of accountability charac-
terised by a heightened sensibility towards the surroundings that guides a better 
ecological and social impact. We conclude that the education considered here 
took participants some way to what Latour (2014) inferred is a purposeful life in 
the epoch of the (m)Anthropocene, where: 
all agents share the same shape-changing destiny. A destiny that cannot be 
followed, documented, told, and represented by using any of the older traits 
associated with subjectivity or objectivity. Far from trying to ‘reconcile’ or 
‘combine’ nature and society, the task, the crucial political task, is on the 
contrary to distribute agency as far and in as differentiated a way as possible. 
(Latour, 2014, p. 17) 
At least until transformational experiences, such as these workshops, enable us 
to transcend the object/subject relationship. In this particular case study, the par-
ticipants shared a desire to support the rise of such Earth-inclusive approaches to 
lives of action that help reconcile the root causes of social injustices and ecologi-
cal degradation towards truly sustainable (ecologised) thinking. This goes beyond 
(ecomodern) end-of-pipe solutions that temporarily alleviate guilt through 
defection and keep organised and structural change in the space of reform. 




















220 Hedenqvist, Pulé, Vetterfalk, and Hultman
marginalised (eco)systems, groups and beings – that so commonly is encouraged 
by industrial/breadwinner masculinities – and enable the institutional transition 
towards norms and practices in favour of broader, deeper and wider care for our 
glocal commons. 
Conclusion 
The devastating social and ecological crises of the (m)Anthropocene have 
exposed industrial/breadwinner masculinities as heavily infuencing the perpetu-
ation of a world order based on domination over our glocal commons. Western 
masculine socialisations are deeply tied to values and identities aligning with 
industrial modernisation and the extractivist global political economy. There is, 
thus, a vital and urgent need to reconsider the ways that men and masculini-
ties are constructed away from the reifcation of hegemonic patriarchal domina-
tion towards broader, deeper and wider care. Building on ecofeminist insights, 
the conceptualisations of ecological masculinities have emerged as one way to 
facilitate such a transition. One of the pluralised ways in which this concept 
seeks practical change is through an educational material and workshop series 
for male refective groups that has been piloted in Järna, Sweden, which we have 
considered in this chapter. 
Interviews with participants revealed that they experienced personal changes
towards more caring values and behaviours as a result of the workshop series.
Some common themes crystallised as increased outcomes of the education:
interconnectivity, accountability, emotional literacy and embodied knowledge.
The interviewees asserted that they were conscious about issues of gender and
environment even before joining the groups, and that it was one of the reasons
for participating, but that it often felt diffcult to act in line with their aware-
ness. To access suppressed feelings about personal, familial, social and ecologi-
cal crises and listen to other people’s stories in a safe space seem to have had a
positive effect on their emotional and relational capabilities. Several partici-
pants implied achieving a heightened sense of emotional literacy and intercon-
nectivity (how everyone/everything is connected, and constitutive of, nature),
which made it feel good and less of a sacrifce to engage in pro-feminist and
pro-environmental behaviours and act according to their awareness. Hence,
emotional and relational literacies were necessary additions to the knowledge/ 
factual comprehension in promoting empowerment and personal change in the
frst instance and to, in turn, foster challenge to the deep structures of patri-
archy, including a shift from entitlement to care and collective responsibility.
To transcend the rationality of the mind and the emotionality of the body can
be described as developing ‘embodied knowledge’ that facilitates accountable
actions towards more caring ecological and social impacts. While the following
outcomes are not assured, the participants did indicate these personal changes
from the refective group workshop series: increased engagements for gender
equality at home and work; more attentiveness to the lives of human and other-
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physically; made commitments to stop fying; reduced meat and dairy consump-
tion; larger willingness to organise. 
Through the refective groups the process of masculine ecologisation, as con-
structed by these men, reinforced the personalised and structural transitions
towards norms and practices aligning with social and environmental care. In this
sense, what the participants shared in the interviews after they had been part of the
refective groups may offer a glimpse of hope that men’s care can be extended to
glocal environmental issues, they can change, and the gendered aspect of our social
and ecological problems is transformable. The study did have notable limitations.
Specifcally, the education was tested with progressive men who, although clearly
in need of overcoming passive awareness, were already receptive to visions of a
gender-equal and environmentally caring world. In this sense, they represented
a favourably biased test group. Consequently, future research could focus on how
other, less progressive groups of men experience the Men in the Climate Crisis work-
shop series, along with mixed groups, women only and non-binary only groups
as well. Developments in alignment with these recommendations are underway.
Version two of the education material is currently in development. This devel-
opment of the education material in the direction of broader gender inclusivity
will provide fresh opportunities to study the ways that women, genderqueer people
and mixed groups experience this education material and workshop series. This
level of diversifcation offers rich ground for further theoretical and methodologi-
cal testing of the education materials and its effcacy in awakening broader, deeper
and wider care, not only in men, but throughout the masculinities that dwell in
us all. In support of this development, future studies would beneft from pre- and
post-participant interviews, in order to reach beyond the self-perceived changes
of participants, to include codable metrics, and with those, quantitative analyses. 
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Notes 
1 Masculine hegemonisation is used here to indicate the active process of reifying select 
masculinities norms, such as insertion into spaces, being competitive, righteous, vio-
lent and dominant as ways of playing win–lose games with the planet and people. 
2 Ecologisation is used to refer to the process of prioritising a relational approach to the 
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3 Earth is intentionally capitalised as an acknowledgement of the sentience of the 
planet as a single, self-regulating organism, aka. Gaia (Lovelock, 1979). 
4 ‘Education material’ refers to an eight-part workshop process, developed by Hultman 
and Pulé at Chalmers University, with Vetterfalk from the feminist non-proft organi-
sation MÄN: Men for Gender Equality, founded in Sweden in 1993. The version of 
the material discussed here focuses on information and embodiment practices custom-
ised for men’s behaviour and values changes away from violence and towards greater 
care for the Earth, others and the self. 
5 We use ‘industrial/breadwinner masculinities’ close to the concept of breadwinner 
masculinity often used in feminist studies (Stacey, 1990), to supersede the more 
familiar, but older, term ‘hyper-masculinity’ that is defned as the amplifcation of 
traditional expressions of masculinities through physical strength, aggression, sexual 
prowess, military might, domination, being a ‘winner’, and not being a ‘girl’ (Kivel, 
1999; hooks, 2004; Katz, 2006, 2012, 2016; Hultman and Pulé, 2018). We do so to 
emphasise the entangled relationship between male domination and industrialisation, 
and the social and environmental consequences which have proved to be severe. This 
categorisation represents the most obtuse of ‘unmarked’ (i.e. normalised) masculini-
ties, the social and environmental impacts of which are obscured by the systems that 
created and continue to maintain them (Barthes, 1967, p. 77; Reeser, 2010, pp. 8–9; 
MacGregor and Seymour, 2017). 
6 Global emissions are taken here to be the principle anthropocentric effuent of moder-
nity. 
7 Consider that a decade ago, the extractive industry response to a global fnancial crisis 
that resulted in a big drop in the use of coal, gas and oil, and the lowering green-
house emissions was to usher in renewed and accelerated research, development and 
exploitation of natural resources. In the wake of recent economic crises brought on by 
COVID-19, the refex of global regulators has been to prop up international fnancial 
mechanisms as the primary line of defence against severe economic collapse once 
again (Quéré et al., 2020). 
8 Consider the political intonations along with social and ecological implications of 
Donald Trump in the US, Jair Bolsonaro in Brazil, Narendra Modi in India, Viktor 
Orbán in Hungary, Benjamin Netanyahu in Israel, Vladimir Putin in Russia, Recep 
Tayyip Erdoğan in Turkey and more, while these individuals were, or remain, in power 
(Kyle and Gultchin, 2020). 
9 For detailed instructions and methods on the #AfterMeToo conversation guide, see: 
MÄN (2018). 
10 For detailed instructions and methods on the Men in the Climate Crisis conversation 
guide, see: MÄN (2020). 
11 Important inspiration and input has been received from Hultman and Pulé (2018), 
Macy and Johnstone (2012), Swedish ecofeminist Karin Styrén, gendered sustain-
ability researcher Pernilla Hagbert, Transition Network and Earth Rights activist 
Pella Thiel, Transitions journalist Abigail Sykes and climate justice educators Gustaf 
Sörnmo and Frida Ekerlund from the organisation Vardagens Civilkurage (Everyday 
Moral Courage). 
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13 Pathways for inclusive wildfre 
response and adaptation in 
northern Saskatchewan 
Heidi Walker, Maureen G. Reed, 
and Amber J. Fletcher 
Introduction 
Extreme climate-related events are often stimuli for the development of dis-
aster risk reduction and climate change adaptation strategies (IPCC, 2012; 
Wise et al., 2014). Developing these strategies is complex, involving multiple 
actors and institutions across scales and jurisdictions that may have differing 
priorities, objectives and decision-making authorities. While scientifc-techni-
cal approaches that reduce the proximate causes of risk often dominate these 
processes, scholars and practitioners are increasingly recognising the need for 
transformational change to address the structural and systemic causes of risk and 
vulnerability (Nalau and Handmer, 2015; O’Brien et al., 2015; Pelling et al., 
2015; Heikkinen et al., 2018). 
Responding to this need, ‘adaptation pathways’ approaches examine 
whether systemic change is needed and the role of incremental adaptation 
in achieving this; and raising awareness and understanding of the inter-
play between knowledge, values, power and agency to inform responses to 
change, particularly in dynamic, complex and contested contexts. 
(Wise et al., 2014, p. 327) 
Pathways approaches recognise that past responses to hazards shape current and 
future trajectories. Such responses are also imbued with power relations, which 
affect who and what is represented in adaptation processes (Fazey et al., 2016), 
and also how they are represented (Cox et al., 2008). Feminist scholarship on cli-
mate change impacts and adaptation, for example, recognises that institutional 
policies and practices are shaped by power relationships associated with gender, 
class and race (Kaijser and Kronsell, 2014; Ravera et al., 2016). These relation-
ships enable and constrain the availability of certain adaptation pathways and 
result in different outcomes and experiences across social groups. 
In this chapter, we apply insights from literature on adaptation pathways and 
feminist literature on climate change to examine how past responses to a major 
wildfre event in a jurisdictionally complex region of northern Saskatchewan, 
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from interviews with community residents and government representatives, we 
examine how emergency and wildfre management institutions facilitated or con-
strained pathways for adaptation and how these were shaped by dominant knowl-
edges and values. Ultimately, we consider the implications of these predominant 
pathways for diverse social groups and whether a transformation is required for 
building inclusive adaptation processes as communities continue to live with fre 
in the future. 
Adaptation pathways and the role of institutions 
Institutions are an important site for understanding how the development of 
various adaptation pathways are constrained or enabled (Pelling et al., 2015). In 
this chapter, we defne institutions as the ‘“rules of the game” – the rules, norms 
and practices – that structure political, social and economic life’ (Chappell and 
Waylen, 2013, p. 599). Formal institutions include policies, programmes, regula-
tions and authorities which are infuenced by informal institutions such as socio-
cultural norms, values and knowledge systems (Reed et al., 2014). Institutions 
for hazard response and adaptation are shaped by historical processes and power 
relations, resulting in institutional inertia that may constrain policy and practice 
(Burch et al., 2014; Clarke et al., 2016). Furthermore, it is important to criti-
cally examine the informal relations that underpin formal institutional practice 
in order to recognise whether and what fundamental shifts are needed to achieve 
desirable futures (O’Brien, 2012). 
Gender is an institutionalised system of power that, in turn, shapes other insti-
tutions (Chappell and Waylen, 2013). Informal institutions are gendered, and 
these gendered norms and expectations become embedded within formal insti-
tutions for climate change mitigation and adaptation (Ravera et al., 2016). For 
example, the dominant framing of climate change as a technical, scientifc and 
security problem is underpinned by masculine norms, which has meant that solu-
tions have often been relegated to traditionally male-dominated sectors, such as 
public safety and infrastructure (Macgregor, 2010). Accordingly, responses and 
adaptation to climate hazards have centred on strategies to reduce physical expo-
sure and structural damage, which are led by male-dominated professions and 
activities (e.g., engineered solutions, frefghting) (Enarson, 2016). 
Feminist intersectionality theory recognises that gender interacts with other axes
of identity and power, such as race, ethnicity and socio-economic status, to infu-
ence climate change institutions (Kaijser and Kronsell, 2014). Pease (2016) noted
that the masculinised nature of climate change response intersects with Western
rationalist and instrumentalist ideologies, resulting in hierarchical, rule-based pro-
cedures based on external ‘expertise’ (e.g., professional frefghting authorities) over
local knowledges and priorities (Paveglio et al., 2015). As a consequence, the con-
tributions, values and knowledge of people who fall outside the norms of ‘external
experts’, such as women and Indigenous people, are often excluded. 
Gendered and culturally hegemonic wildfre institutions have very real, but 
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and Fairbrother (2013, p. 113) pointed out that wildfre response, policy and 
practice in Australia are typically ‘assumed to have emanated from objective and 
empirical, if not scientifc, bases but this does not take into account the fact that 
emergency management, bushfre response and fre-fghting, remain overwhelm-
ingly male-dominated areas’. They found that where national policy promoted 
the household decision between early evacuation and ‘stay-and-defend’, men 
were far more likely than women to stay-and-defend–largely due to pressure to 
conform to dominant masculine norms and expectations. Early evacuation, by 
contrast, was viewed as a weaker, feminised response. Interestingly, Tyler (2019) 
observed that despite greater fatality rates among men during past wildfre events 
in Australia, the ‘extremely gendered’ nature of wildfre management institutions 
has meant a continued emphasis on masculinised ‘fght’ approaches to wildfre 
preparedness and planning, with less attention on preparedness for early evacu-
ation. The study noted community engagement programmes geared towards 
empowering women to stay-and-defend. However, such programmes are based 
on the assumption that women either lack the knowledge of wildfre preparedness 
or are more amenable than men to behaviour change (Tyler, 2019), highlight-
ing how masculine norms underpin formal institutions, creating an institutional 
‘stickiness’ that reinforces certain development pathways (Mackay et al., 2010). 
Programmes promoting stay-and-defend presume an ideal solution, which is 
based on masculine practices. Importantly, such dynamics are context-specifc. 
For example, in countries like Canada where mandatory evacuation is the pre-
ferred policy response to major wildfre events, gendered institutional dynamics 
likely operate in different ways. 
The adaptation pathways approach identifes key decisions and interventions
over time, along with the informal institutions that underpin these processes, to
understand how various adaptation pathways are enabled or constrained (Pelling
et al., 2015; Fazey et al., 2016; Heikkinen et al., 2018)1 (Table 13.1). Adaptation
pathways are analysed by the extent of change including resistance, incremental
adjustment, or transformation. Resistance is characterised by ‘business-as-usual’
approaches to adaptation, often involving additional investment in existing infra-
structure, social institutions and/or economic fows. Incremental change refers to
marginal shifts in these same areas, which enhances fexibility without causing
major systemic disruption. While there is still signifcant debate in climate change
scholarship about what is meant by transformation, it can be broadly character-
ised as a fundamental change to societal structures and power relations (O’Brien,
2012; Heikkinen et al., 2018). Resistance and incremental adaptation are far more
common than transformational strategies that address underlying social causes of
vulnerability (Wise et al., 2014; Heikkinen et al., 2018). 
Dominant adaptation pathways may be identifed through the priorities for 
addressing risk (as well as the framing of risk), the types of knowledge that are 
centred, and the extent to which existing power relations are maintained or 
challenged (Table 13.1). Resistance is characterised by a reliance on existing 
practices, centralised knowledge and the maintenance of existing power struc-
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Table 13.1 Characteristics of adaptation pathways (based on Nalau and Handmer, 2015; 
Pelling et al., 2015; Heikkinen et al., 2018) 
Resistance Incremental change Transformation 
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expertise and maintenance of existing power structures, though it may include 
some new issues and participatory elements. Transformation is characterised by 
an emphasis on the root causes of risk and vulnerability, highly participatory 
approaches and major changes to existing power structures. The priorities for 
addressing risk, the types of knowledges recognised, and power relations shape, 
and are shaped by, formal and informal institutions for climate change adap-
tation. From the transformational perspective, pathways that reinforce existing 
forms of inequality and marginalisation are increasingly seen as undesirable and 
an indicator of the need for major structural change (e.g. Tschakert et al., 2013; 
O’Brien et al., 2015). Therefore, it is necessary to ‘shed light on and problematise 
norms and underlying assumptions that are naturalised and regarded as common 
sense, but build on and reinforce social categorisations and structures of power, 
not least through institutional practices’ (Kaijser and Kronsell, 2014, p. 428). 
2015’s wildfres in northern Saskatchewan 
In 2015, prolonged dry conditions resulted in a rash of over 700 wildfres across the 
Canadian province’s northern boreal forest region and the largest evacuation the 
province had ever experienced. The La Ronge region of northern Saskatchewan 
was one of the areas most impacted by the 2015 fres; it is also a place particularly 
notable for its jurisdictional complexity. Its population centre is a tri-community 
that includes a town (La Ronge), northern village (Air Ronge) and First Nation 
(Lac La Ronge Indian Band [LLRIB]), with a total population of approximately 
6,000. While the three communities within the population centre are politically 
distinct, they are to some extent socially integrated and share some key services. 
In addition to its main population in the tri-community, the LLRIB also com-
prises fve smaller satellite communities with a total population of over 3,000. 
The community leaders jointly issued a mandatory wildfre evacuation order 
in early July of 2015, spurring residents to evacuate on their own to stay with fam-
ily and friends elsewhere or by bus to urban evacuation centres. Four of the fve 
LLRIB satellite communities were also either partially or fully evacuated, as were 
nearby unincorporated subdivisions and lakeside cabins. Once the evacuation 
was called, in addition to local governments and organisations, provincial and 
federal government departments and agencies, the national police service, the 
Canadian Army, municipal frefghting agencies and non-government organisa-
tions (e.g. the Red Cross) became involved with the evacuation and emergency 
response. Residents spent anywhere between two weeks and one month outside 
of their community. Ultimately, about 100 cabins were destroyed in surrounding 
areas, but the tri-community itself experienced no major physical damage and no 
serious injuries were incurred by either residents or emergency responders. 
Method 
Our research was conducted three years after the fres. The lead author lived 
in the region for 16 months and conducted 44 semi-structured interviews with 
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community members and local government representatives who had experienced, 
or been involved with, the wildfres. The interviewees were identifed through 
established key community contacts, archived media reports and other relevant 
documents (e.g. local emergency plan). Ten interviews were with key local and 
provincial government and agency representatives, including from local govern-
ments (municipal, village), LLRIB government, local and First Nation agencies 
(Fire service, Indigenous social service agency) and provincial government agen-
cies (e.g. wildfre management). These actors represent a unique viewpoint, as 
they were both local residents of the tri-community and key actors in response 
efforts during or after the wildfre event. Interviews focused on the roles, respon-
sibilities and responses of the representatives’ respective organisations during 
and after the wildfre event. The remaining 34 interviews took place with local 
residents from the tri-community and surrounding areas and focused on their 
experiences of the fres. Participants were selected based on stratifcation by loca-
tion (jurisdiction of residence at the time of the fres). We also ensured the par-
ticipation of women, men, Indigenous and non-Indigenous residents. Additional 
demographic characteristics, such as age, income and length of residency were 
collected through a participant checklist following each interview. Interviews 
were transcribed verbatim and coded using a primarily inductive approach 
aided by NVivo 12 qualitative data analysis software. Direct quotes that illus-
trate the fndings indicate the speakers’ gender and community of residence, but 
names and identifying information have been removed to maintain participants’ 
confdentiality. 
Looking to past wildfre responses to learn for future adaptation 
trajectories 
At the local level, adaptation pathways in the La Ronge area appear to be pre-
dominately characterised by resistance and incremental change to infrastruc-
ture and institutions. During and after the wildfre event, the emphasis was on 
the proximate causes of risk and professional and specialised expertise was most 
heavily relied upon. Though some participatory elements and new issues, such 
as impacts to the local business community, were evident, existing institutional 
power relationships have largely remained intact and have resulted in the contin-
ued exclusion of certain voices, knowledges and values. 
Priorities for addressing risk 
The risk priorities for the La Ronge wildfres were characterised by elements of 
resistance and incremental change. The emphasis remained on the proximate 
causes of risk and vulnerability during and after the event, as evidenced by the 
framing of wildfre as an immediate threat and the prioritisation of physical infra-
structure to mitigate future exposure to fre. During the fres, a local Emergency 
Operations Centre committee was convened, which was comprised of local 
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other regional (e.g. the tri-community fre service), provincial (e.g. Wildfre 
Management, Emergency Management & Fire Safety, Transportation, Health, 
Social Services) and federal (e.g. police) jurisdictions. The committee appears to 
have adopted hierarchical structures and a focus on the immediate physical risks 
associated with the fres. In the words of one participant who was involved in the 
emergency operations: 
[Emergency Operation Centre meetings] are wonderful things to watch and 
listen to. People are quickly identifed and everybody gives a brief report, but 
if somebody asks a question and says ‘Can you give me help?’, ‘Okay, you 
two handle that on a sidebar [conversation] when we are done, but let’s get 
through the common briefng’. So, it is well managed and I didn’t feel there 
were obvious gaps. Now that is in terms of the emergency management. 
(male emergency operations representative) 
As the participant continued, it became clearer that emergency management in 
this case was framed primarily as an issue of ensuring the health, safety and wel-
fare of citizens as related to the immediate threat (i.e. the proximate cause of risk) 
of fre within the community: 
There were necessary sidebar conversations about social services support for 
the evacuees, which was a concern of the Lac La Ronge Indian Band that 
could and should be addressed in separate conversations. I think the Chief 
wanted some of that addressed at the big table, but we didn’t need to all be 
there for that. … She has a valid point, but at the briefng I think raise the 
matter, identify who do I get help from and then afterwards get that help. 
My approach to it is much more of a command-and-control – we are here to 
share information and then go do my work. 
From this perspective, social services and community supports are considered 
peripheral to ‘big table’ conversations. 
Since 2015, additional measures have been taken to enhance the prepared-
ness for, and mitigation of, wildfre risk within the tri-community area. When
asked about adaptation measures that had occurred in and around their com-
munities, participants most commonly referred to a signifcant uptick in fuel
management projects. Fuel management is a core component of FireSmart, a
nation-wide programme aiming to balance the ‘natural role [of fre] with the
protection of human life, property and economic values’ (FireSmart Canada,
2020). It involves the thinning or removal of vegetation to mitigate the sever-
ity, intensity and spread rates of fre around communities. Many local residents
and government representatives expressed enthusiasm for the additional fuel
management projects that had been implemented, which is likely, to some
extent, due to its successful application in the nearby unincorporated subdivi-
sion of Wadin Bay. Relatively few homes and cabins were lost in that com-
munity in 2015, which was largely attributed to the three fuel management
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treatments completed as part of its FireSmart planning efforts in the previous
year (Ault et al., 2017). 
But the FireSmart program is great and I think it should do more. 
(woman, Air Ronge) 
they call it FireSmart, you know [LLRIB] actually started cleaning up in the 
trees a bit between the communities, which I think is good. 
(man, LLRIB) 
As discussed later in this chapter, however, FireSmart was not uniformly sup-
ported by community members, some of whom questioned its effects on the land-
scape and associated values. 
The prioritisation of the proximate causes of risk during the fres appeared 
to set the stage for the continued emphasis of these issues in the recovery and 
longer-term adaptation phases following the event, indicating an adaptation 
pathway characterised by resistance. The risk was narrowly defned through a 
professional emergency management discourse and subsequent adaptation efforts 
have been technical in nature. Through a feminist lens, such approaches value 
masculinised realms of expertise while community concerns are problematically 
sidelined (Pease, 2016). However, the increasing scale to which these wildfre 
mitigation initiatives are applied and somewhat expanding opportunities for pub-
lic participation – as discussed in the following section – suggest elements of 
incremental change. 
Knowledge 
Professional and specialised knowledge was prioritised after the wildfre event, 
though as time progressed, there were some additional opportunities for pub-
lic engagement in debriefng and wildfre mitigation efforts. For example, two 
local public engagement sessions occurred shortly after the event, which pro-
vided opportunities for debriefng between local residents and key decision-mak-
ers. These sessions focused primarily on the frontline fre operations, economic 
impacts of the fres and the role of the local business community. The town of La 
Ronge held the frst session, which focused on providing information and answer-
ing questions about how fres had been handled within the community. Experts 
from sectors that played key roles in frontline frefghting efforts were present to 
provide additional information. 
We did a presentation on behalf of [the] mayor and council on what our 
response was and what we did and why we did certain things. There were also 
representatives from the fre department, wildfre management, conservation 
offcers, not in an offcial capacity but there in case there was a question that 
we needed background information. 
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The La Ronge and District Chamber of Commerce – an organisation that advo-
cates for businesses in La Ronge, LLRIB, and Air Ronge – provided a second 
opportunity for resident engagement. The meeting addressed feelings that the 
local business community had been excluded from decision-making throughout 
the fre event, as the following resident indicated: 
One of my beefs is what I would consider businesses that had a role to play were
shut down and kicked out of town. I think that is a huge mistake. I mean the
frst thing you do in a panic situation is try to surround yourself with people who
can contribute and help you out. Kicking out the guy who owns the hardware
store and has the parts, the rental store that rents water pumps – kicking those
people out of town I would say actually hinders your efforts and doesn’t have to. 
(male resident, La Ronge) 
The meeting provided an opportunity for some community residents – in this 
case, local business owners – to express their concerns and provide suggestions 
for enhanced inclusion going forward. To some extent, recognition of these con-
cerns and the need to maintain economic stability throughout a major event 
gained attention within government agencies. 
We have had some in the business community offer their insights. 
(male municipal government representative). 
One of the things we would like to do is involve our local businesses … so 
that they are not handcuffed when an evacuation does happen and they can 
still make a bit of a proft or keep their doors open when they come back to 
the community after the evacuation. 
(male provincial government representative). 
As mentioned in the previous section, when the immediate urgency of the event 
faded and the communities began a return to normal life, action for local wild-
fre preparedness and adaptation predominately involved fuel treatment activi-
ties within the tri-community region. Two local municipal leaders pointed out 
that relatively little action had occurred across local jurisdictions since 2015, 
indicating that the region primarily relied on the knowledge and expertise of the 
provincial wildfre management agency for wildfre planning and development of 
adaptation strategies. 
I don’t think we’ve sat down with the three communities and said this is 
what we’re going to do next time this happens. So, I think that defnitely 
needs to be done. 
(male municipal government representative) 
The main concern is that we are going to wait too long. It is kind of going 
to be like the Shakespearean tragedy where we are going to be sitting there 
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and we are going to be thinking about what we should do rather than actu-
ally taking some action items seriously and by the time the next fre rolls 
through, we don’t have a solid plan. So that is defnitely the number one 
concern that I have. 
(male municipal government representative) 
The strong existing institutional arrangements for FireSmart practice have 
enabled some opportunities for community participation. The FireSmart 
Communities Program, for instance, supports local residents in the develop-
ment of a local FireSmart Board, a community protection plan and community 
FireSmart events (FireSmart Canada, 2020). Before the 2015 fres, the resort sub-
division of Wadin Bay was the only community in the La Ronge region to hold 
FireSmart Community Recognition status. Spurred by the success of the pro-
gramme in Wadin Bay, two other unincorporated subdivisions in the La Ronge 
region have also joined the FireSmart Communities Program since 2015, provid-
ing some opportunity for local participation in wildfre preparedness. 
Power relations 
While some participatory elements were evident, existing power dynamics were 
more or less maintained, resulting in the exclusion of some social groups, expe-
riences and values during and after the event. Differentiated experiences at 
the intersection of location, culture and gender were apparent, as participants 
reported prioritisation of central communities over satellites, marginalisation of 
Indigenous and local knowledge and values and failure to acknowledge women’s 
contributions. 
During the fres, LLRIB was not only concerned about its main population 
centre within the tri-community, but also the four of its fve outlying satellite 
communities that were partially or fully evacuated. Historical inequalities asso-
ciated with colonisation in Canada have resulted in signifcant economic dis-
crepancies between Euro-Canadian and Indigenous populations, especially those 
living on reserves (Wilson and McDonald, 2010), which meant that compared to 
La Ronge and Air Ronge, LLRIB played a larger role in organising transportation 
to evacuation centres and ensuring the welfare of its residents throughout the 
wildfre event. Frustration with the lack of attention to wellbeing – for example, 
‘where 3,000 people went and whether 3,000 people were okay and whether this 
mom who was nine months pregnant was sleeping on the foor’ (female LLRIB 
government representative) – at local emergency operations committee meetings 
was clear. This participant elaborated to say: 
The focus very much became La Ronge. We [LLRIB staff] were having a meet-
ing in the morning with regards to our outlying communities, then we would 
go to [La Ronge] council chambers and have a meeting there with regards 
to an update on the tri-community, and then we would go to [the evacua-
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answer calls. Then there would be another meeting at about 6:00 pm with 
regards to what was happening with the outlying communities. So it got to 
be a lot of meetings, but what happened was that [La Ronge and Air Ronge] 
couldn’t have cared less about what was happening in Grandmother’s Bay, 
Hall Lake, or Stanley Mission – they just wanted to talk about what was 
happening in the tri-community. That is all that mattered to them. … It was 
very interesting to see our tri-community really separate and have different 
opinions on what was important and what wasn’t important. 
The dominant approach to wildfre management may, therefore, have prioritised 
the immediate threat of fre in the areas surrounding the main population cen-
tres, rather than the secondary impacts residents experienced after evacuation, 
which may have been particularly pronounced for many LLRIB residents from 
the satellite communities who relied on evacuation by bus and accommodation 
at large urban evacuation centres. While the prioritisation of response to the 
proximate causes of risk was successful insofar as no serious physical injuries were 
sustained, such models may deny local agency, knowledge and culturally relevant 
mechanisms for dealing with risk (Scharbach and Waldram, 2016). These mod-
els may also lead to the exclusion of certain communities – in this case, smaller 
Indigenous communities located further away from centres of decision-making. 
The public engagement sessions after the event, to some extent, opened up 
new policy directions (e.g. consideration of impacts to the business commu-
nity). However, the retrospective discussions about how the fres were handled 
within the community again revealed an institutional inertia that emphasised 
response to the immediate risk of fre and centring of the male-dominated sec-
tors who responded to this risk (e.g. municipal and wildland frefghting agen-
cies). Contributions such as cooking, cleaning, delivering meals, caring roles, 
rebuilding social fabric and responding to mental and emotional health impacts 
were most often performed by women, but often less recognised than the male-
dominated sectors’ ‘frontline’ responses. For some women, these contributions 
also occurred at the intersection of gendered roles and Cree cultural norms, such 
as for the following woman who volunteered at the LLRIB evacuation hub to 
provide meals for residents and emergency workers: 
[helping in this way] is something I feel is a cultural thing. That would be 
something my grandmother would do – at her cabin and you would see a boat 
coming, [she would] turn the coffee on and get cookies out … Anybody that 
came over had to have coffee or food and for our family that is such a big 
thing, so to me it was just absolutely normal – when you go anywhere and see 
somebody helping you, you do what can what you can to give back to them. 
(woman, LLRIB member) 
As she continued, her frustration at the lack of acknowledgement such contributions
received was clear: ‘not once were [LLRIB and the volunteers] recognised in the
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had engaged in caring work during the fres and noted the lack of attention that their
contributions received in formal engagement and decision-making processes. 
Participant 1: I mean in all fairness, for sure protecting the property and people is 
number one, but we just wanted them to be inclusive of everything. 
(woman, La Ronge) 
Participant 2: but as far as afterwards, the leadership – they all had their own 
experience with the wildfre situation too. For sure it was stressful 
for everybody and they had lots on their plates, but if you have a 
group of people that have stepped up you would think there would 
be some acknowledgement of that and just learning from the expe-
rience because it hadn’t been done before. (woman, La Ronge) 
As an alternative to the more top-down engagement sessions, some community 
members expressed a desire to see more collaborative engagement inclusive of the 
diverse experiences and contributions of community residents. 
I don’t feel we are going to be any better prepared for the next time because 
they are not asking the right questions to the right people … I would have 
liked to see a public consultation from the groups that were here. What 
worked for you? What didn’t work for you? Like a think tank or brainstorm-
ing session … rather being from a fnger-pointing point of view, more of a 
constructive look at it, but there hasn’t been anything like that. 
(woman, LLRIB member) 
We need to identify both strengths during the last event and build on them 
and areas to improve in the future. We need to include dialogue with trap-
pers and traditional people. 
(man, La Ronge) 
Longer-term adaptation initiatives fell within FireSmart’s mandate to protect life, 
property and economic values, indicating a continued emphasis on the proximate 
causes of risk and pathways characterised by resistance and incremental change. 
Many of the fuel management projects completed in and around the tri-commu-
nity have not fallen under the FireSmart Communities Program, which means 
that project development and completion were led by the provincial wildfre 
management agency with input and approval by community leadership. Shortly 
after a fuel treatment was implemented near her neighbourhood, one resident 
shared the grief she felt through the loss of place where she frequently went to 
collect medicinal plants, lead land-based education programmes for children and 
spend time with family and friends. She especially lamented the lack of engage-
ment with local residents prior to completion of the fuel management project. 
We have these spaces within our community that are like stepping off grid 
and into an untouched piece of paradise. I spend much of my time exploring 
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these places and sharing this love of the boreal with my family and with 
families in my community. The threat of forest fres has always been a part of 
my life here in La Ronge and four years ago the threat caused us to evacuate 
our home and leave most of what we had behind. The important things were 
with me though, the irreplaceable family members. Since the fres, I have 
seen our tree population around town dwindle as we become a ‘fre smart’ 
community. This has involved the thinning of trees in places that surround 
residential areas and will supposedly slow the spread of fre as it will have less 
fuel. This past winter, an area by my house that I frequent daily fell victim 
to this practice. … The heart-breaking part about it is that there was no 
consultation or warning before the trees were taken. The land was stripped 
of diversity, left defenceless against the winds, and all in the name of saving 
‘things’. 
(woman, Air Ronge) 
Another resident expressed concern that a singular reliance on fuel treatments 
has eclipsed other approaches for building adaptive capacity, such as proactive 
emergency preparedness and planning. 
I am worried about people taking fre protection to the extreme now. I think 
we need an emergency plan and an emergency response and an understand-
ing that this is climate change and this is what we have to come to face, but 
not to battle it [by] clear cutting the whole area. 
(woman, unincorporated subdivision). 
These concerns challenge an underlying assumption that the protection of physi-
cal structures and economic assets are the principal – or only – values residents 
wish to maintain. It also indicates that the prioritisation of these issues may 
exclude the diverse social groups and the non-material values they hold for areas 
immediately adjacent to their communities. One participant explicitly cited the 
need to bridge diverse knowledges and experiences as wildfre preparedness and 
adaptation progresses: 
It is not to go back 50 years to live like we did, but there are things that were 
done for a reason and that wisdom I think can be brought, but we have sort 
of let too much of that go. … computers and hard evidence-based scientifc 
knowledge are not everything. It is wonderful – I am not saying that we 
shouldn’t have those kinds of statistics and that kind of work, we need that 
also – but we need more common sense and what worked in the past and let’s 
carry that forward. 
(woman, unincorporated subdivision) 
This sentiment, along with other noted examples, indicates that there is an 
apparent appetite for more transformative change to include a broader range of 
voices and issues. 
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Discussion 
That adaptation pathways were characterised by resistance and incremental 
change is not overly surprising, as major wildfres are commonly framed as tech-
nical problems and approached with technical solutions and sectoral expertise 
(Bosomworth, 2015; Nalau and Handmer, 2015). A feminist institutional lens 
indicates that this framing itself is gendered and, although historically male-dom-
inated sectors may have formal rules that include diverse groups, masculinised 
norms can shape the development of institutions and sectors to the disadvan-
tage of women and other non-conforming groups (Kronsell, 2016). The result-
ing norms, then, give rise to institutional inertia that is ‘reinforced over time 
and often come to be deeply embedded in organisations and dominant modes of 
political action and understanding’ (Pierson, 2004, p. 11). 
The emphasis on the proximate causes of risk proved highly effective for pre-
venting fatalities during the 2015 fre season, but institutional inertia resulted in 
a continued singular emphasis on proximate risks over the longer term. Although 
some opportunities for public participation emerged, focus remained ‘on creat-
ing solutions within domains dominated by men’ (Cox et al., 2008, p. 477). In 
this case, these solutions arose from and supported wildfre management agencies 
and local business. This also meant that the active contributions made by groups 
outside of ‘frontline’ work, such as caring roles often performed by women due 
to gendered expectations and socialisation, were largely excluded from public 
discussion and debriefng following the fres. 
Our data also revealed the intersectional nature of power embedded within 
institutional practice for wildfre response and adaptation. The primary empha-
sis on reducing physical harm through the rapid removal of residents from their 
communities was reminiscent of Scharbach and Waldram’s (2016, p. 66) obser-
vation that wildfre risk and response in Saskatchewan is based on a Western 
model of risk, ‘conceptualised synchronically in response to acute challenges 
(i.e., an impending, immediate threat); once out of harm’s way, risk is no longer 
the operative factor for dealing with evacuees’. How histories of colonisation 
contributed to different responsibilities across local jurisdictions, and how 
impacts and losses were experienced in diverse ways by women, men, youth and 
Elders after removal from their communities, were either absent or considered 
peripheral to local emergency management discussions. Women’s contributions 
to wildfre response often went unrecognised while longer-term adaptations have 
neglected broader systems of meaning and knowledge associated with the land-
scape. Intersectionality, therefore, shaped not only the material impacts of the 
wildfre, but also the dominant discourse shaping wildfre response and adapta-
tion (Moosa and Tuana, 2014). 
Many of the impacts and losses experienced due to environmental change and 
hazard events are nonmaterial and nonquantifable, such as those to mental and 
emotional health, self-determination and infuence and sense of place (Turner 
et al., 2008; Tschakert et al., 2019). In a previous analysis, we found that these 
nonmaterial impacts and losses in La Ronge were experienced differently across 
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intersections of location, gender, ethnicity, age, and access to fnancial resources 
and infuenced by broader structures such as gendered norms and expectations 
and histories of colonisation (Walker et al., 2020). However, diverse experiences 
remained largely invisible in formal debriefng and decision-making processes, 
such as in the public engagement sessions following the fres. 
Power dynamics have consequences for which and whose experiences, knowl-
edges and values were included or excluded as communities prepare for fre in 
the future. Longer-term adaptation efforts (e.g., FireSmart) integrate some level 
of community participation. Globally, such programmes have played a role in 
enhancing fre preparedness and, in some circumstances, have also contributed 
to social cohesion, self-effcacy and resilience (Haynes et al., 2020). However, 
fre management is conceptualised by this programme primarily through a phys-
ical-infrastructural lens, which may not necessarily account for local ecological 
knowledge and values attached to the natural environment (Bosomworth, 2018). 
Fuel management projects are located in close proximity to La Ronge tri-com-
munity neighbourhoods – often the most accessible natural spaces for residents, 
which may be used and valued in diverse ways by different social groups within 
the community. Reliance on FireSmart as the sole means of engagement limits 
the kinds of considerations that are accounted for in future planning for wildfres 
or long-term adaptation measures that communities might adopt. If adaptation 
initiatives only respond to risks to physical and economic assets and are imple-
mented primarily by external agencies, the nonmaterial values that diverse social 
groups hold for the natural areas immediately adjacent to their communities, 
which contribute to individual and community health, wellbeing, and resilience, 
may also continue to be impacted. Where local knowledges and values are not 
recognised, mistrust toward external agencies may also impede future response 
efforts (Paveglio et al., 2015). 
While no evidence of transformative change was evident in the La Ronge 
study, residents’ cited need for more inclusive planning, including the bridging of 
local, traditional and external knowledge indicated a desire for transformation. 
Findings that demonstrated the exclusion of certain values and experiences also 
indicate a need for transformation – ‘fundamental shifts in power and representa-
tion of interests and values’ (Pelling, 2011, p. 84). Implementing both incremen-
tal and transformative forms of adaption is one way forward, though attention 
is needed to how these may constrain one another (Wise et al., 2014; Hadarits 
et al., 2017). It may also be necessary to examine equity in power relations by 
‘questioning and challenging fxed beliefs, values, stereotypes, identities and 
assumptions especially about who is able to participate in adaptation planning, 
whose knowledge counts and who suffers the consequences of specifc choices’ 
(Ajibade and Adams, 2019, p. 856). As described in the results, this includes 
explicit attention to how informal institutions, including gendered and western 
norms and power relations, intersect to shape institutional policy and practice for 
emergency and wildlife management (Waylen, 2014). 
Transformation requires more than just greater participation in existing insti-
tutions (Haynes, Bird and Whittaker, 2020). Rather, it necessitates changes to 
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participation itself, including highly participatory visioning and decision-mak-
ing that a) centres local knowledges, values and experiences, especially those 
that exist at the intersections of multiple forms of oppression, and b) takes a 
learning-oriented approach. First, centring local knowledges and experiences can 
make institutionalised forms of inequality visible, and can even transform them 
(Jacobs, 2019). Historically marginalised groups, such as Indigenous women, are 
also actively responding to the effects of climate change and hazards in their 
communities, as was evident in the La Ronge study. Prioritising these forms of 
leadership in environmental decision-making can also help to rebalance power 
relations that are steeped in the legacies of colonisation (Whyte, 2014; Dhillon, 
2020). 
Second, chasms may exist between the ‘expert’ knowledge of disaster risk 
reduction and the local knowledge and embodied experiences of altered local 
spaces, raising the need for strategies that foster learning and knowledge co-pro-
duction (Tschakert et al., 2016). Both individual and social learning are neces-
sary for effective adaptation processes and can be facilitated through collaborative 
planning that fosters multi-directional knowledge transfer, critical refection and 
collective dialogue (Armitage et al., 2011; Tschakert et al., 2013). Even highly 
participatory processes, however, do not necessarily result in transformative out-
comes as they are not immune to intra- and inter-group power dynamics or the 
tendency to focus on technical/infrastructural solutions, which may reproduce 
existing forms of inequality and vulnerability (Godfrey-Wood and Naess, 2016; 
Tschakert et al., 2016). Explicitly integrating consideration of structural inequal-
ities into dialogue and refection processes and employing methodological inno-
vations that draw on embodied and affective experiences may help address these 
challenges (Tschakert et al., 2016). 
Conclusion 
Past responses to wildfre in the La Ronge region have focused on the proximate 
causes of risk and the actors and specialised knowledges that respond to those 
risks. Some limited opportunities for public engagement expanded the range of 
issues considered (e.g. to include economic impacts on the local business com-
munity). However, the authoritative emphasis on proximate causes of risk, physi-
cal and economic impacts and professional knowledge indicated that adaptation 
trajectories continue to be characterised by resistance and incremental change. 
While highly effective for basic harm reduction, this emphasis has constrained 
transformation during recovery and longer-term planning, thus missing opportu-
nities to address root causes of risk and vulnerability. The pathways characterised 
by resistance and incremental change have been constructed with Western and 
masculine norms, resulting in the exclusion of certain voices, knowledge and 
experiences. These include the contributions of women – especially Indigenous 
women – to the emergency response efforts and the nonmaterial impacts of wild-
fre and evacuation that are experienced in diverse ways across intersections of 
gender, ethnicity, socio-economic class and age. 
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Lack of transformation at the local level to date does not necessarily mean that 
it is not occurring at other societal scales or over longer time periods (Heikkinen 
et al., 2018). Indeed, a short-term study undertaken three years after an event 
may be insuffcient to track transformative change. However, current approaches 
that continue to exclude certain voices, knowledges, and experiences, and which 
reinforce existing forms of inequality, indicate the need for more immediate 
transformative approaches to inform inclusive adaptation processes at the local 
scale. Such approaches include the development of highly participatory decision-
making processes that are learning-oriented and centre local knowledges, values 
and experiences. The establishment of participatory processes in the quiescent 
times between major events can both contribute to more inclusive and trans-
formative adaptation and inform improved immediate response to future wildfre 
events. 
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14 Moving forward: Making equality, 
equity, and social justice central 
Gunnhildur Lily Magnusdottir and Annica 
Kronsell 
Fortunately, the climate crisis is increasingly recognised across the world. 
Associated with this recognition is a crisis discourse. While crises may encour-
age action, the crisis discourse also conveys a message that all individuals are 
implicated in the crises on equal terms and in equal ways. This is not the case. 
Paraphrasing Cynthia Enloe1 (see also Chapter 3, this volume): 
we are not all in this together. We’re on the same rough seas, but we’re 
in very different boats. And some of those boats are very leaky. And some 
of those boats were never given oars. And some of those boats have high-
powered motors on them. We are not all in the same boat. 
Enloe calls attention to the danger of a world where patriarchal and anthropocen-
tric norms dominate and social differences are overlooked. This book highlighted 
those issues, and the relation between gender and social justice issues and climate 
issues, in particular, by concentrating on how institutions and policy-makers who 
are compelled to deal with climate issues can connect this activity with a sensi-
tivity to social differences. Climate institutions are signifcant – we have argued 
– as they are responsible for steering toward climate objectives through strategies, 
incentives, guidelines, policies, roadmaps, and other actions that aim to mitigate 
as well as adapt to climate change. Furthermore, climate institutions enact power 
and affect power relations by promoting certain norms and values through poli-
cies and by distributing resources and, in turn, engaging specifc actors. 
This book explored if and how climate institutions in industrialised states rec-
ognise and understand the relevance of gender and other social differences in 
their climate policy-making. In democracies, they have an obligation to do so. 
We fnd that they do, but mostly from a very narrow understanding of gender. We 
have argued that equality, equity, and social justice are so central to climate miti-
gation and adaptation, that they should be key considerations in climate policies 
and actions, not only for democratic and justice reasons but also for substan-
tive reasons. Not least on the occasions when gender, social justice, and climate 
objectives can be mutually supportive, such as if women’s transport and waste 
management behaviour becomes normative it could also lead to reduced emis-
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such as in hegemonic masculine areas – for example, in the construction sector 
(Chapters 9 and 10, this volume), responses to natural disasters (Chapter 13, this 
volume), and in shaping opinions on climate change, masculinity, and care for 
Earth (Chapter 12, this volume). 
Path dependence, ‘sticky’ institutions and eco-technological 
framing 
We departed from a feminist institutional framework to locate the main institu-
tional challenges and barriers to further inclusion of climate-relevant social fac-
tors and, in particular, gender in climate policy-making, and applied the concepts 
of path dependence and ‘stickiness’, which lays out the course of action of climate 
institutions and limits the scope of policy-makers and other actors for innovation 
and new paths in climate policy-making. 
We identifed path dependence in most chapters. Ecological modernisation 
emerged as a path dependence that is structuring climate institutions in indus-
trialised states and can be said to have substantial power of the climate agenda 
in general. Ecological modernisation centres around the idea that climate issues 
can be resolved in tandem and harmoniously with continued economic growth, 
and increase wealth and prosperity, as the market adjusts resource and energy 
use through prize mechanisms and from a continuum of innovations. This is not 
explicitly or discussed at length in any of the chapters, but rather forms a type of 
normal condition. This powerful normality informs and structures climate policy-
making so that it will privilege effciency arguments and technical knowledge 
over other types of knowledge that could help address social issues. 
Second, patterns of path dependence can be traced in climate policy-making at
all levels, from intergovernmental actors such as the UN and EU to local authori-
ties and actors. At the UN level, efforts toward social inclusivity are hampered by
path dependencies related to the characteristic of the international legal system
(Chapter 2, this volume). In particular, state sovereignty means there is limited
enforcement capacity when it is based on state consent, thus, even when interna-
tional institutions such as the UNFCCC have established rules on gender they are
politically constrained in getting states to follow through, even on the commitments
that they have agreed to. At the EU level, climate change path dependence con-
cerned the topic of climate change and its framing as a developmental issue which
later became tinged by foreign and security concern leading to a prioritisation over-
riding gender concerns. On the other hand, the fact that in the EU gender equality
is a fundamental value, formal commitments to gender equality and gender main-
streaming which has mainly been related to the labour market, can possibly come
into play in cases where climate change is framed as a problem in internal policies
(EU green deal). So far, ‘efforts to address gender inequality and efforts to address
climate change continue to run in parallel rather than being integrated into each
other’ due to institutional stickiness and path dependence (Chapter 3, this volume). 
Second, climate policy is a very broad feld of action, and climate institutions
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volume) and Sweden (Chapters 5 and 6) may very well develop ways to integrate
equality and equity issues, but whether they will be realised, or not, is constrained
by priorities and previous choices in other ministries and other sectors, like con-
struction, transport, and energy (Chapters 7, 9, 10, and 11). The focus tends to be
on economic interests and technical solutions in line with the dominant norms of
ecological modernisation (Chapter 12), when what is likely needed is more focus
on public interest and welfare. This means that research on climate change, in
general and within sectors, has not advanced the studies of social effects and impli-
cations. As argued, there is a huge gap in knowledge among policy-makers. 
Third, a barrier found in many of the institutions and sectors, as highlighted 
in the book, is a hegemonic masculine environment which results in the imbal-
anced representation of men and women – and sometimes also limited recogni-
tion of marginalised social groups. This barrier is not only found in formal climate 
institutions such as in Swedish, Danish, and German ministries (Chapters 4, 5, 
and 7), but also in different sectors, such as the transport sector, European waste 
management (Chapter 8), and in European and North-American construction 
(Chapters 9 and 10). There are a number of tools available for climate policy-
makers, such as gender mainstreaming, but the low representation of women and 
marginalised groups makes gender mainstreaming and intersectionality appear 
less appropriate and might make policy-makers insensitive to climate-relevant 
differences in behaviour as, for example, transport patterns (Chapter 11) and 
responses to and effects of climate change, such as severe wildfres in Canada, on 
different social groups (Chapter 13). Imbalanced representation and limited rec-
ognition of intersectional social factors, relevant to climate change, do not only 
risk making climate strategies less effective, when targeting the general popula-
tion but can also be seen as a signal of democratic defcit and limited environ-
mental and even economic justice in climate politics. 
Fourth, civil servants who work in formal climate institutions and often fnd 
themselves in path dependent institutional environments, characterised by eco-
modernisation and limited intersectional understanding are faced with demo-
cratic challenges. Those civil servants are limited by the legal framework of the 
work within (Chapter 2, this volume), the administrative context and logic and 
the mandate they have from their governments. They are often aware that in 
order to maintain validity and credibility in policy-making, their actions and 
ideas have to ft within a given framework that is deemed legitimate by both the 
public and politicians (Chapters 4, 5, 6, and 7). 
Finally, climate change action is set in a frame of time urgency. There is an 
urgent need to reduce carbon emissions even by the set dates of 2030 and 2050, 
which puts stress on the policy-makers to fnd ways to enact this. At the same 
time, social transformation takes time and as Alber et al. (Chapter 4, this vol-
ume) state; ‘climate protection specialists in the ministry are chronically over-
loaded’. Hence, even if they are willing and able to work with gender it cannot 
take too much time, and a genuine intersectional approach would make it even 
more time-consuming. Such approaches require that gender and intersectional 
research are taken into account and that developed policies are monitored and 
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evaluated. A very important issue, then, is how is this doable within the stressful 
timeframe of climate policy-making today? Is it possible to move this quickly? Is 
it even desirable, or are stressed and overworked policy-makers more likely to 
follow a path-dependent logic of appropriateness and stick to familiar strategies 
in their policy-making, which might favour certain social groups, and knowledge. 
Potentials and suggestions for advancing equality and social 
justice 
Moving on to the opportunities to advance equality and social justice issues in 
climate policy-making, we revisit the following question: 
What and where are the main opportunities to advance gender equality, equity, 
and social justice within climate institutions? 
Issues relating to social inclusion and climate change do surface in climate insti-
tutions in industrial states, but they tend to run in parallel with limited coordina-
tion between them. These issues must be addressed in cross-cutting ways at many 
levels, in terms of formal policy-making in climate institutions at different levels, 
cooperating on a global level with the UN at the forefront, to local initiatives at 
the municipal level. Furthermore, a just and socially sustainable climate policy-
making requires further coordination between different policies and sectors vital 
to climate mitigation and adaptation, and a common understanding of the inter-
sectional nature of climate change and its effects. 
Apart from cross-cutting cooperation, coordination, and a common under-
standing, gender experts, femocrats, and other civil servants – with a profound 
understanding and knowledge of social justice issues – who might perceive them-
selves as inside-activists, are important. Their leeway for innovation is, however, 
limited due to the aforementioned institutional barriers, but existing formal legal 
frameworks on gender and social inclusion are crucial building blocks for pursu-
ing equality and equity in institutions. 
The strategy of gender mainstreaming is, for example, of importance when 
discussing formal remedies, but it has to date often merely been a limited addi-
tion to existing policies. Gender mainstreaming still has the potential to advance 
socially just climate policies since it is a dynamic tool which can be broadened to 
include both new gender perspectives, as well as knowledge of other intersecting 
social factors, in everyday policy-making. However, none of these potentials and 
suggested approaches are suffcient on their own and what is being called for is a 
new thinking and a transformative and sustainable way of integrating gender and 
intersectionality with all climate policy-making initiatives, which challenges the 
current path dependencies of the institutions in which climate action is enabled. 
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